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	<title>Comments on: How the Teamsters successfully played the CDS market</title>
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	<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/02/02/how-the-teamsters-successfully-played-the-cds-market/</link>
	<description>A slice of lime in the soda</description>
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		<title>By: AnonymousChef</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/02/02/how-the-teamsters-successfully-played-the-cds-market/comment-page-1/#comment-11728</link>
		<dc:creator>AnonymousChef</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2010 19:49:12 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Tomrus,

Assuming this is a net negative for welfare (and I have no idea whether it is), the simplified answer would be the holdout effect. To do a restructuring, you need substantially all creditors on board. The CDS swap gives a party an incentive not to be onboard. And so a transaction that destroys value (i.e., the company&#039;s liquidation value is smaller than its going concern value by at least the CDS spread) can go through.

The question is, in these circumstances, why wouldn&#039;t the other parties make a side deal to make not crashing the company worth its while?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Tomrus,</p>
<p>Assuming this is a net negative for welfare (and I have no idea whether it is), the simplified answer would be the holdout effect. To do a restructuring, you need substantially all creditors on board. The CDS swap gives a party an incentive not to be onboard. And so a transaction that destroys value (i.e., the company&#8217;s liquidation value is smaller than its going concern value by at least the CDS spread) can go through.</p>
<p>The question is, in these circumstances, why wouldn&#8217;t the other parties make a side deal to make not crashing the company worth its while?</p>
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		<title>By: tomrus</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/02/02/how-the-teamsters-successfully-played-the-cds-market/comment-page-1/#comment-11725</link>
		<dc:creator>tomrus</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2010 17:45:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/02/02/how-the-teamsters-successfully-played-the-cds-market/#comment-11725</guid>
		<description>So it would be better to close the CDS market... which leads to a wonky question. In terms of economic theory, why did adding a market (in this case CDSwaps) lower welfare?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So it would be better to close the CDS market&#8230; which leads to a wonky question. In terms of economic theory, why did adding a market (in this case CDSwaps) lower welfare?</p>
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		<title>By: Felix Salmon</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/02/02/how-the-teamsters-successfully-played-the-cds-market/comment-page-1/#comment-11724</link>
		<dc:creator>Felix Salmon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2010 17:43:57 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I think that empty creditors *can* be a problem, in theory. I&#039;m just not yet convinced that they *are* a problem, in practice.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think that empty creditors *can* be a problem, in theory. I&#8217;m just not yet convinced that they *are* a problem, in practice.</p>
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		<title>By: Sandrew</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/02/02/how-the-teamsters-successfully-played-the-cds-market/comment-page-1/#comment-11721</link>
		<dc:creator>Sandrew</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2010 16:39:45 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Did you change course on the empty creditors issue?  I seem to recall you being in Hu&#039;s camp: http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/04/18/how-the-cds-market-makes-restructurings-more-difficult/</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Did you change course on the empty creditors issue?  I seem to recall you being in Hu&#8217;s camp: <a href='http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/04/18/how-the-cds-market-makes-restructurings-more-difficult/'>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/20 09/04/18/how-the-cds-market-makes-restru cturings-more-difficult/</a></p>
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