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	<title>Comments on: Where bank regulation is headed</title>
	<atom:link href="http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/09/09/where-bank-regulation-is-headed/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/09/09/where-bank-regulation-is-headed/</link>
	<description>A slice of lime in the soda</description>
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		<title>By: Don the libertarian Democrat</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/09/09/where-bank-regulation-is-headed/comment-page-1/#comment-6583</link>
		<dc:creator>Don the libertarian Democrat</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2009 01:06:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/09/09/where-bank-regulation-is-headed/#comment-6583</guid>
		<description>This is from Arnold Kling on EconLog on February 9th:

&quot;Taleb, like me, wants to get rid of risk-taking by banks, and leave non-insured institutions free to take whatever risks they want, as long as they are not creating risks for others. His solution is to nationalize banks. (me: why would this mean that they would not take risks? Suppose that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae had been fully nationalized as of three years ago. Would they have taken more risk or less risk?)&quot;

And my response:

&quot;Although I&#039;d like to nationalize a few banks in this mess, I agree with you. We don&#039;t need to run them, especially if we have narrow/limited purpose banks. I didn&#039;t like this idea at first, but if it allows the existence of risk-taking non-insured institutions, then I&#039;d be for it.&quot;

Maybe we didn&#039;t use the correct hand gestures.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is from Arnold Kling on EconLog on February 9th:</p>
<p>&#8220;Taleb, like me, wants to get rid of risk-taking by banks, and leave non-insured institutions free to take whatever risks they want, as long as they are not creating risks for others. His solution is to nationalize banks. (me: why would this mean that they would not take risks? Suppose that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae had been fully nationalized as of three years ago. Would they have taken more risk or less risk?)&#8221;</p>
<p>And my response:</p>
<p>&#8220;Although I&#8217;d like to nationalize a few banks in this mess, I agree with you. We don&#8217;t need to run them, especially if we have narrow/limited purpose banks. I didn&#8217;t like this idea at first, but if it allows the existence of risk-taking non-insured institutions, then I&#8217;d be for it.&#8221;</p>
<p>Maybe we didn&#8217;t use the correct hand gestures.</p>
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		<title>By: Taunter</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/09/09/where-bank-regulation-is-headed/comment-page-1/#comment-6576</link>
		<dc:creator>Taunter</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2009 21:24:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/09/09/where-bank-regulation-is-headed/#comment-6576</guid>
		<description>That macro view is the job of Treasury and Congress.  And even if you believe that there needs to be a single-purpose agency charged with the task, by all means, don&#039;t make it the same agency that defends the dollar.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>That macro view is the job of Treasury and Congress.  And even if you believe that there needs to be a single-purpose agency charged with the task, by all means, don&#8217;t make it the same agency that defends the dollar.</p>
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		<title>By: Lord</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/09/09/where-bank-regulation-is-headed/comment-page-1/#comment-6572</link>
		<dc:creator>Lord</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2009 20:38:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/09/09/where-bank-regulation-is-headed/#comment-6572</guid>
		<description>That is the regulatory system we had, boring commercial banks and exciting investment banks.  It doesn&#039;t work when even the exciting ones become too big to fail.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>That is the regulatory system we had, boring commercial banks and exciting investment banks.  It doesn&#8217;t work when even the exciting ones become too big to fail.</p>
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		<title>By: Mike</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/09/09/where-bank-regulation-is-headed/comment-page-1/#comment-6570</link>
		<dc:creator>Mike</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2009 20:15:52 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Wouldn&#039;t giving the Fed that kind of regulatory capacity just continue the slow-motion dismantling of the 1951 Accord? It would seem to violate the spirit of that agreement, even though technically the Accord was between the Fed and Treasury.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Wouldn&#8217;t giving the Fed that kind of regulatory capacity just continue the slow-motion dismantling of the 1951 Accord? It would seem to violate the spirit of that agreement, even though technically the Accord was between the Fed and Treasury.</p>
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