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from MacroScope:

Baltic shipping index getting drier

An obscure gauge of shipping costs rose to prominence in geeky macro circles during the financial crisis because its plunge provided a telling lead on the economic crash that unfolded in 2008 and 2009. Now, the Baltic Dry Index has again taken a nosedive, falling to its lowest level in more than two decades.

This time, analysts are explaining it away as a reflection of an increased number of carriers at sea.

Julian Jessop at Capital Economics, acknowledges this has indeed been a big factor behind the index’s decline. Still, he suggests the magnitude of the drop should give forecasters some pause.

We think it would be wrong to dismiss entirely the warning signals that the sinking of the Baltic index is sending about the underlying demand for commodities and the health of the world economy more generally. If the BDI fails to rebound soon, now that the peak of the holiday season has passed, it may well be telling us something important about the health of the global economy after all.

from Global Investing:

January in the rearview mirror

As January 2012 drifts into the rearview mirror as a bumper month for world markets, one way to capture the year so far is in pictures - thanks to Scott Barber and our graphics team.

The driving force behind the market surge was clearly the latest liquidity/monetary stimuli from the world's central banks.

The ECB's near half trillion euros of 3-year loans  has stabilised Europe's ailing banks by flooding them with cheap cash for much lower quality collateral. In the process, it's also opened up critical funding windows for the banks and allowed some reinvestment of the ECB loans into cash-strapped euro zone goverments. That in turn has seen most euro government borrowing rates fall. It's also allowed other corporates to come to the capital markets and JP Morgan estimates that euro zone corporate bond sales in January totalled 46 billion euros, the same last year and split equally between financials and non-financials..

But to the extent that the ECB move was aimed primarily at preventing a seizure of the banks, then one measure of  success can be seen in the degree to which it steepened government yield curves in Spain and Italy. A positive yield curve, which measures the gap between short-term  and long-term interest rates,  is effectively commercial banks' ATM -- they  make money by simply borrowing short-term and lending long. This chart then shows some normality returning to the benchmark interest structure.

from Breakingviews:

A Van Winkle return to Davos and to real problems

By Rob Cox The author is a Reuters Breakingviews columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.It was well past midnight in late January 2000 when an investment banking contact called my Davos hotel room to share the latest details on Vodafone’s hostile bid for Mannesmann. That was news, but the huge hostile takeover was no longer the largest deal in history. It had been displaced a few weeks earlier by the agreed merger of AOL and Time Warner. Such was the talk of the World Economic Forum. The great and the powerful had gathered together to celebrate the success of business and, especially, of finance.

Exuberance over technology and venture capital was almost limitless back in 2000, thanks to the seemingly limitless rise of the tech stocks. Dotcom startups were all the rage. When Japanese Internet mogul Masayoshi Son finished one panel, he was assailed by a gaggle of entrepreneurs waving business plans for him to peruse. In full disclosure, this columnist two weeks later signed up to establish the online financial commentary business that eventually became Reuters Breakingviews.

Coming back to this gathering 12 years later is a Rip Van Winklerian experience. The old world and its little worries look positively quaint. Back then, at what in retrospect proved to be the height of the Great Moderation, business was booming, the Nasdaq still had another 20 percent or so to climb, companies were merging like mad; everything looked rosy. President Bill Clinton parachuted in to give a victory lap. Even the demonstrations that took place against neoliberalism and world trade now look quaint. Defacing a McDonald’s is a far cry from overthrowing governments.

The economic moderation turned out to be built on financial excess. That AOL deal – hailed as visionary by all the delegates of 2000 – has become the poster child for foolish corporate finance. The Nasdaq is a third lower than 12 years ago (before adjusting for inflation). And the banks – what can I say? From triumph to tribulation.

The political world also looks much more treacherous. Geopolitics has not yielded to the irresistible forward march of free market capitalism, and peace no longer looks like something to be taken for granted. The 9/11 attacks spawned wars in Afghanistan and Iraq – the kinds of conflicts that in 2000 were supposed to be a thing of the past.

The World Economic Forum has changed with the times. The rise of the BRICs has brought greater diversity to the audience, which is a good thing. It has also brought many more people – so many, in fact, the organizers have expanded their caste system. There is now a dizzying number of different badges, each offering differing levels of access and status. It’s much easier to be here and still be excluded from the elite – much like the feeling of many of the world’s dispossessed.

The most striking difference, though, is in the increased complexity and severity of the questions confronting the collection of top business people, politicians, investors and academics. Europe’s sovereign debt crisis keeps trundling forward, bringing to the fore thorny challenges to sovereignty, the role of central banks and the solvency of nations. Instead of Clinton smiling from the podium, this year’s keynote address came from the troubled German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the leader with the most cards at the debt crisis table.

from Expert Zone:

Global Economics: When China is not just China

(The views expressed in this column are the author's own and do not represent those of Reuters)

The People's Republic of China's (PRC's) relationship with Iran receives a good deal of attention. As the U.S. considers how to stop Iran's nuclear weapons program short of military action, the PRC is considered vital in ensuring economic sanctions are effective. But it has been difficult to win Chinese cooperation in applying sanctions. One mistake the U.S. may have made is treating China as a unified entity.

It is true, of course, that the PRC has a tightly controlled political system. There is one ruling party, a powerless legislature, and muzzled debate. Even so, distinct interests have emerged.

State-owned enterprises rarely operated internationally a decade ago and, if they did, unfailingly followed the central government line, as when China Unicom was nationalised in 1999. One outcome of state-led development since 2003 is powerful growth by state firms. By some measures, State Grid is the world's biggest power company, China Mobile the biggest telecom, and ICBC the biggest bank.

The PRC's global presence is also much greater. Chinese firms are the world’s biggest exporters. From 2005 to 2011, Chinese outward investment exceeded $300 billion, even excluding bonds.

China's corporate kings are the two largest oil companies, both state-owned: CNPC and Sinopec. Both rank in Fortune’s top 10 globally. They are the two biggest owners of foreign non-bond assets, accounting for more than 25 percent of outward investment -- more than $80 billion -- by themselves. CNPC and Sinopec own stakes in Canadian oil projects; CNPC sends Venezuelan oil to the U.S. for refining; and Sinopec has just made a sizable U.S. shale deal. They also have made large acquisitions in Europe.

Iran has been an important target, with CNPC and Sinopec each having multibillion-dollar projects. However, there are indications that both, along with smaller cousin China National Offshore Oil, have slowed recent work. Why? It probably wasn’t orders from Beijing. Rather, proceeding with their considerable business in Iran in the face of sanctions would put much more of their global business at risk.

from Expert Zone:

Fallout of recession in euro zone

(The views expressed in this column are the author's own and do not represent those of Reuters)

It will not be before February that the euro zone GDP numbers are out. The available information so far indicates the economy is already in recession. This will have serious consequences for all countries, including India.

The data for November is disturbing. Unemployment has hit a new peak of 10.3 pct and is possibly the worst in Spain where it has touched 23 pct. Naturally, consumption expenditure has declined in the euro zone by about 1 pct and will have a depressing effect on GDP growth.

Factory orders are down even in Germany which is the largest euro zone economy. The fall exceeded 4.8 pct although the industry was still flashing positive signals.

Indications are that the euro zone economy is already in recession and growth may have slipped 1.75 pct with some countries diving deeper. The debt crisis and subsequent agreements entered into by EU (excluding the UK), to bring about better fiscal consolidation, have forced a number of countries to cut public spending. While this may reduce fiscal deficit -- the original sin -- it will deepen recession further.

The recession in the euro zone will have adverse consequences for many countries. In India, the impact of the European debt crisis was visible right from the beginning of 2011 though it intensified since August. India was hit most in comparison to other countries. The stock market lost nearly 20 pct in 2011 in the absence of FII investment which also pushed the rupee down from 45 to 53 to the dollar. Simultaneously, there was a fall in direct foreign investment.

The recession in the euro zone will have a crippling effect on our exports which, presently, account for 21 pct of our total exports. Italy and Spain, which are more prone to debt crisis and recession, together share more than 3 pct of our exports. Already, the export growth is down. It was 4 pct in November.

from Amplifications:

Will we ever grow out of growth?

By Kenneth Rogoff

The views expressed are his own.

Modern macroeconomics often seems to treat rapid and stable economic growth as the be-all and end-all of policy. That message is echoed in political debates, central-bank boardrooms, and front-page headlines. But does it really make sense to take growth as the main social objective in perpetuity, as economics textbooks implicitly assume?

Certainly, many critiques of standard economic statistics have argued for broader measures of national welfare, such as life expectancy at birth, literacy, etc. Such appraisals include the United Nations Human Development Report, and, more recently, the French-sponsored Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, led by the economists Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi.

But there might be a problem even deeper than statistical narrowness: the failure of modern growth theory to emphasize adequately that people are fundamentally social creatures. They evaluate their welfare based on what they see around them, not just on some absolute standard.

The economist Richard Easterlin famously observed that surveys of “happiness” show surprisingly little evolution in the decades after World War II, despite significant trend income growth. Needless to say, Easterlin’s result seems less plausible for very poor countries, where rapidly rising incomes often allow societies to enjoy large life improvements, which presumably strongly correlate with any reasonable measure of overall well-being.

In advanced economies, however, benchmarking behavior is almost surely an important factor in how people assess their own well-being. If so, generalized income growth might well raise such assessments at a much slower pace than one might expect from looking at how a rise in an individual’s income relative to others affects her welfare. And, on a related note, benchmarking behavior may well imply a different calculus of the tradeoffs between growth and other economic challenges, such as environmental degradation, than conventional growth models suggest.

from Amplifications:

Fragile and unbalanced in 2012

Nouriel Roubini The opinions expressed are his own.

The outlook for the global economy in 2012 is clear, but it isn’t pretty: recession in Europe, anemic growth at best in the United States, and a sharp slowdown in China and in most emerging-market economies. Asian economies are exposed to China. Latin America is exposed to lower commodity prices (as both China and the advanced economies slow). Central and Eastern Europe are exposed to the eurozone. And turmoil in the Middle East is causing serious economic risks – both there and elsewhere – as geopolitical risk remains high and thus high oil prices will constrain global growth.

At this point, a eurozone recession is certain. While its depth and length cannot be predicted, a continued credit crunch, sovereign-debt problems, lack of competitiveness, and fiscal austerity imply a serious downturn.

The US – growing at a snail’s pace since 2010 – faces considerable downside risks from the eurozone crisis. It must also contend with significant fiscal drag, ongoing deleveraging in the household sector (amid weak job creation, stagnant incomes, and persistent downward pressure on real estate and financial wealth), rising inequality, and political gridlock.

Elsewhere among the major advanced economies, the United Kingdom is double dipping, as front-loaded fiscal consolidation and eurozone exposure undermine growth. In Japan, the post-earthquake recovery will fizzle out as weak governments fail to implement structural reforms.

Meanwhile, flaws in China’s growth model are becoming obvious. Falling property prices are starting a chain reaction that will have a negative effect on developers, investment, and government revenue. The construction boom is starting to stall, just as net exports have become a drag on growth, owing to weakening US and especially eurozone demand. Having sought to cool the property market by reining in runaway prices, Chinese leaders will be hard put to restart growth.

They are not alone. On the policy side, the US, Europe, and Japan, too, have been postponing the serious economic, fiscal, and financial reforms that are needed to restore sustainable and balanced growth.

from Expert Zone:

There is no place like home

(Paul Donovan is a Managing Director and Global Economist at UBS. The views expressed in this column are the author's own and do not represent those of Reuters)

Most economists believe that nearly everything in this life can be reduced to an economic explanation.

This even applies to popular culture. The Wizard of Oz has been explained as a parable of late 19th century economics, as a veiled commentary on the gold standard versus the use of silver that dominated the 1896 presidential election in America. The yellow brick road is gold, the cowardly lion was William Jennings Bryan (a pro-silver politician). The wicked witches represented Wall Street (east) and railroad interests (west). Dorothy had to put on silver shoes to make her way to the Wizard of Oz (the U.S. President). She then learned that she could escape the bizarre, fantasy world of Oz and get back to reality by clicking her heels and repeating “I want to go home”.

Confronted by the bizarre, fantastic world of the Euro today, investors could learn from the Wizard of Oz. Global investors may well want to click their heels and mutter “I want to go home”. After two decades of globalising capital flows, investors may once again feel the urge to have their money at home, or at least closer to home than has been the case hitherto.

Why should investors favour home or regional markets? In a rational world, investors should search for the best risk adjusted returns they can find, and put their money there. However, as the Euro only too clearly demonstrates, we do not live in a rational world.

There are two forces at work here. The first is the fact that political risk is playing a larger and larger role in the world’s financial markets. Governments have an increasing impact through regulation, government debt (and default fears), intervention in currency and bond markets and policy statements.

What this means is that the performance of markets can no longer be interpreted through economic activity alone. Increasingly, one must understand the political environment and the likely changes that that environment may bring to bear on investments. For many investors this is a development that they have not experienced before: political risk was a declining force in financial markets in the two decades that preceded the global financial crisis. The problem is that political risk is very often specific to a country or to a culture.

from Expert Zone:

Too many questions, no convincing answers

(Nipun Mehta is an award-winning private banker with many years of experience across Asia. The views expressed in the column are his own and not those of Reuters)

If one were to evaluate global events of the last four years dispassionately, the subprime mess in the U.S. and the imminent debt default by Greece (and four other countries to a lesser extent) and the resultant crisis in the euro zone have virtually held the global economy to ransom.

This generation of bankers, analysts, bureaucrats, politicians or even economists, has not been witness to the kind of convolutions that governments and markets are passing through. All this has also led to credit rating agencies taking some surprising and some highly inexplicable decisions.

The outcome of this extraordinary, though not entirely unexpected, chain of events has been various out-of-the-box decisions and/or suggestions like introduction of a new tax on the rich called the ‘Buffet Tax’, an offer by Brazil to start funding the euro zone deficit (much like the tail wagging the dog), of breaking up of the EU, of easing Greece out of the EU, of issuing a new layer of ‘Euro Zone Bonds’, tranches of quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve, etc. The pendulum of risk aversion has swung so sharply that gold and more recently the dollar are the only asset classes that have performed in the last few quarters.

The uncertainty created by persistent delays in a clear decision within the euro zone has created a lot of volatility across markets and asset classes. The latest potential solution of investors taking a 50 pct cut in their investment in Greek bonds will shave off billions of dollars of assets from a few European Banks’ books and impair their balance sheets by raising a serious question mark on their overall asset quality.

Bank rating downgrades have already happened in Europe and unless governments capitalise some of them soon, an impending banking crisis is brewing in some European countries. Due to their huge exposure to Greek bonds, two of the largest French banks have already been forced to announce a 110 bln euro asset liquidation over the next few years to strengthen their balance sheets. Can you imagine the impact of such a measure on global businesses in various countries?

The kind of volatility across bond, forex, commodity and equity markets that we have seen globally over the last few months has been immense, and unknown to many, with far reaching implications. If a close to 9 pct rupee devaluation (vis-à-vis the dollar) over the last three months can create havoc amongst businesses, imagine the kind of impact on P&L a/cs, of bond price movements on profitability of some global banks, of importer or exporter revenues in case of adverse forex movement. The fact that company budgets have gone awry or government fiscal deficits estimates have increased will be apparent only after a lag. It’s best to be prepared.

from Global Investing:

If China catches a cold…

China has defied predictions of a hard economic landing for some time now so it is somewhat unsettling to see  investors positioning for a sharp slowdown in the world's second-largest economy.

Over the last 10 years, the world has become accustomed to Chinese annual GDP growth of above 9 percent. A seemingly insatiable demand for commodities from soya beans to iron ore has catapulted the Asian giant to near the top of the global trade table. China is the biggest trading partner for countries on nearly every continent, from Angola to Australia.

But many are now fretting that an unhappy coincidence between stuttering global demand and domestic strains in the property and banking sectors could knock Chinese growth to below 7 percent (the level commonly identified as a 'hard landing'), with grave implications for the rest of the world.

"It used to be the case that if the US sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold. But with the US already confined to the emergency room since 2008 thequestion is what happens if China catches a cold," says Citi in a recent report.

Many are now preparing for the first sneeze.

Commodity exporters are expected to bear the brunt of a sharp Chinese slowdown. Investors have pared back exposure to Brazil, Russia, Chile and South Africa, citing fears over China.

On the flipside, Turkey, Mexico, Israel and India have been identified as less vulnerable.