Opinion

Anatole Kaletsky

Euro zone’s big problems require big fixes

Anatole Kaletsky
May 16, 2014 12:56 UTC

ECB President Draghi addresses a news conference in BrusselsAt last, the European Central Bank seems ready to inject some adrenalin into the moribund euro zone economy. After last week’s news conference, when European Central Bank President Mario Draghi strongly hinted that action would take place after the June 5 council meeting, there have been a host of interviews and leaks specifically describing the new ideas the bank has in mind.

The biggest measure, now almost a foregone conclusion, will be a cut in the interest rate the ECB pays on bank deposits from zero to negative 0.1 or 0.2 percent. Bank officials have also hinted at several additional stimulus measures: extension of loans to commercial banks at low fixed rates for three years or even five years; ECB purchases of bank loans to small and medium enterprises, packaged into asset-backed securities; and concessional lending to European banks on condition they pass on these funds to small and medium businesses.

The leaks generated a great deal of enthusiasm this week. The euro weakened from almost $1.40 to $1.37; bond yields in Italy and Spain fell to record lows; and European stock markets jumped 1 percent to 2 percent.  Wednesday, the market reaction crossed the Atlantic, with interest rates on U.S. Treasury bonds falling to their lowest levels in six months.

People enter a government-run employment office in MadridSadly, however, investors may be overexcited. Even assuming that all the reports about ECB plans turn out to be true, the bank failed to follow through on similar rumors several times recently. It is also far from clear that these policies would address the big economic problems facing the euro zone: feeble economic growth and widespread unemployment; a continuing credit crunch for small and medium enterprises in Southern Europe; vast imbalances in competitiveness between Germany and the rest of the euro zone, and deflationary pressures that create debt traps and balance-sheet recessions in the peripheral economies.

A negative interest rate on deposits, the measure that has been suggested most strongly, is unlikely to have much effect for two reasons.

Have markets finally received Bernanke’s taper message?

Anatole Kaletsky
Dec 19, 2013 16:33 UTC

Thanks goodness it’s over. Financial market behavior ahead of last night’s announcement by Ben Bernanke on a gradual reduction in U.S. monetary stimulus has been tedious and irritating, rather like listening to whining children in the back of the car on a long journey: “Daddy, are we there yet?” In fact, impatient whining about when the Fed might start to “taper” has spoiled for many investors what should have been one of the most enjoyable financial journeys of all time, scaling previously unexplored market peaks and passing through unprecedented monetary vistas.

Imagine if everyone had simply taken Ben Bernanke at his word when he said in May that the Fed would continue buying bonds at the rate of $85 billion every month until it was absolutely confident that unemployment was on the way to 6.5 percent and that the scale of these purchases would only be increased or diminished if and when a change was clearly warranted by economic statistics. Investors would then have concluded, as I suggested at the time, that no significant changes in U.S. monetary policy were likely until the end of 2013.

Stock markets around the would have enjoyed their strongest year for a decade without the trauma of the spring and summer “taper tantrum.” Nobody would have been shocked or embarrassed by the “September surprise,” when the Fed very sensibly decided to keep up the pace of monetary stimulus in the face of lackluster economic figures, despite the howls of indignation from analysts who were wrong-footed by their own unsubstantiated predictions of early tapering. Finally, investors would have been fully prepared for the Fed’s decision to go ahead with tapering this week. After all, the recent strong run of U.S. employment, housing and production data provided exactly the sort of strong economic background that Bernanke had posited all along as the necessary condition for tapering, especially in conjunction with the Congressional budget deal that was ratified by the Senate at the same moment Bernanke as spoke across town.

The end of the Fed’s taper tantrum

Anatole Kaletsky
Nov 21, 2013 15:03 UTC

Following Wednesday’s publication of the Federal Open Market Committee minutes, we now know that a reduction in U.S. monetary stimulus could be on the agenda for the next FOMC meeting on December 19. How much does this matter?

When the Fed unexpectedly decided not to “taper” in September, the markets were stunned and gyrated wildly, although investors had only themselves to blame for being wrong-footed in this way. Ben Bernanke had made crystal clear his reluctance to reduce monetary stimulus as long as the U.S. economy appeared to be weakening, which appeared to be the case throughout the summer. By December 19, the situation may well be very different, since the economy will probably be improving and the U.S. fiscal stalemate may well have been resolved. If such improvements happen, the Fed will have no compunctions about wrong-footing investors again, in the opposite direction, as this column suggested last month.

So what will be the impact on the world economy and financial markets if the Fed decided to taper as early as December? The answer is, not much. As long as the Fed stands by its commitment to keep interest rates near zero for the foreseeable future, tapering will have no major economic impact. Therefore its financial significance should also be marginal, except insofar as investor psychology overwhelms rational economic analysis.

Central bank stimulus is here to stay, but what if it fails?

Anatole Kaletsky
Nov 14, 2013 16:29 UTC

If anyone still doubted that central bankers all over the world will keep interest rates at rock-bottom levels, those doubts should have been dispelled this week. Janet Yellen’s statement on Thursday to the U.S. Senate that the Fed has “more work to do” to stimulate employment, and that “supporting the recovery today is the surest path to returning to a more normal approach to monetary policy,” capped a series of surprisingly clear commitments to easy money from central bankers this week. On Wednesday Joerg Asmussen, a member of the executive board of the European Central Bank, and Ewald Nowotny, the Austrian central bank governor — both of whom had previously been reported as voting against last week’s surprise ECB rate cut — said that they might in fact support further rate cuts and even negative interest rates, as well as the possibility of breaking the taboo against U.S.-style purchases of government bonds. And Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England, reiterated more strongly than ever that any early increase in British interest rates was out of the question, despite the fact that the outlook for the British economy has turned out to be much better than the BoE had expected.

But what if these zero interest rate policies produce disappointing results in the year ahead, as they have in each of the past four years? What if the world economy fails to spring back to life or just plods along with sub-par growth, despite all this stimulus, as has happened in each of the past four years?

With luck, these questions will not need answering because fiscal austerity has acted as a powerful headwind to economic recovery in the U.S., Europe and Britain and these budget consolidation efforts are now being relaxed. The new records on Wall Street and other stock markets suggest growing confidence among investors that monetary stimulus will finally deliver decent levels of growth next year — and this does indeed seem likely. But what if the optimism turns out to be wrong? What if the U.S. and Britain fail to grow by at least 3 percent next year, and what if Europe stays stuck with sub-1 percent growth and mass unemployment? In that case, the monetary and fiscal policy experiments since the Lehman crisis would have to be judged as failures — and that judgment would open the way to much more radical ideas than zero interest rates and QE. Such radical ideas would be of two opposing types.

With hostage taking over, a Washington deal beckons

Anatole Kaletsky
Oct 24, 2013 15:37 UTC

Nobody should be surprised that Wall Street hit new records this week. After all, the U.S. has just witnessed the end of a sensational hostage crisis that was threatening national security and undermining economic confidence — and even more sensationally, this was the second such crisis in two months.

John Boehner was held hostage by Republican hardliners until last Thursday, when the U.S. Congress voted to continue pumping money into the U.S. government. The fiscal militants forced Boehner to endanger the U.S. economy with threats of a Treasury default. Boehner reluctantly paid this rhetorical ransom in order to preserve the appearance of party unity and therefore his own credibility as a political leader.

Now consider events a month earlier on the other side of Washington. Until September 18, when the Federal Reserve voted to continue pumping money into the U.S. bond market, Ben Bernanke was arguably held hostage by the Fed’s hardliners. The monetary militants forced Bernanke to endanger the U.S. economic recovery with threats of a premature end to quantitative easing. Bernanke reluctantly paid this rhetorical ransom in order to preserve the appearance of institutional unity and therefore his own credibility as an economic leader.

Are markets making another blunder?

Anatole Kaletsky
Jun 20, 2013 14:50 UTC

In the four weeks since Ben Bernanke first mentioned that the Federal Reserve Board might start to taper its program of quantitative easing (QE) later this year, more than $2 trillion was wiped off the value of global stock markets — and probably far more from the value of global bonds, which is harder to estimate.

On Wednesday Bernanke spent almost an hour answering press questions to try to clarify the Fed’s policy on interest rates and QE. The result was a further steep fall in equity and bond prices around the world. Does this mean that Bernanke did not really want to signal to, and pacify, financial markets and was trying, instead, to prepare investors for higher interest rates and tougher times ahead? Or is it possible that the market has simply misunderstood his comments, both at Wednesday’s press conference and in his statement on May 22?

I have argued repeatedly in this column for the last interpretation — that tapering would not begin before the end of this year and that financial markets have misinterpreted the Fed’s intentions, partly for reasons connected with the vested interests of analysts and traders, whose livelihoods depend on convincing the world that economic policy is highly volatile and uncertain. If monetary policy were predictable and stable, which is essentially what Bernanke has promised, then the status and salaries of Fed-watchers in Washington would be hard to justify and the profits of short-term macroeconomic speculators would disappear. But maybe this view was simply wrong.

What’s behind the spooked stock market?

Anatole Kaletsky
May 30, 2013 16:14 UTC

Strange things have been happening in the world economy and financial markets this week. While that sentence could be written almost any time in the past five years, since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, the strangeness this week has taken a particular form that reveals more than it confuses.

Almost all the economic news recently has been favorable, or at least better than expected. U.S. home values have risen more than at any time since 2006, job losses are down and consumer confidence has been restored to pre-crisis levels. Japan has enjoyed its fastest growth in years, with evidence mounting of stronger consumption and rising wages. Even in Europe, the outlook appears to be improving as policy shifts away from austerity and toward growth, with the European Commission no longer pressing governments to hit their deficit targets. Meanwhile, the European Central Bank hints at the possibility of negative interest rates and other extraordinary stimulus measures. But financial markets have reacted to all this good news by becoming more volatile – panicky, even – than at any time this year.

Although the U.S. stock market briefly hit a record high on Tuesday, prices quickly slumped. Meanwhile, Japanese shares have suffered their steepest fall since the 2011 tsunami. Most importantly, bond markets have collapsed the world over, pushing long-term interest rates in the United States, Japan and much of Europe to their highest levels in more than a year.

A breakthrough speech on monetary policy

Anatole Kaletsky
Feb 7, 2013 16:01 UTC

Wednesday night may have marked the “emperor’s new clothes” moment of the Great Recession, in which the world suddenly realizes its rulers are suffering from a delusion that doesn’t have to be humored. That delusion today is economic fatalism: the idea that nothing can be done to break the paralysis in the global economy and therefore that a “new normal” of mass unemployment and declining living standards is inevitable for years or decades to come.

That such economic fatalism is nonsensical is the key message of a truly historic speech delivered on Wednesday by Adair Turner, chairman of Britain’s Financial Services Authority and one of the most influential financial policymakers in the world. Turner argues that a virtually surefire method of stimulating economic activity exists today and that politicians and central bankers can no longer treat it as taboo: Newly created money should be handed out to the citizens or governments of countries that are mired in stagnation and such monetary financing of tax cuts or government spending should continue until economic activity revives.

The idea of distributing free money to end deep recessions has been promoted theoretically by serious economists since the 1930s, when it was one of the few practical policies that Keynesians and monetarists agreed on. John Maynard Keynes proposed burying money in disused coal mines to be dug up by unemployed workers, while Milton Friedman suggested dropping money out of helicopters for citizens to pick up. Friedman also argued in a 1948 paper that governments should rely solely on printed money to finance their regular cyclical deficits. More recently, as conventional policies to revive growth have faltered, with widespread disappointment about the impact of zero interest rates and quantitative easing, proposals for distributing money directly to citizens have been quietly gaining traction among critics of orthodox central banks. I discussed this trend, sometimes described as “quantitative easing for the people,” in several columns last year.

Confessions of a deficit denier

Anatole Kaletsky
Nov 15, 2012 04:44 UTC

Here is a confession: I am a deficit denier.

To say this in respectable society is to be reviled as a self-serving rogue, worse than someone who denies climate change. Yet whenever I see a budget crisis — the U.S. falling off a fiscal cliff; austerity protests paralyzing Europe; Britain’s governing coalition tearing itself apart over missed budget targets -– I cannot resist the same conclusion: These countries’ leaders should take a deep breath, relax and stop worrying about deficits.

For there is actually no fiscal crisis in the United States, Britain or most European countries — including even Italy and Spain. Greece is another matter. But the very specific Greek disaster hardly justifies a generalized global panic about all government debts.

Consider some statistical facts. Interest rates are lower today than at any time in history, meaning that governments find it easier to borrow money than ever before. This hardly suggests impending bankruptcy.

Is a revolution in economic thinking under way?

Anatole Kaletsky
Oct 25, 2012 14:15 UTC

Four years after the start of the Great Recession, the global economy has not recovered, voters are losing patience and governments around the world are falling like ninepins. This is a situation conducive to revolutionary thinking, if not yet in politics, then maybe in economics.

In the past few months the International Monetary Fund, previously a bastion of austerity, has swung in favor of expansionary fiscal policies. The U.S. Federal Reserve has committed itself to printing money without limit until it restores full employment. And the European Central Bank has announced unlimited bond purchases with printed money, a policy denounced, quite literally, as the work of the devil by the president of the German Bundesbank.

This week an even more radical debate burst  into the open in Britain. Sir Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England, found himself fighting a rearguard action against a groundswell of support for “dropping money from helicopters” – something proposed by Milton Friedman in 1969 as the ultimate cure for intractable economic depressions and recently described in this column as “Quantitative Easing for the People.”

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