Comments on: The systemically-important 30 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/11/30/the-systemically-important-30/ A slice of lime in the soda Sun, 26 Oct 2014 19:05:02 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=4.2.5 By: Ginger Yellow http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/11/30/the-systemically-important-30/comment-page-1/#comment-9434 Tue, 01 Dec 2009 11:52:43 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/11/30/the-systemically-important-30/#comment-9434 “They do more stress testing of longer term scenarios, rather than what the quants did with mainly short-term VAR.”Well, they do on the insurance side of things. But insurers performed just as badly as the banks, if not worse, with their investments.

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By: David Merkel http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/11/30/the-systemically-important-30/comment-page-1/#comment-9404 Mon, 30 Nov 2009 22:18:13 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/11/30/the-systemically-important-30/#comment-9404 The reason there are no US insurers there is the bancassurance model never took off here. If I can be more controversial though, on a solvency basis, the state-controlled regulation of solvency of insurers has been more risk averse (and sound) than the national regulation of banks.Actuaries are a plus as well; banks don’t have them. They do more stress testing of longer term scenarios, rather than what the quants did with mainly short-term VAR. The cruder models work better than the fancy ones, because markets aren’t always liquid.Insurers usually possess “table stability” rather than the “bicycle stability” that banks possess. Bicycles are stable when they are moving, but not if they stop. Tables are always stable. Most insurers would find it difficult to stop writing business, but they can typically do it without affecting solvency. Banks have a harder time with that because of their shorter funding structures and hedging needs.http://alephblog.com/2009/01/03/bi cycle-stability-versus-table-stability-i i/

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By: Tim Backshall http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/11/30/the-systemically-important-30/comment-page-1/#comment-9373 Mon, 30 Nov 2009 17:43:53 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/11/30/the-systemically-important-30/#comment-9373 Might be interesting to some – http://www.scribd.com/doc/23385096/FSB30 -Intrinsics

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By: vk9141 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/11/30/the-systemically-important-30/comment-page-1/#comment-9361 Mon, 30 Nov 2009 15:11:16 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/11/30/the-systemically-important-30/#comment-9361 Ginger Yellow – good point well made

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By: Ginger Yellow http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/11/30/the-systemically-important-30/comment-page-1/#comment-9359 Mon, 30 Nov 2009 15:05:06 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/11/30/the-systemically-important-30/#comment-9359 Because these are the institutions which are most likely to cause global problems. The whole point of the list is to focus complicated cross-border supervision efforts where they’re needed most. Despite their size, Wells Fargo and Berkshire Hathaway are overwhelmingly domestic institutions. The same can’t be said for Mizuho or Axa, which have substantial overseas operations (indeed, for Axa, I’d be surpised if even half of their business was in France).

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