Chrystia Freeland

DAVOS, Switzerland–George Soros is a traitor to his class. That’s not an insult or a tabloid exaggeration. It is, instead, a direct quote from my conversation with the billionaire investor and philanthropist at the World Economic Forum here.

‘‘I am a traitor to my class,’’ Soros said. ‘‘I think that the income differentials are too wide and ought to be narrowed,’’ he added, which is why he favors a bigger hit on those, like himself, at the very top.

But among his plutocratic peers, he said, that is very much a minority opinion. In fact, Soros, who helped spearhead the muscular Wall Street support for Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election, particularly among hedge fund and private equity investors, believes the president’s call for higher taxes is the reason he has been ditched by the financiers: ‘‘That has led my hedge fund community to abandon Obama in favor of any Republican, because they don’t like to be taxed.’’

Henry Blodget, a former (and formerly disgraced) Wall Street analyst who has been resurrected as one of the smartest writers on business and politics, agrees that the financial class is strongly attached to its tax breaks. After his Wall Street friends have had a few drinks, he said, ‘‘they are cackling that they have fooled everybody into thinking that there’s some justification for this.’’ ‘‘This’’ is the carried interest tax provision, which allows some private equity and hedge fund managers to pay tax at 15 percent.

But the cackling may be coming to an end — and the hostility toward the president mounting — following his State of the Union speech on Tuesday. A centerpiece of that address, and most likely a central theme on the campaign trail over the next nine months, was Obama’s insistence that the 1 percent must pay up.

‘‘Right now, because of loopholes and shelters in the tax code, a quarter of all millionaires pay lower tax rates than millions of middle-class households,’’ Obama said, in an oblique attack on the carried interest tax break and on Republican candidate Mitt Romney, who paid an effective tax rate of 13.9 percent on income of $21.6 million in 2010.

‘‘Tax reform should follow the Buffett Rule,’’ the president said. ‘‘If you make more than a million a year, you should not pay less than 30 percent in taxes.’’ And, like Soros, the president has decided not to duck charges of class war: ‘‘Now you can call this class warfare all you want. But asking a billionaire to pay at least as much as his secretary in taxes? Most Americans would call that common sense.’’

And not just Americans. Davos is all about identifying the common challenges the global business community faces. One of the big ones this year is governments reining in their plutocrats in the most painful possible place — their bank accounts. In Britain, for example, the week began with proposals from Vince Cable, the business secretary, on how to bring down salaries for top executives.

‘‘We cannot continue to see chief executives’ pay rising at 13 percent a year while the performance of companies on the stock exchange languishes well behind,’’ Cable told Parliament on Monday. ‘‘And we can’t accept top pay rising at five times the rate of average workers’ pay as it did last year.’’ Chilling words for the City, especially since Cable serves in the cabinet of a Conservative prime minister.

Another one of the annual tropes at Davos is an emphasis on the softer side of business. This is a time of year for chief executives to wax poetic about their companies’ initiatives to educate the rural poor in India or provide clean water in Africa. But alongside these carefully crafted tales of corporate social responsibility, there is plenty of grumbling about government overreach. Three and a half years after the 2008 financial crisis, a particularly popular notion is the idea that the pendulum of financial regulation has swung too far, endangering not just the banking sector, but the sluggish economic recovery more generally.

There is also a powerful sense that businesspeople are being blamed for structural issues that aren’t their fault. One British executive told me it was wrong to criticize executives for their high salaries. Those were the fault of their boards and compensation committees: ‘‘The CEO,’’ the executive said, ‘‘really has no say.’’

In a similar vein, the private equity chief David M. Rubenstein, who served in the administration of President Jimmy Carter, said during a panel discussion that businesspeople like Mitt Romney shouldn’t be blamed for paying low taxes — that’s the government’s fault. ‘‘You change the law, and they’ll pay the taxes,’’ said Rubenstein, a co-founder and managing director of the Carlyle Group. ‘‘Romney said — and I’m not his defender — he’s paying whatever the law required. If you change the law, change the law. But don’t criticize him for paying the taxes that the law requires him to pay.’’

There’s some truth to that argument. After all, even Warren Buffett, the inspiration for Obama’s Buffett Rule, and the class traitor Soros today pay only those taxes required of them. Their point, as Soros told me, is that the tax rate should be higher. But of himself and Buffett, he added, ‘‘the Republicans are trying to save us from taxation — against our will.’’

Yet the Rubenstein defense goes only so far. The low tax rates for millionaires are neither a natural law nor an act of God. They are the result of a political process that, since the late 1970s, has pushed rates, particularly at the top, hugely downward. Business has been instrumental in that shift, both as a matter of general ideology and in fighting doggedly and skillfully for sector-specific tax breaks, like the carried interest provision.

It is pleasant to spend a few days in snowy Davos eating fondue, skiing and talking up creative examples of social entrepreneurship. It can even be fun to muse on one of the big questions the World Economic Forum has designated for collective cogitation: how to ‘‘redesign’’ capitalism.

But the hard part is embracing higher taxes or a lower salary. ‘‘I personally believe that when it comes to policy, you shouldn’t be pursuing self-interest but the public interest,’’ Soros said. But Davos Man prefers to believe in a world of ‘‘kumbaya’’ capitalism, where self-interest and the public interest would coincide. Openly insisting that this is not always the case is how Soros really has betrayed his class.

Watch George Soros tell Chrystia why he thinks it will take years for Germany to realize that Europe needs additional stimulus and why he would be loading up on Italian government bonds if he were still an active investor.

Watch as the billionaire investor tells Chrystia why the hedge fund community has abandoned President Obama and why there’s not a huge gap between the views of the president and Republican front-runner Mitt Romney.

BUDAPEST – Sometimes the conventional wisdom is right. The Arab Spring really is the most important political event since the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe. So it makes sense to find out what the East Europeans make of the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa and to ask what they think it will take to transform the promise of these rebellions into a lasting political transformation.

A good place to look for those answers this week was Budapest, where Central European University, one of the intellectual centers of the region’s political and economic transition, is celebrating its 20th anniversary.

The scholars and activists who gathered here to toast those two decades strolled along the sunny banks of the Danube, listened to a special concert of Liszt and Mahler — and spent a lot of time debating the lessons of their revolution for the Arab Spring.

Here are four of them:

– The first is that selling democracy has become harder now than it was 20 years ago. That’s because, as Aryeh Neier, the human rights activist and head of the Open Society Foundations, explained, the equation of prosperity and democracy, which was universally acknowledged in 1989 and the period that followed, has broken down today.

“In 1989, the U.S. had succeeded in conveying the view that economic prosperity and political freedom go hand in hand,” Mr. Neier said. “That is by no means so certain today. The rise of China and the difficulty the West continues to have in recovering from the financial crisis have broken the link between prosperity and freedom.”

– A second big idea was that while technology has probably made it easier to rebel against authoritarian governments, it has also made it tougher to build enduring, deeply rooted democratic polities to replace them.

Ivan Krastev, a Bulgarian political scientist and one of the world’s leading thinkers about democracy and authoritarianism, argued that the communication revolution had created a “fragmentation of the public space.” Instead of all of us being part of a single public debate, the Internet and social media have allowed us all to consume only “the information that confirms our biases.” That may be useful when you are trying to bring together a crowd to topple a tyrant, but, as Krastev explained, it makes constructing the common civic space upon which a functioning democracy depends much harder.

– The third big idea was a historical one. Wanda Rapaczynski was one of the leading creators of Poland’s vibrant free press. But she identified a critical external force in her explanation of what made the revolutions in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic succeed: Europe and the promise of membership in the European Union.

“How did we get so lucky?” Rapaczynski asked. “The most important role was played by our aspiration to join NATO and the EU. We had to carry out reforms in accordance with EU guidelines and deadlines. We made tremendous progress.”

Rapaczynski described the reforms that preceded membership in the European Union as a period of “sponsored transformation” and pointed out that “once the pressure of the beauty contest was off, the pace of reform slowed.” At a moment when many are questioning the value and the durability of the European experiment, Rapaczynski’s reminder of the positive power the European idea has had in the eastern half of the Continent is timely.

– The fourth lesson of Central Europe for the Arab Spring came from the founder and chief benefactor of Central European University: George Soros. Soros, who fled Budapest as a teen-ager and made his fortune in the United States, suggested that the history of his homeland offered an example for the Arab revolutions that was both cruelly realistic and ultimately inspiring.

“Reflecting on the Arab revolutions, one very important factor is that people were willing to sacrifice their lives for a common cause,” Soros said. “That is a memory, a historic event, that will change those countries forever. It is irreversible.”

That’s the positive part of Soros’s lesson. But here is the dark cloud to that silver lining:

“Revolutions are rarely successful. They often end in tragedy. But they change the behavior of that country afterwards. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution was repressed. But it carried with it the seeds of the successful revolution in 1989.”

At a time when many of us in the West — and on the Arab street — are looking for instant results from the Jasmine Revolution, Soros’s conclusion is both heartening and frightening. Sometimes, as with Hungary’s 1956 uprising, a successful rebellion can take 33 years to work.

That long view may be one of the greatest gifts Central Europe has to offer Egypt, Tunisia and their neighbors. Pretty soon, we will start to write the obituaries of the Arab Spring. We will begin to talk about how the promise of Tahrir Square has been squandered by the chaotic and corrupt governments the brave people on the street propelled into office. But, as with 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Prague and 1980 in Gdansk, revolutions can be successful even if it takes decades for their promise to flower.

Listening to these friends and patrons of Central Europe’s successful revolutions prompted one big question. It was left unspoken — and that is probably appropriate, since it is most properly asked on the banks of the Nile, not the banks of the Danube. It is this: Where is the European Union and where is the George Soros for the Middle East and North Africa?

The party this week in Budapest was a testament to the power of smart, committed outsiders to help a revolution deliver results in less than three decades. The European Union can still help, by admitting Turkey, not a participant in the Arab Spring, but an essential example for the Muslim world.

As for Soros, it is probably asking too much to expect this octogenarian to be the patron saint of the Arab Spring, as he was for the revolutions of 1989. But the Arab world, too, has its democracy-loving billionaires. It is time for them to step up to the plate. Come visit Budapest — where one professor told me this week, “I may be the only academic in town who didn’t study on a Soros scholarship” — to appreciate how rich the reward could be.

The American blogosphere lit up this week with discussion of a report from the International Monetary Fund that, by some measures, the Chinese economy will be bigger than the U.S. economy by 2016.

It makes a great headline, but that story was, of course, old news: Given China’s size, and the speed with which it is growing, simple arithmetic tells you that its economy will one day be bigger than that of the United States. The only question is when.

The bigger surprise is the huge affection U.S. capitalists have for Communist China.

“When I go to China, I find more people in government who are interested in learning about the things that private equity can do to help an economy and help companies than you often do in Washington,” David Rubenstein, co-founder and managing director of Carlyle Group, one of the world’s largest private equity firms, said in an interview this week.

“Washington, for a number of reasons, is not as focused on the joys of private equity,” Rubenstein explained. “So very often, you have to defend yourself when you’re talking to a member of Congress.”

In contrast, he said, he gets a warm reception in the People’s Republic: “What they really think is that private equity firms have shown in the West that they know how to make companies more efficient, that they know how to make workers more efficient and managers more efficient and how to make companies more productive. And that’s something they want.”

The content of his remarks is conventional wisdom among U.S. business people today: it is a truth universally acknowledged that China – with its censorship, central plan and one-party state – is a better place to do business than the United States.

This has become such a familiar refrain that it is easy to lose sight of what a radical assertion it is. We used to think that capitalism and democracy went together; that was the premise behind much of the U.S.-led global nation-building effort of the past two decades. But it has become commonplace to hear the most successful American business people assert that the world’s great power that most explicitly rejects democracy – China – is also the most business-friendly.

This embrace of Chinese Communism shouldn’t be entirely surprising. The best business people are pragmatists. Deng Xiaoping famously said it didn’t matter whether a cat was black or white so long as it caught mice. Smart business people are likewise pretty indifferent to a regime’s ideology (and indeed its treatment of dissidents, journalists and other such niceties) as long as their deals can get done and their tax rates are lenient.

So long as you have a skill or a technology that the comrades have decided China needs, its authoritarian system can be welcoming indeed, and free of many of the delays and frustrations that getting things done in a democracy can entail.

It is easy to equate that effectiveness of execution with good government. But fans of authoritarian regimes, including well-run ones such as China, should never forget the agency problem that is their big structural flaw: For their systems to work, dictators need not only be smart; they must also act in the interests of the state, not of themselves. It doesn’t always work out that way.

Legendary fund manager George Soros recently made the provocative argument that one of China’s most contentious policies – its undervalued currency – is a fraught issue because it is wrapped up in the self-interest of its mandarins. He argued that the undervalued currency is “a form of transferring purchasing power – wealth – from the citizens to the government without imposing taxation.” This made the central government powerful and attracted the best talents to government because it was a way to become wealthy.

The problem now, Soros said, is that the national interest would be served by allowing the currency to appreciate, but the officials whose job it is to make that call are loath to give up the personal benefits of an undervalued exchange rate.

As we prepare for a world in which China is the largest economy, we should be on the lookout for moments like this, when the interests of the state and of its mandarins don’t coincide. And it might be worth remembering that democracy, for all its quarrelsome inefficiencies, has the great virtue of making the conflicts of interest between the state’s servants and the state itself transparent, and making it easy to kick the bums out when those conflicts become acute.

Chrystia wrote an essay for Foreign Policy’s Top 100 Global Thinkers Issue on the economists and financiers whose ideas survived the financial crisis:

In a letter to shareholders written just after the dot-com bust, Warren Buffett observed, “You only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out.” The 2008 financial crisis had a similar effect on our economic and financial gurus: It revealed whose thinking was based on whiggish, End-of-History assumptions about the essential triumph of Western democratic capitalism and whose mental framework admitted the possibility of radical disruption. The thinkers whose intellectual — and maybe even psychological — starting point was that Western market democracy is neither perfect nor eternal turned out to be much better at foreshadowing the financial crisis, and it is those thinkers whose ideas are the most relevant today, in the uncertain, post-crisis world.

These specialists in uncertainty are a broad church: They range from academic economists who saw the crisis coming, like New York University’s Nouriel Roubini and the University of Chicago’s Raghuram Rajan, to philosophers of finance like George Soros and Mohamed El-Erian, who have made huge market bets, as well as intellectual ones, on how bubbles are formed and how they burst. One striking similarity between many of them is that they have seen regime change up close.

The most dramatic example is Soros, whose formative life experience was the Nazi invasion of Budapest when he was 13 years old. That trauma taught him two things: that the world could change overnight, and that those, like his beloved father Tivadar, who responded to that upheaval instantly were the ones who survived. Roubini, who is sometimes caricatured as either Dr. Doom or the Hugh Hefner of the dismal-science set, is likewise best described as a specialist in revolution. He spent his childhood being moved around volatile parts of the world from Istanbul to Tehran to Tel Aviv — and began his career as an economist studying the 1990s emerging-markets crises in Latin America, Asia, and Russia. El-Erian, Rajan, and Daron Acemoglu, a widely cited young Turkish economist, also have both personal and professional experience of rapidly, and sometimes traumatically, changing social and economic orders.

These men were all born or at least partly raised outside the United States. That is surely no accident. In the 20th century, and even in the 19th and 18th, America was the world’s laboratory, the place where many of the best, and most revolutionary, ways of organizing government and the economy were being worked out. The United States is still the world’s most powerful country and most intellectually vibrant — after all, these global thinkers now make their home in America — but partly because the United States is so big and has been so prosperous for so long, American-centric thinkers have been relatively slow to spot the challenges to the Washington Consensus and offer coherent alternatives.

Being a “global nomad,” as Roubini calls himself, has another intellectual advantage. Thanks to communism’s collapse, the lowering of trade barriers, and the technology revolution, the world economy is more interdependent than ever. This group takes America’s connection to the global economy as the starting point for its analysis — hence El-Erian’s emphasis on global financial imbalances (also a signature theme of Martin Wolf‘s Financial Times columns) and the relationship Rajan traces between rising income inequality and its U.S. political manifestation in subprime mortgages.

This crew is all about big ideas and the big picture — their frame of reference is global, and their intellectual strength is their ability to understand that entire economic systems can, and do, collapse. Paradoxically, the opposite impulse is simultaneously in fashion: You might call it the economics of small steps, an approach that eschews the big theory altogether in favor of smaller, achievable, and, crucially, measurable proposals.

Posted by Peter Rudegeair.