Changing China

from Global Investing:

Home is where the heartache is…

On a recent trip home to Singapore, I was startled to learn just how much housing prices in the city-state have risen in my absence.

A cousin said he had recently paid over S$600,000 -- about US$465,000 -- for a yet-to-be-built 99-year-lease flat. Such numbers are hardly out of place in any major metropolis but this was for a state-subsidised three-bedroom apartment.

Soaring housing prices have fueled popular discontent -- little wonder as median monthly household incomes have stagnated at around S$5,000.

For its part, the government -- which houses 80 percent of people on the densely populated island -- insists that public housing prices are shaped by 'market forces', pointing to a raft of financing schemes to help first-time buyers.

What's less contentious is that Singapore is only part of a regional real estate boom that has driven property values by as much as 70 percent since the start of 2009 in cities such as Sydney, Hong Kong and Beijing.

Like Singapore, the government in China is acting to cool house prices that have skyrocketed in recent years out of the reach of a large swathe of its middle classes.

Chief among Beijing's policy arsenal is social housing. The government is stepping up construction of public housing, targeting a rollout 36 million affordable homes from now until 2015. At the same time, clampdown on property speculation has also helped ease Chinese housing prices.

from Global Investing:

A shoe, a song and the promise of the West

I found myself at Selfridges this week, specifically in what the London retailer says is the world's largest shoe department.

Slightly dazed by cornucopia of women's shoes on slick display, I was roused only when the haze of muzak wafting over the PA system was suddenly dispersed by the jaunty strains of the Chinese New Year ditty 'Gongxi Gongxi'.

A 1946 composition from Shanghai, the song has gone from classic to kitsch, evolving to become the most popular festive song in the Chinese-speaking world. Its ubiquity rests on the many -- for me at least -- teeth-grindingly cloying versions played all over shops and markets in Asia. (Click here for example and don't say I didn't warn you)

I was somewhat surprised by the song's appearance in the British retail icon -- not least because it's still some ways off the Year of the Dragon. But then looking at the shoppers around me it all made sense.

Mainland Chinese travellers spent some £200 million on Bond Street last year. That's a 155 percent surge from 2009, according to an association of luxury retailers in the London thoroughfare.

Never mind that these products are largely assembled back in their home country, Chinese tourists buy their designer bags on Bond Street and elsewhere in Europe to avoid China's luxury sales tax. More importantly, these status-conscious buyers have the assurance that they are not being sold knock-offs -- a risk rampant in a country notorious for its lack of regard for intellectual property.

Those reasons are similar to those that drive the wealthy elite in many emerging economies to London, a city that Goldman Sach's Jim O'Neil has dubbed the "BRIC capital of the world".

from George Chen:

Winners and losers as Hong Kong rents scale new heights

By George Chen The opinions expressed are the author’s own.

When you walk around Hong Kong's Central commercial and business district these days, you may notice a number of stores are holding "removal sales", which means they can no longer remain in the same location. The reason? In most cases, just blame soaring rents.

Many analysts have forecast declines in residential and commercial property prices in Hong Kong for next year, although at a stable pace rather than a sharp drop. This may be true for some suburban areas where purchase options are more plentiful than those in downtown areas, but until that happens, prices are likely to keep rising, at least for the rest of the year.

A couple of years ago, mobile phone industry leader Nokia took a moderately sized space on Russell Road in Causeway Bay just opposite Times Square, one of the busiest shopping districts in Asia, for its flagship store in Hong Kong. Local media said the store used to be one of Nokia's busiest in Asia, thanks to mainland Chinese travelers. But the good old days are going to end soon.

The Hong Kong Economic Times reported on October 27 that British luxury brand Burberry had signed a new lease with the owner of a site currently occupied by Nokia. Burberry is said to have agreed to pay HK $6.5 million (about US $836,600) per month for the two-floor 5,200 square foot space,versus the HK $1.8 million that Nokia is paying.

When the news came out, the reaction from the market was quite naturally, "Wow". One reader on Sina Weibo, China's most popular micro-blogging service, wondered: "How many coats and bags will Burberry need to sell to cover the monthly rent?" In Hong Kong, a coat or bag at Burberry usually sells for about HK $10,000-15,000. You can do your own calculations.

from Jeremy Gaunt:

Splendour in China and other branding

MSCI, the index provider used by leading investors across the world, has decided it needs a name change in Greater China. In a news release this morning the firm (which is no longer owned by Morgan Stanley, the MS in its title) said its Chinese business would henceforth be branded as  MSCI 明晟.

When I tweeted this @reutersJeremyG, one wag suggested  this meant "MSCI small-ladder-bigger-ladder-books-on-a-picnic-table", which is what it indeed looks like to an untrained eye (like mine).  But it is actually Ming Sheng, which  apparently is supposed to symbolise "brightness and transparency, prosperity and splendour".

That might sound a little flowery for an index provider, but is arguably apt given the role such indices have in opening up markets to investment.

The key point, however, is that MSCI decided it needed a Chinese business name. Henry Fernandez, MSCI's chairman and chief executive officer, said that as his business had grown in China, so it had become increasingly important to have local branding.

So we have MSCI Bright Splendour, or something like that.  Parlour game time: What would other companies be?

from Africa News blog:

Was South Africa right to deny Dalai Lama a visa?

By Isaac Esipisu

Given that China is South Africa’s biggest trading partner and given the close relationship between Beijing and the ruling African National Congress, it didn’t come as a huge surprise that South Africa was in no hurry to issue a visa to the Dalai Lama.

Tibet’s spiritual leader will end up missing the 80th birthday party of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a fellow Nobel peace prize winner. He said his application for a visa had not come through on time despite having been made to Pretoria several weeks earlier. (Although South Africa’s government said a visa hadn’t actually been denied, the Dalai Lama’s office said it appeared to find the prospect inconvenient). Desmond Tutu said the government’s action was a national disgrace and warned the President and ruling party that one day he will start praying for the defeat of the ANC government.

It’s the second time the Dalai Lama has been unable to honour an invitation to South Africa by Tutu after failing to make it to a meeting in 2010.

South Africa will certainly win more plaudits in Beijing, which last week agreed to $2.5 billion in investment projects with during a visit by South African Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe.

But pro-Tibet activists say South Africa is undermining its credentials as a country of freedom and democracy, established after the end of white minority rule a generation ago.

How big a gamble will China take on Europe?

By Scott Boyd The views expressed are his own.

As news broke this month suggesting it was more likely than ever that Greece was headed for default, China extended an offer of assistance that beleaguered European governments may find difficult to refuse. Premier Wen Jiabao announced that China was willing to increase its holdings of European sovereign debt at a time when several Eurozone countries are struggling to raise capital.

In return, China seeks little–simply an assurance that profligate governments promise to get their financial affairs in order, and perhaps some other small favor that, in the words of Premier Wen Jiabao, “would reflect our friendship.” The Premier even suggested that a good way to demonstrate this new-found goodwill would be to support China’s bid to be reclassified as a “market economy” by the World Trade Organization.

Currently, anti-dumping tariffs are applied against products shipped from China that are deemed to be sold at below the true market cost. This is an attempt to counter the subsidies and other incentives the Chinese government provides to many manufacturers to ensure their competitiveness; a change in designation would remove most of these tariffs.

While lower costs may be good news for consumers, for European manufacturers, it could prove disastrous. Disadvantaging European manufacturers already facing weak domestic demand could lead to wider job losses and a further slowing of the economy. Eurozone officials would be well advised to consider carefully the potential impact on domestic manufacturers before agreeing to easing China’s access to the European markets.

Either way, change will come within a few years, as China is slated to be re-designated as a market economy in 2016. Nevertheless, there is a very good reason why Beijing is trying to move the date forward – each year China comes under increased competition from other emerging economies.

China’s ability to undercut other production centers has proven remarkably profitable, but outside events are forcing China to update its approach. By deliberately undervaluing its currency, China has created a massive trade surplus with its export markets which has resulted in the loss of manufacturing jobs in both the U.S. and Europe. These job losses have contributed to slower economic growth in Western economies, leading inevitably to an overall decline in consumer spending and, by extension, lower demand for China’s exports.

China’s pursuit of stability risks greater stress

By Ethan Devine The author is a guest Breaking Views columnist; the opinions expressed are his own.

While Western economies wither, China is in an entirely different predicament. Beset by high inflation and a frothy real estate market, Chinese policymakers have been trying to cool their economy for going on two years. The central bank, the People’s Bank of China, has led the charge, restricting loans to real estate and hiking the required reserve ratio 12 times in 21 months.

Thanks to this, along with slower growth in the United States and Europe, Chinese inflation is now waning. Add an incipient export slowdown, and China may soon be able to loosen credit to everything but real estate. Neither too hot nor too cold, this Goldilocks economy superficially looks just right for China.

Unfortunately, the reality is that China’s economy more closely resembles a boiling bowl of porridge with a clump of ice in the middle. Poorer provinces are on a debt-fueled construction binge in open defiance of Beijing, so policymakers have to over-tighten where they do have control.

Private real estate developers are unsurprisingly feeling the squeeze, some borrowing at interest rates of more than 30 percent in the black market. Meanwhile, the rest of the private sector is suffering collateral damage. Credit has always been scarce for private companies in China, but now it is practically non-existent. Among the consequences, factory machinery orders are evaporating, and accounts receivable are ballooning as customers take longer to pay their bills.

Since stability remains China’s primary policy objective, some expect policy to ease, particularly with exports poised to slow. Recent riots in Guangdong, the heart of China’s manufacturing industry, are a reminder that a sharp economic downturn could be every bit as destabilizing as high inflation. But much of the Chinese economy is running too hot for wholesale easing.

Construction starts, for example, hit a new all-time high in July. This is particularly alarming since property sales are slowing. Credit-fueled construction may partly explain why China’s debt is growing so much faster than GDP. Fitch calculates that China’s total credit to GDP will end 2011 at 185 percent, up from 124 percent at the end of 2007.

from George Chen:

China is still waiting for inflation to peak

By George Chen The opinions expressed are the author’s own.

How time flies. It's already the end of August and speculations naturally arise about what China's inflation reading will be for this month.

The most optimistic view these days is that the August Consumer Price Index (CPI) could decline to below 6 percent. The most pessimistic view I've heard is that growth has slowed down in August, but probably only to 6.2 percent or 6.3 percent.

But, why should we care about the August CPI so much? One month cannot tell the whole story.

The reason we care so much is because if the August CPI growth slows down (we will see the official release of August economic data in the coming weeks), it's good news for the central bank as well as for the ordinary people in China who have been fighting with fast inflation for more than three years already. But, it's not good enough.

Yesterday, amid market talks about August CPI, I heard something interesting from Mengniu, China's top dairy product maker: "We are confident we can at least maintain (first-half) margin levels in the second half," Mengniu Chief Financial Officer Wu Jingshui told reporters after the company's first-half earnings release. He added the company might raise product prices and adjust its product mix to offset an estimated 3 to 5 percent rise in raw milk costs in 2011.

Why China can’t save the global economy this time

By Nicholas Consonery The opinions expressed are his own.

When the global economy broke down in 2008, China was the savior. At that time Beijing rolled out a massive stimulus that was one of the biggest—per size of the economy—that the world has ever seen. The resulting benefits bolstered China’s economic strength at a time when the rest of the global economy was staggering under the weight of failing banks and surging public debt.

But the success of Beijing’s stimulus has masked underlying weaknesses in the country’s growth model. And the market is now waking up to the realization that global economic growth might remain suppressed for years to come.

In this environment, investors should be aware that the Chinese economy won’t be able to serve as the beacon of global growth indefinitely. Exports and investment overshadow household consumption. Public pressure is growing on the government to make growth more sustainable. The yawn between rich and poor is widening. And the Chinese leadership struggles to negotiate such difficulties with a homogeneous 1.3 billion person population dispersed throughout a country that is in different stages of development at the same time.

Reigning over this conundrum is the Chinese Communist Party—the 80-million member strong political apparatus in the unenviable position of being responsible for ironing out the country’s massive economic imbalances.

In a new report entitled “China’s Great Rebalancing Act” my colleagues and I on Eurasia Group’s China Team offer our assessment of the Party’s capabilities.

Our conclusion? China’s weaknesses are not just economic but also political. We argue that the Chinese political system is an obstacle to economic change in China, because the top leadership currently lacks the willingness to push through bold reforms that would require picking clear winners and losers in the government and the state-supported corporate sector. These reforms would lead the Chinese economy away from public investments and toward a more robust and diversified growth model, with consumption playing a bigger role. But the results of Beijing’s efforts to “rebalance” in this way—which is the ostensible goal of the Party’s much-heralded 12th Five Year Plan—will be disappointing for foreign investors and for policymakers in Beijing alike.

from The Great Debate:

Can China afford to downgrade the U.S.?

By Joseph S. Nye, Jr. The opinions expressed are his own.

After the rating agency Standard & Poor’s downgraded America’s long-term debt, China said that Washington needed to “cure its addiction to debts” and “live within its means.” It must have been a delicious moment in Beijing, accustomed over the years to lectures from Washington about its management of the yuan.

But actions speak louder than words. The real test will be whether China moves away from the dollar in any significant manner. While it makes modest adjustments to its reserve holdings, there are few good alternatives to the dollar. And while it calls for an international basket of currencies to replace the dollar, there are few takers. Of course, China might move toward opening its currency and credit markets in an effort to make the yuan a reserve currency, but the authoritarian political system is unwilling and unprepared to move to that degree of economic freedom.

Many commentators see the downgrading of American debt as a great shift in the global balance of power between the U.S. and China. Some wags have warned the American navy not to sail too close to China, because if the Chinese captured our ships, we would no longer have enough money to ransom them. But such jokes misunderstand the nature of power. Analysts point to China’s seemingly unstoppable growth and its holdings of United States dollars. But as I show in my latest book, The Future of Power, they fail to take into account the role of symmetry in interdependence in creating and limiting economic power. If I depend on you more than you depend on me, you have power. But if we both depend equally upon each other, there is little power in the relationship.

Some observers claim that China could bring the United States to its knees by threatening to sell its dollars. But in doing so, China would not only reduce the value of its reserves as the price of the dollar fell, but it would also jeopardize U.S. willingness to continue to import cheap Chinese goods, which would mean job loss and instability in China. If it dumped its dollars, China would bring the United States to its knees, but might also bring itself to its ankles. The situation, analogous to the Cold War’s balance of terror, where the price of aggression was the inevitable destruction of both sides, has both sides eager to maintain the balance of interdependence even as they continue to jockey to shape the structure and institutional framework of their market relationship. In 2010, when the United States angered China by selling arms to Taiwan, some People’s Liberation Army generals suggested that China punish the U.S. by dumping its dollars. The Chinese leadership wisely rejected their advice.

On American power relative to China, much will depend on the often underestimated uncertainties of future political change in China. China's size and high rate of economic growth will almost certainly increase its relative strength vis-a-vis the U.S. This growth will bring it closer to the U.S. in power resources, but doesn't necessarily mean that it will surpass the U.S. as the most powerful country. Even if China suffers no major domestic political setback, many current projections are based simply on GDP growth. They ignore U.S. military and soft-power advantages, as well as China's geopolitical disadvantages. As Japan, India and others try to balance Chinese power, they welcome an American presence.

The United States faces serious problems regarding debt, secondary education, and political gridlock, but one should remember that they are only part of the picture. In principle, and over a longer term, there are solutions to current American problems. Given the challenges they face, both China and the United States have much to gain by working together. As the largest and second largest economies in the world, the two countries have a responsibility to provide such international public goods as financial stability and less carbon intensive growth. But hubris and nationalism among some Chinese, as well as unnecessary fear of decline among some Americans, make it difficult to assure this future. Extrapolating the wrong long-term projections from short-term cyclical events like the recent financial crisis or the S & P downgrade can lead to costly policy miscalculations.