If Khaled Asadi, a former GE Energy executive who lost his job after alerting his boss to concerns that GE might have run afoul of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, had sued his old employer in New York or Connecticut, things might have worked out differently for him. Several federal trial judges in those jurisdictions have ruled that whistle-blowers who report corporate wrongdoing internally are protected by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, even though the statute defines whistle-blowers as employees who report securities violations to the Securities and Exchange Commission. But Asadi, who worked in GE Energy’s office in Amman, Jordan, filed a claim that the company had illegally retaliated against him in federal district court in Houston. And on Wednesday, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals – with hardly a nod to contrary lower-court decisions in other circuits – ruled that Asadi is not a whistle-blower under Dodd-Frank because he talked to his boss and not the SEC.
Remember UBS’s attempt to play what it considered a get-out-of-jail-free card in the megabillions litigation over mortgage-backed securities UBS and more than a dozen other banks sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? UBS’s lawyers at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom came up with an argument that could have decimated claims against all of the banks: When Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 and established the Federal Housing Finance Agency as a conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, UBS said, lawmakers explicitly extended the one-year statute of limitations on federal securities claims – but neglected to extend, or even mention, the three-year statute of repose. UBS argued that FHFA’s suits, which in the aggregate asserted claims on more than $300 billion in MBS, were untimely because they were filed after the statute of repose expired.
Last spring, when U.S. District Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald of Manhattan decimated the consolidated private litigation over banks’ manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate, the only claims that remained upright in the rubble of her ruling were those brought under the Commodity Exchange Act, which makes tampering with the price of exchange-traded commodities or futures illegal. Buchwald’s opinion cited a plethora of Manhattan federal court decisions that permitted victims of futures price manipulation to move forward with their suits, including three consolidated class actions involving rigged prices for oil futures. I suspect we’re going to be hearing a lot more about those cases over the next several months. Even as the class action bar tries to persuade the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals to reinstate the Libor antitrust claims that Buchwald dismissed, plaintiffs lawyers are gearing up for the next big litigation: claims that BP, Royal Dutch Shell, Statoil and other unidentified conspirators violated commodity and antitrust laws by reporting false prices for North Sea Brent crude oil to the price-setting agency Platts.
Remember the shocking ruling a couple of years ago by U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge Mary Walrath in the bankruptcy of Washington Mutual Inc? In September 2011, Walrath refused to approve a hard-fought $7 billion reorganization plan for WMI because of concerns that four distressed debt hedge funds might have traded WaMu notes based on confidential information they or their lawyers obtained in negotiations to resolve the bankruptcy. The hedge funds were outraged by Walrath’s decision, which they said was wrong on both the facts and the law. Ultimately, however, they agreed to make the whole mess go away by kicking about $30 million of their expected recovery to WMI shareholders, who had first raised the insider trading accusations.
Well, that didn’t take long.
Two weeks ago, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Hollingsworth v. Perry that an advocacy group opposing same-sex marriage could not stand in the shoes of California officials to appeal a trial court ruling that the state’s ban was unconstitutional. Yesterday, the firm that argued in the Supreme Court for same-sex couples, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, filed a letter brief at the 4th Circuit, arguing that under Perry, three public interest groups do not have standing to appeal a trial court ruling against the Consumer Products Safety Commission.
The oil giant BP has recently done a very good job of casting itself as the victim of greedy plaintiffs lawyers looking to get rich by submitting unwarranted claims for businesses that weren’t actually harmed by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Did you see the company’s full-page advertisements to that effect in The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times? Or maybe you read smart pieces by Paul Barrett of BloombergBusinessweek (“How BP Got Screwed on Gulf Oil Spill Claims”) or Joe Nocera of the Times (“Justice, Louisiana Style”), who both pointed out that the court-appointed lawyer serving as the administrator of BP’s multibillion-dollar class action settlement is himself a onetime plaintiffs lawyer – as is the New Orleans federal judge overseeing the deal. (Lawyers representing BP claimants, I should note, dispute just about everything BP says about the judge and the administrator.)
In August of 2012, the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Housing Finance Agency announced that they had amended the terms of Treasury’s investment in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored mortgage lenders under FHFA’s conservatorship. After Fannie and Freddie went into conservatorship in the economic crisis of 2008, Treasury invested more than $100 billion in a new class of senior preferred stock that guaranteed the government first dibs on a percentage of Fannie or Freddie profits. Those seemed like a distant hope in 2008, but by 2012, Fannie and Freddie were, in fact, making money. Preferred shareholders junior to the government believed the mortgage lenders were generating enough profits to pay Treasury’s dividend and leave something for them as well. But in August, FHFA and the government – without consulting Fannie and Freddie junior preferred shareholders – disclosed that under a newly executed “net worth sweep,” Treasury would be receiving all of the profits kicked out by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, then and in the future.
Until fate, in the person of a private investigator, brought her together with a Mississippi whistle-blower lawyer named Timothy Matusheski, Debra Leveski didn’t even know she could sue her former employer, the for-profit university ITT Educational Services, for supposedly duping the federal government. Leveski spent about 10 years working at ITT’s campus in Troy, Michigan, first as a recruitment officer, then in the financial aid office. She left the company in 2006 as part of the settlement of a sexual harassment suit she brought against ITT. Less than six months later, Leveski received a letter from an investigator working for Matusheski, who at the time specialized in False Claims Act suits against for-profit universities, which had come under scrutiny for allegedly enrolling students simply to receive federal student aid funding. Intrigued, Leveski called the investigator and eventually met with Matusheski.
The more we find out about the mostly secret inner workings of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the more questions we should all have about the intersection of national security and Fourth Amendment restrictions on unreasonable searches by government authorities. Based on recent comments by U.S. Supreme Court Justices Elena Kagan and Stephen Breyer, the court is primed for an inevitable constitutional review of the National Security Agency’s program of gathering phone and Internet data from foreign suspects and U.S. citizens alike under provisions of the Patriot Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. That debate will surely center on the Fourth Amendment, but a lesser-known argument that has popped up in some cases challenging FISA wiretaps raises different constitutional objections to the NSA’s widespread data collection. And just as it was in California’s ban on gay marriage, Article III of the Constitution could be the linchpin of any Supreme Court decision on the legality of the NSA program.
You might not expect Dr. Seuss and Jekyll & Hyde to be invoked in oral arguments before the Delaware Supreme Court on the question of whether shareholder derivative breach-of-duty claims against corporate directors can survive a merger when that merger is allegedly the result of the directors’ misconduct. But indeed they were, amid discussion of slippery, transmogrified claims that left four Delaware justices (as well as lawyers on both sides) searching for analogies.