The idiocy of double secret probation
Bill Black makes mincemeat of the idea that the government can and should keep a top-secret list of systemically-dangerous institutions which are subject to â€śheightened prudential standardsâ€ť:
Iâ€™ll put aside for a later time discussing the obscenity of proposing that the American people be kept from learning which banks are SDIs and can secretly tap the U.S. Treasury and the Fed for unlimited funds. Iâ€™ll also mention only in passing the hilarity of Congress proposing that we can successfully create a super secret society of those, including some members of Congress, who will know which banks are on the list â€“ and will never leak.
Here, I want to emphasize the investor. The drafters have forgotten that the SEC mandates the disclosure of material information to investors. The fact that a bank is on the secret list is extraordinarily important to investors. So, the bill as drafted would create a system in which the banking regulators and Congress must keep the DOUBLE SECRET PROBATION list secret â€“ but the banks must publicly disclose that they are on the list. Of course, itâ€™s possible that the Treasury and the Fed â€“ you remember, the folks that tell us constantly about their commitment to â€śtransparencyâ€ť â€“ are actually so insane that they will propose amending the securities disclosure laws and destroy the entire concept of mandating that publicly traded companies disclose material information to investors.
Obviously, there would be a stigma involved were a bank to go onto this list. But equally obviously, the whole point of having this list in the first place is that such banks are too big to fail. Which means that the banks’ investors can have some little faith that they managed to make a moral-hazard play instead of simply investing in a bank going down the tubes.
In any case, as Black says, it’s hardly the job of regulators to keep from investors the fact that their bank is looking shaky. Either banks are small enough to fail, in which case there are no systemic problems if lots of investors try to exit at once. Or else they’re too big to fail, in which case it’s the job of regulators to reassure the markets that a backstop exists — rather than to try to keep those markets in the dark. The plan as it stands is just idiotic.