Opinion

Alison Frankel

Rakoff ripples: NY court says SEC boilerplate no defense

Alison Frankel
Dec 15, 2011 10:17 EST

In 2006, Bear Stearns entered a $250 million settlement of Securities and Exchange Commission allegations that its traders engaged in illicit market timing for certain preferred customers. Like scores of SEC defendants concerned with liability in related civil litigation, Bear insisted on the language that’s become boilerplate in SEC settlements. So “without admitting or denying” the SEC’s findings, the bank agreed to disgorge $160 million and pay a $90 million penalty.

Bear and its successor, JPMorgan Chase, turned to Bear’s insurers to cover the disgorgement. (Penalties aren’t indemnified in Bear’s policy.) The insurance agreements said the bank was covered for damages awards and charges incurred by regulatory investigations, with one catch: The policies excluded claims “based upon or arising out of any deliberate, dishonest, fraudulent, or criminal act or omission,” if there were a final adjudication reflecting that wrongdoing.

No problem, right? The SEC settlement explicitly said that Bear didn’t admit deliberate or dishonest behavior when it agreed to the disgorgement. The insurers, represented by DLA Piper, Drinker Biddle & Reath and several other firms, balked at paying, but JPMorgan, with counsel from Proskauer Rose, sued to enforce the policies. In September 2010, New York State Supreme Court Justice Charles Ramos agreed that Bear hadn’t admitted anything. “An insured’s settlement or consent to entry of an order with the SEC, wherein it did not admit guilt, will not preclude if from disputing those findings in subsequent litigation with its insurers,” Ramos wrote in an order refusing to dismiss JPMorgan’s suit. “The [SEC settlement] does not contain an explicit finding that Bear Stearns directly obtained ill-gotten gains or profited by facilitating these trading practices.”

Ramos’s decision was issued before the SEC’s “neither admit nor deny” boilerplate became a source of controversy, thanks to U.S. District Senior Judge Jed Rakoff of Manhattan federal court. I’ve speculated on the consequences if other judges opt to abide by the rules Rakoff seems to want to impose on corporate defendants setting with federal agencies. But a ruling Tuesday by the New York state Appellate Division, First Department, suggests the boilerplate language that Ramos cited — and Rakoff has derided — may no longer offer defendants much benefit even without judges specifically rejecting it.

As my Reuters colleague Joseph Ax reported, the appeals court dismissed the JPMorgan suit against the insurers. But the decision’s implications may be broader than that. In an opinion written by Justice Richard Andrias, the state judges simply didn’t pay much heed to the SEC “neither admit nor deny” boilerplate. “Read as a whole,” the decision said, “the offer of settlement, the SEC Order … and related documents are not reasonably susceptible to any interpretation other than that Bear Stearns knowingly and intentionally facilitated illegal late trading for preferred customers, and that the relief provisions of the SEC Order required disgorgement of funds gained through that illegal activity.” Moreover, in a footnote, the opinion referred explicitly to Rakoff’s criticism of SEC boilerplate in SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor.

JPMorgan counsel John Gross of Proskauer referred my call to a JPMorgan spokesman, who didn’t get back to me. Insurance counsel Joseph Finnerty III of DLA Piper didn’t return a call for comment.

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COMMENT

Interestingly, Judge Ramos is now presiding over the Ambac suit against EMC, Bear Stearns and JP Morgan. I wonder how his view of those defendants will be affected by having presided over their prior lawsuit with their insurers.

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$315 ml Merrill deal shines light on damages in MBS litigation

Alison Frankel
Dec 6, 2011 18:13 EST

A filing late Monday confirmed what I reported last month: Merrill Lynch has agreed to a $315 million settlement of a securities class action stemming from 18 Merrill mortgage-backed note offerings. This agreement is the fourth MBS securities settlement, following this summer’s landmark $125 million Wells Fargo class action deal and a pair of settlements with Citigroup and Deutsche Bank, totaling $165.5 million, that National Credit Union Agency reached in November. The Merrill agreement, negotiated by lead class counsel at Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann, is by far the biggest score so far for MBS investors in a securities suit (as opposed to contract, or put-back, litigation).

There are dozens more MBS securities suits out there, as the Merrill settlement agreement acknowledges: the deal carves out claims by AIG, the Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and other MBS investors that have already filed their own securities suits against Merrill Lynch. But one of the big mysteries of the MBS securities litigation has been how to value the cases, since there’s so little precedent in the way of settlements. The NCUA deals helped; the credit-union regulator repackaged and resold mortgage-backed securities belonging to five failed credit unions, so the agency actually knew how much the credit unions lost through their MBS investments. In its talks with Citi and Deutsche Bank (which the agency didn’t formally sue), NCUA was able to claim specific, fact-based damages.

The Merrill settlement documents provide significantly more insight for plaintiffs who don’t have the luxury of U.S. government backing to sell repackaged mortgage-backed securities. The documents don’t disclose the class’s specific damages claim; the case settled before investors filed their damages expert’s report. But the exhibits included along with the settlement brief indicate a methodology for calculating damages that other plaintiffs can use. MBS defendants, including Merrill Lynch, will undoubtedly continue to assert that MBS noteholders shouldn’t recover anything for their securities claims because they’re sophisticated investors who knew the riskiness of mortgage-backed notes. But as hundred-million-dollar settlements pile up, that’s a tougher argument to sell.

The Merrill class members, like most MBS securities plaintiffs, based their claims on Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, which holds that investors can recover damages if a registration statement contains false or misleading statements. (It’s a handy theory for investors, who don’t have to show fraudulent intent.) Section 11 includes three means of calculating damages. If investors sold their securities before bringing suit, their damages are the difference between what they paid for the stocks or bonds and the price the securities fetched. If they’re still holding their investment on the day the suit is filed, damages are defined as the difference between what they paid and the value of the securities on the filing date. If they sell while the litigation is underway, they’re permitted to claim the lesser of those two amounts.

That sounds simple, but when you’re trying to calculate the value of notes belonging to thousands of investors who bought and sold at different times in the illiquid MBS market, it’s not. Bernstein Litowitz and its experts did the next best thing. According to a table at the end of this exhibit to the memo in support of settlement, the class estimated the value of each tranche of every one of the 18 offerings in the class action had lost. (The table expresses the value of each MBS tranche on the day the suit was filed as a percentage of the offering price; so, for example, the most senior tranche in the table’s first-listed MBS offering was worth 58.26 percent of its par value on the day the suit was filed, while the lowest tranche was worth only 1.38 percent of its offering price.) The chart doesn’t tally up total losses based on the difference between the offering value and the value on the filing date, but Bernstein Litowitz said in the settlement memo that the calculation “amounts to billions of dollars in the aggregate.”

So why did the plaintiffs firm settle for $315 million? For starters, if the case had gone to summary judgment and then trial, Merrill and its parent, Bank of America, would have disputed the class’s estimate of the value of investors’ securities on the day the suit was filed (and thus, the class’s damages). Mortgage-backed notes aren’t like stocks trading in a robust market, so there’s a lot of wiggle room in pricing them. The notes are also unlike stocks in that many of them are still paying principal and interest, at least in the senior tranches, so the defense could assert price declines are illusory.

Moreover, Merrill’s lawyers at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom would also have argued that any lost value in the securities was due to the economic downturn, not to misrepresentations in the registration materials. As Bernstein Litowitz wrote in the settlement memo: “Defendants asserted throughout the litigation — and were expected to continue to assert through summary judgment and trial — that the overall economic downturn, housing price declines, and reduced liquidity, not the alleged untrue statements and omissions, were to blame for the decline in the certificates’ value. … If successful in establishing their negative causation defense or other affirmative defenses, it is anticipated that defendants would argue that estimated damages were substantially less or zero.”

The $315 million proposed settlement still has to be approved by U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff, who is overseeing the Merrill MBS class action. Bernstein Litowitz did not file a fee request as part of the settlement agreement.

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Rakoff’s rules: What if other judges did it?

Alison Frankel
Dec 1, 2011 09:59 EST

On Tuesday, as you probably heard, Facebook reached a settlement with the Federal Trade Commission to resolve allegations that it deceived users about how it used their personal information. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg said publicly that “we made a bunch of mistakes.” But you won’t find any such admission in Facebook’s proposed settlement agreement with the FTC. In that document, Facebook “expressly denies the allegations set forth in the [FTC] complaint.”

There’s a similar denial of wrongdoing from Merck, which last week reached a $950 million resolution of the Justice Department’s civil and criminal allegations that it falsely marketed the painkiller Vioxx. Even though Merck pled guilty to a misdemeanor violation for off-label marketing and agreed to pay a $322 million criminal penalty, the company said it wasn’t admitting liability or wrongdoing in the civil portion of the DOJ settlement, for which it agreed to pony up $628 million.

Over at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, meanwhile, regulators obtained a $24 million settlement in early November with a North Carolina company called Queen Shoals. But if you check out the Queen Shoals consent order entered by a North Carolina federal judge, you’ll see that the defendants “neither admit nor deny” the CFTC’s allegations. And in the Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation’s most recently disclosed enforcement agreement, an October 20 settlement with the First Community Bank of Santa Rosa, Calif., the bank resolved allegations “without admitting or denying any [FDIC] charges of unsafe or unsound banking practices.”

I could go on, citing DOJ Antitrust Division consent decrees, Environmental Protection Agency settlements with polluters, Food and Drug Administration enforcement deals, but you get the idea: government agencies routinely reach civil settlements that permit corporate defendants to resolve allegations without actually admitting they did anything wrong. Such concessions by the government are the grease that keeps the wheels of civil enforcement turning. Defendants agree to pay penalties and change their behavior as long as they don’t have to make admissions that could hamper their defense in related private litigation.

That’s why the Securities and Exchange Commission was so peeved by Senior U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff‘s ruling Monday, which holds that the SEC’s boilerplate “neither admit nor deny” settlement language obscures the truth of the agency’s allegations. Rakoff held that it’s not fair, reasonable, or in the public’s interest for him to approve a settlement without knowing the “cold, hard, solid facts, established either by admission or by trials.” SEC Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami, in an unusually heated response, said in a statement that Rakoff’s ruling “ignores decades of established practice throughout federal agencies and decisions of the federal courts.”

As Khuzami noted — and as Andrew Longstreth has reported for On the Case — there are consequences to demanding admissions of wrongdoing from defendants. Going to trial against recalcitrant corporations takes resources that would otherwise go to enforcement actions against other allegedly wayward businesses. Khuzami (and Longstreth) focused only on the costs to the SEC, but if other federal judges adopted Rakoff’s standard, the ripples would extend across the pool of government enforcement. There’s no good reason, after all, to distinguish between the SEC and the other government agencies that make similar compromises in settlement deals.

Imagine the impact. These days it’s news when a judge questions a government agency’s civil settlement (see, for instance, this Reuters report on U.S. District Judge Emmett Sullivan criticizing a deal in which Barclays resolved allegations of violating trade sanctions). If judges begin rejecting regulatory agreements in which defendants don’t concede liability, all hell will break loose. The enforcement system as we know it simply wouldn’t function.

But maybe it’s time for a little regulatory paradigm shifting. Kevin LaCroix at the D&O Diary read Rakoff’s ruling to require only that Citi agree to the non-admission admission the SEC extracted from Goldman Sachs last year when Goldman agreed a $535 settlement of similar allegations that it misled investors about a designed-to-fail collateralized debt obligation. Rakoff said the SEC’s agreement with Goldman contained an “express admission” from the bank, but really, Goldman only “acknowledged” that its marketing materials for the CDO “contained incomplete information,” and called the omission “a mistake” that it “regrets.” The language is careful; Goldman didn’t actually concede illegal or even improper conduct, which limits the impact of the admission in private litigation.

Can Citi — and other corporate defendants — live with acknowledging mistakes, as long as those mistakes don’t specifically amount to illegality? Rakoff has challenged regulators and his fellow judges to find that out.

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Chief judge: Rakoff assignment to Citi case was ‘totally random’

Alison Frankel
Nov 30, 2011 11:30 EST

If there’s one federal jurist the Securities and Exchange Commission absolutely, positively did not want to see at the top of the docket in its $285 million settlement with Citigroup, it was Senior Judge Jed Rakoff of Manhattan federal court. Rakoff has been a festering sore for the agency since 2009, when he rejected a proposed $33 million settlement with Bank of America over failing to disclose bonus payments to Merrill Lynch executives in merger-related documents. In a March 2011 opinion in the Vitesse Semiconductor case, Rakoff took the agency to task for agreeing to settlements in which defendants neither admit nor deny wrongdoing. Then in July he claimed jurisdiction over the SEC’s case against former Goldman Sachs director Rajit Gupta, accusing the agency of forum shopping in filing an administrative action against Gupta. You can only imagine the teeth-gnashing at the SEC when Rakoff was assigned the Citi case. After the SEC tried to argue that Rakoff doesn’t have the power to consider the public interest in his evaluation of the proposed settlement, Monday’s rejection of the settlement was practically a foregone conclusion.

So you may be wondering — as I was — how it is that Rakoff ended up with the Citi case. The answer, according to his chambers and Chief Judge Loretta Preska of the Southern District, is that the assignment was purely random. Yes, there are 41 federal district judges in the district, so the odds of any of them overseeing multiple, unrelated cases filed by the same plaintiff are long. But according to Preska and Rakoff’s chambers, that’s what happened here.

The SEC filed the Citigroup case in federal court in Manhattan, rather than Washington, D.C. (where it filed a $75 million settlement with Citi in 2010) because the new Citi case includes SEC charges against Brian Stoker, a Citi Global Markets employee who allegedly structured and marketed the CDO that’s at the bottom of the case. Unlike the two Citi employees in the 2010 case, Stoker refused to settle with the agency. So in anticipation of litigation with him, the agency filed the entire Citi case in New York.

Once it was filed, it went into what’s known in the Southern Distrrict as “the wheel.” Preska said there are actually different wheels for each category of civil suit, but each active judge is equally represented on each wheel. (They’re also not actual wheels, but electronic simulations.) Rakoff is a senior judge, which means he can pick and choose which civil wheels he’s on. But like many of the judges who recently took senior status in the Southern District, he’s still on all of the civil wheels. He’s no more likely than any other judge in the district, in other words, to be assigned any particular case.

“It’s wholly random,” Preska told me. “There is no under-the-table nothing.” Rakoff’s chambers confirmed that both the BofA and Citi cases were assigned to the judge by random.

The Gupta case was a somewhat different matter. Under the Southern District’s rules, criminal cases and SEC enforcement actions “arising from the same alleged fraud” are assigned to the same judge. So once Rakoff was assigned the Galleon insider trading cases, the SEC’s Gupta action was considered related. (Lawyers in civil cases in Manhattan federal court can also indicate that new complaints are related to pending cases, which, as I’ve explained, is how Rakoff came to oversee so much of the district court litigation related to the Bernard Madoff liquidation.)

And before we get caught up in alternative conspiracy theories about how Rakoff got the Citi case, we should remember that the SEC’s litigation with BofA and Citi stand out mainly for the way Rakoff handled those cases. Rakoff wasn’t assigned the agency’s $535 million settlement with Goldman Sachs, which was approved by U.S. District Judge Barbara Jones of Manhattan federal court, nor the SEC’s $154 million deal with JPMorgan Chase, which got a green light from Manhattan federal judge Richard Berman in June 2011.

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COMMENT

“I worry about “experts” who go unchallenged by
public scrutiny”, from Telling Lies by Paul Eckman

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Mets ruling could upend Madoff bankruptcy

Alison Frankel
Sep 28, 2011 18:27 EDT

Helen Chaitman of Becker & Poliakoff represents more than 300 investors who had accounts with Bernard Madoff. For more than two years she’s hammered away at one particular argument in federal bankruptcy court, in Congress, even on YouTube: Madoff bankruptcy trustee Irving Picard of Baker & Hostetler shouldn’t be allowed to demand the return of profits that Madoff investors pulled out of their accounts as long ago as 2002, six years before the Ponzi scheme imploded in December 2008. On Tuesday night, Chaitman finally found vindication, even though it wasn’t in any of her cases. Manhattan federal judge Jed Rakoff, ruling in Picard’s fraud case against the owners of the New York Mets, concluded that a section of the federal bankruptcy code precludes Picard from attempting to claw back money Madoff investors pulled out of the Ponzi scheme before 2006.

“This is something I’ve been saying from the beginning,” Chaitman told me. “Anyone who didn’t withdraw their money in the last two years [of Madoff's scheme] is out completely.” Jonathan Landers of Milberg, who represents 30 clawback clients, agreed: “This is a very, very significant ruling.”

That’s putting it mildly. Judge Rakoff’s 18-page ruling could completely upend the Madoff bankruptcy. Among the big-name Madoff investors who would be off Picard’s hook completely if Rakoff’s ruling stands is former Securities and Exchange Commission general counsel David Becker, who’s in hot water for allegedly failing to alert SEC commissioners of a potential conflict of interest stemming from his parents’ long-closed Madoff account. Picard had filed a clawback suit against Becker, who inherited money after his parents’ account was liquidated in 2002; Rakoff’s ruling would wipe out Picard’s suit.

Other big winners from Rakoff’s ruling could be Madoff’s surviving children, who would still face a $58.7 million clawback claim for their two-year withdrawals but not claims on another $83.3 million they withdrew between 2002 and 2006, according to Picard’s 2009 complaint. Bank Medici founder Sonja Kohn’s clawback exposure would be reduced from $38.8 million to $11.2 million. Madoff’s early alleged enablers Frank Avellino and Michael Bienes would be looking at $17.2 million in clawback claims, not $56 million. Hard luck Madoff investor Melvyn Weiss, the onetime securities class action kingpin who was convicted for paying kickbacks to name plaintiffs, won’t see much relief from Rakoff’s ruling. His two-year exposure is $17.5 million, only $2 million less than Picard’s six-year claim.

Under Rakoff’s ruling, Madoff mentor Jeffrey Picower’s clawback liability would have been slashed from $2.4 billion to a fraction of that amount. But according to Picower counsel William Zabel of Schulte Roth & Zabel, the reduction in Picower’s case is “irrelevant,” since his widow decided to return $7.2 billion to the Madoff estate to remove any taint from her foundation.

Picard has asserted a total of about $8 billion in clawback claims, seeking the return of fictitious profits withdrawn from Madoff Securities accounts. That total includes claims against the financial institutions, such as UBS, UniCredit, and HSBC that allegedly abetted Madoff’s fraud. If Judge Rakoff’s ruling stands, about $5 billion of those clawbacks would be disallowed because the money was withdrawn before 2006.

The decision is obviously a boon to the Mets owners and their lawyers at Davis Polk & Wardwell. The judge left standing only one of Picard’s fraud counts against the Mets, limiting the Madoff trustee’s potential recovery to no more than $386 million, rather than the nearly $1 billion in principal and profits Picard wanted. Moreover, for Picard to get his hands on any of the Mets owners’ principal, he will have to prove they were “willfully blind,” a prospect Judge Rakoff doesn’t seem to consider very likely. He said Picard’s evidence that the Mets owners deliberately ignored warnings of Madoff’s fraud was sufficient to get past the Mets’ motion to dismiss but still “less than overwhelming.”

That’s only the beginning of this ruling’s story, though. Judge Rakoff has offered an interpretation of the intersection of bankruptcy and securities laws that could extend well beyond the Madoff bankruptcy. Bankruptcy lawyers are just beginning to parse the decision, but there’s no doubt that if it stands, it could have profound implications for bankruptcy trustees trying to recover money for defrauded investors.

Rakoff’s ruling is based on a provision of the federal bankruptcy code that offers a so-called “safe harbor” in cases involving stock brokerages and securities contracts. The provision restricts a bankruptcy trustee’s ability to undo securities transactions except in cases of actual fraud. The intent of the provision was to quell market chaos, putting a two-year time limit on a trustee’s attempts to go after counterparties in stock deals. The safe harbor cuts out fraudulent conveyance claims based on state laws, which often have longer time frames. (New York, for instance, has a six-year statute of limitations on fraud, which is the source of Picard’s assertion that he can recover fictitious profits dating back six years.)

In the Madoff Chapter 11, Manhattan bankruptcy court judge Burton Lifland ruled that the safe harbor provision doesn’t apply in the Madoff case. Federal appeals courts have found that the provision does not apply to Ponzi schemes, and Manhattan federal court senior judge Kimba Wood recently ruled, albeit indirectly, that the safe harbor doesn’t come into play in the Madoff case.

Judge Rakoff, however, found it does. He concluded that under a June 2011 ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a case involving a trustee’s attempt to recover money from a redemption of Enron debt, he must look at the plain language of the safe harbor provision. And under a strict reading of the law, he said, Madoff investors are shielded from fraudulent conveyance claims except in instances of actual fraud. “Because Madoff Securities was a registered stock brokerage firm,” the judge wrote. “The liabilities of customers like [the Mets owners] are subject to the ‘safe harbor’ provision.” Madoff’s contracts with his customers, Judge Rakoff wrote, fell under the provision’s definition of a securities contract; and his customers’ withdrawals from their accounts constituted “settlement payments” or transfers “in connection with a securities contract” under the language of the law.

Rakoff expressly rejected arguments by Picard’s Baker & Hostetler lawyers that Congress did not intend the safe harbor to protect investors who cashed out fictitious profits, because seeking the return of their ill-gotten withdrawals would have no effect on the broader market. They also argued that Congress meant the law to protect only brokers, not investors. Judge Rakoff said that didn’t matter. “Resort to legislative history is inappropriate where, as here, the language of the statute is plain and controlling on its face,” he wrote.

Landers of Milberg said Rakoff’s interpretation was compelled by the Second Circuit’s Enron decision, which holds that “there’s no squirreling around with [the provision]-if it applies, it applies.”

Picard has no automatic right to appeal Judge Rakoff’s ruling, but must petition the judge to grant leave for an appeal. Spokeswoman Amanda Remus declined comment on the trustee’s plans.

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COMMENT

This looks like it should not be a surprise to the lawyers. So it’s hard to see how it makes a difference anywhere but on TV.

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