Comments on: Emerging-market debt after Ecuador http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/08/emerging-market-debt-after-ecuador/ A slice of lime in the soda Sun, 26 Oct 2014 19:05:02 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=4.2.5 By: Uncle Billy, Mental Gidget http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/08/emerging-market-debt-after-ecuador/comment-page-1/#comment-6645 Thu, 10 Sep 2009 21:11:00 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/08/emerging-market-debt-after-ecuador/#comment-6645 RTFA? Read the fine allegory?

Bovinely passive, just like State Street was in regards to Reserve Primary/Lehman?

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By: J http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/08/emerging-market-debt-after-ecuador/comment-page-1/#comment-2710 Sun, 14 Jun 2009 06:53:44 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/08/emerging-market-debt-after-ecuador/#comment-2710 To carmen:

http://www.auditoriadeuda.org.ec/index.p hp?option=com_content&view=article&id=89 &Itemid=58

Irregularities in the instrumentation of the issue of Global Bonds 2012 and 2030
a. The issue offer of Global Bonds 2030 and 2012 was not authorized by the Ecuadorian laws due to that the Executive Decree was not yet published at the date of subscription.
b. The “Opinion of the State’s General Attorney Office” does not analyze the terms of the operation and conditions its opinion to the granted authorization through Decree.
c. Salomon Smith Barney Inc. and J.P. Morgan acted in the negotiation of July 27th 2000 without the formal authorization of Ecuador.
d. The competence for the Ecuador Consul in New York to proceed to the restructuration of the external debt is delegated AFTER THE DATE OF NEGOTIATION.
e. Competence delegation to a “Commission” to negotiate the external debt, even though of being this an exclusive attribution of the Finances Minister.
f. Contract of a Trust and Exchange Agent without authorization because the Executive Decrees 605 A and 605 B were published on September 1st 2000, that is, after the date of the mentioned contract.
g. Collateral Guarantees liquidation in an illegal and arbitrary way.
h. Negotiation of Brady Par and Discount Bonds that did not have entered to any restructuration because they were prepaid, having constituted guarantee.
i. The State’s General Attorney does not analyze the contract called “Indenture” that constitutes essential requirement to make the negotiation.

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By: carmen http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/08/emerging-market-debt-after-ecuador/comment-page-1/#comment-2570 Tue, 09 Jun 2009 22:13:02 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/08/emerging-market-debt-after-ecuador/#comment-2570 Correa’s stance is extremely troubling, particularly because it’s creating a very dangerous precedent for all other nations out there that might as well not comply with their obligations, since there are no consequences any way. Correa makes the decision not to pay the debt because he alleges it was illegitimate/illegal… because of conclusions reached by a bogus, politically-driven Commission whose report was not substantive.. Some of the arguments provided were that the documents were written in English and Ecuador at the time didn’t have officials who could read English… what type of argument is that!!!

What we’re seeing in Ecuador today is a total disrespect for rule of law, sanctity of contracts, respect for private property and commitment; violations to freedom of expression and human rights, and no access to due process. All of this to forward Mr. Correa’s political agenda. Let’s open our eyes and understand who we’re dealing with here.

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By: Admirer of Ecuador..LS http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/08/emerging-market-debt-after-ecuador/comment-page-1/#comment-2544 Tue, 09 Jun 2009 15:50:21 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/08/emerging-market-debt-after-ecuador/#comment-2544 Wonderful to see a country stand up for itself against the IMF and others who trot out rules to dominate and control rather than to engage.
Oh that our leaders here in Canada had the “balls” to do the same thing.

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By: anonymous http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/08/emerging-market-debt-after-ecuador/comment-page-1/#comment-2538 Tue, 09 Jun 2009 14:45:43 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/08/emerging-market-debt-after-ecuador/#comment-2538 minderbender,

RTFA: “unloaded with both barrels on his former client”

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By: minderbender http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/08/emerging-market-debt-after-ecuador/comment-page-1/#comment-2529 Tue, 09 Jun 2009 07:34:43 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/08/emerging-market-debt-after-ecuador/#comment-2529 You know what would be an interesting fact that readers might want to bear in mind when they read Buchheit’s comments? That Ecuador sacked his law firm a few months ago, just before completing the transaction he is criticizing.

But I think it’s understandable that Felix didn’t pick up on this, it’s pretty obscure… where did I read it again?

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By: Joe the Trader http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/08/emerging-market-debt-after-ecuador/comment-page-1/#comment-2519 Mon, 08 Jun 2009 21:47:10 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/08/emerging-market-debt-after-ecuador/#comment-2519 Felix,
You are right to be concerned about the emerging european exposure of developed Europe. Europe is facing two crises a over-indebtedness crisis like the one Latin America faced in the 80s and an Asian style fx crisis. The difference is that in Europe now, exposure at the bank level is to the corporate sector and not to the soveriegn sector. In fact in the 1980s US banks had 180% exposure to Latin America while developed European banks have exposure of around 240%. This is problematic because of the mismatch in fx liabilities (a la Asia 97). In Asia real fx depreciated by around 40%, to date E European real fx has depreciated by less than 20%. Given how much worse global economic conditions are in the current environment it seems that risk to developed Europe remains very high.

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