Opinion

Felix Salmon

Pinning the blame on the House Republicans

By Felix Salmon
September 14, 2009

Jim Surowiecki has an interesting response to Joe Nocera’s contrarian idea that letting Lehman fail, far from precipitating the worst of the financial crisis, actually enabled the government to bail out AIG and otherwise increase its intervention to something approaching the needed level.

Here’s Nocera:

In the months between Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, Mr. Paulson and Mr. Bernanke had approached Congressional leaders about the need to pass legislation that would give them a handful of additional tools to help them deal with a larger crisis, should one ensue. But they quickly realized there was simply no political will to get anything done. After Lehman, however, Mr. Paulson and Mr. Bernanke were able to persuade Congress to pass a bill that gave the Treasury Department $700 billion in potential bailout money — which Mr. Paulson then used to shore up the system, and help ease the crisis. Even then, it wasn’t easy; it took two tries in the House to pass the legislation. Without the crisis prompted by the Lehman default, it would have been impossible to pass a bill like that.

And here’s Surowiecki:

What if Congress had passed the TARP bill the first time around, instead of voting it down on September 29th? While it’s certainly true that Lehman’s failure provoked a global panic, and in the days immediately after it went under we saw credit markets start to freeze up, stock-market sell-offs, and the like, it’s also true that the news that the U.S. government was working on a toxic-asset bailout plan for the banks actually did stabilize the markets. By Friday, September 26th, for instance, the S&P 500 Index was trading only slightly below where it had been before Lehman went under. At that point, it seemed, investors were reasonably confident that the government’s actions would bring some order to the chaos in the system.

That confidence disappeared, obviously, on September 29th, when the House of Representatives voted down the TARP.

Is it then the House Republicans, rather than Hank Paulson, who deserve most of the blame for failing to respond strongly enough to the financial crisis? Might we have muddled through fine if they’d just passed the TARP bill the first time around? After all, September 29 came after the AIG bailout, so clearly the stomach-churning stock-market implosion we saw thereafter was not necessary for the enaction of further multi-billion-dollar bailouts.

One thing worth remembering here though is that it’s pretty spectacularly unhelpful to look at the stock market as an indicator of financial well-being over the course of the crisis. The Dow hit its all-time high long after the crisis had already begun, and from then on in it was a decidedly lagging indicator. The fact that it only took a couple of weeks to implode in the wake of the Lehman bankruptcy could actually be a sign of the stock market reacting much more quickly than it had done previously.

In any case, even if Nocera is right and Lehman’s failure was in hindsight a good thing, it was at the same time a chaotic thing, and any silver lining came more through luck than judgment. I still think we’d have been better off saving both Lehman and AIG this time last year — and I still think that if Paulson had wanted to do that, he would have found a way.

Comments
4 comments so far | RSS Comments RSS

the house of representatives wanted to signal that support of the financial system was going to be soft and that they didn’t want to be taken for granted. this was new information to the markets and so they reacted. in the coming months the markets had the opportunity for testing the resolve of the government and did so repeatedly.

Posted by q | Report as abusive
 

OF COURSE it was a good thing. The “mistakes” made on that fateful weekend, and the later dithering of those Republican congressmen, ended up saving us all from so much. I feel sorry for all those affected, and hate the burden the AIG rescue puts on all of us, but face it: it’s most probable that we would be governed by vice-president Palin if it weren’t for Lehman’s failure and the chaos that followed. That’s simply worth trillions. Indeed the damage a McCain adminstration would have caused outweighs most merely financial considerations.

Prior to Lehman, most could see that we were witnessing a historic economic debacle… but it was unfolding in slow motion. And the Democrats were in a near-panic about McCain’s poll strength. And then, suddenly, it became a national CRISIS, here and now. All our politicians and economic leaders were talking doomsday scenarios, even as they all flailed about so obviously helpless to fix things. And McCain personally came off badly relative to Obama in terms of how he got involved (or not). The timing was very fortunate; one month earlier and the sense of calamity would have receded and the Republicans would recovered substantial ground.

Posted by axg | Report as abusive
 

I’m inclined to believe that in the face of this “jobless recovery”, that all the wrong people are suffering. At this time, there’s been little regulation imposed on these “captains of finance.” With that in mind, the repubs and dems alike share the blame of poor custodianship of this nation’s wealth.

If you’re unemployed and in your late fifties as I am, you’d like to see the fat boys do some bleeding too. They enjoyed the excesses of the past few years at the expense of a multitude of honest, hard working folk who will never taste the good life even though they played by the rules.

As Voltaire said, “The comfort of the rich depends on an abundance of the poor.”

Posted by RH Pyle | Report as abusive
 

Felix- i think your coverage of the market is excellent and I love reading your stuff. i’m curious why you think bailing Lehman out would have prevented the chaos from showing up, even worse, down the road? Lehman failed because they had a lot of bad assets on their books, as did lots of other institutions. they did everything they could to keep the world from realizing this. as we know now (and they most likely knew at the time), the assets really were quite bad and weren’t going to recover in value. The final reckoning and deleveraging were inevitable, with or without a bailout.

if you are interested, i should have a post up tomorrow on businessinsider.com that discusses this some more.
keep up the great work!

Posted by TJ | Report as abusive
 

Post Your Comment

We welcome comments that advance the story through relevant opinion, anecdotes, links and data. If you see a comment that you believe is irrelevant or inappropriate, you can flag it to our editors by using the report abuse links. Views expressed in the comments do not represent those of Reuters. For more information on our comment policy, see http://blogs.reuters.com/fulldisclosure/2010/09/27/toward-a-more-thoughtful-conversation-on-stories/
  •