The biggest news to come out of Tuesday’s ongoing hearing to evaluate Bank of America’s proposed $8.5 billion settlement with investors in 530 Countrywide mortgage-backed securities trusts is that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency gave Bank of America clearance to put Countrywide into bankruptcy if Countrywide’s liabilities threatened BofA’s existence. Or at least that’s what Kathy Patrick of Gibbs & Bruns, who represents 22 institutional investors that negotiated the proposed deal with BofA and Countrywide MBS trustee Bank of New York Mellon, said her clients were told by BofA Chief Risk Officer Terry Laughlin in 2011 as they tried to come to terms on a settlement of investor claims that Countrywide breached representations and warranties about the underlying mortgage loans. To my knowledge, Patrick’s assertion – which was intended to support her argument that MBS investors risked getting much less than $8.5 billion for their put-back claims – is, if true, the first tangible indication that Bank of America ever did more than hypothesize bankruptcy for Countrywide.
Objectors to the proposed settlement, meanwhile, scored points with their argument that BNY Mellon had options aside from acquiescing to what AIG counsel Michael Rollin of Reilly Pozner called “a sweetheart deal for BofA.” Both Rollin and his partner Daniel Reilly, who occupied most of the three hours of opening arguments by objectors (including 22 AIG-related entities, several Federal Home Loan Banks, the investment manager Triaxx and a variety of pension funds and local banks), emphasized that after the Countrywide MBS trustee received a demand letter from Gibbs & Bruns on behalf of major institutional investors, the trustee could simply have begun requesting loan files from BofA as the servicer of Countrywide MBS trusts, evaluating those loan files for material breaches, and demanding that Bank of America repurchase defective loans.
Rollin played a deposition clip from a BofA servicing executive, who said it was the bank’s official policy to repurchase loans that breached representations and warranties. That statement alone, Rollin said, proved the fallacy of arguments that BNY Mellon and the Gibbs & Bruns investor group could not have pierced the corporate veil to tag Bank of America with successor liability for Countrywide’s breaches. The trustee could simply have asserted put-backs to BofA as the servicer, Rollin suggested, without ever getting into the quagmire of successor liability. After all, the Reilly Pozner lawyers argued, the $8.5 billion settlement amounts to the put-back of only 2.5 percent of the 1.6 million mortgages underlying 530 Countrywide MBS trusts covered by the deal. Had BNY Mellon taken the alternative route of demanding the put-back of defective loans, they said, the trustee could have forced BofA to buy back a higher percentage of loans.
“The trustee wants your honor to believe that this settlement was the only way,” Rollin told New York State Supreme Court Justice Barbara Kapnick. “But it wasn’t the only way. There were other ways to achieve more.”
But for a hearing that is supposed to determine whether Bank of New York Mellon made a reasonable and good-faith decision to settle put-back claims on behalf of all 530 Countrywide MBS trusts, there was an awful lot of hostility exchanged Tuesday by lawyers for the two camps of MBS investors in the case, the Gibbs & Bruns group that negotiated the deal and the AIG-led coalition that opposes it.