The Berkshire range
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Warren Buffettâ€™s Berkshire Hathaway, no stranger to exotic insurance risks, is insuring Quickenâ€™s $1 billion prize for picking a perfect NCAA tournament bracket. The odds of picking the winner of all 63 basketball games are absurdly low: somewhere in the realm of 1 in 128 billion to 1 in 772 billion. Those odds raise the question of why Quicken is even looking for insurance in the first place. Maybe, as David Merkel points out, â€śthose seeking insurance on unlikely events think the events are more likely than they actually areâ€ť.
Warren Buffett is very good at both the insurance business and the publicity business. A combination of those talents is presumably why Quicken is probably paying more than the $0.01 fair value (the payout multiplied by the odds, or $1 billion times 1/128 billion) for the policy. How much more Quicken is paying, however, isnâ€™t clear, and there just may not be enough data to accurately price the policy.
Dan McCrum has a great look into more arcane but much larger bets made by Berkshire, which sold a series of â€śvery large and very long dated put options… against stock indices in the US, UK, Europe and Japan between 2004 and 2008â€ť. McCrum quotes business professor Pablo Triana, who has calculated that Buffett could lose between $14 billion and $20 billion if markets move against him. Hereâ€™s Triana on the implications of those derivatives:
The main point is not that those unfavorable things will unfailingly happen, and we certainly donâ€™t even try to assign any specific probability to their occurrence. The point, rather, is to illustrate the myriad of exposures Berkshire got itself entangled with by deciding to sell the puts and how the firm could hurt badly both accounting-wise and cash-wise just if some things that have already happened (and not that long ago, actually) were to happen again.
The WSJâ€™s Ryan Tracy reports on just how big those exposures are: $31.4 billion in gross outstanding CDS, and $5.8 billion in derivatives. As a result of its risk exposure, the US Financial Stability Oversight Council is considering labelling Berkshire too big to fail and subjecting it to Fed oversight, Bloomberg reports.
Matt Levine points out that Berkshires is largely in the business of â€śtaking financial risks away from other peopleâ€ť. And it does seem to be doing that: it has more outstanding CDS, on a net notional basis, than any too big to fail bank. The very luster that makes it seem like Buffett canâ€™t fail, Levine writes, can actually be an argument that he is, in fact, too big too fail. Â – Ben Walsh
On to todayâ€™s links:
“Sex toys are definitely mainstream, but investors and banks are still too scared to join in” – Katie JM Baker
“Each year, startups’ exit price grows 3x faster than inflation” – Tomasz Tunguz