Poor South Africans have called upon newly elected president Jacob Zuma to keep his election promises on service delivery. The past week has seen a number of protests flaring up across South Africa against what protesters called poor service delivery.

In one township in the country’s Mpumalanga province residents barricaded the entire township, burning tyres, throwing stones at policemen and calling for the head of the local mayor, whom they described as “good for nothing”. “There is no development. You can see for yourself,” one resident told journalists. He spoke of alleged neglect and apparent self enrichment from local government officials.

Locals also complained about being “overlooked” for jobs in the local municipalities in favour of people from outside.

Demonstrations lasted nearly the whole day on Wednesday 22nd July. Later in the afternoon the local municipal council came to address the crowds who-for-a-while refused to listen to their elected officials. One thing they wanted clarified was whether their brothers and sisters- arrested during the last two days of protests would be released before they could listen to whatever the town council’s meeting had concluded. Ninety-nine residents had been taken into police custody.

Siyathemba Township is but one example of this recent surge in protests against perceived lack of service delivery. The challenges of getting access to water and sanitation facilities, health care, employment, and electricity fifteen years into democratic South Africa are being brought up, albeit via the protests.

The residents in Siyathemba said they want Zuma to act on non-performing government officials. Do these protests suggest that poor South Africans are exercising their democratic right by speaking out on non performing government officials? Does the South African government simply view these protestors as unruly and unemployed youths who are out to damage the reputation of the country and Zuma? Or does national government pressure  local and provincial governments to deliver on their elections mandate?

Nigeria marks its first 10 years of unbroken civilian rule on Friday after emerging from nearly three decades of uninterrupted military dictatorship on May 29, 1999.

The political elite in Africa’s top oil producer are rolling out the drums to celebrate the milestone.  And why not?

Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military ruler who won elections in 1999, ended Nigeria’s pariah status and brought Africa’s most populous nation back into the international fold, helping secure an $18 billion debt write-off in 2005.

Power was then transferred to President Umaru Yar’Adua in 2007 - the first successful transition from one civilian leader to another since independence from Britain in 1964 - although the election was condemned by observers for widespread rigging.

Soldiers have so far stayed put in their barracks during the historic decade, despite mounting frustrations among ordinary people - most of whom live on less than $2 a day - that their lives are not changing quickly enough for the better.

Cause for celebration, given Nigeria’s post-independence history, when the army exploited such frustrations to truncate the First Republic in 1966 and the Second Republic in 1983.

But while the great and the good celebrate, many ordinary Nigerians feel indifferent about the landmark.

The poorest say democracy has done little to change their standard of living. The huge earnings from Nigeria’s mainstay oil and gas industry are still not improving their lives.

There is much greater freedom of speech and of association, but some say the only tangible change in their daily lives over the past decade has been the arrival of the mobile phone.

Critics say Obasanjo’s high-profile campaign against corruption - the monster that had held Nigeria back for decades - was little more than a weapon against his enemies.

Initial optimism over his tenure gave way to a feeling that he was just as overbearing and kleptocratic as his predecessors.   

Yar’Adua’s assumption of power two years ago was seen as a breath of fresh air, but again Nigerians have been left wondering whether their optimism was misplaced.

 Economic reforms have slowed, infrastructure remains shambolic in large parts of the country and electricity supply remains as intermittent as it was a decade ago, despite Nigeria being the world’s eighth biggest exporter of crude oil.

In moments of desperation, some even wonder if the country was better off under military rule. So where does the truth lie?

How much has Nigeria really changed in the decade since military rule?  Has the country come too far for it to be conceivable that the military could one day take power again, or does democracy still have only a fragile hold on the giant of Africa?

Can Nigeria, the so-called “giant of Africa”, live up to its claim of being the biggest democracy in the black world? Not if its latest state governorship election is anything to go by, argue some in Africa’s most populous nation.

The re-run of elections for the post of governor in southwest Ekiti state were seen as a test of whether Nigeria’s electoral system has improved since flawed federal and state polls in 2007.

But for the opposition, it turned out to be as much of a charade as all the other re-runs in states where the 2007 results were nullified, all of them won by President Umaru Yar’Adua’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and all mired in controversy.

The official results showed the PDP candidate in Ekiti winning by a narrow 4,000-vote margin. The Action Congress opposition party has vowed to challenge the results in court. The re-run had to be postponed in two of more than 60 wards because of violence as frustrated voters protested against the alleged falsification of results.

The resident electoral commissioner Ayoka Adebayo at one point quit and went into hiding. “(This election) was supposed to be the election that will enhance the image of INEC (election commission), electoral process in our dear country Nigeria and the whole black race,” she wrote in a resignation letter published by Nigerian newspapers.

“Unfortunately, the circumstances changed in the middle of the process; therefore my conscience as a Christian cannot allow me to further participate,” she said, a few days before being persuaded to return to her post.

Residents spoke of voter intimidation, while election monitors and journalists complained they were manhandled by party thugs. Soldiers were deployed to assist 10,000 additional police officers already meant to be ensuring security.

The southwest is Nigeria’s most politically volatile region. Electoral violence in the area in the 1960s and in 1983 contributed to the collapse of the first and second republics. Analysts say the Ekiti re-run is a sign of what could happen in 2011 when Nigeria holds its next round of general elections.

Yar’Adua, who came to power two years ago pledging to reform the electoral system, has sent six bills designed to improve the process to the national assembly. But it will take months to pass them into law. Critics say reforms are not enough - attitudinal change is also needed in a system which sees elections as a “do-or-die affair”, to quote former president Olusegun Obasanjo.

Time is fast running out if Nigeria is to avoid a repeat of the chaotic experience of two years ago. If South Africa and neighbouring Ghana can successfully hold national polls, why can’t Nigeria, Africa’s top oil producer and second biggest economy? Or is it, as some local commentators put it, “a giant with clay feet”?

Professor Thandwa Mthembu is Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the  Central University of Technology, Free State. He writes in his personal capacity.

Based on current information on Jacob Zuma’s beliefs, ideas and practices, what are the prospects for his soon-to-be installed administration in South Africa?
My overall thesis is that Zuma is no less enigmatic than former President Thabo Mbeki, his old rival.

But Zuma is more eclectic in thinking and approach. Books have been written about Mbeki’s enigmatic character. But, one thing certain in the socio-economic governance and administration model he ushered in is that he exhibited neo-liberal and pro-capitalist inclinations that made him appear dogmatic and monolithic. This is evident in his macro-economic policy, Gear. It is also evident in his micro-economic policies. BEE policies, for example, were designed to create a new black middle class and “filthy rich” black people, too.

I believe Zuma is no less enigmatic; but is progressively eclectic. At the personal level, whilst he is incontrovertibly traditionalist, he mingles with the Church, modernists and the like, effortlessly.
Zuma has a deep sense of respect for elders, which is, ironically, an integral part of our moral values. Even though Archbishop Tutu has expressed resentment of Zuma as a person, the ANC leader has avoided any retaliation. That is a marked contrast to Mbeki’s response to Tutu’s criticisms of ANC practices in 2004 (not Mbeki himself) – the then president branded the Nobel peace laureate a self-serving ignoramus, a liar and a populist.

Zuma appears to be at peace with his capabilities or lack thereof. He exhibits no mistaken belief that there is no South African who knows better than he does. He is, therefore, unlikely to assemble teams of Harvard professors to solve South Africa’s problems. He has already shown his preference for local talent and will draw on many local experts to solve South Africa’s problems.
On many occasions, Zuma has made it clear Mbeki-led macro-economic policies, including those of the Reserve Bank, will not change, despite protests from his comrades. Further, he has effectively called for a re-alignment of our affirmative action policies, promising Afrikaners that they could be recalled into government positions that require skills that are acutely lacking. Again, this attests to his belief in the worth of alternative ideas and sections of our society. But, despite this reality, the coalition of the media and opposition parties has not stopped to pronounce his indebtedness to his leftist friends.

Worrying our human rights activists, he has made it clear that the laissez faire approach to criminals is up for review. Intriguingly, his rather conservative views on this matter resonate with those of many sections of our society, some liberals included.

We should, therefore, expect the Zuma administration to be more eclectic, pragmatic and open to varied ideas and approaches. In the process, we should witness different and less dogmatic approaches to solving our problems. More sections of our society should feel they matter and that government is accountable.

William Gumede is the author of “The Democracy Gap: Africa’s Wasted Years” and ”Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC”.

South Africa votes on 22 April with not only its globally admired efforts to build democracy in tatters, but against the backdrop of many other promising attempts to build viable democracies across Africa now backsliding.

Military coups, such as the recent one in Madasgascar, assumed to be part of Africa’s terrible past, appear now to again have become a regular occurrence. The election earlier this year of Muammar Gadaffi - who himself came to power by military coup in Libya - as leader of the African Union, by his peers, is symbolic of the continental regression.

When South Africa became democratic in 1994 with Nelson Mandela at the head, it was hoped that the new democracy at the southern tip of Africa would provide a powerful home-grown impetus for expanding democracy across the continent.

And it initially looked promising, with Mandela’s exemplary moral leadership; and his successor Thabo Mbeki’s initial efforts to champion an African economic, social and democratic ‘renaissance’.

However, soon the African curse struck: Mbeki’s moving rhetoric did not match actual day-to-day practice. While preaching democracy, Mbeki clamped down on internal dissent, packed public watchdogs with uncritical loyalists, and looked the other way when allies were shown to be corrupt or incompetent.

It is inconceivable that the ruling African National Congress, with Jacob Zuma at the helm, will not win South Africa’s national elections. Formidable charges of corruption were dropped against Zuma after the acting head of the national prosecuting authority emphasised that the case against the incoming president was solid, but that possible political interference in the timing of whether to press charges against Zuma made the authority reluctant to press ahead.

Most African independence and liberation movements have failed on three levels in government: leadership, building viable democracies and prudently managing their economies.

Some leaders come to power by violent means and rule through violence. Some start off proclaiming themselves democrats, but once in power turn into autocrats. Some leaders prefer to die in office, as the case of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe.

Lack of democracy and the lack of viable alternatives – either because they are brutally silenced or just irrelevant – are among the reasons why oppressive regimes are ousted in coups.

Yet in the still rare cases where opposition parties remove oppressive ruling parties through the ballot box, they often behave no better in power themselves.

Democracy is invariably seen by most of the continent’s leaders and ruling parties in the most minimalistic way – and meaning only holding the occasional election.

Another problem is that very few post-independence African ruling governments have managed to spread wealth evenly. Invariably the benefits go to the old colonial elite and the new post-colonial ones made up of prominent struggle figures and the liberation or independence ‘aristocracies’. The overwhelming majority remain as poor as before.

It is not that there are no quality leaders in ruling African political movements, it is that the patronage system of these movements is so entrenched that serious new contenders outside these networks cannot break through.

Ruling political movements are often the problem themselves: parties run tyrannically are unlikely to be able to build democratic societies. What makes successful independence or liberation movements, trying to overthrow corrupt colonial administrations, often make for poor governments.

Furthermore, liberation and independence movements often mimic the autocratic governments they fight.

Open elections for the top leadership are discouraged, leadership centralised and opposition is often discouraged.

Doctrinaire positions on economics, whether inspired by the West, the East or romantic notions of past African management styles, makes for woolly economics once in power.

African voters often vote for parties and leaders based on their past struggle record, rather than on actual performance in government. Yet, it is their performance in government that will make a difference in ordinary voters’ lives.

Most African leaders, even the out-and-out dictators, claim to be ruling on behalf of the people. Yet, they experience daily life in a way that is outrageously different to that of the average poor supporter: when ordinary South Africans are besieged by crime, Jacob Zuma spends more in a month on personal security than many might earn in years.

South Africa goes into the election with a number of parties, but in Africa, it is not only whether there is an opposition party that is crucial, but the kind of opposition party.

Sadly, in most African countries opposition parties are hardly relevant.

In South Africa, enthusiasm for the Congress of the People, a splinter from the ANC, has abated, following poor policies, the undemocratic election of its leaders and poor visibility.

The global financial crisis is likely to make daily life even more difficult for ordinary people not only in South Africa, but across Africa.

Such worsening conditions may prove the catalyst for restless long-suffering ordinary Africans to rebel against failing governments.

However, it may also provide unscrupulous, but failing leaders, the excuse to reverse democratic reforms, blaming scapegoats for their own inadequacies, bowing under the pressure from their allies to extend corrupt patronage, or to embark on irresponsible economic populist measures, to bolster their own power.

Most African parties and leaders often still mostly blame outside and internal forces for failures, which block the necessary self-examination.

Yet, unless there is thorough introspection by African political movements themselves, to learn from past failures, viable democracy will remain a distant dream for the continent’s long-suffering ordinary citizens.

Manoah Esipisu is deputy spokesperson at the Commonwealth Secretariat. He is co-author of “Eyes of Democracy: Media in Elections”. He writes in his personal capacity.

Next week South Africa will hold its fourth elections since the extinction of apartheid and the rise to power of freedom icon Nelson Mandela. The election will come four months after the cliff-hanger 2008 election in Ghana, and ahead of potentially critical elections in Angola, Malawi and Mozambique.

Elections do not have a very good reputation in Africa, and, in my view, there are seven reasons why.

Lack of political will

So profound and fundamental is this problem that if it is not addressed it can render all the others irrelevant. A botched election is as a result of a deliberate political decision by somebody to subvert the electoral process in their interest. For example, the (now defunct) Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) did not wake up one day and say “We think that we are going to change the results of this election. We think we are going to mess with the paperwork so no one will know what the result of this election was.” It is clear that there was a deliberate decision by a Mr X or a Mr Y to tell the Commission what to do or what not to do. And because of structural or other reasons beyond my immediate understanding, the Commission (as an institution and its leadership) was vulnerable to that kind of pressure.

The lack of political will partly stems from the winner-takes-all model associated with most democratic processes in Africa. There is so much at stake that no one wants to risk losing. No one wants to be on the outside.  There are really no profound ideological differences in the political parties. It is simply that people who are on the inside want to stay on and people who are on the outside want to get on the inside. Being on the inside means that you are in control. Ultimately it is all about money and power.

Abuse of incumbency

An incumbent will use all the resources at their disposal while in office to try and rig the electoral process or manipulate it to their benefit. This is a significant issue of perennial concern to Africans. It takes various shapes and forms. It could range from an incumbent using vehicles and staff from a government department to subverting money (as was the case in Zambia in 2001). It could also be as nasty as the manipulation of state media, the judiciary and the electoral commission. It is a serious problem.

Weak institutions

Many electoral commissions in Africa are weak and vulnerable. They are not properly independent .The way they are nominated and composed – usually by the executive and without a proper vetting process by parliament, leaves them open to abuse and manipulation. They often do not control their budgets and yet the way that budget is released or not released could impact their performance. Whether they are given adequate staff and whether resources are made available on time are critical to whether they can truly play their role as institutions responsible for democratic transition. The problems cited above could lead to a lack of confidence and a credibility crisis for an electoral commission. That’s why electoral commissions can falter and fail. Sometimes it is no fault of their own. They are designed to fail.

Two other institutions are worth mention. The lack of an independent and credible judiciary could be a death sentence to an election. Where does an aggrieved party or individual turn to if they are unhappy with the process? Conversely, when the judiciary stands up to be counted, it can have a very positive effect. If there is one significant positive that came out of the Nigerian election (April 2007), it was the role of the judiciary. In electoral-related cases filed in Nigerian courts, the judiciary came up with a number of decisions that went against the political will of the administration of Olusegun Obasanjo and is seen as a great positive to emerge from the process that was roundly criticised by domestic and international observers.

State media can also be designed to fail. In Malawi for example, the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) was created as a government agency. The broadcaster’s leaders rightly say that unless parliament changes its mandate, they must serve the government in power. Ahead of elections next month, the MBC on average gives the ruling party more than 90 percent of coverage and the one percent to the opposition is all negative.

Weak political systems

Parties are often vehicles for individuals (which could be fine), but personality politics often provoke conflicts. Personal rivalries and fallings out are sometimes allowed to creep onto the national stage. Sadly, it is not about the name of the party or what it stands for, it all comes down to the name of the individual.

Poor voter registration processes

I often come across poor voter registration processes. On the one level it is a very technical issue. It can be down to a lack of civic education, it can be due to a lack of planning and money and resources. But even where there is cash in abundance, it can still go wrong. Ghana acknowledged that it had an inflated roll in some regions in last December’s election while Bangladesh, which had tens of millions of voters, had a perfect register with a digital photo for voter identification.

If people are not registered to vote, they are denied that right and nothing can be more profound. It gives people who want to be aggrieved after the election a good reason for rejecting the result. A good voter register is also your greatest insurance policy for the integrity of the ballot.

Lack of transparency in results process

Transparency is a key issue. This is a very simple thing but ultimately it can create a lack of confidence, suspicion, tension and then violence. And when someone or a party loses, they can claim to have been cheated. If electoral officials fail to provide adequate transparent proofs that a claim of cheating is erroneous, people will assume that it happened. They will say there is no smoke without fire and they will start using it to whip up tensions.

Lack of inclusivity

At the end of the day, elections are run for voters and political parties – who are the customers. And yet the attitude often in Africa is not to keep the customer happy. The attitude is often to keep the customer outside the shop. The parties and voters are seen as the enemy by the electoral commissions rather than stakeholders. One of the greatest strengths of the Ghanaian election was the existence of an inter-parties advisory committee which sought to fix emerging problems through adequate consultation with all those involved. It is a great thing to undermine rumour and conjecture; it is a great thing to enhance confidence. South Africa has a similar arrangement although the model is different from Ghana’s.

South Africa’s case

The extent to which South Africa tackles these challenges – in next week’s elections and beyond - will provide lessons for the growth of democracy in Africa which, although boosted by the smooth transition in Ghana, is still scarred by the 2007 and 2008 elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe.

Six Ethiopian opposition parties have joined forces to go up against the government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in next year’s parliamentary elections, but their chances of bringing change look slim at best and they complain of heavy-handed tactics by the ruling party.
 
The foremost opposition figure in Africa’s second most populous country, Birtukan Mideksa, a 34-year-old former judge, has been in solitary confinement since December. She was jailed after the first democratic poll in 2005, which ended in rioting that was bloodily suppressed, was pardoned in 2007 and rearrested last year after renouncing the terms of her pardon.
 
Bekele Jirata, a top official from another party, recently spent four months in prison after being accused of working with rebels from the Oromo region. He is now out on bail.
 
The government dismisses opposition accusations that political activity is restricted as baseless. “The political space is continually widening,” Bereket Simon, the government’s head of information, told me recently.
 
Meles points to achievements such as a reduction in infant mortality to 123 deaths for every 1,000 births from 166 in just five years. A programme to help seven million Ethiopians who regularly suffer from food shortages is meant to ensure the catastrophic famine of the mid-1980s is never repeated. Meles is a key regional friend of Washington and sent forces into Somalia to fight Islamists in late 2006, only withdrawing this year.
 
But Western allies and donors are frustrated by what they see as the restrictions on democracy. Human rights groups have cried foul over a new law that restricts groups that get outside funding from working on issues of democracy, human rights or criminal justice. The government says only Ethiopians should be involved in Ethiopian politics.
 
So is the ruling party restricting its rivals unfairly to ensure it keeps power or trying to protect an emerging democracy in a volatile part of the world?

Picture: Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi speaks to Reuters in 2007. Andrew Heavens/Reuters

If anyone in Africa was worried that the global financial crisis might dim China’s interest in the continent, President Hu Jintao will be visiting this week to give some reassurances - as well as possibly to temper any unrealistic hopes for the amount of assistance to be expected.

As Chris Buckley reported from Beijing, this visit is also about China showing the wider world that it is a responsible power.

The fact that none of the countries Hu will visit is among Africa’s economic or resource heavyweights - Mali, Senegal, Tanzania and Mauritius - is seen as a sign that China wants to send a message that its engagement with Africa is about much more than resources.

Trade between China and Africa rose to $107 billion last year and more deals are expected on this visit. Nearly all of Africa’s exports to China still come from a handful of countries rich in oil or minerals, though, and now the global downturn has put those in more doubt.

China’s involvement in Africa is a subject we looked at recently. Alistair Thomson in Dakar found that even if some Chinese investments in Africa were losing their lustre, many Chinese firms were taking a longer-term view to pursue strategic expansion - and some were hunting for bargains. For China, Africa also offers an important destination for exports, as any visit to even the most remote African marketplace will quickly show.

Growing trade relations with China were one of the things seen by Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo in a previous blog post as a way for Africa to emerge better off from the financial crisis and less dependent on Western aid.

But China’s involvement in Africa has brought concern from some in the West - quite apart from those who may stand to lose out on the business front - with some critics saying Beijing’s interest is too focused on the drive to secure resources and pays little heed to the kind of thing that Western donors say they want to promote, such as elections, human rights and the fight against corruption.

Will Africa be able to depend on China in the long term? How healthy is that going to be? What do you think?

Pictures: Money changer Kwami Longange poses for a portrait on a streetcorner in Goma in eastern Congo, February 9, 2009. REUTERS/Finbarr O’Reilly

China’s President Hu Jintao delivers a speech in Beijing December 31, 2008. REUTERS/Jason Lee

“Sub-Saharan Africa: Year of Regression”. That was the heading used by U.S.-based rights group Freedom House in its survey of political freedom in the world published this week.

Of course the Freedom House survey pointed to the coups in Guinea and Mauritania as well as the situation in Zimbabwe, whose elections were condemned by many countries and where the crisis shows no sign of lessening, but there were plenty of other names on the list too:

Senegal - long held up as an example of democracy in Africa - dropped from “free to partly free” because of “a growing authoritarian trend”.

Nigeria suffered a drop “because of the ruling party’s increasing consolidation of power and marginalization of the opposition”.

Measuring freedom might sound like an abstract concept, but investors have cited improvements in governance and democracy, among other reasons, for increased interest in Africa as a whole in recent years. Countries that do better on those scores may find it helps to increase prosperity too.

Twelve of the 48 countries in the survey fell according to the group’s indicators. On the other hand, the report pointed to what it saw as positive developments in Angola, Ivory Coast, Zambia and Comoros.

“Sub-Saharan Africa has seen notable increases in freedom over the past generation, making these recent setbacks all the more disheartening,” said Arch Puddington, Freedom House director of research.

Is it fair to say freedom is on the decline in Africa? Ghana’s election seemed to get 2009 off to a better start that some of last year’s elections on the continent. Is there reason to think that this year may be better overall?

A court ruling that effectively reinstates corruption charges against African National Congress leader Jacob Zuma could hardly have come at a worse moment for him and the party that has dominated South Africa since the end of apartheid.

There appears little doubt that Zuma will be the party’s presidential candidate ahead of elections expected around April, but the ANC now faces its toughest electoral test yet with hefty graft charges hanging over its man.

Prosecutors say the ruling means Zuma remains charged with corruption, fraud and money laundering. This might severely hurt his image, internationally and at home, during a battle to fend off a challenge from the new party of ANC dissidents called COPE. The ANC is still expected to win, but maybe without such a sweeping parliamentary majority to be able to shape laws as it wishes.

The news brought renewed concerns of political instability and the rand fell to a one-month low.

Zuma’s lawyers may appeal to the Constitutional Court, the highest in the country, which will drag out the case further. Zuma has said before he will only step down as president if found guilty of the corruption and fraud charges.

Prosecutors and Zuma may try to secure a deal that will end the long-running saga over charges that Zuma’s supporters see as politically motivated.

A settlement may suit Zuma if it looks as though he will face new charges and a trial that will either coincide with the election, or punctuate the first years of his presidency.

The appeals court ruling is good news for former President Thabo Mbeki, helping to repair his image after being ousted by the ANC in September, following the high court judgement that suggested he interfered to secure charges against Zuma. He cannot be expected to return to government, however.

What should Zuma and the ANC do next? Even if no charges are brought by then, would the case be likely to have an impact on the elections? Would COPE stand to benefit?