Has there ever been a more lopsided multibillion-dollar case than the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s fraud litigation against the banks that sold mortgage-backed securities to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? I don’t think U.S. District Judge Denise Cote of Manhattan, who is overseeing securities fraud suits against 11 banks that haven’t already settled with the conservator for Fannie and Freddie, has sided with the banks on any major issue, from the timeliness of FHFA’s suits to how deeply the defendants can probe Fannie and Freddie’s knowledge of MBS underwriting standards in the late stages of the housing bubble. But even in that context, Judge Cote’s summary judgment ruling Monday – gutting the banks’ defenses against FHFA’s state-law securities claims – is a doozy.
In 2012, five African-American Detroit homeowners and a Michigan legal services group asserted a notably creative legal theory in a class action against Morgan Stanley. Their lawyers at Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein and the American Civil Liberties Union acknowledged that Morgan Stanley didn’t write the supposedly predatory mortgages that victimized African-American borrowers in Detroit. Those housing-bubble mortgages were originated by New Century, a notorious subprime lender that went under in 2007. But the suit argued that New Century was writing loans to feed Morgan Stanley’s securitization machine. Because Morgan Stanley wanted to bundle certain types of subprime loans into its mortgage-backed securities, the theory went, its policies guided New Century’s predatory practices. So according to the homeowners’ suit, Morgan Stanley was actually responsible for the disparate impact of New Century’s discriminatory lending.
A few months ago, plaintiffs’ lawyers at Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd created quite a stir when they filed thousands of pages of deposition transcripts and other juicy discovery in an investors’ fraud case against Morgan Stanley, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. The documents — exhibits to the investors’ summary judgment motion — included never-before-seen internal communications between Morgan Stanley and the rating agencies as they worked on a structured investment vehicle known as Cheyne, putting on public display the allegedly half-cocked evaluations that Moody’s and S&P performed in 2005, when they were swamped with subprime mortgage-backed financial instruments to rate.