Opinion

David Cay Johnston

Closing Wall Street’s casino

David Cay Johnston
Nov 18, 2011 15:26 EST

The author is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.

A superb example of a sound rule in law and economics that needs reviving, because it can halt the rampant speculation in derivatives, is the ancient legal principle that gambling debts are not enforceable through court action.

Not so long ago — before casinos, currency and commodities speculation, and credit default swaps became big business — U.S. courts would not enforce gambling debts.

Restoring this principle offers a simple way to shrink the rampant speculation in derivatives that was central to the 2008 meltdown on Wall Street.

Professor Lynn Stout, a deeply principled Republican capitalist who teaches corporate law at the University of California, Los Angeles, raised this issue at a conference where we both spoke about the 2008 Wall Street meltdown.

“Derivatives are gambling,” she said, referring to credit default swaps, at the University of Missouri-Kansas City law school conference on the financial crisis. “They are a zero-sum game in which one side loses the bet and one side wins,” Stout said.

Actually they are worse than that, since the hefty fees Wall Street pockets for arranging the bets result in a less-than-zero-sum game.

As Wall Street fights meaningful financial regulations, and draft regulations remind us how complex and unfathomable regulations can be, this is a good time to remember the basic principles that served society so well until Chicago School theorists, and casino corporations, together with commodities and currency traders convinced us we were too modern to need them.

UNENFORCEABLE GAMBLING DEBTS

Stout recounted the history of unenforceable gambling debts back to the Romans. She cited an 1884 Supreme Court case on what were then called “difference contracts” to show that derivatives have a long history of being treated by the law as unproductive at best and often damaging to society, just as we saw in 2008.

“I have not found a successful economy that did not have legal restrictions on bets,” she said.

She said that in addition to being nonproductive, such bets add risk to the system, invite bad conduct because bets can be rigged and foster asset bubbles, which are inevitably followed by crashes like the one from which we still have yet to recover.

As the author of a book on the gambling industry’s rise, “Temples of Chance,” and as a lecturer at Syracuse University on the regulatory law of the ancient world, I recognized Stout’s points were spot on. But her warnings are being drowned out by radical anti-regulatory rhetoric, the army of Capitol Hill lobbyists working for derivatives sellers and the politicians to whom they donate.

Stout noted that speculators these days like to call themselves by other names — for instance, hedge fund managers. But hedging suggests engagement in a business such as oil or grain and buying or selling contracts backed by assets you have or will use.

PURE SPECULATION

Most of the bets on Wall Street were pure speculation. Against $15 trillion of mortgage bonds, Stout said, Wall Street marketed credit default swaps in 2008 with a notional value of $67 trillion. Worldwide, traded swaps at their peak equaled $670 trillion or $100,000 for each person on the planet, vastly more than all the wealth in the world. Those numbers make it a mathematical certainty that the swaps were mostly speculation, not hedging.

Stout likened some derivatives to a market in fire insurance in which you buy coverage not for your own home, but for those of strangers. Such insurance would create an incentive to commit arson for profit. Yet we allow speculative derivatives that melted the housing market.

Stout’s approach would not stop derivatives that are backed by hard assets, such as a mortgage whose interest rate is derived from an index like the London Interbank Offered Rate or Libor and thus varies over time.

But credit default swaps that are just bets on which one party wins and which one loses would vanish if we restored the ancient, time-tested and therefore profoundly conservative rule that government will not enforce the collection of gambling debts.

Making gambling debts unenforceable produced its own problems. For one, it created work for people like the late Harry Coloduros, who sat in my kitchen 25 years ago, bouncing my little Molly on his knee as I made coffee, and told me about gamblers he beat up to make them pay up.

I cannot imagine Goldman Sachs hiring the likes of Harry to collect on bets when the losing party fails to pay up. So, unless taxpayers cover the bets, as they were forced to at 100 cents on the dollar in the AIG wagers, Goldman would likely get out of speculative bets and stick to actual hedging.

And that shows the immense value of restoring the sound policy of making losing bettors suffer their losses without any help from government.

COMMENT

@AdamSmith

“We need a fighter”. How about Elizabeth Warren in the future?

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You’re paying taxes, so why aren’t energy companies?

David Cay Johnston
Nov 8, 2011 12:42 EST

By David Cay Johnston

The views expressed are his own.

In a competitive market, economists argue endlessly about who bears the burden of corporate income tax. Is it owners, who get a smaller net return? Or workers, who make less? Or suppliers, who get lower prices? Or customers, who pay higher prices?

In one sector of the U.S. economy, however, the answer is clear-cut. Corporate-owned utilities (mostly electric and natural gas) and pipeline partnerships, all of them legal monopolies, pass their income tax burdens on to customers.

Now a study, released last week, provides powerful new evidence that these two industries convert corporate income taxes from a burden to a benefit.

The study was prepared by Citizens for Tax Justice and the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy. Both are foundation-backed nonprofits that say the tax system favors the rich and corporations over most Americans.

Utilities charge prices, known as rates, set by political appointees who regulate the industry. Embedded in those rates are generous sums to cover corporate income and all other taxes. Pacific Gas & Electric, the northern California utility, was awarded $431 million to pay 2007 corporate income taxes, a final decision by the California Public Utilities Commission shows. Similar amounts were approved, or are in the process of final approval, for each subsequent year.

But in the three years from 2008 through 2010, PG&E’s corporate parent did not pay roughly $1.7 billion in federal income taxes on $4.8 billion of profits, the expected sum based on the federal 35 percent corporate income tax rate. Instead, PG&E collected more than $1 billion in refunds, thanks in good part to a 2008 increase in accelerated depreciation, which lets companies defer taxes into the future, the study showed.

Brian Hertzog, PG&E’s Washington director of corporate relations, said that the rules that let the company defer paying taxes into the future mean it can use that money immediately to help pay for new plant and equipment. He said this costs much less than borrowing in the markets and thus benefits customers.

Hertzog has a point. When customers pay their monthly bills they loan money to PG&E at zero interest, which is a lot cheaper than borrowing in the markets.  But that is neither capitalism nor market economics.

The market chooses to invest and sets a price for credit. The regulatory and tax systems force captive customers to make interest-free loans to utilities, denying the customers the use of their money for other purposes, including paying down their own debt, which may be at much higher interest rates than the savings from using that money to finance utility projects.

Forcing captive customers to extend interest-free credit to utilities strikes me as a subtle form of legalized theft.

PG&E’s roughly $2.7 billion swing from burden to benefit is not unique. The 26 large utilities studied paid an average rate of just 3.7 percent over the three years, a 10th of the 35 percent statutory U.S. tax rate. Half of the 26 corporate-owned utilities analyzed got money back from the government, thanks to deferrals and tax benefits from tax shelters in non-utility operations. Just four paid corporate income tax of more than 10 percent.

The trophy for turning the burden of taxes into a benefit goes not to General Electric, whose skillful use of tax law and lobbying for tax breaks is famous, but to Pepco Holdings, which owns the monopoly electric utility in and around the U.S. capital. Pepco’s three-year tax rate? Minus 57.6 percent. GE’s was only minus 45.3 percent.  Pepco says it pays all of its taxes as required by law. For sure that’s true.

Here’s the irony. Pepco’s biggest customer, by far, is the federal government. So, federal taxpayers and other customers paid electric rates to Pepco that assumed about $309 million in corporate tax payments would flow to the Treasury, only to see $508 million of their taxes flow to Pepco as refunds. Ouch.

The roughly $817 million tax benefit Pepco enjoyed — from taxes it collected but did not turn over combined with refunds — almost equaled the $882 million in profits Pepco’s corporate parent reported during the same period.

This is an old story at Pepco Holdings. In the six years preceding the study, 2002 through 2007, Pepco Holdings reported pretax profits of $949.2 million. Its cash paid for taxes was negative $116.4 million, my analysis shows. Cash paid for income taxes is a simpler measure than the painstakingly detailed examination in the Citizens for Tax Justice study. Cash paid also tends to understate reality.

Pipelines have an even juicier deal. Under the 1986 Tax Reform Act they are exempt from paying corporate income taxes if organized as partnerships. However, under a rule from the era of President George W. Bush, federal regulators let them collect the corporate income tax anyway. That IS legalized theft.

How do utilities and pipelines convert the burden of corporate income taxes into a benefit, whether temporary or permanent? Easy as 1, 2, 3.

  1. Political appointees on regulatory boards, many of whom come from and return to the utility and pipeline industries, require customers to pay the utilities’ corporate income taxes measured as if the utilities were stand-alone companies filing their own tax returns.
  2. Most utilities do not stand alone, but are subsidiaries of holding companies.
  3. Each holding company files a tax return that consolidates its utility and non-utility businesses, allowing it to capture some of the utility taxes as additional assets or as profits.

The result is little or none of the tax that customers are forced to pay actually gets to government.

Here are two questions to ask about this costly state of affairs: Why have you not heard about this from anti-tax politicians and organizations that insist they are trying to ease your burdens? Who will put an end to this forced transfer of wealth from utility and pipeline customers to the companies’ shareholders?

 

COMMENT

Columnist here….

@libsrnazi, the total revenues of Exxon Mobil do not even equal half of the federal income tax receipts (they run about a third as much) so your comment that the company’s taxes were equal to half of individual income taxes in nine of the last ten years is nonsense.

Others here seem to not have missed that this column dealt with legal monopolies, not competitive corporations, even though that is the opening of the column.

Monopolies UNIQUELY get to pass all costs on to customers; in a competitive market not all costs get passed on to customers and the cost of taxes, as the column notes at the start, can fall on any of four sectors: owners, workers, vendors or customers or some combination.

If a corporation can automatically pass on all of its tax costs then it is NOT in a competitive market.

Furthermore, if all companies in an industry, a competitive industry, can just pass on tax costs then why would they care so much about corporate income taxes?

@JJHG, what you describe as an error is in countless documents, including testimony, in monopoly rate cases I have been covering going back four decades.

And your math is wrong because of inflation (though if we get into a long running deflation that would change).

If I pay $1 today in my electric bill to cover the corporate utility’s income taxes and it pays that $1 over to government in 30 years the inflation adjusted value of that dollar will be less than half its instant value. Deferred taxes are not adjusted for inflation. Thus, deferrals amount to a gain to the company deferring and a loss to the consumer paying the utility and that is before getting into government borrowing against anticipated future revenues, which can make the deferral into a negative for government as borrowing costs will be higher than inflation.

Deferrals are generally treated these days as zero interest capital, but authorized rates of return have been raised so high — I have read decisions that grant utilities 18% pretax returns and in other columns shown 55% returns — that the zero interest point is weak.

As my column notes, customers generally pay higher interest rates on their debt than utilities do, so the forced loan to utilities of deferred tax dollars makes consumers worse off.

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Pipeline profiteering

David Cay Johnston
Oct 17, 2011 14:14 EDT

By David Cay Johnston
The opinions expressed are his own.

Last year a fourth of the nation’s oil pipelines earned excessive profits, at up to seven times the rates allowed these regulated monopolies, according to an explosive analysis prepared by a former general counsel for the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

R. Gordon Gooch, the former counsel, alleges in his Oct. 3 study, for instance, that Sunoco’s Mid-Valley Pipeline, which carries crude oil from Texas to Michigan, earned a 55 percent return on assets. That is seven times its authorized profit margin, based on a calculation derived from an accounting report the company filed with FERC.

Three other regulated monopoly pipelines earned more than 40 percent on their assets, while another three earned more than 30 percent, an examination of their FERC filings by Reuters shows.

To put that level of profitability into context, overall nonfinancial businesses earned a 6.7 percent after-tax profit on their assets last year, the latest Bureau of Economic Affairs report shows.

In a competitive market, profits are unlimited except for the discipline of competition. Because there is no market to discipline monopolies, Congress created FERC, which sets prices, known as rates, for pipelines and some other energy monopolies.

FERC is supposed to balance the interests of customers and owners, making sure customers are charged only “just and reasonable” rates and that owners earn “just and reasonable” profits on top of recovering actual costs.

‘JUST AND REASONABLE’
The test of whether that standard is met is revealed each year on a document, filed to FERC under oath, known as Page 700. Line 9 shows how much it cost a pipeline to provide service, including a generous allowance for taxes and its profit. Line 10 shows actual revenues.

The two lines ideally should match, except for minor timing differences. When they do, it indicates the “just and reasonable” standard has been met. If Line 10 is larger, it shows extra profits.

Last year, 47 of the nation’s 175 regulated monopoly oil pipelines reported significantly larger figures on Line 10 than Line 9, as Gooch details in his analysis.

Gooch submitted his findings as part of a FERC rulemaking procedure. He was FERC general counsel from 1969 to 1972. Then he enjoyed a long career as a litigator in pipeline rate cases on behalf of oil companies, known as shippers, who pay pipeline companies to transport their liquids, crude and refined.

Having covered these issues for four decades, I think Gooch’s position here is solid as can be.

The rulemaking at issue would affect how costs are calculated on annual Form 6 reports, of which Page 700 is the most significant part.

“If this rulemaking is adopted as is,” Gooch wrote, “there will be no effect on the unlawful revenues, no risk to the public utilities at all. In fact, their ability to collect unlawful excess profits with impunity may be enhanced.”

FERC spokesperson Mary O’Driscoll said that since Gooch’s analysis was filed in a rulemaking proceeding, the commission will respond in the proceeding. She said, “The commission is not going to speak outside of the proceeding.”

None of the five FERC commissioners responded to my telephone calls to their offices. Only Sunoco Logistics, controlling owner of Mid-Valley Pipeline, returned my calls.

‘APPROVED BY FERC’
The key defense to the excess profits charge is shown in what Sunoco Logistics told me. Spokesman Joe McGinn said its rates “are approved by FERC and follow all FERC rules and guidelines.”

And that is the scandal. Not just that companies are earning excess profits, but that FERC seems to look the other way and enable this.

Gooch argues that the rulemaking proceeding he commented on in his analysis would institutionalize excess rates and make it difficult for a court to stop oil pipeline owners from collecting more profit than is lawful.

Retired now, Gooch has become a full-time reformer trying to stop what he sees as rules designed to destroy the “just and reasonable” tenet of utility regulation.

The issues here are not academic. Unless controlled, monopolies can cause massive economic damage. Excess profits amount to a tax on the public for private gain.

Utilities have been promoting the theory of deregulation because they know it lets them, as monopolists, escape the rigors of both regulation and competition.

Consumers bear the burden of these excess profits every time they pump gasoline or fly in a jetliner.

Accounting reports show that oil pipeline profiteering has gone on for years under administrations of both parties.

FERC is a small federal agency whose decisions exert a broad impact on the economy, yet it gets little news coverage. Commissioners and key staff come from, and go back to, the energy industries they regulate.

FERC’s budget is financed not with taxes, but fees paid by the energy industries.

On the “just and reasonable” standard, a controlling decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1984 instructed FERC that “not even a little unlawfulness is to be tolerated.”

Yet in 2005 FERC granted the SFPP pipeline a rate hike nine times greater than its increased costs, Gooch wrote.

THE OCTOPUS
The SFPP pipeline is a corporate descendant of the railroad monopolies that caused California so much economic damage a little more than a century ago that they were known as The Octopus.

Despite the easy-to-spot evidence of profits that are far in excess of authorized rates, earlier this year the commissioners gave all 175 pipelines the freedom to raise rates by 6.8 percent per year compounded for the next five years.

Sunoco’s Mid-Valley Pipeline was entitled to a profit of $3.9 million in 2010, but comparing the two lines shows an actual profit seven times that large, more than $27 million.

The latest annual pipeline rate hike was approved in a way that makes consumer challenges virtually impossible.

A general rate case would open every pipeline expense, including taxes and profits, to scrutiny. The commissioners avoided that by granting an indexed rate increase to all pipelines with no proof of higher costs required.

This latest index rate increase will generate $3.4 billion more in excess profits over the next five years, Gooch calculated.

Gooch said he filed his analysis because he believes that if the excess profits were brought to the commission’s attention they would have to stop the profiteering.

He said FERC has failed to “redress years of toleration of unlawful conduct by some oil pipelines.”

By filing his report, he said, “it does not seem likely that any commissioner, past or present, would turn a blind eye to unlawful excess profits of some public utilities if the results of the annual report filings had been called to their attention.”

Here are a few of the questions Gooch’s report raises:

What is the point of filing accounting reports, especially under oath, if their contents are ignored?

Why would a government agency help monopolies whose rates it sets earn more than just and reasonable profit margins?

Why have President Obama (and before him Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton) appointed commissioners closely allied with the energy industry instead of consumer advocates?

Why has Congress not investigated FERC?

There are many more questions. This column will be pursuing answers about how FERC not only ignores, but actively helps, monopoly pipelines gouge the public.  (Editing by Kevin Drawbaugh)

This column first appeared on Thomson Reuters News & Insight.

COMMENT

@Ozzie, all pipelines my column refers to are rate-regulated monopolies as a matter of law. If they were competitive there would be no reason to have ever regulated their rates.

The absolute dollars are not the issue, but the rate of return — the 55 percent return cited for the Sunoco line is not a market return. I included the average for all large US companies — 6.7 percent — to give perspective.

And I showed how automatic 6.8% annual rate increases are authorized, which is not market pricing, certainly not in this economy.

I don’t think “ruin” is a reasonable standard, as you evidently do, nor is the issue villainy, as you write. The issue is whether FERC is acting properly and applying the legal standard of just and reasonable is the standard set by law. If you can show how a 55% ROA is reasonable please do so.

Also, its the SFPP pipeline, not SPFF; the Sunoco profit was not $3.9 million (which was authorized) but seven times that much. And Johnston has a “t” in it.

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