Anatole Kaletsky

Were Bernanke’s comments a fire drill or a false alarm?

Anatole Kaletsky
Jul 11, 2013 14:14 UTC

Whenever Alan Greenspan was praised for delivering a clear message on U.S. monetary policy, he liked to reply something along the lines of: “If you think that, you have misunderstood what I said.” Ben Bernanke prefers the opposite approach. On May 22, he triggered one of biggest financial panics since 2008 by raising the possibility of reducing the Fed’s record-breaking monetary stimulus, while admitting that he had no idea when to start this process. He spent the subsequent six weeks trying to clear up the mess that he had created by explaining in painstaking detail the precise timing and conditions under which “tapering” might or might not take place. In the process he created even greater confusion and financial volatility. It now appears that he would have done much better for the world economy — and for his own reputation — by saving his breath and imitating Greenspan’s obfuscation.

The Fed minutes published on Wednesday revealed so many divergent opinions on the conditions, timing and even direction of any change in monetary policy, that all the recent speeches and press conferences on tapering could reasonably be described as white noise. Which raises the question of why investors reacted so strongly to all this confusion. Recent market behavior around the world suggests an explanation: while Fed tapering was not in itself a very important issue, Bernanke’s comments acted as a financial alarm bell, drawing attention to risks in the world economy that were forgotten or ignored. When we hear a fire alarm we naturally ask ourselves three questions: Is it a false alarm? Is it a fire drill? Or is it a real fire — and if so, where?

Similar questions may shed some light on the tapering scare. For the U.S. stock market, Bernanke’s May comments were clearly a false alarm, since the Fed was nowhere near a decision to tighten monetary policy, as we now know officially from the minutes. It is not surprising, therefore, that U.S. equity prices have rebounded to their pre-Bernanke record highs. But looking beyond the U.S. stock market, tapering speculation seems more like a fire drill than a false alarm.

Long-term interest rates have risen sharply as the world has been reminded that central banks will not continue buying government bonds forever. Following this reminder, investors who tie up their money for ten years or more in long-term government bonds are now demanding a premium of 2.5 to 3 percentage points above Fed funds. Such steepening of the term premium is a perfectly natural and healthy development as economic conditions normalize, as they seem to be doing in the U.S. But the natural rise in long-term U.S. interest rates is a problem if it happens too suddenly or goes too far — which is why Bernanke may have done the U.S. a favor by testing the vulnerability of the housing market and Wall Street to higher long-term rates. Meanwhile in weaker economies, such as continental Europe, Japan and Britain, local central banks have been put on notice by the Fed that they will have to resist a steepening of long-term yield curves for which their economies may be less ready than the U.S. This is exactly what the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have started to do in response to Bernanke’s fire drill.

Unfortunately the fire drill analogy looks too complacent once we shift attention from the U.S. and Europe to the emerging markets, where currencies, equities and bonds have all been collapsing, along with consumer and business confidence, since Bernanke first spoke. Perhaps, then, the financial alarms of the past two months really did warn of danger, not in the U.S. or Europe but in the EMs — and specifically in China.

Don’t worry about a stock market drop

Anatole Kaletsky
Mar 14, 2013 15:50 UTC

A feeling of vertigo may seem natural as Wall Street approaches a record and stock markets around the world climb to their highest levels since 2007. With the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index  now only 0.5 percent away from its 2007 high of 1565 and with the Dow Jones industrial average scaling new peaks almost daily, what will investors expect to see when they reach the mountaintop? The mountaineering analogy suggests, at best, a long descent and, at worst, a precipitous drop. But how literally should we take such metaphors?

Bearish analysts often claim that stock market peaks have always been followed by sharp falls, citing as evidence the record high of October 2007, which was quickly followed by a 57 percent collapse in 2008-09. They add that the previous peak, in March 2000, was followed by a 37 percent plunge and that last major high before that, in August 1987, preceded the biggest-ever market crash, in October 1987. These precedents, along with the even more vertiginous peaks of 1989 in Japan and 1929 on Wall Street, certainly sound scary, but they are meaningless.

It may be true that all major market peaks have been followed by big declines, but the reason is semantics, not finance or economics. A peak is, by definition, a high point followed by a decline. A new market high that is not followed by a fall in prices is simply not called a peak. A record of this kind, far from preceding a steep decline, tends to act as a staging post for higher prices. Looking back through history, it turns out that this benign type of record, paving the way for higher prices, is actually the norm.