Onetime Texas billionaire Sam Wyly and the estate of his late brother Charles just can’t seem to outsmart the Securities and Exchange Commission. Their latest attempt to evade the consequences of their allegedly fraudulent offshore trust scheme failed Monday, when U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin of Manhattan, in a ruling of first impression in the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, said that the SEC is entitled to freeze the Wylys’ assets, even though both Sam and Charles’ estate declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy in late October, after the SEC began to take steps to collect the nearly $200 million (plus interest) Scheindlin awarded the agency in September.
(Reuters) – On Wednesday, the $200 million activist hedge fund Stilwell Value and its founder, Joseph Stilwell, filed a complaint against the Securities and Exchange Commission in federal court in Manhattan. Stilwell’s lawyers at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom and Post & Schell are asking for a declaratory judgment to block the SEC from bringing an administrative proceeding against Stilwell, who has been under investigation since 2012 for interfund lending. According to Stilwell’s complaint, if the SEC follows through with its threats to sue him in an administrative proceeding – rather than prosecuting its case against him in federal district court – it will be breaching the U.S. Constitution.
In 2012 and 2013, when the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals was considering the question of whether Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions protect whistleblowers who report their concerns internally, rather than to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the SEC stayed out of the fray. The case, Khaled Asadi v. G.E. Energy, centered on the tension between two sections of Dodd-Frank, one of which seemed to define whistleblowers only as those who tip the SEC about potential misconduct by their employers. In its Dodd-Frank implementation process, the SEC attempted to resolve the tension, issuing rules to clarify that whistleblowers are protected from retaliation regardless of whether they report concerns to the agency or up the chain of command through internal compliance programs, as the older Sarbanes-Oxley Act had encouraged. The SEC’s rules have convinced most of the federal trial judges who have considered the scope of Dodd-Frank whistleblower protections; courts have typically cited the deference due to the agency’s interpretation of a law it is responsible for enforcing.
In a post earlier this week, I wrote about whistleblower lawyers’ concerns that unsuspecting tipsters will be misled into signing up with one of the many non-lawyer groups advertising on the Internet for Dodd-Frank whistleblowers. Unlike lawyers’ websites, ads by non-lawyers aren’t subject to state bar regulations. Nor are fee agreements between whistleblowers and non-lawyer agents. Lawyers who regularly represent tipsters told me that a proliferation of supposedly deceptive ads after the Securities and Exchange Commission implemented its whistleblower bounty program is one of the biggest problems in their business.
The Securities and Exchange Commission was pretty darn pumped about its $200 million settlement Thursday with JPMorgan Chase, part of the bank’s $920 million resolution of regulatory claims stemming from losses in the notorious “London Whale” proprietary trading. And why not? As George Cannellos, the co-director of enforcement, said in a statement, JPMorgan’s $200 million civil penalty is one of the largest in SEC history. The agency also showed that it’s serious about its new policy of demanding admissions of liability from some defendants. For those of us accustomed to the SEC’s “neither admit nor deny” boilerplate, it’s startling to see the words “publicly acknowledging that it violated the federal securities laws” in an SEC settlement announcement. So let’s permit Cannellos some chest-thumping: “The SEC required JPMorgan to admit the facts in the SEC’s order – and acknowledge that it broke the law – because JPMorgan’s egregious breakdowns in controls and governance put its millions of shareholders at risk and resulted in inaccurate public filings.”
In the first full year of operation for the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Dodd-Frank whistle-blower program, the agency received 324 tips from whistle-blowers working outside of the United States – almost 11 percent of all the whistle-blower reports received by the SEC. If those tips eventually result in sanctions of more than $1 million, the SEC whistle-blowers will be in line for bounties. But if they’re fired by their companies for disclosing corporate wrongdoing, they may not be able to sue under Dodd-Frank because the law’s anti-retaliation protection for whistle-blowers does not specify that it extends overseas. And as you know, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling in Morrison v. National Australia Bank holds that civil laws should be presumed not to apply overseas unless they say otherwise.
If Khaled Asadi, a former GE Energy executive who lost his job after alerting his boss to concerns that GE might have run afoul of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, had sued his old employer in New York or Connecticut, things might have worked out differently for him. Several federal trial judges in those jurisdictions have ruled that whistle-blowers who report corporate wrongdoing internally are protected by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, even though the statute defines whistle-blowers as employees who report securities violations to the Securities and Exchange Commission. But Asadi, who worked in GE Energy’s office in Amman, Jordan, filed a claim that the company had illegally retaliated against him in federal district court in Houston. And on Wednesday, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals – with hardly a nod to contrary lower-court decisions in other circuits – ruled that Asadi is not a whistle-blower under Dodd-Frank because he talked to his boss and not the SEC.
On Thursday, the Securities and Exchange Commission released its annual report on the activities of the whistle-blower office it established in late 2011, at the direction of the Dodd-Frank Act. The office’s eight lawyers received 3,001 whistle-blower tips in the SEC’s fiscal year 2012, which ended on Sept. 30. A total of 547 tips involved alleged misconduct in corporate disclosure, 465 alleged offering fraud and 457 related to stock manipulation. At least one bore fruit: In August, the SEC made its first bounty payment to a whistle-blower whose tip led to a judgment of more than $1 million. The agency said the whistle-blower office is processing an undisclosed number of additional whistle-blower bounty applications.
Last April, as a follow-up to revelations that Wal-Mart had allegedly covered up bribes paid by its Mexican subsidiary, the great Corporate Counsel reporter Sue Reisinger ran a very surprising piece. Despite the scandal engulfing Wal-Mart, defense lawyers told Reisinger that the company may have made a strategically smart decision not to disclose the matter to the government. Smart? Really? Would Wal-Mart’s alleged bribery have blown up into a public relations fiasco that cried out for governmental consequences if the company had quietly admitted the facts to the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Justice Department?
For good or ill, one of my themes over the last 18 months has been frustration with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s enforcement efforts. And according to a recently published study by Berkeley Law professor Stavros Gadinis, I’m not alone. Gadinis’s paper, posted Wednesday at the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, said that it’s been three decades since any academic analysis of SEC enforcement actions against broker-dealers. In that time, Gadinis wrote, the information vacuum has been filled with complaints about the commission’s perceived foot-dragging and questions about the so-called revolving door between the SEC and private law firms. To add some substance to the discussion, Gadinis undertook what he said was the first systematic examination of SEC enforcement actions against broker-dealers — a category that includes major financial institutions — in 30 years, analyzing more than 400 cases finalized in 1998 and 2005-2007. (Gadinis added 1998 to the study so it would include cases brought in a Democratic administration.) His overall conclusion: Size matters, at least when you’re a broker-dealer facing off against the SEC. According to the prof’s data, firms with more than 1,000 employees fared much better than their smaller counterparts in terms of whether cases are brought against individual defendants; whether the SEC brought cases as administrative proceedings; and what kind of sanctions the SEC extracted.