Professor Thandwa Mthembu is Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the  Central University of Technology, Free State. He writes in his personal capacity.

Based on current information on Jacob Zuma’s beliefs, ideas and practices, what are the prospects for his soon-to-be installed administration in South Africa?
My overall thesis is that Zuma is no less enigmatic than former President Thabo Mbeki, his old rival.

But Zuma is more eclectic in thinking and approach. Books have been written about Mbeki’s enigmatic character. But, one thing certain in the socio-economic governance and administration model he ushered in is that he exhibited neo-liberal and pro-capitalist inclinations that made him appear dogmatic and monolithic. This is evident in his macro-economic policy, Gear. It is also evident in his micro-economic policies. BEE policies, for example, were designed to create a new black middle class and “filthy rich” black people, too.

I believe Zuma is no less enigmatic; but is progressively eclectic. At the personal level, whilst he is incontrovertibly traditionalist, he mingles with the Church, modernists and the like, effortlessly.
Zuma has a deep sense of respect for elders, which is, ironically, an integral part of our moral values. Even though Archbishop Tutu has expressed resentment of Zuma as a person, the ANC leader has avoided any retaliation. That is a marked contrast to Mbeki’s response to Tutu’s criticisms of ANC practices in 2004 (not Mbeki himself) – the then president branded the Nobel peace laureate a self-serving ignoramus, a liar and a populist.

Zuma appears to be at peace with his capabilities or lack thereof. He exhibits no mistaken belief that there is no South African who knows better than he does. He is, therefore, unlikely to assemble teams of Harvard professors to solve South Africa’s problems. He has already shown his preference for local talent and will draw on many local experts to solve South Africa’s problems.
On many occasions, Zuma has made it clear Mbeki-led macro-economic policies, including those of the Reserve Bank, will not change, despite protests from his comrades. Further, he has effectively called for a re-alignment of our affirmative action policies, promising Afrikaners that they could be recalled into government positions that require skills that are acutely lacking. Again, this attests to his belief in the worth of alternative ideas and sections of our society. But, despite this reality, the coalition of the media and opposition parties has not stopped to pronounce his indebtedness to his leftist friends.

Worrying our human rights activists, he has made it clear that the laissez faire approach to criminals is up for review. Intriguingly, his rather conservative views on this matter resonate with those of many sections of our society, some liberals included.

We should, therefore, expect the Zuma administration to be more eclectic, pragmatic and open to varied ideas and approaches. In the process, we should witness different and less dogmatic approaches to solving our problems. More sections of our society should feel they matter and that government is accountable.

William Gumede is the author of “The Democracy Gap: Africa’s Wasted Years” and ”Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC”.

South Africa votes on 22 April with not only its globally admired efforts to build democracy in tatters, but against the backdrop of many other promising attempts to build viable democracies across Africa now backsliding.

Military coups, such as the recent one in Madasgascar, assumed to be part of Africa’s terrible past, appear now to again have become a regular occurrence. The election earlier this year of Muammar Gadaffi - who himself came to power by military coup in Libya - as leader of the African Union, by his peers, is symbolic of the continental regression.

When South Africa became democratic in 1994 with Nelson Mandela at the head, it was hoped that the new democracy at the southern tip of Africa would provide a powerful home-grown impetus for expanding democracy across the continent.

And it initially looked promising, with Mandela’s exemplary moral leadership; and his successor Thabo Mbeki’s initial efforts to champion an African economic, social and democratic ‘renaissance’.

However, soon the African curse struck: Mbeki’s moving rhetoric did not match actual day-to-day practice. While preaching democracy, Mbeki clamped down on internal dissent, packed public watchdogs with uncritical loyalists, and looked the other way when allies were shown to be corrupt or incompetent.

It is inconceivable that the ruling African National Congress, with Jacob Zuma at the helm, will not win South Africa’s national elections. Formidable charges of corruption were dropped against Zuma after the acting head of the national prosecuting authority emphasised that the case against the incoming president was solid, but that possible political interference in the timing of whether to press charges against Zuma made the authority reluctant to press ahead.

Most African independence and liberation movements have failed on three levels in government: leadership, building viable democracies and prudently managing their economies.

Some leaders come to power by violent means and rule through violence. Some start off proclaiming themselves democrats, but once in power turn into autocrats. Some leaders prefer to die in office, as the case of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe.

Lack of democracy and the lack of viable alternatives – either because they are brutally silenced or just irrelevant – are among the reasons why oppressive regimes are ousted in coups.

Yet in the still rare cases where opposition parties remove oppressive ruling parties through the ballot box, they often behave no better in power themselves.

Democracy is invariably seen by most of the continent’s leaders and ruling parties in the most minimalistic way – and meaning only holding the occasional election.

Another problem is that very few post-independence African ruling governments have managed to spread wealth evenly. Invariably the benefits go to the old colonial elite and the new post-colonial ones made up of prominent struggle figures and the liberation or independence ‘aristocracies’. The overwhelming majority remain as poor as before.

It is not that there are no quality leaders in ruling African political movements, it is that the patronage system of these movements is so entrenched that serious new contenders outside these networks cannot break through.

Ruling political movements are often the problem themselves: parties run tyrannically are unlikely to be able to build democratic societies. What makes successful independence or liberation movements, trying to overthrow corrupt colonial administrations, often make for poor governments.

Furthermore, liberation and independence movements often mimic the autocratic governments they fight.

Open elections for the top leadership are discouraged, leadership centralised and opposition is often discouraged.

Doctrinaire positions on economics, whether inspired by the West, the East or romantic notions of past African management styles, makes for woolly economics once in power.

African voters often vote for parties and leaders based on their past struggle record, rather than on actual performance in government. Yet, it is their performance in government that will make a difference in ordinary voters’ lives.

Most African leaders, even the out-and-out dictators, claim to be ruling on behalf of the people. Yet, they experience daily life in a way that is outrageously different to that of the average poor supporter: when ordinary South Africans are besieged by crime, Jacob Zuma spends more in a month on personal security than many might earn in years.

South Africa goes into the election with a number of parties, but in Africa, it is not only whether there is an opposition party that is crucial, but the kind of opposition party.

Sadly, in most African countries opposition parties are hardly relevant.

In South Africa, enthusiasm for the Congress of the People, a splinter from the ANC, has abated, following poor policies, the undemocratic election of its leaders and poor visibility.

The global financial crisis is likely to make daily life even more difficult for ordinary people not only in South Africa, but across Africa.

Such worsening conditions may prove the catalyst for restless long-suffering ordinary Africans to rebel against failing governments.

However, it may also provide unscrupulous, but failing leaders, the excuse to reverse democratic reforms, blaming scapegoats for their own inadequacies, bowing under the pressure from their allies to extend corrupt patronage, or to embark on irresponsible economic populist measures, to bolster their own power.

Most African parties and leaders often still mostly blame outside and internal forces for failures, which block the necessary self-examination.

Yet, unless there is thorough introspection by African political movements themselves, to learn from past failures, viable democracy will remain a distant dream for the continent’s long-suffering ordinary citizens.

Corruption charges against Jacob Zuma have been dropped, as expected. It’s not an acquittal, the prosecutors said. The ANC leader will have to go back to court for the charges to be formally withdrawn.

Even when they are, critics make the point that a cloud will still hang over the man expected to become South Africa’s next president.

The former head of the Scorpions manipulated the case to cause political damage to Zuma, according to the prosecutors, but some mud may still stick to the Zulu politician.

“The withdrawal of these charges has got absolutely nothing to do with the merits of the case against Jacob Zuma, which have never been seriously challenged. So that cloud will continue to hang over Zuma,” said Alistair Sparks, political analyst at
Standard Bank Securities.

Not everyone agrees, of course. The ANC said the decision to end the 8-year-old case was a victory for the rule of law.

“Never again should we allow persecution of one individual for such a long period of time,” said ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe.

So, is this good for South Africa, in that its next leader will be free to govern without the worry of facing these charges? Or is South Africa paying too heavy a price for this exoneration?

South African prosecutors are considering a legal request by ruling ANC leader Jacob Zuma to drop the graft charges against the man who is expected to be the next president after the elections in April. Zuma has always denied any wrongdoing and his followers say the charges were politically motivated.

A decision to drop the charges would give the African National Congress a big boost ahead of what is expected to be the most closely-contested poll since apartheid ended in 1994. It would also remove a major distraction for Zuma in office and the prospect of court appearances that could tarnish South Africa’s standing abroad.

In the short term, investors might also welcome such a step that removes a source of uncertainty and eases political risk.

Long-term, however, dropping the charges could damage South Africa’s image.

South Africa often boasts about its constitution, but faces rising disquiet about the independence of its judiciary.

A victory for Zuma could add to that sentiment, eroding confidence in the rule of law and stoking fears South Africa is sliding away from the democratic ideals it sought to promote after the end of apartheid. Some foreign investors even worry it could give the impression South Africa is heading in the direction of neighbouring Zimbabwe.

Opposition party COPE said dropping the charges would add weight to perceptions that South Africa is becoming a “banana republic”.

Better to drop the charges or let them stand? What do you think?

A court ruling that effectively reinstates corruption charges against African National Congress leader Jacob Zuma could hardly have come at a worse moment for him and the party that has dominated South Africa since the end of apartheid.

There appears little doubt that Zuma will be the party’s presidential candidate ahead of elections expected around April, but the ANC now faces its toughest electoral test yet with hefty graft charges hanging over its man.

Prosecutors say the ruling means Zuma remains charged with corruption, fraud and money laundering. This might severely hurt his image, internationally and at home, during a battle to fend off a challenge from the new party of ANC dissidents called COPE. The ANC is still expected to win, but maybe without such a sweeping parliamentary majority to be able to shape laws as it wishes.

The news brought renewed concerns of political instability and the rand fell to a one-month low.

Zuma’s lawyers may appeal to the Constitutional Court, the highest in the country, which will drag out the case further. Zuma has said before he will only step down as president if found guilty of the corruption and fraud charges.

Prosecutors and Zuma may try to secure a deal that will end the long-running saga over charges that Zuma’s supporters see as politically motivated.

A settlement may suit Zuma if it looks as though he will face new charges and a trial that will either coincide with the election, or punctuate the first years of his presidency.

The appeals court ruling is good news for former President Thabo Mbeki, helping to repair his image after being ousted by the ANC in September, following the high court judgement that suggested he interfered to secure charges against Zuma. He cannot be expected to return to government, however.

What should Zuma and the ANC do next? Even if no charges are brought by then, would the case be likely to have an impact on the elections? Would COPE stand to benefit?

Given that the leaders of the world’s most firmly capitalist countries are splashing around unprecedented billions to nationalise banks, prop up industry and try to get economies moving, it might seem churlish for anyone to question South Africa’s ruling ANC for planning to spend a bit more freely.

This weekend, the African National Congress set out its election manifesto priorities of creating jobs and improving education and health - promises interpreted by many as marking a generally leftward shift under the leadership of president in waiting Jacob Zuma.

But the plan raises the questions of how the spending will be paid for and how dramatic a shift to the left there will be - of major interest to investors as well as South Africans.

“Zuma did not attach a price tag to the manifesto, but ANC leaders privately admit, to allay fears of a tax hike, that it would be too costly to implement,” said this article in the Sunday Independent.

Africa’s biggest economy has grown significantly since the end of apartheid in 1994, although the dynamism had started to falter even before the global financial crisis spread gloom around the world.

South Africa’s poor and its workers had long complained that the benefits were not being shared around fairly and that only those in a new elite were thriving. The leadership under Zuma, widely expected to become president this year, was always going to be under pressure for more social spending from the ANC grassroots and the party’s union and Communist Party allies.

The pressure may have increased further with the emergence of the new COPE party after the ousting of President Thabo Mbeki. Although COPE’s electoral impact is uncertain and it has not yet spelled out its policies clearly, the fact that close allies of Mbeki are behind it has suggested it is likely to align more with the former president’s stance, seen as ‘pro-business’.

Zuma has always been at great pains to spell out to business leaders and foreign investors that there would be no dramatic changes under his rule. Flight of investment could further weaken the rand, mean job losses just at the moment when the ANC wants to create more and force up government borrowing costs.

That could make it even harder to finance populist pledges without resorting to measures that might create even more financial instability.

This article in South Africa’s Times raised questions over the ANC’s plans for the central bank and whether that would damage its standing as a pillar of macroeconomic stability seen as vital for growth.

It is certainly going to be a very tricky time. How substantial do you think any shift to the left is and would it be for the best? If conflicting promises have been made to different interest groups then which are going to be met? Can they all? If not, then what will be the reaction of those who feel disappointed?

(Picture: President of the ruling African National Congress Jacob Zuma dances on stage at his party’s election campaign launch. Reuters)

Keith Gottschalk, The University of the Western Cape

Jacob Zuma’s legal team has already proved, year after year that, if you have a bottomless pocket such as taxpayers, you can protract litigation, U.S.-style for the better part of a decade.

    The Presidency currently has a line item budget of 10 million rand per year for Zuma’s legal expenses. By South African standards, this is a record. It will certainly enable his legal team to appeal every point of procedure, then if necessary the verdict, and sentence. Each appeal starts with a delay of six or nine months on the court rolls, repeated as it winds it way upwards through a full bench of the High Court, followed by the Supreme Court of Appeal, followed by the Constitutional Court.

    Sooner or later Zuma’s lawyers will also discover that above the highest court in South Africa lies the new Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal, based in Windhoek, already resorted to by Zimbabwean white ranchers.

    In short, it’s unimaginable that Zuma’s trial will have concluded by election day in 2009. The last appeal might well stretch even beyond a one-term Zuma presidency, which would end in 2014.

      There are several analogies in other western-style governments. U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney shrugged off similar allegations to those against Zuma. Israeli Prime Minister Erhud Olmert was not prosecuted for illegally receiving money, but has announced his early retirement.

    Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi faces more serious claims than Zuma - allegations that he bribed judges. Italy’s ruling party reacted by passing a law forbidding the prosecution of a prime minister. Then they retroactively changed corporate accounting law to pre-empt another prosecution. At the same time a top ANC leader smeared South Africa’s judges as “counter-revolutionary”, Berlusconi smeared his judges as “Reds”.

    This reflects badly on Italian democracy, unequal under the law. One law for the rulers and wealthy, and another for the citizens.

 Not even fire-breathing ANC leaders have lowered themselves to the level of Berlusconi’s party, and proposed to change the law to prohibit prosecution of a President, or retroactively neuter the corruption laws. But they have organized massive demonstrations outside every court where Zuma appears. They have hotted up populist rhetoric to the point where words such as “kill” are now routine. These mass rallies and demonstrations by the ANC, COSATU, and SACP ensure that every verdict against Zuma will be de-legitimated in advance as political bias by a judiciary still mostly white.

 Further, the terms of office of almost half the judges of the Constitutional Court will expire soon after President Mbeki’s own term. Should he become President, Jacob Zuma will be in the enviable position of being able, de facto, to select some of the judges before whom he might later appeal.

 In short, should Zuma be found not guilty, the political results would be much rhetorical grandstanding. Should he be found guilty, South Africa’s democracy will be under similar strains to that in Italy or Israel.

 His defence team will in that case no doubt lead in mitigation Zuma’s three decades of service to liberating South Africa, including one decade on Robben Island. Following this, it is indisputable that Zuma played a leading role as negotiator ending civil war in KwaZulu-Natal province during the early 1990s. He then took over from a frail Mandela as facilitator of the Burundi ceasefire talks in the late 1990s. Alongside President Mbeki, Zuma facilitated the Inter-Congo dialogue in 2002 which re-unified the four-way partitioned Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In short, Zuma has indisputably saved tens of thousands of lives in three countries by ending civil wars years earlier than without his efforts. Should Zuma receive a jail sentence, obviously he will be immediately pardoned by his successor as President or Acting President.