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	<title>Comments on: CDS demonization watch, insurable-interest edition</title>
	<atom:link href="http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/</link>
	<description>A slice of lime in the soda</description>
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		<title>By: Dan Hess</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-1484</link>
		<dc:creator>Dan Hess</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 09 May 2009 02:55:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/#comment-1484</guid>
		<description>That&#039;s a nice glossary page.  It even says it came from a 2001 textbook; probably copied by an intern.  If you want to find out how PIMCO actually feels about CDSs, see Bill Gross&#039;s January 2008 Market Commentary.  

http://www.pimco.com/LeftNav/Featured+Market+Commentary/IO/2008/IO+January+2008.htm

Here&#039;s one gem:
&quot;Our modern shadow banking system craftily dodges the reserve requirements of traditional institutions and promotes a chain letter, pyramid scheme of leverage, based in many cases on no reserve cushion whatsoever. Financial derivatives of all descriptions are involved but credit default swaps (CDS) are perhaps the most egregious offenders. While margin does flow periodically to balance both party’s accounts, the conduits that hold CDS contracts are in effect non-regulated banks, much like their hedge fund brethren, with no requirements to hold reserves against a significant &quot;black swan&quot; run that might break them.&quot;

The whole article lays out a hypothetical doomsday scenario with derivatives and particularly CDSs at the center.  By the end of the year, it had played out and we found ourselves living in the People&#039;s Republic of America.  

Hello?  The shadow banking system actually did collapse.  By the middle of 2008, Uncle Sam, through Fannie and Freddy, was suddenly almost alone in home lending.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>That&#8217;s a nice glossary page.  It even says it came from a 2001 textbook; probably copied by an intern.  If you want to find out how PIMCO actually feels about CDSs, see Bill Gross&#8217;s January 2008 Market Commentary.  </p>
<p><a href='http://www.pimco.com/LeftNav/Featured+Market+Commentary/IO/2008/IO+January+2008.htm'>http://www.pimco.com/LeftNav/Featured+Ma rket+Commentary/IO/2008/IO+January+2008. htm</a></p>
<p>Here&#8217;s one gem:<br />
&#8220;Our modern shadow banking system craftily dodges the reserve requirements of traditional institutions and promotes a chain letter, pyramid scheme of leverage, based in many cases on no reserve cushion whatsoever. Financial derivatives of all descriptions are involved but credit default swaps (CDS) are perhaps the most egregious offenders. While margin does flow periodically to balance both party’s accounts, the conduits that hold CDS contracts are in effect non-regulated banks, much like their hedge fund brethren, with no requirements to hold reserves against a significant &#8220;black swan&#8221; run that might break them.&#8221;</p>
<p>The whole article lays out a hypothetical doomsday scenario with derivatives and particularly CDSs at the center.  By the end of the year, it had played out and we found ourselves living in the People&#8217;s Republic of America.  </p>
<p>Hello?  The shadow banking system actually did collapse.  By the middle of 2008, Uncle Sam, through Fannie and Freddy, was suddenly almost alone in home lending.</p>
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		<title>By: ab</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-1454</link>
		<dc:creator>ab</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2009 16:26:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/#comment-1454</guid>
		<description>From the PIMCO website:

The event risk embedded in bonds and other credit assets was very difficult to reduce prior to the evolution of credit default swaps. In the brief decade since their inception, credit default swaps have become not only a tool that effectively hedges event risk but also a flexible portfolio management tool that far exceeds that single benefit.

http://europe.pimco.com/LeftNav/Bond+Basics/2006/Credit+Default+Swaps+06-01-2006.htm

Sounds like they appreciate the benefits of CDS...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From the PIMCO website:</p>
<p>The event risk embedded in bonds and other credit assets was very difficult to reduce prior to the evolution of credit default swaps. In the brief decade since their inception, credit default swaps have become not only a tool that effectively hedges event risk but also a flexible portfolio management tool that far exceeds that single benefit.</p>
<p><a href='http://europe.pimco.com/LeftNav/Bond+Basics/2006/Credit+Default+Swaps+06-01-2006.htm'>http://europe.pimco.com/LeftNav/Bond+Bas ics/2006/Credit+Default+Swaps+06-01-2006 .htm</a></p>
<p>Sounds like they appreciate the benefits of CDS&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: Dan Hess</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-1409</link>
		<dc:creator>Dan Hess</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2009 04:46:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/#comment-1409</guid>
		<description>I think we need to remind ourselves that credit default swaps have not been with us long at all.  They were invented just in 1997 at JPM and only in Dec. 2000 when Clinton signed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act did they really start to take off.  That&#039;s just this decade.  The wonderful 1980s and 1990s happened entirely without them.  CDS&#039;s have had a positive impact on credit but we mostly ended up with credit we did not need.

I think Pimco handling of bonds is instructive.  The world&#039;s largest bond fund uses virtually no CDSs (a miniscule amount in relation to their size).  They just study like hell and if they like the risk/reward they buy.  They earn their keep by their hard evaluation of risk.  If there is a default, they absorb it and they are diversified.  In 2008 they saw a positive return with on the order of a trillion dollars under management.  

To say that lending would have collapsed were it not for credit default swaps is not accurate.  Lending by the big players in swaps actually did collapse quite drastically and the ones who stepped into the breach were the US government and the unleveraged PIMCOs of the world.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think we need to remind ourselves that credit default swaps have not been with us long at all.  They were invented just in 1997 at JPM and only in Dec. 2000 when Clinton signed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act did they really start to take off.  That&#8217;s just this decade.  The wonderful 1980s and 1990s happened entirely without them.  CDS&#8217;s have had a positive impact on credit but we mostly ended up with credit we did not need.</p>
<p>I think Pimco handling of bonds is instructive.  The world&#8217;s largest bond fund uses virtually no CDSs (a miniscule amount in relation to their size).  They just study like hell and if they like the risk/reward they buy.  They earn their keep by their hard evaluation of risk.  If there is a default, they absorb it and they are diversified.  In 2008 they saw a positive return with on the order of a trillion dollars under management.  </p>
<p>To say that lending would have collapsed were it not for credit default swaps is not accurate.  Lending by the big players in swaps actually did collapse quite drastically and the ones who stepped into the breach were the US government and the unleveraged PIMCOs of the world.</p>
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		<title>By: Anonymoose</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-1404</link>
		<dc:creator>Anonymoose</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2009 23:09:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/#comment-1404</guid>
		<description>A simple point: Given that CDS are bilateral private contracts it is entirely possible, and likely legal given the lack of regulations on CDS contracts, to create several hedges with several different CDS issuers wherein the issuers do not know about the other hedges and thus will agree to pay off the full rate.

Given that MS knew it could cause a default by calling their loan, hedging such as this would create a perverse incentive to make the company default and get paid several times for the same loan.

Though the CDS issuers might be able to call fraud, given the end result, but litigation such as that is expensive and piercing the corporate veil is always a pain in the ass.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A simple point: Given that CDS are bilateral private contracts it is entirely possible, and likely legal given the lack of regulations on CDS contracts, to create several hedges with several different CDS issuers wherein the issuers do not know about the other hedges and thus will agree to pay off the full rate.</p>
<p>Given that MS knew it could cause a default by calling their loan, hedging such as this would create a perverse incentive to make the company default and get paid several times for the same loan.</p>
<p>Though the CDS issuers might be able to call fraud, given the end result, but litigation such as that is expensive and piercing the corporate veil is always a pain in the ass.</p>
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		<title>By: ab</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-1392</link>
		<dc:creator>ab</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2009 20:36:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/#comment-1392</guid>
		<description>Dan,

I recognize that there have been major changes in risk management in the past half-century, but I&#039;d say that most of these had a very positive effect on the availability of credit. You can argue that we&#039;ve overlended recently, but I don&#039;t think you can claim that a prohibition against hedging wouldn&#039;t create a major credit contraction.

More to the point, what would be the benefit from prohibiting hedging (other than to &quot;man up&quot;, whatever that means)? For every story of hedged banks refusing to cooperate with borrowers, I&#039;d guess there are 100 untold stories of banks lending because they have that hedging ability.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Dan,</p>
<p>I recognize that there have been major changes in risk management in the past half-century, but I&#8217;d say that most of these had a very positive effect on the availability of credit. You can argue that we&#8217;ve overlended recently, but I don&#8217;t think you can claim that a prohibition against hedging wouldn&#8217;t create a major credit contraction.</p>
<p>More to the point, what would be the benefit from prohibiting hedging (other than to &#8220;man up&#8221;, whatever that means)? For every story of hedged banks refusing to cooperate with borrowers, I&#8217;d guess there are 100 untold stories of banks lending because they have that hedging ability.</p>
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		<title>By: Dan Hess</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-1389</link>
		<dc:creator>Dan Hess</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2009 20:04:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/#comment-1389</guid>
		<description>Ab,

Your rudeness is only matched by your ignorance of history.

With all due respect, there was a time in the not-too-distant past when banks didn&#039;t hedge their every risk.  Banks still lent and the economy did just fine, better indeed, than it has recently.  

These bankers need to man up like bankers of their father&#039;s generation and assume some risk, after doing the boring work of analyzing things themselves.  

How did anything of size ever get built or any product come to market over the last few hundred years?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ab,</p>
<p>Your rudeness is only matched by your ignorance of history.</p>
<p>With all due respect, there was a time in the not-too-distant past when banks didn&#8217;t hedge their every risk.  Banks still lent and the economy did just fine, better indeed, than it has recently.  </p>
<p>These bankers need to man up like bankers of their father&#8217;s generation and assume some risk, after doing the boring work of analyzing things themselves.  </p>
<p>How did anything of size ever get built or any product come to market over the last few hundred years?</p>
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		<title>By: ab</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-1387</link>
		<dc:creator>ab</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2009 19:25:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/#comment-1387</guid>
		<description>I guess when you land at Reuters you lose the sanity / intelligence of your old commenters. Anyone who suggests that it&#039;s criminal for a bank to HEDGE THEIR RISK obviously has no idea what they&#039;re talking about. And if you think we should ban hedging, I hope you&#039;re excited to help make the 2008 credit crunch look like a lending bubble. No hedging = no lending. Enjoy.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I guess when you land at Reuters you lose the sanity / intelligence of your old commenters. Anyone who suggests that it&#8217;s criminal for a bank to HEDGE THEIR RISK obviously has no idea what they&#8217;re talking about. And if you think we should ban hedging, I hope you&#8217;re excited to help make the 2008 credit crunch look like a lending bubble. No hedging = no lending. Enjoy.</p>
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		<title>By: Dan Hess</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-1385</link>
		<dc:creator>Dan Hess</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2009 18:33:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/#comment-1385</guid>
		<description>Felix, your title shows you still don&#039;t get it, or are trying to provoke.  &quot;Demonize&quot; suggests that CDSs are being made out to be worse than they are.  Poor CDSs are the victim here. 

Felix, this is not a lunatic fringe.  Have you taken too much of the KoolAid?  Warren Buffett has been shouting from the rooftops on certain financial weapons of mass destruction for seven years and CDS have absolutely covered themselves in glory ever since.

An unsurprising headline:
&quot;Berkshire’s Munger Favors ‘100% Ban’ on Credit Swaps&quot;:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&amp;sid=aKIC60dEOH2U&amp;refer=news</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Felix, your title shows you still don&#8217;t get it, or are trying to provoke.  &#8220;Demonize&#8221; suggests that CDSs are being made out to be worse than they are.  Poor CDSs are the victim here. </p>
<p>Felix, this is not a lunatic fringe.  Have you taken too much of the KoolAid?  Warren Buffett has been shouting from the rooftops on certain financial weapons of mass destruction for seven years and CDS have absolutely covered themselves in glory ever since.</p>
<p>An unsurprising headline:<br />
&#8220;Berkshire’s Munger Favors ‘100% Ban’ on Credit Swaps&#8221;:<br />
<a href='http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&#038;sid=aKIC60dEOH2U&#038;refer=news'>http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2 0601103&#038;sid=aKIC60dEOH2U&#038;refer=news</a></p>
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		<title>By: Dan Hess</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-1384</link>
		<dc:creator>Dan Hess</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2009 18:11:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/#comment-1384</guid>
		<description>Banks should not use CDS&#039;s or anything else to hedge against default.  They should try to come up with some estimate of the risk and then either take on the debt and its risk or not.

Hey banks, assess risk.  That&#039;s your job.  That&#039;s why you get paid.  Banks are the ones that meet with the borrower, they are the ones that can see on a case-by-case basis where they are making money or how they are using it.

Banks outsourcing risk assessment through CDSs is like a surgeon outsourcing the cutting and stitching parts, or a police department outsourcing the arresting part, or a fire department outsourcing the parts involving heat and smoke.  Risk assessing and assuming is their main task.  

The only reason banks earn the big bucks is to assess and assume risk.  If it&#039;s just about the mechanical processing of accounts and transactions, my Federal Employee Retirement System does that at a cost of a few hundredths of a percent per year.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Banks should not use CDS&#8217;s or anything else to hedge against default.  They should try to come up with some estimate of the risk and then either take on the debt and its risk or not.</p>
<p>Hey banks, assess risk.  That&#8217;s your job.  That&#8217;s why you get paid.  Banks are the ones that meet with the borrower, they are the ones that can see on a case-by-case basis where they are making money or how they are using it.</p>
<p>Banks outsourcing risk assessment through CDSs is like a surgeon outsourcing the cutting and stitching parts, or a police department outsourcing the arresting part, or a fire department outsourcing the parts involving heat and smoke.  Risk assessing and assuming is their main task.  </p>
<p>The only reason banks earn the big bucks is to assess and assume risk.  If it&#8217;s just about the mechanical processing of accounts and transactions, my Federal Employee Retirement System does that at a cost of a few hundredths of a percent per year.</p>
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		<title>By: mercurino</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-1378</link>
		<dc:creator>mercurino</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2009 16:51:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/#comment-1378</guid>
		<description>i have a somewhat different question.  Overleveraged Bank holds $100 in bonds from Struggling Car Company.  Vulture Hedge Fund agrees to buy those bonds from Overleveraged Bank for 30¢ on the dollar, or $30 total.  Vulture Hedge Fund then buys a CDS contract to insure the full $100 in bonds on Struggling Car Company.  Vulture Hedge Fund then proceeds to refuse a government-sponsored bailout of Struggling Car Company, effectively forcing Struggling Car Company into bankruptcy.  Vulture Hedge Fund is thus only out the $30 for the purchase of the bonds and whatever the premium on the CDS insurance was.  Assuming that premium was $50 - which is probably way too high - the potential profit margins for Vulture Hedge Fund on the default of Struggling Car Company is still 20%.

How is this legal?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>i have a somewhat different question.  Overleveraged Bank holds $100 in bonds from Struggling Car Company.  Vulture Hedge Fund agrees to buy those bonds from Overleveraged Bank for 30¢ on the dollar, or $30 total.  Vulture Hedge Fund then buys a CDS contract to insure the full $100 in bonds on Struggling Car Company.  Vulture Hedge Fund then proceeds to refuse a government-sponsored bailout of Struggling Car Company, effectively forcing Struggling Car Company into bankruptcy.  Vulture Hedge Fund is thus only out the $30 for the purchase of the bonds and whatever the premium on the CDS insurance was.  Assuming that premium was $50 &#8211; which is probably way too high &#8211; the potential profit margins for Vulture Hedge Fund on the default of Struggling Car Company is still 20%.</p>
<p>How is this legal?</p>
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		<title>By: Don the libertarian Democrat</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-1377</link>
		<dc:creator>Don the libertarian Democrat</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2009 16:49:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/#comment-1377</guid>
		<description>That&#039;s the thing. If I buy a CDS, someone has to sell it to me. I can&#039;t simply declare a CDS on X to be paid by ? That&#039;s where price discovery comes in. There are two different assessments of the risk.

If I cause a default on X, I&#039;ll be sued by X and the person who sold me the CDS, as well as probably be investigated by the govt.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>That&#8217;s the thing. If I buy a CDS, someone has to sell it to me. I can&#8217;t simply declare a CDS on X to be paid by ? That&#8217;s where price discovery comes in. There are two different assessments of the risk.</p>
<p>If I cause a default on X, I&#8217;ll be sued by X and the person who sold me the CDS, as well as probably be investigated by the govt.</p>
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		<title>By: KenG</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-1375</link>
		<dc:creator>KenG</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2009 16:28:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/#comment-1375</guid>
		<description>so what kind of insurer would sell insurance to a customer who was able to create a cause for a claim at any time? How could any company be stupid enough to sell a CDS to a a lender, and give them the authority to decided when they should be paid?

We have lots of regulations that prevent people from causing themselves harm (like laws against using drugs), why can&#039;t we have regulations that prevent companies from doing really stupid things?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>so what kind of insurer would sell insurance to a customer who was able to create a cause for a claim at any time? How could any company be stupid enough to sell a CDS to a a lender, and give them the authority to decided when they should be paid?</p>
<p>We have lots of regulations that prevent people from causing themselves harm (like laws against using drugs), why can&#8217;t we have regulations that prevent companies from doing really stupid things?</p>
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		<title>By: James B. Shearer</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-1374</link>
		<dc:creator>James B. Shearer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2009 16:20:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/#comment-1374</guid>
		<description>Well you aren&#039;t generally allowed to buy insurance on say a racehorse and then shoot the horse and collect the insurance.  Don&#039;t know if this is the same but it appears the allegation is that it is the same.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well you aren&#8217;t generally allowed to buy insurance on say a racehorse and then shoot the horse and collect the insurance.  Don&#8217;t know if this is the same but it appears the allegation is that it is the same.</p>
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		<title>By: R Duane Willing</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-1373</link>
		<dc:creator>R Duane Willing</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2009 16:17:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/#comment-1373</guid>
		<description>To make a loan at interest and fees then insure the loan so to be able to collect by calling the loan and forcing bankruprtcy is the kind of finance that Adolph Hitler rose up against. Perhaps by the look of it? Justifiably so! RDuane Willing</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>To make a loan at interest and fees then insure the loan so to be able to collect by calling the loan and forcing bankruprtcy is the kind of finance that Adolph Hitler rose up against. Perhaps by the look of it? Justifiably so! RDuane Willing</p>
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		<title>By: Mark Wolfinger</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-1372</link>
		<dc:creator>Mark Wolfinger</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2009 16:11:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/cds-demonization-watch-insurable-interest-edition/#comment-1372</guid>
		<description>When buying insurance ( betting on failure) MS had a way to make it more likely that failure would occur and that the insurance policy would pay off. How can that be acceptable (i.e. allowed to go unpunished) behavior?   

The folks selling that insurance didn&#039;t know about that extra liability

Isn&#039;t that like trading on inside information?  

Or were the insurers responsible for understanding the risk they were taking? The game was rigged and MS collected and hurt the whole country (world?) by their actions.

And they come out whole in this mess?  This is not right.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When buying insurance ( betting on failure) MS had a way to make it more likely that failure would occur and that the insurance policy would pay off. How can that be acceptable (i.e. allowed to go unpunished) behavior?   </p>
<p>The folks selling that insurance didn&#8217;t know about that extra liability</p>
<p>Isn&#8217;t that like trading on inside information?  </p>
<p>Or were the insurers responsible for understanding the risk they were taking? The game was rigged and MS collected and hurt the whole country (world?) by their actions.</p>
<p>And they come out whole in this mess?  This is not right.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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