The author is a Reuters Breakingviews columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.

Barack Obama’s corporate tax plan is a good start. His proposal to reduce the top corporate tax rate to 28 percent from 35 percent and eliminate loopholes is an overdue initiative. But there’s also room for improvement. For one, to avoid boosting the deficit, the president suggests collecting more money from domestic multinationals, which would only make it tougher for them to compete abroad.

The objective is at least clear. The United States has a statutory corporate tax rate higher than most other developed nations, while its effective rate is in the middle of the pack. The 10 percentage point gap between the two figures is stark compared to the negligible one for the rest of the G7. Broadly speaking, the plan would enable Uncle Sam to tax more income at a lower rate. And in theory, that should keep the government out of the business of picking winners and losers.

But in practice, the president’s plan does so, in a bid to boost employment. U.S. companies in subsidy-starved industries like retail would be big winners. Their tax cuts would be paid for by multinationals. Obama wants an unspecified minimum tax on foreign earnings, which would bruise the likes of General Electric and Apple, which compete in lower-tax regimes. Depending on the details, that could affect factors like the cost of capital.

The Obama administration also nods to manufacturers by slashing the industry’s top effective tax rate to three percentage points lower than the ceiling for others. Green energy firms also would benefit from extended subsidies, while fossil-fuel producers would lose precious loopholes.

Despite these accommodations, the president does aim for fairness elsewhere. For instance, he would get rid of the carried interest tax loophole allowing hedge fund and private equity bosses to enjoy low capital gains rates on their regular income. Other archaic provisions also would be eliminated.

Such aggressive reform doesn’t stand much chance in an election year, but the president has moved the ball in the right direction. His likely Republican opponent in November, Mitt Romney, wants the top corporate tax rate at 25 percent. That should mean for once there’s actually some middle ground.

The author is a Reuters Breakingviews columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.

Shell is paying a full price to gain exposure to promising natural gas prospects off the Eastern coast of Africa. The oil group’s $1.6 billion offer for Cove Energy represents a 70 percent premium to the AIM-listed energy explorer’s undisturbed share price. Cove may be tiny, but its assets are attractive. With more than $11 billion of cash on hand, Shell can easily afford it. If Asian gas prices stay high or Cove’s exploration projects deliver, this small but highly priced deal may be worth the bother.

Cove’s main attraction is an 8.5 percent stake in an as yet undeveloped gas find off the coast of Mozambique. The field is thought to contain between 15 trillion and 30 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas. Take the average of those two figures, and the purchase price equates to about $4.60 per barrel of oil equivalent, according to Bernstein Research – or $4.10/boe, excluding cash on the balance sheet. That’s roughly double the average of $2.30/boe that Shell has forked out for other gas explorers recently.

Overpaying is overpaying, regardless of how big or small the deal is. But Cove thinks the Mozambique assets alone could be worth up to $1.6 billion, based on optimistic assumptions about the field’s gas reserves and the size of the export capacity from the field. Crucially, it also assumes that Asian buyers keep paying dear prices for gas. The region may be short of liquefied natural gas (LNG) now, and oil-linked Asian contracts should keep a floor under prices. But that dynamic could change by the time the Mozambique supplies come onstream near the end of the decade – especially if U.S. companies win approval to build big LNG export hubs.

Still, Cove’s other exploratory tracts in Mozambique, Kenya and Tanzania could always come good. Part of Cove’s premium price can also probably be justified by lower costs – a big LNG export facility should be cheaper to build and operate in Mozambique than in Australia, where Shell is also investing heavily in gas. Shell can also arguably get more out of Cove’s assets than other putative buyers who lack its gas know-how, financial clout, and marketing savvy. It’ll take some luck, but the deal might just end up looking very clever.

The author is a Reuters Breakingviews columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.

Gold, it seems, can have it both ways. Its latest charge to a three-month high is ascribed both to relief at a Greek bailout and to fear it won’t work. The bubbling precious metal has become simultaneously a speculative, risk-on play and a safe haven. That duality should keep the gold bull alive for a little while yet.

The golden beast is showing signs of fatigue. A three-month high leaves it 8 percent down on its September peak. Demand for gold rose in 2011 – but by just 0.4 percent on 2010. Ultra-high prices are weighing down jewellery consumption. India, traditionally the largest consumer of gold for jewellery, imported 44 percent less gold in the fourth quarter of 2011 than a year earlier as the rupee plunged. China overtook India as the biggest gold importer, but its demand was up a meagre 3 percent year-on-year.

Weakness in jewellery demand is in fact not new. It is down by a quarter over the past decade, from an annual average of 2,587 tonnes in 2002-04 to 1,931 tonnes in 2009-11. Extremely high prices are deterring consumers. Industrial demand has been stable, at about one tenth of the total. But it is demand for gold as an investment that has soared, rising from just 341 tonnes in 2003 to an annual average of 1,604 tonnes in 2010-11.

Sustained dollar weakness, zero interest rates and abundant money printing by the U.S. Federal Reserve have all boosted the appeal of gold and reduced the opportunity cost of holding it. The September price peak of $1,920 per ounce coincided with fears of a euro zone collapse and additional money-printing in the United States. When paper money cannot be trusted, gold seems priceless.

Normality is the gold bull’s enemy. Better American data, which has reduced the likelihood of more quantitative easing, and a firmer dollar are negative signals. Rising U.S. interest rates will eventually be the precious metal’s nemesis. But that day is still distant and euro zone crisis risks intensifying again, sending investors gold’s way. Gold’s bull run is tired but not quite over.

UPS hasn’t unwrapped the expected cost savings from acquiring TNT. Stripping out expenses would be relatively easy, though, given UPS’ formidable presence in Europe. And the opening offer suggests it would retain a large slug of these benefits for itself.

But for now at least, UPS is bidding against itself – and it could stay that way. FedEx has a negligible 3 percent market share in European delivery, a third of what UPS claims, according to HSBC. That would make it harder for FedEx to extract synergies of a similar magnitude. As a result, Barclays estimates FedEx savings from a tie-up with TNT at just $240 million. Taxed and capitalized, this amounts to about $1.8 billion. UPS is already offering TNT a premium of $1.9 billion, meaning FedEx shareholders wouldn’t necessarily cheer a competing offer.

What’s more, FedEx has a weaker balance sheet. UPS may have been deliberately taking advantage of this fact with its all-cash offer. Matching the 9 euros a share bid in cash would take FedEx’s net debt to three times operating cash flow including leases, according to HSBC, against a multiple of just two times for UPS.

Deutsche Post DHL, meanwhile, faces a different kind of obstacle. Acquiring TNT would create a titan with a 33 percent market share in Europe – almost four times larger than nearest rival UPS. Though there could be divestiture workarounds, antitrust authorities would quickly descend on any such proposal.

A rival bid can’t be ruled out, of course. FedEx, for example, may calculate that the risk of being totally outgunned in Europe warrants paying over the odds. Still, TNT investors are expecting at least 9 percent more right now. As it stands, it’s not obvious their shipment will come in.

GM’s ormer financing arm would be better off waiting for an opening to launch a much-delayed stock offering rather than selling itself. Sure, the business now known as Ally Financial would fit well with several banks – or even its previous owner. And the U.S. Treasury, which pumped $17 billion into Ally and owns about three-quarters of it, wants its money back. But the troubled mortgage division, ResCap, may give some pause. And Ally is too big to swallow easily.

The company’s $112 billion of global auto loans are enticing. For example, TD Bank’s low loan-to-deposit ratio prompted it to buy Chrysler Financial in 2010. TD’s major Canadian rivals are similarly challenged as are U.S.-based Regions Financial, PNC, BB&T and Wells Fargo.

But large-scale finance deals are scarce. Capital One’s $9 billion acquisition of ING Direct is the biggest unassisted deal since before the crisis. And the Federal Reserve signaled last week it would put any deal over $2 billion in assets under the microscope. The extra time required to seal the deal – and the prospect it could be nixed – may be deterrent enough.

Ally would be almost three times the size of the ING deal. It’s probably worth $25 billion, assuming it were to sell for 1.3 times its $19.3 billion book value – midway between TD’s near-book value purchase of Chrysler Financial and the 1.6 multiple GM paid in 2010 for AmeriCredit.

Buying just Ally’s assets might circumvent the Fed. But paying a slight premium for net assets of the North American outfit would require $68 billion, according to KBW. A bank could dip into its cash and securities to raise the money, but with liquidity rules still unclear, the prospect is less likely. If one did, Ally’s remnants would essentially be in wind-down mode, with much of the sale proceeds used to pay creditors.

GM may fancy bringing Ally back into the fold. But the price tag would either use up most of its cash or simply involve Treasury swapping ownership of Ally into a greater stake in GM. That suits no one’s purpose. Unless Wall Street’s financiers can find a way round these problems, Ally and U.S. taxpayers are probably better off waiting for an IPO.

The T-Mobile takeover plan scrapped by regulators unquestionably took its toll. In 2010, AT&T’s free cash flow was atop its target range and earnings per share surpassed it. Last year, free cash flow settled back into the middle of its range while EPS barely scraped the bottom. Even had the T-Mobile costs been excluded, earnings would have fallen short of target. And while on a longer, three-year horizon, AT&T’s total shareholder return of 9 percent outperformed the broader market, it was near the bottom of its own self-described peer group. That all suggests T-Mobile proved a bigger distraction for AT&T management than even the hefty immediate costs imply.

AT&T tried to blame Washington for the torpedoed deal – and it may even have a point where tight spectrum rules are concerned. But shareholders shouldn’t get too distracted by that excuse. Stephenson and the company’s directors led AT&T into antitrust battle without sufficient ammunition. With say-on-pay on the ballot at this year’s annual shareholder meeting, investors can show their displeasure about the repercussions for that decision – and should.

The author is a Reuters Breakingviews columnist. The opinions expressed are her own.

Jack Ma may have failed to buy back a stake in his e-commerce group Alibaba from U.S. partner Yahoo, but he has at least found a fallback plan. Ma has offered $2.5 billion to take his Hong Kong-listed unit, Alibaba.com private. The premium, 46 pct to the company’s last price before the deal was announced, is decent, and minority investors have no better options. But it still looks opportunistic.

Alibaba.com shares closed just two percent below the offer price of HK$13.50 a share after the announcement, suggesting investors aren’t spoiling for a fight. No-one else can bid given Alibaba.com’s 27 percent free float, and the company said it won’t offer a better price for at least a year. Sluggish fourth-quarter revenue doesn’t bode well for a quick turnaround. And there is not a big enough shareholder to block the deal single-handedly.

Minority shareholders aren’t toothless. They can veto the buyout with 2.7 percent of the total outstanding votes, or 10 percent of the public shareholders. They have some reason to seek a better price, since the shares are 80 percent below their 2007 highs. Hong Kong tycoon Richard Li’s failed battle to take his telecoms group, PCCW, private in 2009 shows that buyouts by management and founders aren’t always a sure-fire success.

Ma’s offer looks like a bet that Alibaba.com’s business woes are temporary. He may be right. The division is to some extent suffering from a setback in global demand and tight credit conditions at home. China still has huge potential for business-to-business e-commerce, which is in its relative infancy, and Alibaba is a giant in the market.

The risk is that Ma will dent his track record with the capital market. He is offering no more than the initial public offer price in 2007. That matters because Taobao, the real crown jewel of the parent Alibaba group, has long been mooted as a big future IPO. Many investors hoped Ma would inject it into Alibaba.com one day. They may now be reluctant to pay up next time he comes calling.

The authors are Reuters Breakingviews columnists. The opinions expressed are their own.

The International Monetary Fund played a big part in the first bailout of Athens but will have just a minor role in the second. The fund is providing only 13 billion euros more, barely enough to service existing loans. With the EU taking greater responsibility for the Greek mess, the IMF may find it easier to build a broader euro-zone firewall.

It would be churlish to accuse the IMF of stinginess. Even before the second package was announced on Tuesday, the fund had promised 30 billion euros, one of the largest loans in IMF history. An extra 13 billion – the amount German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble suggested the IMF will offer – would take the debt to a stratospheric 33 times Greece’s financial contribution to the fund. That compares to about 15 for Ireland. The new money will also be lent over a longer period, possibly up to a decade.

Still, the IMF appears to be strategically retreating. Its likely contribution toward the 130 billion euro pot would be just a tenth of the total, compared to the roughly one-third split in previous euro-zone rescue funds. The IMF is arguably contributing even less, because it will start getting money back from its first Greek bailout. By the end of 2014, Greece will have to pony up close to 11 billion euros to repay the previous IMF loan – so the fund’s peak exposure will be little changed by the latest deal.

It’s a shrewd compromise. The package gives Greece more time to get settled, reducing the threat of political disorder. Yet the gradual pullback should also reassure powerful developing nations worried that the fund has been too indulgent with wealthy euro members. Countries like China and Brazil may now be more willing to contribute to the $500 billion of extra firepower that IMF chief Christine Lagarde wants to build in case of a further deterioration in the zone.

Of course, the fund will still be playing a prominent role in Greece, by helping monitor and implement fiscal reform. But in financial terms, Greece seems to have maxed out its IMF credit.

The authors are Reuters Breakingviews columnists. The opinions expressed are their own.

The Greek deal, hammered out in a marathon overnight negotiating session, makes the best of a bad job. Of course, it would have been better to have bitten the bullet earlier by restructuring Athens’ debt sooner. And Greece is still unlikely to pull through without further economic and political shocks. But the debt restructuring cum 130 billion euro bailout keeps the pressure on Athens and has probably defused a wider blow-up.

Greece, its private creditors and its official creditors are all taking some pain. That’s appropriate. As a foolish borrower, Athens has to reform. As foolish lenders, private investors must suffer a haircut. This will be more severe than expected. The rest of the euro zone made an error in letting Greece into the single currency, turned a blind eye when the country originally got into trouble, and has a strong interest in making sure that contagion to other vulnerable countries is minimised. So it is right to be lending Athens a lot more money on even more generous terms than previously pledged.

But will the deal really get Greece’s debts down to 120 percent of GDP by 2020? With the economy still shrinking and the people nearing the end of what they can tolerate, there is huge scepticism that the country will keep to its side of the bargain. This is heightened by the fact that the lion’s share of the new bailout cash will be paid upfront.

Greece’s official creditors are alive to the danger that Athens will stop playing ball once it has received the money – especially with an election looming in April. They are insisting on further reforms for example, hacking back the public sector – before the first cash is disbursed. They are beefing up the task force that is helping Athens implement the changes as well as strengthening their monitoring of the programme. Greece has also had to agree to amend its constitution so priority is given to servicing its debt. Finally, the leaders of the two main political parties have committed to stick to the deal after the election.

Athens could still wriggle out of this straitjacket, particularly if it can secure a primary budget surplus next year and so will then no longer need cash to run its normal operations. At that point, the government could conceivably say it was stopping interest payments on even the restructured debt.

On the other hand, if Greece really has reached a primary surplus, much of the hard work will have been done. The benefit of reneging on interest payments entirely would have to be weighed against the cost of provoking a massive row with its partners which would then lead it to be turfed out of the euro. An equally likely outcome is that there won’t be a complete breakdown of relations. The programme will just veer off track, the numbers won’t add up, there will be further acrimonious negotiations and the debts will be further restructured. In other words, more of the same.

Apple has no problem getting Chinese consumers to desire its products, as a near-riot outside its Beijing store showed in January. But the U.S. tech giant has been beset by problems. As well as a rolling trademark battle, which has resulted in iPads being taken off the shelves in some cities, Apple’s market share is slipping, and the factory conditions at some of its Chinese partners are being questioned. It needs a new strategy.

Despite strong demand, Apple has so far held the Middle Kingdom at arm’s length. One in eight dollars of Apple’s revenue came from China in its fiscal 2011, yet only five of its 300 stores globally are there. That leaves room for rivals to grow. Apple’s smartphone market share in China was 7.5 percent by the end of 2011, down from 10.4 percent in the third quarter.

Step one should be to distribute more cleverly. The six-month delay in making the iPhone 4S available to its Chinese customers after the U.S. release looks too long. Yet instead of adding channels, Apple is pulling its tablets from unauthorised merchants including Amazon.com’s Chinese site. It halted iPhone 4S sales after overwhelming demand.

Striking a deal with China Mobile, the country’s biggest mobile carrier, would help. It currently relies on China Unicom, which reaches just 10 percent of mobile users. If the iPhone could reach a third of China Mobile’s existing 120 million high-paying customers, it could boost projected earnings per share by up to a quarter in 2013, according to Morgan Stanley.

Tighter control of suppliers is another must. Not owning any factories in its most important manufacturing base has left it vulnerable to criticism over working conditions – particularly at its biggest supplier, Foxconn. The Fair Labor Association said it has uncovered “tons of issues” at the manufacturer’s plants.

Apple could do worse than buy a stake in Foxconn, dipping into its $98 billion cash pile. It has enough funds to buy Foxconn’s parent, Hon Hai Precision, three times over. For Apple, which doesn’t normally own its suppliers, it would be a departure. But doing so would ensure it has a bigger say over its supply chain. Without some new thinking, Apple is unlikely to realise China’s vast potential.