President Barack Obama’s choice of Ghana for his first visit to sub-Saharan Africa since taking office has stirred debate in his father’s homeland Kenya.

Some Kenyans believe Obama ought to have come “home” first. Others, especially among critics of President Mwai Kibaki’s government, say he has deliberately shunned the country to show U.S. disapproval of rampant corruption and nepotism in political circles here.

Prime Minister Raila Odinga, who comes from the Luo ethnic group like Obama’s father, said it was wrong to read too much into Obama’s itinerary, given that neither was he visiting other influential nations in the region like South Africa and Nigeria.

“Ghana is symbolic. It was the first African country to gain independence from Britain in 1957. Ghana is very advanced in its transition to democratic form of governance. So it is perfectly logical,” he told Reuters.

“If Obama were to come to Kenya as the first country in Africa, it would send some very wrong signals that he is coming here merely because of some organic relationship that he has with this country. So in fact it is good.”

Obama has been to Kenya several times, most recently as a senator in mid-2006. In a speech then, he took a strong line against corruption, which has plagued East Africa’s largest economy for decades. “If the people cannot trust their government to do the job for which it exists - to protect them and promote their common welfare - then all else is lost. That is why the struggle of corruption is one of the great struggles of our time,” he said.

That speech drew a sharp response from the government. Spokesman Alfred Mutua called Obama a young man who was “very poorly informed” and chided him for “lecturing” Kenyans. When Obama took power, however, the Kibaki government was so happy it announced a national holiday in his honour. The U.S. leader is wildly popular among all sectors of Kenyan society.

So should Obama have included Kenya on his Africa tour? Is he snubbing his ancestral homeland?

South African President Jacob Zuma has a tough balancing act to perform as he begins his term in office.

 On the one hand, Zuma is anxious to assure investors that there will be continuity in the economic policies that have secured the country’s status as the regional powerhouse.

On the other, he has to address the increasingly vocal demands of his allies in the labour movement, whose support propelled him first to the leadership of the ruling ANC and then to the country’s top government job after April 22 elections.

But what the unions want - increased social spending to cushion their members against the ravages to the global recession that has now also landed in South Africa - would mean veering away from the prudent fiscal stance that has ironically cushioned the country from the worst of the world crisis.

Investors are also keen to see whether Zuma bows to pressure not to renew the contract of central bank Governor Tito Mboweni, loved by financial markets but vilified by unions that say a pre-occupation with inflation targeting has seen the Reserve Bank maintain a tight monetary policy at the expense of economic growth, impoverishing millions.

Can Zuma please one side without alienating the other? And if it comes down to choice, will the President opt to sacrifice his alliance with the Left to maintain South Africa’s international standing? How essential is union support for his success as President and can the ANC stay in power without it?

South African opposition leader Helen Zille has not endeared herself to the majority of voters who recently handed the ruling African National Congress a landslide victory in the national polls.

Zille came under fire from her political enemies for her appointment of a predominantly white and almost completely male cabinet in the Western Cape, the province where her DA party took power from the ANC.

She retaliated by attacking President Jacob Zuma, calling him a “self-confessed womaniser with deeply sexist views, who put all his wives at risk by having unprotected sex with an HIV-positive woman”.

That referred to Zuma’s acknowledgement that he had such contact during a trial on rape charges of which he was acquitted. The row has ended any suggestion that after Zuma’s election, there might be a period of better relations between the government and opposition.

ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe , said Zille has “elevated herself from being the leader of the official opposition to being the enemy”.

Quite apart from the name-calling, the row also looks as though it could distract attention from the opposition’s own efforts to present itself as an alternative to the ANC.

It is not the first time that South Africa’s opposition has found itself caught in a war of words with the ANC rather than showing what it will do differently.

Zille’s opponents say she is still to answer the question over the gender and racial balance in her Western Cape cabinet. Does that matter? What will it mean for her chances of winning over voters from the black African majority, who so clearly backed the ANC in the election? What will it mean for South Africa’s prospects if the government and main opposition are so quickly at each other’s throats?

William Gumede

South Africa’s national elections last week have reshaped the contours of the country’s political landscape. It has almost certainly killed off the careers of many opposition leaders who have become institutions and their parties with them. It virtually obliterated the peer parties of the ANC, with their roots as liberation movements, such as the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the Azanian Peoples’ Organisation (Azapo). It is clear the electorate believes these parties are irrelevant, outdated and under poor leadership. The Inkatha Freedom Party, whose founder, Mangosuthu Buthelezi also professed that it has its origins in liberation movement politics has also been brought down to size.

 The IFP has dominated the KwaZulu Natal province since the 1960s, but embarrassingly lost out to the ANC now. ANC President Jacob Zuma’s overt appeal to Zulu speakers in the province who have supported the IFP in the past, by arguing that is better to support him (Zuma) for the presidency, and have a Zulu-speaker in the presidency, has evidently worked. Many IFP supporters have voted for Zuma merely on the basis of ethnic affinity, rather than his record in government.

 But this strategy also run the risks of increasing ethnic divisions, with some Zuma supporters already whispering for the ‘Xhosa-Nostra’ to be purged from government. This is a reference to individuals who were allies of former President Thabo Mbeki, are Xhosa speakers or who are from the Eastern Cape province from where Mbeki and former President Nelson Mandela hail.

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Morocco serves as the backdrop for such Hollywood blockbusters as Gladiator, Black Hawk Down and Body of Lies. The country’s breathtaking landscapes and gritty urban neighbourhoods are the perfect setting for Hollywood’s imagination.

Unbeknown to most filmgoers, however, is that Morocco is embroiled in one of Africa’s oldest conflicts - the dispute over Western Sahara. This month the UN Security Council is expected to take up the dispute once more, providing US President Barack Obama with an opportunity to assert genuine leadership in resolving this conflict. But there’s no sign that the new administration is paying adequate attention.

The story of Western Sahara would make quite a movie. There was high diplomatic intrigue when Moroccan troops occupied the territory, after Spain abandoned its long-time colony as Generalissimo Franco lay dying in 1975. The subsequent war between Morocco and the Algerian-supported Polisario Front, which sought Western Saharan independence, furnished plenty of action sequences in the desert. There is also the real human tragedy of the Western Saharan refugees, who have languished in exile for more than three decades.

In 1991, the Security Council created the UN mission in Western Sahara, MINURSO, whose mandate has been ritually reauthorized ever since. MINURSO’s original task was to organise a referendum in Western Sahara in which the residents would vote up or down on self-determination. Morocco, on the other hand, lobbied that tens of thousands of Moroccans be counted, a demand that Polisario resisted. 

Morocco’s latest stance is that Rabat share power in Western Sahara with indigenous groups. An autonomy proposal Morocco advanced in 2007 is in fact a credible starting point for negotiations aimed at a power sharing agreement. But Polisario will not discuss power sharing until Morocco recommits to a referendum on self-determination.

It has long been assumed in Western capitals that the Western Sahara question will be resolved through power sharing, but such a solution cannot simply be imposed. Only a negotiated settlement can bring about comprehensive peace.

But the UN does not push effectively for negotiations. Indeed, in rolling over MINURSO’s mandate year after year, the Security Council seems to hope that one party or the other will give in - an attitude that favours the more powerful actor, Morocco, a state that is closely allied with Security Council members France and the US.

The last thing the world needs is more de facto partisanship from the ostensibly neutral Security Council.  Peace in Western Sahara will require that both Morocco and Polisario accept something they do not like. Polisario must accept that the achievement of a comprehensive power sharing agreement with Morocco is a prerequisite for a referendum. Morocco, on the other hand, must commit to a self-determination referendum as a necessary condition for power sharing talks. How to cut the Gordian knot?

The new man in charge of MINURSO is Christopher Ross, former US ambassador to Algeria and Syria. Ross can boast of fluency in Arabic and an extensive background in North African affairs.

King Mohamed and UN envoy to Western Sahara Chris Ross

Instead of waiting for conditions to ripen, the new envoy should, at the next round of negotiations, secure the commitment of the parties - in writing - to a strong Security Council resolution calling for both a negotiated political solution and a referendum. This approach not only balances the interests of the parties but it also unblocks the mutual suspicion currently stalling talks.

 If one side or the other refuses to sign, the Security Council must be willing to wield the weapon of shame and name names. The Obama administration should back Ross to the hilt as enforcer of the UN’s writ.

Western Sahara is not a problem of imagination that needs a Hollywood producer or two. It is problem of political will. With strong, consistent leadership from the US, inside and outside the Security Council, Morocco and the Polisario Front can be put on the right track toward peace.

Jacob Mundy is a PhD candidate in the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter. He is coauthor of the forthcoming Western Sahara: War, Nationalism and Conflict Irresolution.

 
Dr Sehlare Makgetlaneng is the coordinator of the Africa Institute of South Africa’s South African 2009 Election Observation and Monitoring Team. He writes in his personal capacity.

The Zuma administration’s foreign policy will be determined to a great extent by the struggle to satisfy national needs and demands.  These can best be understood if we take into account not only the country’s  increasing level of corruption and violent crime, but also high  level of  expectations  from the urban and rural unemployed, the poor and the working class expecting the qualitative improvement in their material conditions.
     
The Zuma administration will commit itself in practice to the value of continuity in South Africa’s foreign policy. Central to this tradition will be popular foreign policy objectives pursued by South Africa since the end of apartheid.
     
They include support for peaceful resolution of conflict on the African continent and beyond, support for the regional and continental organisations and integration as well as multilateralism. It will continue with the country’s practical and theoretical call for continental socio-political and economic renaissance or transformation.
     
South Africa under the leadership of Thabo Mbeki used the African Renaissance to contribute towards the resolution of conflicts in African countries conducive for the operations of its capital and the realisation of the objectives of its socio-economic policy objectives.
     
It regarded its active participation in conflict resolution as key to peace, security and stability in Africa. It viewed continental socio-economic transformation or renaissance as the process to be achieved through peace and stability creation and consolidation, actions against corruption and implementation of socio-economic policies conducive for the operations of foreign investment.
     
The Mbeki administration was reluctant to lead Africa in international relations. It called for a further integration of Africa into the global capitalist system and African solidarity and unity to fight what Mbeki refers to as global apartheid and to contribute towards an equitable world.
     
These two central aspects of South Africa’s foreign policy, focusing firstly on Africa and secondly on developed countries, raised high level of expectations within Africa and the rest of the world and placed its policy on grounds vulnerable to criticism from individuals with different positions and interests in its efforts to serve as a leader of Africa in its transformation and its relations with the rest of the world particularly developed countries.
     
These problems are a dilemma it faced in its attempts to serve as the representative of Africa to the developed countries and the representative of developed countries in Africa. This policy helped to explain why South Africa under Mbeki was unable to substantiate its declared theoretical position on African Renaissance in practice. It impelled it not to antagonise developed countries in its African Renaissance project and to seek support from weak African countries.
     
Under Mbeki, South Africa put itself on the level that Africa expected more than it could deliver in resolving Africa’s problems.
     
It pretended that it could meet requirements of this expectation. It did not substantiate Mbeki’s progressive position that its role in the resolution of the African conflicts should be guided by the struggle to achieve African transformation in the interests of the masses of the people. South Africa remained central to the consolidation of dominance of Africa by developed countries.
     
The Zuma administration will be a substantial and welcome addition to the struggle against Africa’s problems.
     
It will use the country as the regional and continental power to criticise African leaders who are enemies of their people and strive for free, independent exercise of foreign policy.
     
There will be a shift in the direction towards South Africa realising its potential as a centre of independent development on the African continent.
     
It will be under enormous internal progressive pressure to ensure that the country constitutes a strategic continental threat to the internal and external interests inimical to the interests of the continent and its people.

Professor Thandwa Mthembu is Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the  Central University of Technology, Free State. He writes in his personal capacity.

Based on current information on Jacob Zuma’s beliefs, ideas and practices, what are the prospects for his soon-to-be installed administration in South Africa?
My overall thesis is that Zuma is no less enigmatic than former President Thabo Mbeki, his old rival.

But Zuma is more eclectic in thinking and approach. Books have been written about Mbeki’s enigmatic character. But, one thing certain in the socio-economic governance and administration model he ushered in is that he exhibited neo-liberal and pro-capitalist inclinations that made him appear dogmatic and monolithic. This is evident in his macro-economic policy, Gear. It is also evident in his micro-economic policies. BEE policies, for example, were designed to create a new black middle class and “filthy rich” black people, too.

I believe Zuma is no less enigmatic; but is progressively eclectic. At the personal level, whilst he is incontrovertibly traditionalist, he mingles with the Church, modernists and the like, effortlessly.
Zuma has a deep sense of respect for elders, which is, ironically, an integral part of our moral values. Even though Archbishop Tutu has expressed resentment of Zuma as a person, the ANC leader has avoided any retaliation. That is a marked contrast to Mbeki’s response to Tutu’s criticisms of ANC practices in 2004 (not Mbeki himself) – the then president branded the Nobel peace laureate a self-serving ignoramus, a liar and a populist.

Zuma appears to be at peace with his capabilities or lack thereof. He exhibits no mistaken belief that there is no South African who knows better than he does. He is, therefore, unlikely to assemble teams of Harvard professors to solve South Africa’s problems. He has already shown his preference for local talent and will draw on many local experts to solve South Africa’s problems.
On many occasions, Zuma has made it clear Mbeki-led macro-economic policies, including those of the Reserve Bank, will not change, despite protests from his comrades. Further, he has effectively called for a re-alignment of our affirmative action policies, promising Afrikaners that they could be recalled into government positions that require skills that are acutely lacking. Again, this attests to his belief in the worth of alternative ideas and sections of our society. But, despite this reality, the coalition of the media and opposition parties has not stopped to pronounce his indebtedness to his leftist friends.

Worrying our human rights activists, he has made it clear that the laissez faire approach to criminals is up for review. Intriguingly, his rather conservative views on this matter resonate with those of many sections of our society, some liberals included.

We should, therefore, expect the Zuma administration to be more eclectic, pragmatic and open to varied ideas and approaches. In the process, we should witness different and less dogmatic approaches to solving our problems. More sections of our society should feel they matter and that government is accountable.

William Gumede is the author of “The Democracy Gap: Africa’s Wasted Years” and ”Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC”.

South Africa votes on 22 April with not only its globally admired efforts to build democracy in tatters, but against the backdrop of many other promising attempts to build viable democracies across Africa now backsliding.

Military coups, such as the recent one in Madasgascar, assumed to be part of Africa’s terrible past, appear now to again have become a regular occurrence. The election earlier this year of Muammar Gadaffi - who himself came to power by military coup in Libya - as leader of the African Union, by his peers, is symbolic of the continental regression.

When South Africa became democratic in 1994 with Nelson Mandela at the head, it was hoped that the new democracy at the southern tip of Africa would provide a powerful home-grown impetus for expanding democracy across the continent.

And it initially looked promising, with Mandela’s exemplary moral leadership; and his successor Thabo Mbeki’s initial efforts to champion an African economic, social and democratic ‘renaissance’.

However, soon the African curse struck: Mbeki’s moving rhetoric did not match actual day-to-day practice. While preaching democracy, Mbeki clamped down on internal dissent, packed public watchdogs with uncritical loyalists, and looked the other way when allies were shown to be corrupt or incompetent.

It is inconceivable that the ruling African National Congress, with Jacob Zuma at the helm, will not win South Africa’s national elections. Formidable charges of corruption were dropped against Zuma after the acting head of the national prosecuting authority emphasised that the case against the incoming president was solid, but that possible political interference in the timing of whether to press charges against Zuma made the authority reluctant to press ahead.

Most African independence and liberation movements have failed on three levels in government: leadership, building viable democracies and prudently managing their economies.

Some leaders come to power by violent means and rule through violence. Some start off proclaiming themselves democrats, but once in power turn into autocrats. Some leaders prefer to die in office, as the case of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe.

Lack of democracy and the lack of viable alternatives – either because they are brutally silenced or just irrelevant – are among the reasons why oppressive regimes are ousted in coups.

Yet in the still rare cases where opposition parties remove oppressive ruling parties through the ballot box, they often behave no better in power themselves.

Democracy is invariably seen by most of the continent’s leaders and ruling parties in the most minimalistic way – and meaning only holding the occasional election.

Another problem is that very few post-independence African ruling governments have managed to spread wealth evenly. Invariably the benefits go to the old colonial elite and the new post-colonial ones made up of prominent struggle figures and the liberation or independence ‘aristocracies’. The overwhelming majority remain as poor as before.

It is not that there are no quality leaders in ruling African political movements, it is that the patronage system of these movements is so entrenched that serious new contenders outside these networks cannot break through.

Ruling political movements are often the problem themselves: parties run tyrannically are unlikely to be able to build democratic societies. What makes successful independence or liberation movements, trying to overthrow corrupt colonial administrations, often make for poor governments.

Furthermore, liberation and independence movements often mimic the autocratic governments they fight.

Open elections for the top leadership are discouraged, leadership centralised and opposition is often discouraged.

Doctrinaire positions on economics, whether inspired by the West, the East or romantic notions of past African management styles, makes for woolly economics once in power.

African voters often vote for parties and leaders based on their past struggle record, rather than on actual performance in government. Yet, it is their performance in government that will make a difference in ordinary voters’ lives.

Most African leaders, even the out-and-out dictators, claim to be ruling on behalf of the people. Yet, they experience daily life in a way that is outrageously different to that of the average poor supporter: when ordinary South Africans are besieged by crime, Jacob Zuma spends more in a month on personal security than many might earn in years.

South Africa goes into the election with a number of parties, but in Africa, it is not only whether there is an opposition party that is crucial, but the kind of opposition party.

Sadly, in most African countries opposition parties are hardly relevant.

In South Africa, enthusiasm for the Congress of the People, a splinter from the ANC, has abated, following poor policies, the undemocratic election of its leaders and poor visibility.

The global financial crisis is likely to make daily life even more difficult for ordinary people not only in South Africa, but across Africa.

Such worsening conditions may prove the catalyst for restless long-suffering ordinary Africans to rebel against failing governments.

However, it may also provide unscrupulous, but failing leaders, the excuse to reverse democratic reforms, blaming scapegoats for their own inadequacies, bowing under the pressure from their allies to extend corrupt patronage, or to embark on irresponsible economic populist measures, to bolster their own power.

Most African parties and leaders often still mostly blame outside and internal forces for failures, which block the necessary self-examination.

Yet, unless there is thorough introspection by African political movements themselves, to learn from past failures, viable democracy will remain a distant dream for the continent’s long-suffering ordinary citizens.

By Daniela Kroslak, Deputy Africa Program Director, and Andrew Stroehlein, Communications Director, of the International Crisis Group, Any views expressed are their own.

Pirates, Islamists, refugees, anarchy, civil war -- not much good news has come out of Somalia in the last couple of decades. With warlord replacing warlord over the years and transitional governments constantly hovering between extremely weak and non-existent on the ground, the temptation will be to view this week's election of a new Somali president with an eye-rolling, "so what?"

Yet there is a chance, albeit a slim one, that this moment will mark the start of some small progress for the shattered country. That is, if the international community plays the next few months very carefully and does not let ideology trump pragmatism.

The first reason to feel any hint of optimism is that Ethiopian troops, who invaded Somalia in December 2006, are now leaving. Ethiopia's occupation was an unprecedented disaster. The last two years have been among the worst since Somalia descended into anarchy in 1991, with huge displacement of civilians, a massive humanitarian crisis and grave violations of human rights.

The Ethiopian military campaign, combined with US bombings of suspected militant hide-outs, also set in motion a chain of events that in mid-2008 culminated in the recapture of much of the country's south by the hard-line Islamist insurgent group, Al-Shabaab. They used the Ethiopian presence to rally support from and recruit amongst those marginalised by the transitional government, and they radicalised the Islamist movement.

The way Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed was elected president of Somalia -- a title representing more hope than actual authority over the fractured country -- inspires little confidence in itself. A reformulated Somali parliament in exile, part of UN-sponsored reconciliation efforts known as the "Djibouti process" after the city where it resides, chose him from a list of 14 other bickering leaders, and the vote only happened because of external pressure from the UN, AU, EU and US. These Somali actors have generally been living in a "Djibouti bubble", out of touch with what is unfolding back home and enjoying little credibility among Somalis.

Still, the situation on the ground hands Sheik Sharif a few good cards to play. As a moderate Islamist himself and former chairman of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), an alliance that ruled southern Somalia for six months in 2006, he could be well placed to win over other Islamist elements outside the process and undercut support for the extremists of Al-Shabaab.

Sheik Sharif's installation is significant as he is the first Islamist leader to become head of state with Western support in the Horn of Africa, hopefully reflecting a pragmatic shift in Western attitudes towards political Islam and efforts to contain militant jihadism. But Sheikh Sharif is in danger of being outflanked by the radicals in his camp. He will have to strike a difficult balance between Ethiopia's tight embrace and a still hostile opposition, and he will have to weight carefully Somalia's complex regional interests and clan loyalties.

If Sheik Sharif had clear and substantial backing from the international community in these efforts, including renewed Saudi support to engage with Al-Shabaab, it would make success more likely. In practical terms, this would mean politically and financially supporting a number of steps and encouraging the UN Special Representative, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, to facilitate them.

First and foremost, Sheik Sharif and the international community have to make use of all intermediaries and back channels to reach out to the insurgent groups currently outside the Djibouti process, including Al-Shabaab, as well as the Asmara-based leaders of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia. They must be prepared to draw in to the negotiations members of groups which have control on the ground, even if their current leadership refuses.

The point is to get as many more radical groups and individual leaders on board for the negotiation of a comprehensive ceasefire as a step towards expanded Djibouti talks. Once a credible ceasefire agreement has been reached, each faction should be left to administer its respective territory temporarily and be invited to participate in talks intended to lead to the restoration of a legitimate government. The parties could then establish smaller sub-groups to negotiate issues such as: drafting a new constitution; integrating all armed forces into a common army and police force; planning for a national referendum on the new constitution; and establishing transitional justice processes to address the needs of national reconciliation.

If participants in the Djibouti process encourage influential clan leaders, business community leaders, clerics and civil society to create momentum and grassroots support for that process, its prospects for success will be improved.

The biggest obstacle to peace in Somalia this time may in fact not be Somalis' infamously fractious politics but the reluctance of the international community to engage with the Islamist opposition. However, if there is going to be a lasting settlement that returns even a semblance of stability to the country, Islamists cannot be excluded.

If they are kept out of the process, the extremist Islamists will maintain the upper hand and, quite simply, there will be no process. In that case, peace would, yet again, remain a distant illusion for Somalia's suffering population.

Neil Campbell, EU Advocacy Manager of the International Crisis Group, recently returned from eastern Congo. Any views expressed are his own.

“Unacceptable and murderous.” Those were the words French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner chose to describe the situation in north eastern Congo at a press conference after October’s monthly meeting of EU foreign ministers. Sadly, Congo was not even on the agenda of that meeting.

In the following weeks, Laurent Nkunda’s rebels advanced on Goma, displacing up to 300,000 people; the Congolese army went on a spree of looting, raping and killing in that town; and there was a double massacre in Kiwanja on 4 November, first by pro-government Mayi Mayi militia, then by Nkunda’s rebels against suspected Mayi Mayi loyalists.

At the next meeting of EU foreign ministers, on 10 November, Congo at last made it to the agenda. But the European response to the crisis in central Africa is not encouraging. EU military assistance was not completely counted out in their agreed statement, but turning a general call for “reinforcement of cooperation between the EU, its member states and MONUC [the UN force]” into any specific reinforcements on the ground is far from straightforward.

For now, the EU has chosen the diplomatic route, pressing for a political solution within the framework of two key agreements signed over the past year. The November 2007 Nairobi agreement provides for normalisation of relations between Congo and Rwanda, disarmament of Rwandan Hutu rebels in Congo -- including some perpetrators of the 1994 genocide -- and ending Rwandan support to Congolese Tutsi insurgent Nkunda. The January 2008 Goma agreement outlines a ceasefire, voluntary demobilisation of combatants and the “Amani” peace process between the government, Mayi Mayi militias and Nkunda’s rebels.

On the one hand, an international push behind these deals is welcome. The current escalation in violence resulted in part from international complacency once these agreements were signed, despite the best efforts of the EU’s Special Representative for the Great Lakes region, Roland van de Geer.

Unfortunately, the EU’s recent track record of top-level diplomacy does not give much confidence the 27-country Union will stick together on this issue. Kouchner was the first to call for EU military intervention in Congo. The EU’s chief diplomat, Javier Solana, quickly rejected the idea, the Belgians came out in support, and the British were skeptical. Meanwhile visits to the region by van de Geer, commissioner Louis Michel, and Kouchner with UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband left no impression of a unified front. It is not clear if Miliband’s primary objective was conflict prevention or Commonwealth enlargement with Rwanda. And Solana was not even allowed on the plane.

Diplomacy by others may prove more coherent. The UN Secretary General appointed an African heavyweight as his special envoy. Former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo was then joined by Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania, the African Union’s representative, as facilitators of the Nairobi and Goma agreements at the regional summit in Nairobi last Friday. Obasanjo and Mpaka could learn from the Europeans’ mistakes and initiate a clear division of labour. The former military man Obasanjo should concentrate on the Nairobi agreement and disarmament and reintegration of militias, while Swahili speaking Mkapa should concentrate on other aspects of the Goma process and the Amani peace-building program.

But the EU could still offer practical and immediate assistance. Despite the deficit in political will for the military option, there are possibilities the EU should explore. Europeans could temporarily secure Goma and its airport, allowing the UN forces to concentrate on security in the surrounding areas of Rutshuru and Masisi.

Sure, the EU needs to focus on its commitment to the political solution and ensure that there is one coherent EU message. The best way to protect civilians is a return to the agreements, and by assisting the UN with a specific short-term security objective -- allowing the UN some breathing space to fulfill its wider mandate -- the EU can play an important role towards that political solution, and reinforce its diplomatic message with real and visible commitment.

Time is short, however. Laurent Nkunda’s continued talk of a national agenda risks massive escalation of violence and chaos. But if in turn his rebels are seriously threatened, there is the real chance of widespread revenge killings of the Tutsi minority, to which Rwanda may well respond. And if the fighting continues indefinitely, we may see repeats of Kiwanja on a much larger scale. The paths currently being followed by all armed groups will only lead to an intensification of the conflict, with dire consequences of further regional involvement.