Opinion

Anatole Kaletsky

Will Britain really leave the European Union?

Anatole Kaletsky
Jan 16, 2014 16:00 UTC

Is it conceivable that Britain will leave the European Union? A few years ago this question would hardly have been worth asking.  In the past 12 months, however, the issue of EU withdrawal has shot into the British political headlines.

The latest, and apparently most authoritative, such headlines appeared this week, after a pugnacious speech by George Osborne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and second most powerful figure in the British government. Reuters headlined the Chancellor’s comments like this: “Reform or lose us as a member, Osborne tells the EU.” The Daily Telegraph highlighted the same message: “Osborne warns Britain may leave EU over reform failure.” The BBC headline concurred: “Osborne – Don’t force UK choice between euro and EU exit.”

While the idea of a British EU exit has now become so mainstream that “Brexit” is a universally recognized acronym among diplomats and financiers, no British politician of Osborne’s seniority has previously threatened so explicitly to pull out. But does this really mean that Brexit is becoming more likely?

Osborne’s rhetoric may sound strident, but actually it suggests the opposite conclusion when British politics and European economics are taken into account.

Starting with British politics, David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, leads a fractious coalition between his mostly “Euro-skeptical” Conservative Party and the fervently “Europhile” Liberal Democrats. The Cameron coalition faces a general election in May 2015. And the biggest threat to the government’s survival comes not from the opposition Labour Party, but from a hemorrhage of right-wing votes to the UK Independence Party, an upstart populist movement whose main objective is British withdrawal from the EU.

Five predictions for financial markets in 2014

Anatole Kaletsky
Jan 2, 2014 14:34 UTC

Happy New Year! For the first time since 2008, we investors, economists and businesspeople say these words without irony. While last year was statistically disappointing, with global growth slowing slightly from 2012 and apparently belying the optimism expressed here last January, the verdict of financial markets and business sentiment has been much more consistent with my predictions. Despite the apparent slowdown, stock markets enjoyed their best performance since the 1990s, long-term interest rates soared and consumer confidence all over the world ended 2013 much higher than it started. This apparent paradox is easily explained: the statistical weakness of 2013 was due entirely to a very weak period last winter, connected with the U.S. presidential election and leadership transition in China. By the second quarter, growth had revived in the U.S. and China and accelerated strongly in Britain and Japan.

That conventional wisdom last January was far too pessimistic about the economic outlook is evidenced by the subsequent behavior of financial markets, where equities outperformed bonds by the biggest annual margin on record. But today almost everyone is optimistic. So what unexpected developments could surprise financial markets and business sentiment in 2014? Below are five personal guesses — some possibly far-fetched and others are seemingly obvious, but none yet fully reflected in market prices:

1. Four is the new two.

I think the U.S. economy will grow by about 4 percent, much faster than the 2.5 to 3 percent predicted by the IMF and mainstream economic forecasts. My reasoning is simple. In the last reported quarter, the U.S. economy was already growing by 4.1 percent and the private sector by 4.9 percent. With U.S. budget battles now over and short-term interest rates firmly anchored at zero, there is no reason to expect a slowdown. If the U.S. accelerates to around 4 percent, so will global growth and 4 percent will replace 2 percent as the growth rate assumed in business and financial planning. Global inflation expectations will also rise to around 3 percent, raising the benchmark for global growth in nominal terms to around 7 percent, very similar to the 10 years before the 2008 financial crisis. In other words, the “new normal” of global stagnation widely predicted after the crisis will turn out to be not very different from the old normal.

Have markets finally received Bernanke’s taper message?

Anatole Kaletsky
Dec 19, 2013 16:33 UTC

Thanks goodness it’s over. Financial market behavior ahead of last night’s announcement by Ben Bernanke on a gradual reduction in U.S. monetary stimulus has been tedious and irritating, rather like listening to whining children in the back of the car on a long journey: “Daddy, are we there yet?” In fact, impatient whining about when the Fed might start to “taper” has spoiled for many investors what should have been one of the most enjoyable financial journeys of all time, scaling previously unexplored market peaks and passing through unprecedented monetary vistas.

Imagine if everyone had simply taken Ben Bernanke at his word when he said in May that the Fed would continue buying bonds at the rate of $85 billion every month until it was absolutely confident that unemployment was on the way to 6.5 percent and that the scale of these purchases would only be increased or diminished if and when a change was clearly warranted by economic statistics. Investors would then have concluded, as I suggested at the time, that no significant changes in U.S. monetary policy were likely until the end of 2013.

Stock markets around the would have enjoyed their strongest year for a decade without the trauma of the spring and summer “taper tantrum.” Nobody would have been shocked or embarrassed by the “September surprise,” when the Fed very sensibly decided to keep up the pace of monetary stimulus in the face of lackluster economic figures, despite the howls of indignation from analysts who were wrong-footed by their own unsubstantiated predictions of early tapering. Finally, investors would have been fully prepared for the Fed’s decision to go ahead with tapering this week. After all, the recent strong run of U.S. employment, housing and production data provided exactly the sort of strong economic background that Bernanke had posited all along as the necessary condition for tapering, especially in conjunction with the Congressional budget deal that was ratified by the Senate at the same moment Bernanke as spoke across town.

The budget deal and Washington’s new politics of compromise

Anatole Kaletsky
Dec 12, 2013 15:16 UTC

The muted market reaction to this week’s budget deal in Washington may initially seem like a disappointment. After all, uncertainty over government spending, debt and taxes has consistently emerged in business sentiment surveys as the biggest single factor holding back corporate investment and damaging financial confidence. Why then did Wall Street celebrate this breakthrough with its biggest daily fall in two months?

The standard explanation is that the budget deal will accelerate the tapering of monetary policy by the Federal Reserve Board, and that is probably a valid expectation. The main reason for the seemingly perverse response, however, is simply that this budget deal was predictable to the point of inevitability, even if most Washington pundits committed to the standard narrative of U.S. political dysfunction and gridlock did not see it coming until this week. Viewed from outside the Beltway, the inevitability of eventual bipartisan cooperation on the budget has been obvious since the 2012 election, which essentially settled all the important U.S. fiscal debates.

Having argued this position all year and having suggested back in October that a deal by this week was very likely, I could hardly be surprised that the markets greeted this event with a yawn. Short-term players on Wall Street have simply followed the time-honored formula of “buy on the rumor, sell on the news.” Business leaders and long-term investors, by contrast, are likely to be relieved and even enthused by this agreement, but their responses will have to be assessed over weeks, months and even years, not just a few days.

British economic governance encounters turbulence

Anatole Kaletsky
Dec 5, 2013 16:52 UTC

Students of British history will recall the story of Thomas a’Becket, the 12th century prelate who was handpicked by Henry II to become Archbishop of Canterbury because of his loyalty to the Crown. Within months of his appointment, a’Becket turned against the King in the numerous conflicts between church and state. As a result, a’Becket was murdered at the altar of Canterbury Cathedral in 1170, after four of Henry’s henchmen heard their royal master mutter in irritation: “Will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?” Archbishops do not have much political clout these days, but comparable spiritual importance now attaches to central bankers. And a central banker who suddenly seems reminiscent of Thomas a’Becket is Mark Carney, the recently appointed governor of the Bank of England.

When George Osborne, the British chancellor of the Exchequer (finance minister), delivered his Autumn Statement on Britain’s economic and fiscal prospects this week, he intended it as a “soft launch” for the Tory-Liberal government’s campaign for re-election in May 2015. The big set-piece speech offered Osborne an ideal opportunity to boast about the British economy’s sudden improvement this year and to announce some populist measures, such as a “voluntary” price-control regime for energy utilities, that were carefully designed to wrong-foot the Labour opposition. Osborne’s speech marked the start of a long political campaign designed to create a Pavlovian association in voters’ minds between government policies, rising house prices and the economic recovery. If this campaign is successful it will virtually guarantee election victory for the Tory-Liberal coalition — and it could even make an outright majority for the Tories conceivable in 2015.

Last week, however, the plan for a mutually-reinforcing cycle of rising house prices, strengthening consumer confidence, accelerating economic activity and improving Tory fortunes suddenly came under threat from the most unexpected quarter. Mark Carney was hand-picked this year by Osborne and was imported all the way from Canada because he seemed to offer less resistance than any plausible British candidate to the Tory plan for a pre-election economic recovery powered by rising property prices and re-leveraging by homeowners.

After initial promise, Japan’s new economy risks backsliding

Anatole Kaletsky
Nov 29, 2013 15:55 UTC

At a time when economic optimism is growing and stock markets are hitting new highs almost daily, it is worth asking what could go wrong for the global economy in the year or two ahead. The standard response, now that a war with Iran or a euro breakup is off the agenda, is that some kind of new financial bubble could be about to burst in the U.S. But a very different, and rather more plausible, threat is looming on the other side of the world.

Japan is the world’s third-biggest economy, with national output roughly equal to France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece combined. This year, Japan has become, very unusually, a leader in terms of financial prosperity and economic growth. According to the latest IMF forecasts, Japan’s 2 percent growth rate in 2013 will be the fastest among the G7 countries, easily outpacing the next strongest economies, Canada and the U.S., each with 1.6 percent growth. Japan’s stock market has gained 70 percent since last December, far exceeding the 25 percent bull market on Wall Street, and Japan’s corporate profits are projected to increase by 17 percent, according to Consensus Economics, compared with the paltry gains of 3 to 4 percent in Germany and the U.S.

As someone very much caught up in the economic optimism inspired by the election of Shinzo Abe, I fear it is now time for a reality check. And observing the complacent inertia that seems suddenly to have paralysed Japan after July’s Upper House election, it seems worth recalling the famous maxim (usually attributed to Keynes) about unexpected events: “When the facts change, I change my mind.”

The end of the Fed’s taper tantrum

Anatole Kaletsky
Nov 21, 2013 15:03 UTC

Following Wednesday’s publication of the Federal Open Market Committee minutes, we now know that a reduction in U.S. monetary stimulus could be on the agenda for the next FOMC meeting on December 19. How much does this matter?

When the Fed unexpectedly decided not to “taper” in September, the markets were stunned and gyrated wildly, although investors had only themselves to blame for being wrong-footed in this way. Ben Bernanke had made crystal clear his reluctance to reduce monetary stimulus as long as the U.S. economy appeared to be weakening, which appeared to be the case throughout the summer. By December 19, the situation may well be very different, since the economy will probably be improving and the U.S. fiscal stalemate may well have been resolved. If such improvements happen, the Fed will have no compunctions about wrong-footing investors again, in the opposite direction, as this column suggested last month.

So what will be the impact on the world economy and financial markets if the Fed decided to taper as early as December? The answer is, not much. As long as the Fed stands by its commitment to keep interest rates near zero for the foreseeable future, tapering will have no major economic impact. Therefore its financial significance should also be marginal, except insofar as investor psychology overwhelms rational economic analysis.

Central bank stimulus is here to stay, but what if it fails?

Anatole Kaletsky
Nov 14, 2013 16:29 UTC

If anyone still doubted that central bankers all over the world will keep interest rates at rock-bottom levels, those doubts should have been dispelled this week. Janet Yellen’s statement on Thursday to the U.S. Senate that the Fed has “more work to do” to stimulate employment, and that “supporting the recovery today is the surest path to returning to a more normal approach to monetary policy,” capped a series of surprisingly clear commitments to easy money from central bankers this week. On Wednesday Joerg Asmussen, a member of the executive board of the European Central Bank, and Ewald Nowotny, the Austrian central bank governor — both of whom had previously been reported as voting against last week’s surprise ECB rate cut — said that they might in fact support further rate cuts and even negative interest rates, as well as the possibility of breaking the taboo against U.S.-style purchases of government bonds. And Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England, reiterated more strongly than ever that any early increase in British interest rates was out of the question, despite the fact that the outlook for the British economy has turned out to be much better than the BoE had expected.

But what if these zero interest rate policies produce disappointing results in the year ahead, as they have in each of the past four years? What if the world economy fails to spring back to life or just plods along with sub-par growth, despite all this stimulus, as has happened in each of the past four years?

With luck, these questions will not need answering because fiscal austerity has acted as a powerful headwind to economic recovery in the U.S., Europe and Britain and these budget consolidation efforts are now being relaxed. The new records on Wall Street and other stock markets suggest growing confidence among investors that monetary stimulus will finally deliver decent levels of growth next year — and this does indeed seem likely. But what if the optimism turns out to be wrong? What if the U.S. and Britain fail to grow by at least 3 percent next year, and what if Europe stays stuck with sub-1 percent growth and mass unemployment? In that case, the monetary and fiscal policy experiments since the Lehman crisis would have to be judged as failures — and that judgment would open the way to much more radical ideas than zero interest rates and QE. Such radical ideas would be of two opposing types.

This weekend, China will plot its economic future

Anatole Kaletsky
Nov 6, 2013 20:13 UTC

The ponderously named Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which takes place this weekend, is a more important event for the world economy and for global geopolitics than the budget battles, central bank meetings and elections that attract infinitely more attention in the media and financial markets.

The obvious reason for this meeting’s importance is that China is destined in the long run to become the world’s biggest economy and a political superpower. And the Third Plenum, traditionally held roughly 12 months after the appointment of a new Party leadership, has been used twice before as an occasion for the new leaders to spell out the main strategies they hoped to implement as they consolidated their power. At the Third Plenum in 1978, Deng Xiaoping launched the market reforms that unleashed the power of the profit motive in China, and it was at the corresponding event in 1993 that Jiang Zemin accelerated the process of dismantling state-owned enterprises and integrating China into the world economy that culminated with China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001.

A second, more immediate, reason for the world to pay attention to this weekend’s meeting is that China has recently become not just the strongest engine of growth in the world economy, but also the biggest source of potential economic surprises, both good and bad.

Don’t expect the euro’s rally to last

Anatole Kaletsky
Oct 31, 2013 15:05 UTC

What is happening to the euro? Currencies are more important than stock market prices or bond yields for many businesses and investors, not to mention for globe-trotting families and humble tourists. Which makes it surprising that so little attention has recently been devoted to the strengthening of the euro, which hit its highest level since 2011 this Monday, having jumped by 5.5 percent since September and over 8 percent since early July. This remarkable ascent, which has also driven the euro to its highest level against the yen since the 2008-09 financial crisis, means that European exporters are losing competitiveness, Americans and Asians who live or travel in Europe are feeling like poor relations and many economists are starting to worry that Europe’s nascent economic recovery will be snuffed out.

Purely financial players, by contrast, seem to be more enthusiastic about the euro’s strength than they have been for years. Speculative futures bets in favor of further euro appreciation have reached their highest level since the summer of 2011 — and the only time they were higher than that in the past decade was in the period just before the Lehman shock. Significantly, both of these speculative crescendos were followed by sharp euro declines, since currency markets generally turn when bullish sentiment reaches extreme levels. But there is a deeper reason to expect the euro’s seemingly irresistible rise to reverse.

Currencies tend to move in trends for many years, and the fact is that the euro’s long-term trend against the dollar is still almost certainly downwards, despite the big gains of the past few months.

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