Opinion

Alison Frankel

U.S. stays out of Argentina pari passu case at SCOTUS – for now

Alison Frankel
Mar 26, 2014 19:18 UTC

France, Brazil and Mexico told the U.S. Supreme Court this week that the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals has endangered sovereign debt markets with its ruling last year against the Republic of Argentina. In amicus briefs supporting Argentina’s petition for Supreme Court review, the foreign sovereigns argue that the 2nd Circuit gravely misinterpreted the so-called “pari passu” (or equal footing) clause of Argentina’s sovereign debt contracts. By ruling that Argentina may not pay bondholders who exchanged defaulted bonds for restructured debt before it pays hedge fund creditors that refused to exchange their defaulted bonds, the amicus briefs argue, the 2nd Circuit has undermined international debt restructurings, permitting vulture investors to hold entire foreign economies hostage.

The United States made quite similar arguments, as you may recall, when Argentina’s pari passu case was before the 2nd Circuit. But there’s no filing from the Justice Department among the 10 new amicus briefs urging the Supreme Court to take Argentina’s appeal. Does that mean Argentina has lost its most influential friend in the U.S. court system?

It does not, but it does mean that the administration is waiting for an invitation from the Supreme Court justices before it takes a position in the Argentina pari passu case. And there’s at least some chance the invitation will never come.

It has become rare in recent years for the Justice Department, via the solicitor general, to file an amicus brief on a cert petition without the justices asking to hear the government’s position, said Thomas Goldstein of Goldstein & Russell (and Scotusblog). Unless a government employee is a party in the case, Goldstein told me in an email, the SG “almost never” opines on cert petitions without a specific invitation from the Supreme Court.

Goldstein’s interpretation suggests that we shouldn’t infer anything from the Justice Department’s absence from this week’s amicus briefing for Argentina. The solicitor general may simply be waiting for the justices to invite a brief expressing the views of the Justice Department, which is the typical procedure. In a different Supreme Court case between Argentina and the hedge funds that hold billions of dollars in judgments against it – this one involving the extent of discovery the hedge funds can conduct on Argentine assets they hope to seize to satisfy those judgments – the solicitor general didn’t opine on Argentina’s cert petition until the Supreme Court asked for a brief. The Justice Department ended up agreeing with Argentina that the justices should take the case, then filed a brief supporting Argentina on the merits when the court granted cert. (That case is scheduled for argument next month.)

At Halliburton argument, justices show little appetite for killing Basic

Alison Frankel
Mar 5, 2014 20:25 UTC

After oral arguments Wednesday morning at the U.S. Supreme Court in Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund, I ran into a few securities class action plaintiffs lawyers in the court’s lobby, at the statue of Chief Justice John Marshall. They were looking jaunty indeed. The consensus in their little group was that the justices showed little inclination to toss out the 1988 precedent that has been the foundation of the megabillion-dollar securities class action industry. They regarded Wednesday’s argument as a hopeful portent that classwide securities fraud litigation is likely to survive the Supreme Court’s re-examination of Basic v. Levinson.

I have to agree. From the questions posed to Halliburton counsel Aaron Streett of Baker Botts and EPJ Fund lawyer David Boies of Boies, Schiller & Flexner, the Supreme Court seems to be searching for a way to require investors to demonstrate the price impact of alleged corporate misrepresentations in order to win class certification. That would be a new and different burden for the securities class action bar, which, under Basic’s fraud-on-the-market theory, simply had to show that shares traded in an efficient market in order to invoke the presumption that investors relied on corporate misstatements. To establish price impact, plaintiffs would have to hire experts to conduct event studies analyzing the market effect of particular misrepresentations. But such event studies are already common in securities class action litigation, as both sides acknowledged to the justices. So a new price impact requirement would leave the securities class action industry more or less intact. “We can live with that,” one plaintiffs lawyer told me.

If oral argument is a reliable predictor of the Supreme Court’s ultimate direction – a dicey proposition, of course – all of the lawyers and economic experts who worried they’d be scrabbling for work if the court overruled Basic can relax a bit. In fact, if the justices figure out some way to make price impact part of the class certification process, economics consultants could actually emerge from the Supreme Court’s scrutiny of Basic with more securities fraud business than ever.

As Basic hangs in the balance, next SCOTUS securities case looms

Alison Frankel
Mar 4, 2014 19:28 UTC

On Wednesday, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund, the most momentous securities case of the last quarter century. When this term ends in June, we’ll know whether the fraud-on-the-market theory that the Supreme Court codified in the 1988 case Basic v. Levinson will remain intact as the foundation of the securities class action industry or whether shareholders will lose the leverage of classwide damages claims for supposed fraud under the Exchange Act of 1934. I’ve been saying it for months: Untold billions of dollars hang on the justices’ determination in the Halliburton case.

The stakes are admittedly not quite as high in Omnicare v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension, which the justices have just agreed to hear next term. Omnicare presents the question of whether plaintiffs asserting claims under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 must only show that defendants made objectively false statements in offering documents – as the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals held in the Omnicare case – or must also show that defendants didn’t believe the supposedly false statements at the time they were made, as at least two other federal circuits have concluded. Section 11 class actions, as you know, aren’t historically as prevalent as Exchange Act fraud class actions. But if the Supreme Court overturns Basic v. Levinson, Securities Act claims will be one of the few remaining avenues for shareholders who want to sue through class actions. The justices’ reasoning on the standard of proof will go a long way toward determining how big a threat these cases present to issuers – and to their underwriters, auditors and lawyers.

To set that standard, the Supreme Court will have to resolve apparent tension between two of its own precedents. In the court’s 1991 ruling in Virginia Bancshares v. Sandberg, the majority considered “the actionability per se of statements of reasons, opinions or belief” under Section 14 of the Exchange Act. Because that sort of statement “purports to express what is consciously on the speaker’s mind,” the Supreme Court said, it made sense to limit any discussion of liability to misstatements that did not reflect the speakers’ true beliefs and opinions. According to Omnicare’s petition for certiorari, the 2nd, 3rd and 9th Circuits have all relied on that holding in Virginia Bancshares to conclude that even under Section 11 of the Securities Act – which calls for a more expansive view of liability than the Exchange Act provision at issue in the Virginia Bancshares case – defendants can only be sued for statements that depart from their actual opinions.

Big guns roll out to defend securities class actions as SCOTUS amici

Alison Frankel
Feb 6, 2014 19:40 UTC

Conventional wisdom has it that the future of most securities fraud class actions will come down to U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts (and possibly Justice Samuel Alito, who, as a judge on the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote quite interesting decisions about fraud-on-the-market reliance). Last term, in dissents in Amgen v. Connecticut Retirement Plans, Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Anthony Kennedy made clear their skepticism about the court’s 1988 precedent in Basic v. Levinson, the case that made securities fraud class actions possible via its holding that shareholders may be presumed to have relied on corporate misstatements about a stock that trades in an efficient market. Based on the Amgen majority opinion, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor seem disinclined to overturn Basic when the court once again takes up the issue of classwide shareholder reliance on March 5 in Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund.

Presumably with Chief Justice Roberts in mind, the Erica P. John Fund and its lawyers at Boies, Schiller & Flexner made deference to Supreme Court precedent a major theme of the merits brief they filed last week. As I told you, Boies Schiller cast Basic as a decision rooted in the 80-year-old history of this country’s securities laws, entwined with government regulation of the securities markets and implicitly endorsed by Congress, which has had multiple opportunities over the last 25 years to roll back the presumption of reliance and has repeatedly declined to do so.

As of late Wednesday, it’s not only Boies Schiller saying so to the Supreme Court. Erica P. John – and, by extension, the securities class action industry – has received powerful support in amicus briefs from (among many others) the Justice Department; two former chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission (one Republican, one Democrat); 11 current and former members of Congress; and scholars of the doctrine of stare decisis, whose filing was authored by Harvard Law professor Charles Fried – the onetime U.S. solicitor general who wrote the Justice Department brief supporting investors in the original Basic case at the Supreme Court.

Dueling cert petitions give SCOTUS choice on software patent review

Alison Frankel
Nov 8, 2013 19:26 UTC

On Wednesday, CLS Bank filed a brief opposing U.S. Supreme Court review of a spectacularly controversial en banc decision from the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. You probably remember the Federal Circuit ruling from last May in the CLS case: The en banc court held that Alice Corp’s computer-implemented escrow system is not eligible for patents, but couldn’t muster a majority to explain why. The 10 appellate judges ended up writing six different opinions, none of which attracted enough co-signers to provide long-sought clarity on a standard for the patent-eligibility of abstract ideas that are implemented via computers. As Alice’s lawyers at Sidley Austin explained in their certiorari petition in May, “The legal standards that govern whether computer-implemented inventions are eligible for patent protection … remain entirely unclear and utterly panel dependent.”

CLS’s counsel at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher didn’t contest that assertion – the precedential muddle isn’t really debatable – but argued that the Federal Circuit reached the right conclusion when it found Alice’s escrow system ineligible for patenting. With three new judges on the Federal Circuit, CLS said, it makes more sense to give the new judges – Richard Taranto, a former senior partner at Farr & Taranto; Raymond Chen, the onetime solicitor general of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office; and Todd Hughes, who most recently served in the Justice Department’s civil division – a chance to consider computer-implemented patent eligibility. “The reconstituted court is capable of settling its own internal divisions,” CLS’s brief said. Gibson Dunn actually uses seemingly irreconcilable post-CLS Federal Circuit panel decisions in Bancorp v. Sun Life and Accenture v. Guidewire to underscore its argument that the discussion of software patent eligibility is still percolating healthily in the Federal Circuit so the Supreme Court needn’t get involved.

If, however, the court does decide to take up the issue, CLS wants the justices to use Alice’s case as their vehicle. And here’s where things get interesting in the great debate over whether otherwise-unpatentable abstract ideas become eligible for patents when they’re implemented via computers. Alice isn’t the only party with a pending cert petition on software patent eligibility. The online game company WildTangent is asking for Supreme Court review of a Federal Circuit panel decision that, according to WildTangent’s counsel at Latham & Watkins, sets so low a bar for patent eligibility that just about every computer-implemented abstract idea would survive. The Alice and WildTangent cases really pose the exact same question for the Supreme Court. So which should the justices take?

N.Y. state appeals ruling opens courthouse door to foreign victims

Alison Frankel
Sep 18, 2013 20:06 UTC

In the last few months, the victims of supposed overseas human rights atrocities have begun to feel the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling last April in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum. As you know, the Supreme Court held that Alien Tort Statute cases cannot proceed in U.S. courts unless they have a significant connection to the United States. As a result, ATS claims by foreign citizens accusing international corporations of abetting torture and murder on foreign soil have since been dismissed against Daimler, Arab Bank, Rio Tinto and KBR. Some ATS cases have survived post-Kiobel scrutiny, as my friend Michael Goldhaber reported for The American Lawyer in August, and alleged victims can still assert claims under Other U.S. laws that specifically apply to conduct abroad. But without a doubt, Kiobel has extinguished the jurisdiction of U.S. courts over a wide swath of human rights litigation.

New York state courts, on the other hand, are ready and willing to hear the cases. Or, at least, that’s the implication of a comprehensive decision Tuesday by the state Appellate Division, First Department, that permits 50 Israeli citizens to proceed with claims that Bank of China is liable under Israeli law for facilitating bombings and rocket attacks in Israel by Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad. The state appeals court expressly broke with the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals in holding that Israeli law should apply to the alleged victims’ claims because that’s where they were injured, rejecting the 2nd Circuit’s 2012 decision in a parallel terror-finance case that the laws of the defendant’s home jurisdiction should apply because those courts have the greatest interest in regulating the defendant’s conduct.

According to Robert Tolchin of The Berkman Law Office, who represents the plaintiffs in both the 2nd Circuit and New York state-court cases, the Appellate Division’s ruling opens the door to claims in New York courts by foreigners asserting the laws of their own countries against international defendants. “The Supreme Court in Kiobel knocked out the Alien Tort Statute, but here comes New York negligence law,” he said.

The 2nd Circuit splits with 10th on tolling time bar in securities cases

Alison Frankel
Jul 2, 2013 21:36 UTC

Is the statute of repose – the once obscure cousin of the statute of limitations that burst into prominence as a defense in litigation over mortgage-backed securities – coming to the U.S. Supreme Court?

That’s the thrilling prospect now before us, thanks to a decision last week by the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals in a case against the onetime mortgage securitizer IndyMac and underwriters of some of its MBS offerings. The 2nd Circuit panel – Judges Jose Cabranes, Reena Raggi and Susan Carney – ruled that the filing of a class action does not stop the clock for class members on the three-year statute of repose for federal securities claims. That holding is contrary to a ruling from the 10th Circuit, which found in Joseph v. Q.T. Wiles in 2000 that a pending class action tolls the statute of repose as well as the statute of limitations. The Roberts Court is known for granting review even of arcane issues that have split the federal circuits, and tolling of the statute of repose could impact the outcome of a lot more cases than, say, the intersection of appellate deadlines and awards for contractual legal fees, which the Supreme Court is already scheduled to hear next term.

Plaintiffs lawyer Joseph Tabacco of Berman DeValerio, who was on the wrong end of last week’s 2nd Circuit decision, told me his clients have not yet decided on their next step, which could be to ask the 2nd Circuit for en banc review or to ask the panel for a ruling that its holding applies only prospectively. The statute of repose isn’t as problematic in this particular case as it once seemed, Tabacco said, because some plaintiffs who had been excluded from the IndyMac MBS class action saw their claims revived after the 2nd Circuit remade the rules for MBS class standing in NECA-IBEW v. Goldman. Nevertheless, Tabacco told me, “this is too important an issue” to let the 2nd Circuit panel’s decision go unchallenged. “There are well-reasoned opinions on both sides,” he said. “Clearly, this is an open legal question.”

SCOTUS pay-for-delay ruling: New scrutiny for nonpharma patent deals?

Alison Frankel
Jun 17, 2013 21:08 UTC

In the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling Monday on pay-for-delay settlements in the pharmaceutical industry – in which a brand-name drugmaker pays generic rivals to drop challenges to its patent, thus assuring its monopoly – five justices agreed with the Federal Trade Commission that the key question isn’t whether pay-for-delay deals exceed the scope of the brand-maker’s patent. Courts cannot simply rubber-stamp such settlements as presumptively legal, the majority said in FTC v. Actavis. But nor can they assume that pay-for-delay settlements are illegal by their very nature. Instead, according to the majority, trial courts must conduct a “rule of reason” analysis to determine whether reverse-payment settlements violate antitrust law.

Those inquiries, the majority concedes, are probably going to be “time consuming, complex and expensive” – a much less convenient alternative to the simple scope-of-the-patent test endorsed by the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in the underlying case and by several other federal circuits in previous pay-for-delay suits by the FTC and private plaintiffs. But the scope-of-the-patent approach “throws the baby out with the bath water,” the majority said. A patent holder has monopoly rights only when its patent is valid, the very inquiry that is aborted through pay-for-delay settlements.

The justices concluded that trial judges need not conduct a full-blown inquiry into a patent’s validity to evaluate the anticompetitive impact of a pay-for-delay deal, but can consider (among other factors) the size of the reverse payment as a proxy for the patent’s weakness. “An unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent’s survival,” the majority said, in an opinion written by Justice Stephen Breyer. “And that fact, in turn, suggests that the payment’s objective is to maintain supracompetitive prices to be shared among the patentee and the challenger rather than face what might have been a competitive market – the very anticompetitive consequence that underlies the claim of antitrust unlawfulness.”

Gay marriage, voters’ rights and the thorny Prop 8 standing problem

Alison Frankel
Mar 27, 2013 19:14 UTC

On Tuesday morning at the U.S. Supreme Court, Charles Cooper of Cooper and Kirk was no more than a sentence into his spiel on the sanctity of traditional marriage when Chief Justice John Roberts interrupted with the request that he first address a more prosaic issue: Do Cooper’s clients, as leading proponents of the 2008 California ballot initiative that banned same-sex marriage, even have standing to defend the initiative, known as Proposition 8, in federal court? By the time oral arguments concluded more than an hour later, it seemedlikelier than not that the court would avoid a sweeping ruling on equal protection under federal law for gays and lesbians – and that they’d do it via a finding that Cooper’s clients did not have standing to bring an appeal.

That holding, which was advocated by lawyers for the same-sex couples who sued to invalidate Prop 8, would assure gays and lesbians the right to get married in California. But it would also implicate some difficult issues that the Supreme Court has not previously addressed. What qualifies someone to act as an agent of the state for the purposes of defending a ballot initiative? If state officials choose not to defend a law passed by the voters, may private citizens who backed the initiative act on the state’s behalf? And if the law’s private proponents don’t have federal standing, does that mean state officials have the de facto ability to undo voter-passed laws they don’t support? If the Supreme Court answers these questions in its Prop 8 decision, the ruling may end up being better remembered for setting precedent on standing, stage agency and ballot initiatives than for civil rights.

To understand why, you have to know a little about the procedural history of the case. In 2009, six months after California voters passed Prop 8 and amended the state constitution to ban same-sex marriage, two same-sex couples filed a suit in federal court in San Francisco against the state officials tasked with enforcing the ban. The complaint, filed with great fanfare by Theodore Olson of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and David Boies of Boies, Schiller & Flexner, asserted that Prop 8 violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the 14th Amendment. The state officials named in the suit chose not to defend the law’s constitutionality, but U.S. District Judge Vaughn Walker (now retired) permitted private citizens who had championed the law to intervene as defendants. After a 12-day bench trial in 2010, Walker found Prop 8 to be unconstitutional.

Are class action lawyers in Arkansas snubbing SCOTUS (and CAFA)?

Alison Frankel
Oct 4, 2012 06:35 UTC

Over the summer, the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court made one of the most improbable grants of certiorari you will ever see.

The timing alone was unusual. The court granted cert in Standard Fire Insurance v. Knowles on Aug. 31, almost a month before the first conference of the new term on Sept. 24. But that’s just the beginning of this case’s oddities. There’s no split among the federal circuits on the issue presented in Standard Fire: whether a class action plaintiff can defeat removal to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act by stipulating on behalf of the entire class to seek less than $5 million, the statutory cutoff for a state-court class action. In fact, there couldn’t possibly be a circuit split on that question because only one appellate court, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, has addressed it. And though Standard Fire comes out of 8th Circuit turf in Arkansas, it is not even the case in which the 8th Circuit opined on these class action damages stipulations, which have become an oft-used tactic of plaintiffs’ lawyers who want to keep their cases in state court.

Indeed, as name plaintiff Greg Knowles argued in his brief opposing cert, there is no appellate opinion at all in the Standard Fire case. After a federal court in Arkansas remanded Knowles’s class action to state court in Miller County, where it was filed, the 8th Circuit twice declined to review the district court’s remand opinion. Yet the Supreme Court nevertheless agreed to take the case. Standard Fire’s merits brief is due later this month, and oral arguments will take place later in the term.

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