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from MacroScope:

All eyes on Wednesday EU summit

After last week’s hefty losses, European stock gained yesterday and are up up again this morning, denoting some optimism about the Wednesday supper summit of EU leaders, which might well be unrealistic.

The European growth measures that we know are in the works – boosting the paid-in capital of the European Investment Bank and plans for 'project bonds' underwritten by the EU budget to finance infrastructure – might help a little but will fall a long way short of turning the euro zone economy around, so unless we get something more, on either the growth or the building defences fronts, there’s scope for investor disappointment.

Europe’s international partners continue to demand more dramatic crisis action. After the G8 summit, President Obama was out last night with four demands: - firewalls to protect countries from Greek contagion (are the ESM and IMF funds now viewed as insufficient?), - recapitalization of banks that need it (Spain to the fore here presumably), - A growth strategy to run alongside tight fiscal measures (easier said than done), - easy monetary policy to help the likes of Italy and Spain keep cutting debt (the ECB thinks its 1 percent rate is very loose and is unlikely to cut soon with inflation above target and will only flood the system with more liquidity in utter extremis)

Nothing new there but it keeps up the drumbeat of pressure ahead of the EU get-together. We know French President Francois Hollande, with the backing of others, will press the case for common euro zone bonds at the summit and also know that German opposition will not weaken one jot on that score. Spain’s Rajoy is pressing for more ECB involvement, presumably by reviving its bond-buying programme. Given internal opposition to that within the ECB that is probably the least likely measure to be reactivated, yet anyway.

Despite money flowing out of Greek banks, and at least the threat of it spreading more widely if Greece bombed out of the euro zone, there is no hint yet of any planning for any scheme to underwrite bank deposits across the bloc, probably because the ECB and Germany will not countenance underwriting it. The golden rule of this crisis is that red lines have and will be crossed when it reaches breaking point. We’re not there yet.

With so much focus on Greece and Spain, Portugal has been somewhat overlooked in recent weeks but it will quite likely need a second bailout at some stage and if Greece prompts a wave of contagion, it will be firmly and instantly in the firing line.

from MacroScope:

The end of austerity? Not likely

It was Bill Clinton who, after the 2000 U.S. election was thrown into turmoil by Florida's hanging chads, said the American people had spoken but it was going to take a little time to work out what they had said. No such dilemma in Greece. A plague on both your houses was the message for the traditional ruling parties PASOK and New Democracy, a result that makes a stable government look a remote possibility and puts a very real question mark over its bailout programme.

Today, the largest party New Democracy will try to form a coalition. Given what they've said, the left-wing Left Coalition which leapfrogged PASOK into second place cannot be part of a government committed to the bailout terms so it looks like the two traditionally dominant parties -- two seats short of an overall majority between them -- must seek support from elsewhere or face fresh elections which could well give an even more fractured result. One thing worth noting is that even the resurgent anti-bailout parties mostly say they want to stay in the euro zone so maybe there's soom room for negotiation.

The euro has dived to a three-month low, Bund futures have posted yet another record high and European shares are down so we're right back in fear mode.

Two big questions flow from all that: 1. Could this vote, and socialist Francois Hollande's victory in France, shift the growth/austerity debate? 2. Does Greece, even its possible euro exit, still have the power to spread damaging contagion to the rest of the euro zone?

On the growth front, the answer is only up to a point because Berlin and the European Central Bank -- and the markets -- won't wear anything that will dilute debt-cutting programmes much, whatever the more friendly rhetoric suggests. Italian premier Mario Monti, a man desperate for growth, talked to Hollande, Germany's Angela Merkel and Britain's David Cameron among others after the elections last night, presumably to push that agenda and the argument is gaining force.

EU economics chief Olli Rehn chipped into the growth debate over the weekend, suggesting there is some leeway to temper debt-cutting drives in order to leave scope for growth. But again, details were elusive. Rehn also said those countries under the  microscope had to convince the markets and policymakers of their capacity to put their fiscal houses in order. This sounds rather like having your cake and eating it, or at least reaffirms what we've been saying -- that there may be some limited fiscal wiggle room, but only as much as the markets will allow, which is not much.

So the growth strategy stills seems to rest on structural reforms (which will take years to bear fruit), plus reconfiguring some EU funds and a beefed up European Investment Bank. Those who really count -- Merkel and Draghi at the top of the list -- are talking up growth measures while insisting the austerity drive must not be dimmed. The markets would probably respond well to stimulus which did not fundamentally undermine debt reduction. But that's some trick. And what's on offer so far will not do the trick. Will something more profound be cooked up for the end-June EU summit?

from Breakingviews:

Iran offers Egypt limited lesson in subsidy reform

By Una Galani and Christopher Swann

The authors are Reuters Breakingviews columnists. The opinions expressed are their own.

Iran offers Egypt a limited lesson in reform. The International Monetary Fund says the Arab state should look to the Islamic Republic as a model for how to cut subsidies. Iran ventured where few of its regional rivals dared in 2010 when it raised fuel prices. But the vast differences in wealth between these two countries make the comparison unhelpful.

Iran and Egypt share a common need to reform. An overhaul of subsidies had been debated in Iran for years before Tehran took action to address its $60 billion bill - under the pressure of necessity, after the United States tightened sanctions. Egypt, similarly, has long considered trimming energy subsidies, which now gobble up 20 percent of the budget. The matter is becoming more urgent after the revolution left the country with a double-digit fiscal deficit, increasing debt and shrinking foreign reserves.

Egypt may learn a thing or two from Iran’s extensive public relations campaign prior to the raising of prices. Iranian media went to great lengths to emphasise the social inequity of subsidies. To minimise social unrest, Cairo must ensure the country’s poor understand that they are not the main beneficiaries of the current, absurd system - if only because they live without air conditioning and drive old cars, if any.

The real reason that Iran’s reforms were a political success comes down to a model that Egypt cannot afford. Tehran raised fuel prices and handed out a cash equivalent to the majority of the population. That may have achieved the aim of reducing energy consumption. But it also increased inflation, and it is still unclear whether Tehran actually saved any money.

The Iranian model is inappropriate for a country like Egypt that needs to quickly rein in its spending and cannot afford to keep paying subsidies to everyone, including the wealthy, like Iran. In the end, Egypt’s model of subsidy reform will be a pick n’ mix of swapping expensive fuel oil for gas, raising the price of the most expensive diesel, and establishing a system that weans industry off cheap fuel. For that, Egypt needs a single, multi-pronged comprehensive plan that will look nothing like Iran’s simple formula.

from MacroScope:

Austerity light? Maybe a shade lighter

There is a groundswell building in the euro zone that austerity drives should be tempered.

France’s Francois Hollande, favourite to take the presidency next month, said last night that  leaders across Europe were awaiting his election to back away from German-led austerity, and even ECB President Mario Draghi called yesterday for a growth pact.

He was rather opaque on how - although he was clear the European Central Bank would not be doing anything more -- but his colleague Joerg Asmussen was a little more forthcoming, saying some EU structural funds could be funneled to countries in crisis to boost employment. These sort of ideas are actively part of the mix and could well be enacted at the June EU summit.

Thay also tally with some of Hollande’s policy slate. He is promoting joint European bonds to finance infrastructure projects, greater investment by the European Investment Bank more efficient deployment of EU regional development resources and a financial transaction tax levied help fund youth and education projects. Some of those options are quite likely to happen. Others much less so.

Reality check: The EU’s German paymasters and the ever-present bond market will only tolerate a marginal shift in direction – you need look no further than at what has happened to Spain and its borrowing costs since it upped its deficit target in March -- so there will be not much let-up on the debt-cutting front.   Nonetheless, there has been a distinct shift in the rhetoric. Even Angela Merkel is pushing for a more broadly-based minimum wage in Germany, which could be construed as a growth tactic.

Dutch finance minister De Jager says multi-party talks about the 2013 budget have been constructive. They will continue today.

The Netherlands is supposed to hand Brussels its budget deficit target next week – the government was targeting 3 percent of GDP but lost its coalition partners, who demanded a softer goal, and collapsed earlier in the week. With elections not due until September, a failure to cobble together a budget deal by the main parties would lead to a dangerous period of uncertainty.

from Global Investing:

Hungary can seek IMF aid now. But can it cut rates?

The European Union has given Budapest the green light to seek aid from the IMF. (see here)  In fact, the breakthrough after five months of dispute does not let Hungary completely off the hook  -- to get its hands on the money, Viktor Orban's government will have to backtack on some controversial recent legislation, starting with its efforts to curb the central bank's independence.  It remains to be seen if Orban will actually cave in.

But markets are reacting as if the IMF money is in Hungary's pocket already. There have been sharp rallies in Hungarian dollar bonds,  CDS and currency markets (see graphic below from Capital Economics). The Budapest stock market has posted its best one-day gain since last November while the yield on local 10-year bonds have collapsed almost 100 bps. Hungarian officials are (a bit prematurely)  talking of issuing bonds on world markets.

What investors are hoping for now is a cut to the 7 percent interest rate. Hungary's central bank jacked up rates by 100 bps in recent months to defend the forint as cash fled the country. Now there is a chance those rate rises can be reeled back in. After all, the moribund economy could really use a dash of monetary easing. Thanasis Petronikolos, head of emerging debt at Baring Asset Management has been overweight Hungary and  recalls that after 2008 crisis, the central bank was able to quickly take back its 300 bps of currency-defensive rate hikes.

In the aftermath of this, the central bank may be prompted to cut short term interest rates. If the risk premium comes down a lot, the central bank may feel that 7 percent interest rates are not justified. I’m expecting them to at least take this 100 bps back assuming they can reach an agreement with the IMF.

Hungary's FRAs (forward rate agreement), are still pricing slightly higher short-term interest rates and have not yet reacted to the shifting picture. Many urge caution however on the rate cut expectations, noting that Orban and the IMF may struggle to reach common ground and the central bank will want to see money on the table before it actually acts.

Petronikolos is right in that the economy is moribund, credit growth has slumped and there is a big output gap. But headline inflation is running at 5.5 percent, well above the central bank's 3 percent target, due to an increase in sales tax.  Sandor Jobbagy, at CIB Bank in Budapest is one analyst who says inflation risks have forced him to push back the date of likely interest rate cuts. 

from MacroScope:

ECB to the rescue? Hold your horses

ECB policymakers from Mario Draghi down will come at us from all angles today. Expect a united front on the main theme of the moment; calls for it to consider yet more liquidity operations essentially creating money and/or resuming its government bond-buying programme. That call was first heard at the IMF spring meeting over the weekend and the ECB president’s response could hardly have been clearer, saying: “None of the advice of the IMF has been discussed by the Governing Council, in recent times at least".

Since then a number of his colleagues have followed up. The message: they are looking more to inflation now and banks and governments have to put their own houses in order after the ECB gave them time with its colossal three-year money-creating exercise. The ECB's man in Spain, Gonzalez-Paramo, is already out this morning saying Spain will not struggle to meet its debt issuance target this year despite its rising yields.

The ECB will, of course, act if the crisis drives Europe right back to the brink, it's mandate will pretty much demand it at that stage but we’re not anywhere near there yet – contrary to what many in the markets believe.

That things are not good is not in dispute.

The Netherlands pushed itself further into the mire yesterday when its opposition parties refused to back an austerity budget which the government collapsed over earlier in the week. That leaves the prospect of the Dutch failing to present the EU with a budget plan by an April 30 deadline and, more seriously, a period of policy paralysis stretching to elections which will not be held until September.

That vote is also quite likely to usher in an administration opposed to the austerity drive, a theme that is gathering pace within the euro zone, with socialist Francois Hollande, a warm favourite to take the French presidency next month, staking out similar ground and also suggesting the ECB should adopt pro-growth policies.

However, if there is any shift away from debt cutting – and as the IMF says, that is eminently sensible given many of these countries will drive themselves further into recession which would likely add to debt piles – it will be marginal. German opposition and the bond market will only allow a small shift in emphasis.   The lessons are already there for all to see. Italy pushed back its balanced budget goal by a year, a small shift, and investors were not alarmed. Spain substantially cranked up its 2012 deficit target and has been slaughtered by the bond market ever since, to the point where many now expect it to need a bailout.

from Global Investing:

Ukraine’s $58 billion problem

Ukrainian officials were at pains to reassure investors last week that no debt default was in the offing. But people familiar with the numbers will find it hard to believe them.

The government must find over $5.3 billion this year to repay maturing external debt, including $3 billion to the IMF and $2 billion to Russian state bank VTB. Bad enough but there is worse:  Ukrainian companies and banks too have hefty debt maturities this year. Total external financing needs-- corporate and sovereign -- amount to $58 billion, analysts at Capital Economics calculate. That's a third of Ukraine's GDP and makes a default of some kind very likely. The following graphic is from Capital Economics.

In normal circumstances Ukraine -- and Ukrainian companies -- could have gone to market and borrowed the money. Quite a few developing countries such as Lithuania recently tapped markets, others including Jamaica plan to do so. Ukraine's problem is its refusal to toe the IMF line.  Agreeing to the IMF's main demand to lift crippling gas subsidies would unlock a $15 billion loan programme, giving  access to the loan cash as well as to global bond markets. But removing subsidies would be political suicide ahead of elections in October.  And with the sovereign frozen out of bond markets, Ukrainian companies too will find it hard to raise cash.

So what options does Ukraine have? It could yet sell bonds on global markets. Or it could, as the finance minister sugggested last week, borrow at home in hard currency. But its tiny, illiquid  local debt markets are unlikely to attract too many foreign investors. And yields will be ruinous. Ukraine's 2015 dollar bond is trading with a yield of 9 percent and Ukrainian sovereign dollar debt carries a hefty 870 basis-point premium to U.S.  Treasuries, among the highest in emerging markets. Analysts at Capital Economics write:

Issuing debt at interest rates of 8-10% is unsustainable for a country that even on the IMF’s optimistic projections is likely to record average nominal GDP growth (in US$) of only 4.5% a year over the next three years.

The government could also dip into the central bank's $30 billion reserves. But this would be a temporary fix. Also, reserves are already down $7 billion since last August and spending more of this could leave the hryvnia seriously exposed in coming months.

from MacroScope:

Euro zone goes Dutch

So the euro zone debt crisis morphs again and there is a hint of schadenfreude about the Dutch, who lectured and hectored the Greeks, now falling into the same mire.

The Dutch premier, Mark Rutte, will probably try to cobble together an unholy alliance in parliament in order to meet an April 30 EU deadline for it to present budget plans for the next year. But with elections not until late June at the earliest, there will be an unnerving period of vacuum for the markets and no guarantee that opposition parties will play ball and allow a budget to be put together.

Given all that, today’s Dutch bond auction, not normally a cause for alarm or excitement, is thrown into sharp relief. Expect yields to spiral although the small amount on offer means the paper will be sold. Italy is selling zero-coupon and inflation-linked bonds while Spain,  which remains front and centre despite the Netherlands’ travails, will probably see borrowing costs double when it sells up to 2 billion euros of 3- and 6-month treasury bills. Spanish 10-year yields poked above the pivotal 6 percent level again yesterday as the Dutch government collapse rocked markets. The Bank of Spain confirmed on Monday that a new recession has taken hold.

That brings us neatly to one of the building themes – a backlash against rapid, frontloaded austerity. It started with the IMF/G20 over the weekend where the call went out that Europe should not cut so fast that it drives itself deeper into downturn, which would actually make debt much harder to cut since government revenues would shrink. If socialist Francois Hollande wins the French presidency, he will attempt to balance the budget a little slower than Sarkozy (though the difference between the two of them is less marked than the rhetoric suggests), Italy has pushed back its deadline to get the budget deficit to zero and the Dutch could well end up with a new government that rejects austerity given the country is also in recession and looking at the state of opinion polls. Spain, of course, has already binned its original 2012 deficit target in favour of something looser, though still exacting.

So is there a shift afoot? Two things to note here. First, the Spanish example. It has been punished by the bond market since it adjusted its deficit sights, showing no country can loosen policy more than the markets will allow (which is not much). Also on that front, ratings agency Moody’s said last night that the events in the Hague were “credit negative”. It kept the outlook on its AAA rating stable for now but said any signs of fiscal wavering would make it think again. If the Netherlands was stripped of its AAA rating, there would only be four top-rated members of the euro zone left. Secondly, Berlin has little sympathy for the growth over austerity argument and it is the one that foots the bills although if yesterday’s PMIs were anything to go by even Germany may yet succumb to recession, which could change the terms of the debate there.

Does the success of parties out of the mainstream mean the political class have lost their electorates? If that’s true, then we really are in an unpredictable new world though there has been little or no sign of social unrest yet.

The other theme to ponder is the EU fiscal pact which should not be underplayed since it will in the end commit all euro zone countries to manageable debt levels, after which, who knows, even Berlin might consider the option of common euro zone bonds which would go a long way to draw a line under the crisis. Ergo, it would be disastrous if that edifice began to crumble before it was even topped out. It only requires 12 of 17 euro zone members to ratify it to come into force which looked like a certainty. But Wilders’ populist Dutch party, which toppled the government, will now campaign against the pact, the Irish will hold a referendum on it before the month is out and Hollande has pledged to renegotiate aspects of it. It will probably be fine but there is greater uncertainty surrounding the compact now.

from MacroScope:

Roubini takes on the ECB

It was fun to watch. Nouriel Roubini, NYU economist and crisis personality, was one of just five carefully selected individuals at a large gathering in the International Monetary Fund HQ1 building’s towering atrium who actually got to ask questions of the policymakers on stage.

Roubini was characteristically biting in his critique of conventional orthodoxy, singling out the European Central Bank for not having done enough to stem the euro zone’s two-year financial crisis. He challenged the notion that the ECB is powerless to boost growth further, suggesting -- to the clear discomfort of some policymakers in the room -- that measures to weaken the currency could provide a badly-needed boost to exports:

I saw that on the panel there are four central bankers and the panel is about fiscal policy and sovereign debt. So the natural question is then to think maybe about what could be the contribution of central banks in resolving sovereign debt issues. Now, one simple answer would be to just monetize very large budget deficits and I understand why a central bank would say that’s a no-no.

But there’s a more subtle argument and it’s the following one: we know that while fiscal austerity is necessary, in the short-run, as even Christine Lagarde said and the IMF’s work suggests, that has a net recessionary effect on the economy. You’re raising taxes, you’re reducing transfer payments, you’re reducing government spending, so you’re reducing disposable income, you’re reducing aggregate demand. It makes the recession worse and you can get a vicious circle. Not only do you have deleveraging of the public sector but the raising of taxes and cutting of transfer payments induces also deleveraging of the private sector.

So if domestic demand is going to be anemic and weak in this fiscal adjustment because of private and public sector deleveraging you need net exports to improve to restore growth. That’s what happened in emerging market crises. But in order to have an improvement in net exports you need a weaker currency and a much more easy monetary policy to help induce that nominal and real depreciation that is not occurring right now in the euro zone. That’s one of the reasons why we’re getting a recession that’s even more severe. So, can’t we think of monetary policy as helping to induce the change in relative prices that’s necessary to have a restoration of growth if domestic demand is weak through net export improvements?

Roubini was not alone in his critique either, with the ECB coming under pressure from the IMF itself to lower rates further.

ECB Vice President Vítor Constâncio responded by stressing the institution’s price stability mandate as well as the difficulties of synchronizing policy for a group of nations growing at different speeds:

We have only one monetary policy for the average of the euro area. Headline inflation is now at 2.7 (percent). We anticipate, and we have reasons to trust the forecast that inflation in the euro area will be below 2 at the beginning of next year. Nevertheless it’s about 2. Even if you consider core inflation, it’s now at 1.6 – so it’s clearly not in any way a deflation risk. And this would be the reason for us to have a different monetary policy than the one we have now, because that would be directly connected with our mandate regarding price stability in both directions. But that’s not the case right now.

So your implicit view, or recommendation if I may draw that from your question, really would fit much better, even appropriately, with the mandate of the Fed but it’s not what we have in the ECB.

Nevertheless we are doing a lot in view of the situation that inflation expectations are very firmly anchored. That has allowed us to do lots of things. We rely and trust that in the present situation with a weak economy we can be sure of complying with our primary objective so we can do other things and we have done that – but not what you hinted at.

Bank of France Governor Christian Noyer, who was hosting and moderating the event, had spoken about that very same subject earlier during the panel discussion. Like Constâncio, he argued markets should not expect central banks to shoulder too great a burden:

from Breakingviews:

Growth gap puts IMF in endless campaign mode

By Christopher Swann

The author is a Reuters Breakingviews columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.

It’s not just America’s electorate that’s at risk of campaign fatigue. At the International Monetary Fund spring meetings held this past week, the BRIC nations - Brazil, Russia, India and China - were in full campaign mode even before the ink has dried on previous increases made to their voting strength at the international lending body.

Contributing to the euro bailout fund at the IMF offers a pretext to revive the issue of power. But with developing nations expected to grow twice as fast as rich economies like the United States and Europe over the next five years, haggling over heft can be expected to become a permanent feature of future IMF and World Bank meetings.

Ever since the Washington-based lenders were established 65 years ago, debates over who held the internal balance of power generally took place only twice every decade, when new leaders were chosen. In addition, few questioned the carve-up of leadership - which gives European nations the unwritten right to pick the head of the IMF and America the World Bank chief. In recent years, however, debates over who wears the trousers at the agencies have refused to die down.

Deals on voting power were struck at the fund in 2008 and late 2010, giving developing nations more influence. The last of these - which will elevate China from the sixth largest shareholder to the third - has yet to be ratified. Yet it’s already clear this shift of votes won’t be enough to satisfy fast-growing developing nations.

Emerging countries accounted for two-thirds of global growth over the past five years, the World Bank calculates. This has made the meager voice of the likes of China, Brazil and India look woefully out of date. And the World Bank sees no let-up in this process. If, as the bank expects, poorer nations continue to outpace richer rivals, the status quo power structure at the IMF and World Bank will constantly be lagging.