The overthrow of Madagascar’s leader may have had nothing to do with events elsewhere in Africa, but after four violent changes of power within eight months the question is bound to arise as to whether the continent is returning to old ways.

Three years without coups between 2005 and last year had appeared to some, including foreign investors, to have indicated a fundamental change from the first turbulent decades after independence. This spate of violent overthrows could now be another reason for investors to tread more warily again, particularly as Africa feels the impact of the global financial crisis.

“Although I don’t think these instances of instability in Africa are related to each other or part of a pattern, I think there’s no doubt external constituents and businesspeople around the world will assume there is a pattern,” said Tom Cargill, Africa Programme Coordinator at London thinktank Chatham House.

The fact that coup makers have succeeded without being forced to step down or even face major censure could also embolden those who might be tempted to take power in bigger countries, where falling growth is encouraging disaffection.

“Look at … other African countries, so-called pivotal states: Nigeria is in a terrible state, so is Egypt, so is Kenya, all these so-called big countries,” said Hussein Solomon, a political science professor at the University of Pretoria.

Although there can be a tendency to group very diverse African states together, the picture is far from uniform - Ghana’s presidential election two months ago was one of Africa’s closest, but avoided major violence, reassuring investors despite an acute fiscal crisis.

But social pressures are growing across Africa as a result of the world economic crisis.

The dramatic U-turn by rich countries as they bail out or buy up failing industries is also prompting a reassessment of the model sold to Africa by Western donors since the Cold War — a combination of market capitalism and multiparty democracy.

Cargill said factors were both the financial crisis and the rise of one-party state China, an increasingly important source of investment and trade for Africa.

“I think in future the whole idea of the democratic capitalist system will be tested and questioned, and there will be some who take advantage of its being questioned for their own private ends to launch their own bids for power,” he said.

That debate is already taking place at the African Union, whose rules ban unconstitutional seizures of power but whose chairman for the next year, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, opposes what he says are foreign democratic structures imposed on Africa.

The AU has told Madagascar that any seizure of power by unconstitutional means would be considered a coup d’etat, punishable by AU sanctions or suspension.

But that sits uneasily with Gaddafi’s rebuke last week of Mauritania’s first democratically elected leader, largely confined to his village after being deposed in a coup last year.

“He must accept the fact,” said Gaddafi, who seized power in 1969 “He is not the first head of state to be overthrown.”

Is Africa returning to the old ways or did it never really leave them behind? Will a reassessment of the financial model pushed by Western donors also mean a new look at the multiparty democracy?

Nigerian President Umaru Yar’Adua left for Saudi Arabia more than two weeks ago for the Islamic obligation of the lesser Hajj, a pilgrimage to Mecca. Yar’Adua, who is known to have a chronic kidney problem, has sought medical attention in Jeddah and has still not returned, raising fears about the state of his health. A medical source in Saudi Arabia told Reuters he had undergone an operation.

Government and presidency officials have been tight-lipped about the president’s condition and have not said exactly when he will be back. The opposition has demanded clarity on the president’s health, adding that his absence is having an adverse effect on the workings of government and that the official silence is fuelling speculation and uncertainty.

Should the head of state’s health be a private issue or is it a matter of public interest? Is his prolonged absence from Nigeria a cause for concern? As governor of Katsina state, Yar’Adua spent several months abroad for medical treatment without attracting much public attention, only to return, complete his term and win another one. Can he expect to do the same as leader of the nation?

What if the president leaves office early?

Jacob Zuma, the embattled leader of South Africa’s ruling African National Congress (ANC) launched a big fight for his political life on Aug. 4, asking the  Pietermaritzburg High Court to dismiss a graft case against him that could stop him becoming president next year. If his application is rejected, a full corruption trial could follow later this year and South Africa could head into a protracted period of tension and uncertainty. Read the following insights from leading analysts and have your say on how the legal process could affect South Africa:

Keith Gottschalk, the University of the Western Cape (see full analysis)

“Jacob Zuma’s Zuma’s legal team has already proved, year after year that, if you have a bottomless pocket such as taxpayers, you can protract litigation, U.S.-style for the better part of a decade.”

Rainette Taljaard, Helen Suzman Foundation (see full analysis)

“If the arms deal was the loss of innocence for South African’s ruling party, the Zuma trial will be the collateral damage to constitutional structures with long-term consequences.”

Adenaan Hardien, Cadiz (see full analysis)

“If anything is giving market participants sleepless nights, then it has to be what Reserve Bank Governor Tito Mboweni and his Monetary Policy Committee will decide when they meet next week.”

Adenaan Hadien, Cadiz Holdings

Pietermaritzburg may well have been brought to a standstill with the resumed corruption case of Jacob Zuma in the High Court, but I suspect the same would not be true for local markets.  Certainly, if last week’s market performances are anything to go by, then reactions are likely to be muted.  Last Thursday, the Constitutional Court dismissed all four of Zuma’s appeals to prevent the state from using potentially damaging evidence against him in his corruption trial.  On Monday, Zuma’s legal team submitted an application for a permanent stay of prosecution, arguing that his constitutional rights have been violated.  This application and the round of appeals which may follow if, as is expected, it was rejected, would again delay things.
On the week, the local currency gained over 4% against South Africa’s trading partners’ currencies and bonds enjoyed gains last seen in the late-1990s.  Equities put in a more mixed performance on the week, due to the oscillating woes of resources against financials and industrials.  The performances of bonds were even more impressive, given the higher-than-expected consumer inflation figures released on Wednesday.  Granted, Thursday’s producer inflation numbers were more encouraging.

It is not that the Zuma trial is not important.  That the leader of the majority political party is on trial for corruption is certainly a big deal.  But the saga has dragged on for so long that there is a sense of numbness creeping in.  There is also a positive spin to all this.  Notwithstanding vitriolic noises sometimes made by allies, and while there have certainly been casualties in a brutal battle for succession in the ruling party that has extended to key political institutions, South Africa’s democracy remains firmly intact.  If anything is giving market participants sleepless nights, then it has to be what Reserve Bank Governor Tito Mboweni and his Monetary Policy Committee will decide when they meet next week.  Last week’s performances suggest that there isn’t too much sleep being lost at the moment.

 Raenette Taljaard, Helen Suzman Foundation
 

ANC President Jacob Zuma’s quest for a pre-trial stay of prosecution looks certain to  perpetuate uncertainty and an uncomfortable ongoing holding pattern and turmoil inherent in these dramatic events.

These compounded uncertainties do not only affect the South African economy with perceptions of political risk ratcheting up as key members of the new ANC leadership step up the rhetoric as Zuma goes to court but also creates tremors for core constitutional institutions and the bench in South Africa. After upholding the search and seizure warrants used against Zuma and rebuking his legal team for what amounts to delaying tactics, the Court also discouraged pre-trial legal wrangles of the kind that started in Pietermaritzburg.

Various options are on the table for Zuma: playing for time through delaying tactics; if convicted a possible Constitutional amendment to stay prosecution for a sitting President, or a general amnesty for the arms deal.

New revelations alleging corrupt activity on the part of President Thabo Mbeki in the arms deal - which he chaired as head of a Cabinet Sub-committee - have been dismissed but will fuel the ongoing perceptions that Zuma’s is a selective prosecution, adding fuel to an already burning fire that appears set to singe the judiciary. Unless there is a full account of what happened in the arms deal - a scenario unlikely on the eve of the fourth democratic poll - the rumblings of conspiracy will continue to eat away at the heart of the ruling party irrespective of former President Nelson Mandela’s calls for unity as the party celebrated his 90th.

What appears certain, irrespective of which route is the most likely denouement of the Zuma saga, is that the rule of law, constitutionalism and the South African bench will never be quite the same. If the arms deal was the loss of innocence for South Africa’s ruling party, the Zuma trial will be the collateral damage to constitutional structures with long-term consequences.

Keith Gottschalk, The University of the Western Cape

Jacob Zuma’s legal team has already proved, year after year that, if you have a bottomless pocket such as taxpayers, you can protract litigation, U.S.-style for the better part of a decade.

    The Presidency currently has a line item budget of 10 million rand per year for Zuma’s legal expenses. By South African standards, this is a record. It will certainly enable his legal team to appeal every point of procedure, then if necessary the verdict, and sentence. Each appeal starts with a delay of six or nine months on the court rolls, repeated as it winds it way upwards through a full bench of the High Court, followed by the Supreme Court of Appeal, followed by the Constitutional Court.

    Sooner or later Zuma’s lawyers will also discover that above the highest court in South Africa lies the new Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal, based in Windhoek, already resorted to by Zimbabwean white ranchers.

    In short, it’s unimaginable that Zuma’s trial will have concluded by election day in 2009. The last appeal might well stretch even beyond a one-term Zuma presidency, which would end in 2014.

      There are several analogies in other western-style governments. U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney shrugged off similar allegations to those against Zuma. Israeli Prime Minister Erhud Olmert was not prosecuted for illegally receiving money, but has announced his early retirement.

    Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi faces more serious claims than Zuma - allegations that he bribed judges. Italy’s ruling party reacted by passing a law forbidding the prosecution of a prime minister. Then they retroactively changed corporate accounting law to pre-empt another prosecution. At the same time a top ANC leader smeared South Africa’s judges as “counter-revolutionary”, Berlusconi smeared his judges as “Reds”.

    This reflects badly on Italian democracy, unequal under the law. One law for the rulers and wealthy, and another for the citizens.

 Not even fire-breathing ANC leaders have lowered themselves to the level of Berlusconi’s party, and proposed to change the law to prohibit prosecution of a President, or retroactively neuter the corruption laws. But they have organized massive demonstrations outside every court where Zuma appears. They have hotted up populist rhetoric to the point where words such as “kill” are now routine. These mass rallies and demonstrations by the ANC, COSATU, and SACP ensure that every verdict against Zuma will be de-legitimated in advance as political bias by a judiciary still mostly white.

 Further, the terms of office of almost half the judges of the Constitutional Court will expire soon after President Mbeki’s own term. Should he become President, Jacob Zuma will be in the enviable position of being able, de facto, to select some of the judges before whom he might later appeal.

 In short, should Zuma be found not guilty, the political results would be much rhetorical grandstanding. Should he be found guilty, South Africa’s democracy will be under similar strains to that in Italy or Israel.

 His defence team will in that case no doubt lead in mitigation Zuma’s three decades of service to liberating South Africa, including one decade on Robben Island. Following this, it is indisputable that Zuma played a leading role as negotiator ending civil war in KwaZulu-Natal province during the early 1990s. He then took over from a frail Mandela as facilitator of the Burundi ceasefire talks in the late 1990s. Alongside President Mbeki, Zuma facilitated the Inter-Congo dialogue in 2002 which re-unified the four-way partitioned Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In short, Zuma has indisputably saved tens of thousands of lives in three countries by ending civil wars years earlier than without his efforts. Should Zuma receive a jail sentence, obviously he will be immediately pardoned by his successor as President or Acting President.