Afghan Journal

from Tales from the Trail:

McChrystal gets to keep his 4 stars

General Stanley McChrystal will go out with all the benefits of a four-star general, even though he hasn't been in the position long enough to retire with that rank.

McChrystal was fired last week as the top U.S. commander  in Afghanistan. President Obama relieved McChrystal of his command after the general and his aides were quoted in a "Rolling Stone" article disparaging the president, vice president and top White House advisers involved in the war effort.

On Monday, McChrystal informed his bosses at the Pentagon that he is retiring from active duty. But whether he'd get to keep his 4 stars -- and get the retirement benefits that come with them -- was an open question. McChrystal has been a four-star general for only about a year -- half the time normally necessary to qualify for a four-star general's retirement income.

As commander in chief, it's Obama call.

"The president believes -- and has talked with Secretary Gates about this -- and we will do whatever is necessary to ensure that he, somebody who has served the country as ably as he has, can retire at a four-star level," White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs said.

Click here for more Reuters political news

Photo Credit: REUTERS/Massoud Hossaini/Pool (Gen. McChrystal aboard a helicopter leaving Kandahar city June 13, 2010)

from The Great Debate:

In Afghanistan, history rhymes

The faltering war in Afghanistan brings to mind a famous quote attributed to Mark Twain and a less famous one by Robert Gates, the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Twain: "History does not repeat itself but it rhymes." Gates: "Tough decisions: … how to get out, when, and without losing face."

The Gates quote, in his 1996 memoir (From the Shadows), refers to the Soviet leadership which by the mid-1980s had decided to end its disastrous occupation of Afghanistan but had not figured out exactly how to do that.

The last Russian soldier left Afghanistan in February 1989, at the end of an exit strategy which began with a sharp increase in the number of troops and centered on building up government forces to fight an insurgency rapidly gathering momentum.

Sound familiar? Since taking office, President Barack Obama has ordered an additional 51,000 troops into Afghanistan "to provide the time and the space for the Afghan government to build up its security capacity, to clear and hold population centers that are critical, to drive back the Taliban to break their momentum."

Next, a transition phase, beginning in July 2011, "in which the Afghan government is taking more and more responsibility for its own security."

That rhymes with the way then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev extricated his country from Afghanistan. Not long after taking power in 1985, he ordered the deployment of thousands of additional troops and told his generals they had a year to crush the U.S.-backed opposition. Failing that, they would have to pull out. They did, after four years, not one.

By the end of this year, the length of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan will exceed that of the Soviet Union. U.S. and NATO troops already outnumber the 115,000 soldiers Moscow deployed at the height of the Soviet involvement. By the end of summer, 105,000 U.S. troops will be in place, plus around 40,000 NATO soldiers.

A view from the machine gun

By Michael Georgy

An American Lieutenant was doing his best to reassure villagers in the Afghan heartland Taliban Province that U.S. soldiers would protect them from the Taliban, after a roadside bomb killed a father and son who were driving home on a motorcycle. On patrol he asked several people whether they felt safe, and said they should not hesitate to contact the Americans, located a few hundred metres away in their camp.

When night fell, the officer sat down with a group of Afghan men at a tiny shop. Under the light of a kerosene  lamp he again tried to reassure them the United States was here to protect Afghans.

Lots of questions were asked on a range of issues from security to employment. For instance, what job opportunities were available?

But for me, the request that leapt out involved cultural sensitivities — and there are many in Afghanistan.

The men complained that soldiers manning machine guns on top of vehicles had a view of Afghan women in their homes. Something had to be done, they said.

The exchange underscored the complexities of fighting in Afghanistan, and vast cultural differences between Afghans and NATO troops, who have been fighting the Taliban for nine years.

from Pakistan: Now or Never?:

Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan: finding the devil in the detail

In the increasingly frenetic debate about what to do about Afghanistan, Antonio Giustozzi has a must-read report on prospects for negotiating with the Taliban. In particular, he offers a rare window into Pakistan's often opaque policy towards Afghanistan by providing the context within which Pakistan might be able to bring the Taliban into a political settlement .

Giustozzi presents a far more nuanced picture than the one commonly assumed, describing significant overlaps between various militant groups - the Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP),  the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Muhammad Omar,  the Haqqani network and the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, with only the latter seen as an independent entity.  (These overlaps are crucial to establishing whether Afghan insurgents could be weakened through a policy of "divide and rule" or whether any negotiations on a settlement would need to involve the Taliban movement, and its leadership, as a whole.) 

"The different networks that comprise the Taliban have somewhat different ideological leanings and allegiances, with some groups being more radical than others, or closer to the Pakistani armed forces and intelligence services, or again closer to trans-national jihadist networks such as al Qaeda," he says.  While the Haqqani network had close ties with the Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, "this closeness is not appreciated by most other Taliban networks, who are either hostile to the Pakistani authorities ... or at the very least are unwilling to be controlled by the Pakistanis.

"In turn, the Haqqani network in particular has been trying to contain the antagonistic attitude of some of the more radical Pakistani Taliban leaders such as Baitullah Mehsud (who was killed last year) and his successors toward the Pakistani armed forces; Mullah Omar himself has made efforts to rein them in, although not as proactively."

But it would be wrong, Giustozzi argues, to assume these different ideological leanings suggested the Taliban movement was fragmented; rather among the different militant groups, only the Hizb-e-Islami could be described as organisationally distinguished. And while there had been some tension between the Haqqani group and Mullah Omar, there was no formal split. Nor indeed was there any evidence that an expansion of operations by the Haqqani group in Afghanistan had created tensions with fighters loyal to Mullah Omar. "This is clearly not the reaction one would expect if the Haqqani network was seen by the Taliban leadership in Quetta as a separate, competing organisation."

The Haqqani network is believed to be based in North Waziristan, a stronghold of the TTP, or Pakistani Taliban. Unlike the TTP, blamed for a string of bomb attacks inside Pakistan, the Haqqani network has focused exclusively on fighting in Afghanistan.  Pakistan has resisted U.S. pressure to launch a military operation against militants in North Waziristan, saying it must first consolidate gains made elsewhere in its tribal areas. According to some media reports, including this one in Dawn newspaper, it has also offered to help broker a rapprochement between the Haqqani group and the government in Kabul.  The implication of Giustozzi's assessment, however, would suggest the Haqqani group would follow Mullah Omar's lead in any negotiations, or at the very least move in tandem.

Giustozzi also highlights the ambivalence towards Pakistan of the Afghan Taliban.  "The Taliban relationship with Pakistan also is difficult to define with precision, despite being undeniable. The Pakistani army clearly sees the Taliban as a useful tool for its geopolitical ambitions in Afghanistan, but among the Taliban, the Pakistani patron is far from being popular. Apart from Haqqani and his network (always the closest to the Pakistanis), the other networks more tolerate Pakistani influence than appreciate it."

Afghanistan’s $2 bln gravy train

The United States cannot win a fight for hearts and minds if it outsources critical missions to unaccountable contractors, U.S. President Barack Obama said during a speech he made as a senator back in 2007.  It hasn’t changed much in Afghanistan since then as a U.S. Congressional investigation into a $2.16 billion supply chain that provides  soldiers everything from muffins to mine-resistant vehicles shows.

Security for the supply chain running through remote and hostile terrain has been outsourced to contractors, “an arrangement that has fuelled a vast protection racket run by a shadowy network of  warlords, strongmen, commanders, corrupt Afghan officials, and perhaps others,” according to John F.Tierney, chairman of the subcommittee on National Security And Foreign Affairs.

Here’s a PDFof the report.  It makes for sobering reading.  The scale of the operation is indeed immense, and you can get a glimpse of it if you drove from Kabul to the military base in Bagram.   Container  depots stretch into the arid fields while a long line of brightly decorated trucks jam the entrance to the sprawling military base.

The principal contract supporting the U.S. supply chain in Afghanistan is called Host Nation Trucking, a $2.16 billion contract split among eight Afghan, American, and Middle Eastern companies. Although there are other supply chain contracts, the HNT contract provides trucking for over 70 percent of the total goods and material distributed to U.S. troops in the field, roughly 6,000 to 8,000 truck missions per month. Most of the prime contractors and their trucking subcontractors hire local Afghan security providers for armed protection of the trucking convoys. A typical convoy of 300 supply trucks going from Kabul to Kandahar, for example, will travel with 400 to 500 guards in dozens of trucks armed with heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

The logic behind outsourcing the security of the supply chain is to leave troops free to focus on counter-insurgency. During the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989), by contrast, its army devoted a substantial portion of its total force structure to defending its supply chain.  But this reliance on outsiders has spawned an extraordinary cast of characters and may well be undermining U.S. goals, the report says.

Take for example Commander Ruhullah, the prototype of a new class of warlord in Afghanistan.  Before September 11, 2001, he was relatively unknown in the country.Today, he is the single largest security provider for the U.S. supply chain in Afghanistan, operating along Highway 1, the main transportation artery between Kabul and Kandahar, the congressional report said. Because most U.S. supplies are shipped through Pakistan to Bagram, north of Kabul, while most U.S. troops are surging into Kandahar, in the south, Highway 1 is the critical route for the supply chain within Afghanistan.

Ruhullah commands a small army of over 600 armed guards, the congressional report said.  His men engage in regular combat with insurgent forces. He claims extraordinary casualty figures on both sides (450 of his own men killed in the last year and many more Taliban dead). He readily admits to bribing governors, police chiefs, and army generals. Over a cup of tea in Dubai, he complained to the Subcommittee staff about the high cost of ammunition in Afghanistan -– he says he spends $1.5 million per month on rounds for an arsenal that includes AK-47s, heavy machine guns, and RPGs.51 Villagers along the road refer to him as “the Butcher.”

Afghan mining roadshow opens; temptation, trepidation for India, China

Afghan authorities have organised a roadshow in London that opens on Friday aimed at drumming up interest in the country’s mineral wealth variously estimated at anything from $1 trillion to $3 trillion.

India and China, the regional heavyweights, are the top candidates to fight for a piece of the action in their immediate neighbourhood. If there are such large reserves of copper, iron ore and key industrial metals such as lithium lying untapped in their neighbourhood you would expect them to invest heavily in Afghanistan to feed their supercharged economies.

But they are not rushing in yet with pick axes and shovels, and for the same reasons that deter Western investors. The security and logistical challenges of extracting the minerals and bringing them to the global market remain daunting.

Here’s an analysis on a gold rush that may be a long time coming.

from Tales from the Trail:

Obama delivers checkmate by moving generals

President Barack Obama managed to pull the rabbit out of the hat.

In a surprise move, he chose superstar General David Petraeus to replace General Stanley McChrystal, whose team had badmouthed just about every top civilian adviser to Obama on Afghanistan in a Rolling Stone magazine article.

And with that one decision he managed to wipe away any impression that as commander-in-chief he would allow insubordination, and he preempted any criticism that he would allow the war in Afghanistan to be without competent leadership for reasons of politics and vanity.

It was by far the smartest move, and no one predicted it. That may have something to do with the fact that if the military was a corporation, Petraeus would essentially be taking a demotion -- he is currently head of Central Command which oversees the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and will now be in charge of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

Bill Harlow, a former CIA spokesman who has also worked at the White House and is a retired Navy captain, points out that both are 4-star positions and for a warfighter the most meaningful job is the one in Afghanistan.

"That being said -- it was quite a concession on the part of Petraeus to take it.  I presume it was one of those things where if your commander-in-chief says he needs you, you cannot say no," Harlow tells me. "Very smart move on the part of Obama -- instantly changed the subject from McChrystal to Petraeus -- and eliminates a line of reasoning that by axing McChrystal he is somehow harming the war effort."

Obama basically managed to silence critics who were ready to pounce on whatever decision he made on McChrystal. Even Republicans on Capitol Hill, who basically try to block anything Obama wants, are on board with his choice of Petraeus.

from Tales from the Trail:

General headed to the woodshed, will he get the axe?

The sound of palms slapping foreheads could be heard all over Washington, the physical exclamation of "what were they thinking?"

The spectacularly frank quotes from General Stanley McChrystal and his aides mocking Vice President Joe Biden and other top advisers to the president and commander-in-chief were jaw-dropping, not because that's what they really thought, but because the views were uttered to a reporter working on a profile for Rolling Stone magazine.

Right from the first headline of the article titled "The Runaway General" it was apparent what was to come: "Stanley McChrystal, Obama's top commander in Afghanistan, has seized control of the war by never taking his eye off the real enemy: The wimps in the White House."

It's one thing to talk truth to power -- considered an admirable trait in military and intelligence circles -- and quite another to make fun of  top civilian leadership behind their backs in a very public forum.

So the general has been summoned to Washington from the battlefields of Afghanistan to explain this serious breach in chain-of-command etiquette. And it doesn't look like it's going to be a warm welcome.

UPDATE: President Barack Obama after a cabinet meeting said he had not decided what action he will take. "I think it is clear that the article in which he and his team appear showed poor judgment ... but I also want to make sure I talk to him directly before I make any final decision."

Earlier, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said Obama was angry when he read the article and that "all options are on the table" when it comes to the general's future.

The changing face of war in Afghanistan

I was embedded with Western troops a few days ago. Beforehand I was warned of austere living conditions at the combat outpost. I thought about the agony — since I suffer from technophobia — of filing stories through a satellite phone in the scorching heat.

As I rolled out my sleeping bag I noticed all the soldiers had mosquito nets over theirs. Actually, they were there to keep camel spiders and scorpions away. It was remote as can be. Grape fields, mountains and villages with mud brick huts with, probably, no electricity.

What about troop morale? A sergeant said one of the problems he faces is trying to help his men cope with their girlfriends breaking up with them and family problems. I thought of that old movie image of the soldier getting his letter from the mail pouch and reading the Dear John notice.

 Not here. To my surprise, the combat post had wireless Internet. I walked by soldiers at night and there was that familiar Facebook screen. Love — and no more love — messages carried electronically.

I celebrated. I was able to file without the dreaded satphone. Has Internet changed the face of war? Is there such a thing as idle time anymore?

“Incoming,” the alert sounded, ” get off your computers and take up your positions.” I bet the soldiers can’t wait to get back to instant messaging, or the latest pictures of their girfriends on Facebook, after the Taliban stop firing their AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades.

It’s all mine, says Afghan media

A colleague blogged earlier this week about the report that says Afghanistan is sitting on a veritable fortune in mineral resources – between $1-3 trillion, depending on how optimistic you are.

Although another colleague analysed more critically what enormous difficulties need to be overcome to see even a fraction of that sum, it hasn’t stopped the Afghan media from getting excited.

At one of the busiest news conferences I’ve seen in Kabul for some time — ordinarily you’d have to promise at least tea and biscuits to entice journalists to cover the ministry of mines – Afghans were keen to hear more about these riches and how to get them.

“Will my generation ever be able to benefit from these minerals,” asked one middle-aged reporter.

Mines Minister Mines Wahidullah Shahrani had clearly been asked the question before, and he gave a wry smile before pointing out that it would realistically take 10-15 years of ideal conditions before serious revenues would be generated — but that it was possible in his generation.

The minister also noted that resources could be as high as $3 trillion instead of the $1 trillion noted in the report. “Hmmm!” noted one jaded reporter, “now we don’t have three times as much money as we never had before …”.

The news conference was held at the Afghanistan Geological Survey building, which given the economic potential that minerals offer has benefited greatly from foreign aid and expertise.