Janet Cooper Alexander, a professor at Stanford Law and a scholar of civil procedure and class actions, is not a fan of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion. In an upcoming paper for the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Alexander discusses why, in her view, the high court majority “fundamentally misread” legislative history and congressional intent when it used the Federal Arbitration Act “to advance an agenda that is hostile to consumer litigation and classwide procedures.” Alexander argues that Concepcion‘s overarching endorsement of mandatory arbitration clauses has had a dire impact on the ability of consumers and employees to litigate small claims, since they’re “subject to unilaterally imposed arbitration provisions that overwhelmingly contain class waivers.”
Deference to the decisions of corporate boards is a bedrock principle of Delaware law, embodied in the business judgment rule that guides most Chancery Court analysis. But there are exceptions. In particular, the Delaware Supreme Court has made clear that deals in which a controlling shareholder wants to buy out minority stock owners must be evaluated very carefully, lest the controlling shareholder unduly influence the going-private process. In the landmark 1994 case Kahn v. Lynch, the state high court said that the appropriate standard of review for going-private deals is not business judgment but the entire fairness of the transaction, which gives courts discretion to second-guess the board’s decisions.
U.S. District Judge Otis Wright‘s May 6 ruling in Ingenuity 13 v. John Doe is one of those decisions every lawyer should read. It’s only six pages long and sprinkled with Star Trek references, but its value lies in the cautionary tale outlined by the San Francisco judge. Wright was presiding over one of the many, many cases filed in the last few years by copyright owners suing tens of thousands of defendants over the supposedly illegal downloading of their content via online file-sharing sites. The litigation, as you probably know, is a specialty of pornography producers, whose cases benefit significantly from defendants’ understandable reluctance to be outed (even falsely) as consumers of online pornography. Occasionally defendants or their Internet service providers have stood up to porn purveyors. More often, defendants identified through subpoenas of their ISPs chip up a few thousand bucks to make the whole nightmare go away, leading public interest groups such as Public Citizen and the Electronic Frontier Foundation to call these en masse illegal downloading cases a shakedown operation.
U.S. District Judge Danny Reeves of Frankfort, Kentucky, has just contributed a new episode to the ongoing saga of whether state attorneys general may hire contingency-fee lawyers to prosecute cases on behalf of consumers. Last Thursday, in a thoughtful 33-page opinion, the judge ruled that Kentucky’s attorney general,Jack Conway, has not violated Merck’s constitutional due process rights by using the private firm Garmer & Prather to litigate consumer claims related to Merck’s marketing of the pain reliever Vioxx. Reeves rejected arguments by Merck’s counsel at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom that contingency-fee lawyers should not be permitted to represent the AG in a quasi-enforcement action.
Federal courts in Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee and Michigan may soon be seeing an influx of securities class actions claiming strict liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, thanks to a ruling Thursday by the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in Indiana State District Council of Laborers v. Omnicare. Judge Guy Cole, writing for a panel that also included Judge Richard Griffin and U.S. District Judge James Gwin of Cleveland, found that shareholders asserting Section 11 claims for misrepresentations in offering documents need not show that defendants knew the statements to be false.
A little more than a year ago, when the mortgage lender and onetime Ally Financial subsidiary Residential Capital entered Chapter 11, investors in 392 ResCap mortgage-backed securities trusts announced that they’d reached a pre-bankruptcy deal permitting them an allowed claim of $8.7 billion for ResCap’s breaches of representations and warranties. The deal didn’t promise that investors would end up with $8.7 billion, since they’d be in line behind secured creditors and would have to share with other unsecured creditors in whatever meat remained on ResCap’s carcass. But as I reported at the time, the allowed claim deal did appear to make MBS investors represented by Gibbs & Bruns, Ropes & Gray and Talcott Franklin the biggest unsecured creditors in the bankruptcy.
The doctrine of strict textualism – in which judicial decisions are compelled solely by statutory language – has always reminded me of what my father, an internist, used to say about overeager surgeons: When your only tool is a hammer, every problem is a nail. And when your only judicial philosophy is textualism, every case is a matter of words. Simple enough, right? Wrong. Consider a ruling Friday by a three-judge panel at the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals that turned on the definition of “an event or occurrence.”
Last month, right after U.S. District Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald of Manhattan dismissed class action antitrust and racketeering claims against the global banks that supposedly colluded to manipulate the benchmark London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor), Daniel Brockett of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan politely said, “I told you so.” Brockett had been pushing an alternate theory of liability against the Libor banks, focused on securities and common-law fraud, not on antitrust violations. And even in the Libor litigation wreckage that resulted from Buchwald’s ruling, he said, fraud claims like those filed in March by Freddie Mac’s conservator against a dozen Libor banks were still viable. The only catch was that plaintiffs would have to be able to show that they relied on misrepresentations by panel banks, so cases would probably have to be brought by individual investors with big enough losses in Libor-pegged financial instruments to justify the cost of solo litigation. Nevertheless, Brockett told me he believed those investors were out there.
One of the most salient bits of information in the Justice Department’s civil complaint against Standard & Poor’s and its parent, McGraw-Hill - aside from the revelation that one S&P analyst devised a 2007 dance video riffing on the Talking Heads song “Burning Down the House” – is the amount S&P supposedly earned for rating mortgage-backed securities as banks rushed to squeeze every last dollar from the securitization boom. According to the government, the agency’s Global Asset-Backed Securities Unit was assessing MBS in such a hurry in 2006 and 2007 that S&P rating committees spent less than 15 minutes reviewing analyst evaluations. Yet the agency was rewarded munificently for its efforts. In 2006, S&P was supposedly paid $278 million in fees by the banks whose MBS deals it rated. In 2007 it was paid $243 million for rating MBS.
Attorney-client privilege confers powerful protection over confidential corporate documents. But according to arulingThursday by Chancellor Leo Strine of Delaware Chancery Court, once documents have become public – even if by dubious means – they can be used in litigation.