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	<title>Comments on: Goldman&#8217;s Abacus lies</title>
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	<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/</link>
	<description>A slice of lime in the soda</description>
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		<title>By: tippygolden</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/comment-page-1/#comment-14424</link>
		<dc:creator>tippygolden</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 05 May 2010 01:42:56 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Did IKB believe Paulson was long on the deal? It seems to me  IKB would be called to testify at the civil trial to clear up this issue.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Did IKB believe Paulson was long on the deal? It seems to me  IKB would be called to testify at the civil trial to clear up this issue.</p>
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		<title>By: nemoknada</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/comment-page-1/#comment-14044</link>
		<dc:creator>nemoknada</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 25 Apr 2010 21:09:36 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I guess you were absent the day they taught that the facts alleged in a legal complaint are, duh, alleged facts.  You write as if they are all true.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I guess you were absent the day they taught that the facts alleged in a legal complaint are, duh, alleged facts.  You write as if they are all true.</p>
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		<title>By: lancec</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/comment-page-1/#comment-13843</link>
		<dc:creator>lancec</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Apr 2010 23:29:11 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Does the &quot;Never Scared&quot; part of the motto mean the blog is insufficiently afraid of being foolish, but with confidence?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Does the &#8220;Never Scared&#8221; part of the motto mean the blog is insufficiently afraid of being foolish, but with confidence?</p>
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		<title>By: essorkm</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/comment-page-1/#comment-13805</link>
		<dc:creator>essorkm</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Apr 2010 16:16:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=3431#comment-13805</guid>
		<description>just read Magnetar analysis at propublic.org

GS = Magnetar   ..... nearly same M.O.

RA&#039;s are not the only paid stooges in the CMO mills, so are the &quot;CMO Managers&quot; who presumably independently select the securities.

both Magnetar and GS &#039;outsourced&#039; all fiduciary duties to hand-selected stooge CMO management firms</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>just read Magnetar analysis at propublic.org</p>
<p>GS = Magnetar   &#8230;.. nearly same M.O.</p>
<p>RA&#8217;s are not the only paid stooges in the CMO mills, so are the &#8220;CMO Managers&#8221; who presumably independently select the securities.</p>
<p>both Magnetar and GS &#8216;outsourced&#8217; all fiduciary duties to hand-selected stooge CMO management firms</p>
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		<title>By: Yuansavvy</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/comment-page-1/#comment-13799</link>
		<dc:creator>Yuansavvy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Apr 2010 14:58:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=3431#comment-13799</guid>
		<description>Oh.. Everyone is assuming that the Securities in this deal were traded at face. The reality is as aged first loss pieces, they were probably traded at 10% of face which means even if GS actually kept the B-Pieces (First Loss of Abacus 2007-AC1) their real loss would have been $0 as the super senior had already been overcharged by 200% of the real cost (discounted from face). The $90M loss based on face value of B-Pieces is a standard lie by MBS players to cover up their frauds. It works every time and servicers and trustees use it all the time in the courts and goes over so well.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Oh.. Everyone is assuming that the Securities in this deal were traded at face. The reality is as aged first loss pieces, they were probably traded at 10% of face which means even if GS actually kept the B-Pieces (First Loss of Abacus 2007-AC1) their real loss would have been $0 as the super senior had already been overcharged by 200% of the real cost (discounted from face). The $90M loss based on face value of B-Pieces is a standard lie by MBS players to cover up their frauds. It works every time and servicers and trustees use it all the time in the courts and goes over so well.</p>
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		<title>By: Yuansavvy</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/comment-page-1/#comment-13798</link>
		<dc:creator>Yuansavvy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Apr 2010 14:48:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=3431#comment-13798</guid>
		<description>Has anyone seen the Pooling agreement or any other deal documents other than this Abacus 2007-AC1 PDF? I would love to see the Pooling agreement. Since the trust is on La Salle trustee website (now BAC), I assume they are the Trustee. But where are critical documents? I like to see the Pooling Agreement and distribution reports. It seems they are locked up now. If you have any of these docs post them. Then I will tell you who has done what. As it stands now. GS - Guilty of Fraud and RICO, Paulson - Guilty of Fraud and RICO, ACA Guilty of Fraud and RICO. La Salle - Most Guilty of all for Signing the deal, forming the bogus trust, registering (I would assume they did not do this) in Cayman, Filing bogus 1066 Tax Returns (1066&#039;s)and issuing false Distribution Reports for a trust whose assets were defaulted bonds (artificially kept alive by advances of servicers).

But unfortunately, SEC has a conflict of interests. It can not make the accusations it should because it would open the door for total annihilation of all financial institutions in U.S. whom are all guilty of participating in these MBS criminal activities and equity stripping. U.S. Government has just spent over 5 Trillion Dollar to prop up all these bankrupt financial institutions and there is no way it can allow SEC to take them down. This case is just a slap on the wrist to stop GS from raiding the cookie jar. 

It will be settled in a very quick order to prevent conviction of GS. The Fraud conviction would make Goldman and other MBS players liable for $5+ trillion to foreign financial institutions and governments who were raped by Wall Street.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Has anyone seen the Pooling agreement or any other deal documents other than this Abacus 2007-AC1 PDF? I would love to see the Pooling agreement. Since the trust is on La Salle trustee website (now BAC), I assume they are the Trustee. But where are critical documents? I like to see the Pooling Agreement and distribution reports. It seems they are locked up now. If you have any of these docs post them. Then I will tell you who has done what. As it stands now. GS &#8211; Guilty of Fraud and RICO, Paulson &#8211; Guilty of Fraud and RICO, ACA Guilty of Fraud and RICO. La Salle &#8211; Most Guilty of all for Signing the deal, forming the bogus trust, registering (I would assume they did not do this) in Cayman, Filing bogus 1066 Tax Returns (1066&#8242;s)and issuing false Distribution Reports for a trust whose assets were defaulted bonds (artificially kept alive by advances of servicers).</p>
<p>But unfortunately, SEC has a conflict of interests. It can not make the accusations it should because it would open the door for total annihilation of all financial institutions in U.S. whom are all guilty of participating in these MBS criminal activities and equity stripping. U.S. Government has just spent over 5 Trillion Dollar to prop up all these bankrupt financial institutions and there is no way it can allow SEC to take them down. This case is just a slap on the wrist to stop GS from raiding the cookie jar. </p>
<p>It will be settled in a very quick order to prevent conviction of GS. The Fraud conviction would make Goldman and other MBS players liable for $5+ trillion to foreign financial institutions and governments who were raped by Wall Street.</p>
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		<title>By: Nindy</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/comment-page-1/#comment-13785</link>
		<dc:creator>Nindy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Apr 2010 10:02:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=3431#comment-13785</guid>
		<description>This is a very interesting case, and nuances do matter.  I agree that there seems to be no evidence that Goldman actually stated that Paulson was the equity investor.  However, there does seem to be sufficient evidence that ACA believed that Paulson would be the equity investor and that Goldman knew this, yet did nothing to correct ACA’s false assumption.  A key point in this case is whether Goldman was obliged to do so.  
In order to answer this, it is important to understand some of the key nuances of this industry.  For a CDO manager, it is a logical assumption that the &quot;Transaction Sponsor&quot; would take some material long position in the deal.  The sponsor was traditionally the key investor, the person taking the riskiest part of the deal (usually the equity).  It is also customary to work with the &quot;key investor&quot; to select the portfolio as it is assumed that all parties have aligned interests.  The “key Investor” is, in every way, your customer and, like in any industry, you take their recommendations seriously.   Goldman introduced Paulson as the “Transaction Sponsor” and encouraged, in fact facilitated, ACA to work with Paulson on the portfolio selection.  In this industry, these actions are tantamount to stating Paulson was taking the equity.  
But even if the Courts don’t buy that argument, not identifying Paulson as a party who will be shorting the deal is akin to encouraging your clients to play in a card game where you knew the deck had been stacked by a casino in Vegas.  If the client knew, there is no way they would play.  They would play at one the other 50 casinos in Vegas.  No rationale investor, sophisticated or not, would select a deal where they knew the deck was so blatantly stacked against them over other deals where it was not.  Goldman’s lack of disclosure is a material omission as I believe it is inconceivable that it would not have affected investor decisions.  The SEC should absolutely come down hard on such an unashamed abuse of client trust.
One more point.  Goldman state that they invested and lost $90mm from a piece of the deal.  They use this fact to support their premise that the deal was not designed to fail.  I have dealt with Goldman for many years and there are only two reasons that Goldman would have been long any of the deal.   The first is that they weren’t able to sell all of it before the market turned, that is, they got stuck with it.  Or, the position was hedged somewhere within the bank.  There is no way in a million years that Goldman kept that position simply because they liked the risk; it is just not what they do.  I am sure if the SEC dig deep enough they will find the real reason the position was held, but it definitely does not absolve them of guilt.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is a very interesting case, and nuances do matter.  I agree that there seems to be no evidence that Goldman actually stated that Paulson was the equity investor.  However, there does seem to be sufficient evidence that ACA believed that Paulson would be the equity investor and that Goldman knew this, yet did nothing to correct ACA’s false assumption.  A key point in this case is whether Goldman was obliged to do so.<br />
In order to answer this, it is important to understand some of the key nuances of this industry.  For a CDO manager, it is a logical assumption that the &#8220;Transaction Sponsor&#8221; would take some material long position in the deal.  The sponsor was traditionally the key investor, the person taking the riskiest part of the deal (usually the equity).  It is also customary to work with the &#8220;key investor&#8221; to select the portfolio as it is assumed that all parties have aligned interests.  The “key Investor” is, in every way, your customer and, like in any industry, you take their recommendations seriously.   Goldman introduced Paulson as the “Transaction Sponsor” and encouraged, in fact facilitated, ACA to work with Paulson on the portfolio selection.  In this industry, these actions are tantamount to stating Paulson was taking the equity.<br />
But even if the Courts don’t buy that argument, not identifying Paulson as a party who will be shorting the deal is akin to encouraging your clients to play in a card game where you knew the deck had been stacked by a casino in Vegas.  If the client knew, there is no way they would play.  They would play at one the other 50 casinos in Vegas.  No rationale investor, sophisticated or not, would select a deal where they knew the deck was so blatantly stacked against them over other deals where it was not.  Goldman’s lack of disclosure is a material omission as I believe it is inconceivable that it would not have affected investor decisions.  The SEC should absolutely come down hard on such an unashamed abuse of client trust.<br />
One more point.  Goldman state that they invested and lost $90mm from a piece of the deal.  They use this fact to support their premise that the deal was not designed to fail.  I have dealt with Goldman for many years and there are only two reasons that Goldman would have been long any of the deal.   The first is that they weren’t able to sell all of it before the market turned, that is, they got stuck with it.  Or, the position was hedged somewhere within the bank.  There is no way in a million years that Goldman kept that position simply because they liked the risk; it is just not what they do.  I am sure if the SEC dig deep enough they will find the real reason the position was held, but it definitely does not absolve them of guilt.</p>
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		<title>By: essorkm</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/comment-page-1/#comment-13763</link>
		<dc:creator>essorkm</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2010 21:54:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=3431#comment-13763</guid>
		<description>1. maybe Feds should expand it to a RICO action to include ratings agency as part of the &#039;racketeering criminal enterprise&#039;.

2. GS white lie (head fake) in the pitchbook - note slides on &quot;diversification&quot; of everything extraneous except for the fundamentals of the underlying mortgages themselves</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>1. maybe Feds should expand it to a RICO action to include ratings agency as part of the &#8216;racketeering criminal enterprise&#8217;.</p>
<p>2. GS white lie (head fake) in the pitchbook &#8211; note slides on &#8220;diversification&#8221; of everything extraneous except for the fundamentals of the underlying mortgages themselves</p>
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		<title>By: fdestin</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/comment-page-1/#comment-13613</link>
		<dc:creator>fdestin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 17 Apr 2010 15:47:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=3431#comment-13613</guid>
		<description>I felt compelled to comment as I am surprised you use the allegations made by the SEC as proof rather than using the underlying evidence.  I read the complaints in depth and could not find much of a smoking gun.  

The crux of the case is based on the following:

&quot;On January 12, 2007, Tourre spoke by telephone with ACA about the proposed transaction. Following that conversation, on January 14, 2007, ACA sent an email to the GS&amp;Co sales representative raising questions about the proposed transaction and referring to Paulson’s equity interest. The email, which had the subject line “Call with Fabrice [Tourre] on Friday,” read in pertinent part:  “I certainly hope I didn’t come across too antagonistic on the call with Fabrice [Tourre] last week but the structure looks difficult from a debt investor perspective. I can understand Paulson’s equity perspective but for us to put our name on something, we have to be sure it enhances our reputation.”

And then:

&quot;On January 16, 2007, the GS&amp;Co sales representative forwarded that email to Tourre. As of that date, Tourre knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that ACA had been misled into believing Paulson intended to invest in the equity of ABACUS 2007-AC1.&quot;

It&#039;s really slim at best.  Your interpretation of this is: &quot;it told ACA that Paulson had a long position in the deal when in fact he was entirely short.&quot;  

I cannot read this myself, merely that ACA seemed to believe that Paulson was going long and that Tourre was aware of that possibility, not that he misrepresented amything pro-actively.  Nuances matter.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I felt compelled to comment as I am surprised you use the allegations made by the SEC as proof rather than using the underlying evidence.  I read the complaints in depth and could not find much of a smoking gun.  </p>
<p>The crux of the case is based on the following:</p>
<p>&#8220;On January 12, 2007, Tourre spoke by telephone with ACA about the proposed transaction. Following that conversation, on January 14, 2007, ACA sent an email to the GS&amp;Co sales representative raising questions about the proposed transaction and referring to Paulson’s equity interest. The email, which had the subject line “Call with Fabrice [Tourre] on Friday,” read in pertinent part:  “I certainly hope I didn’t come across too antagonistic on the call with Fabrice [Tourre] last week but the structure looks difficult from a debt investor perspective. I can understand Paulson’s equity perspective but for us to put our name on something, we have to be sure it enhances our reputation.”</p>
<p>And then:</p>
<p>&#8220;On January 16, 2007, the GS&amp;Co sales representative forwarded that email to Tourre. As of that date, Tourre knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that ACA had been misled into believing Paulson intended to invest in the equity of ABACUS 2007-AC1.&#8221;</p>
<p>It&#8217;s really slim at best.  Your interpretation of this is: &#8220;it told ACA that Paulson had a long position in the deal when in fact he was entirely short.&#8221;  </p>
<p>I cannot read this myself, merely that ACA seemed to believe that Paulson was going long and that Tourre was aware of that possibility, not that he misrepresented amything pro-actively.  Nuances matter.</p>
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		<title>By: leungsite</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/comment-page-1/#comment-13598</link>
		<dc:creator>leungsite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 17 Apr 2010 07:24:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=3431#comment-13598</guid>
		<description>Removing a golden egg from a chicken (client) and chicken never dies. How lucky is GS, winning either way by shedding undisclosed risks onto customers. Now is the time for retribution.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Removing a golden egg from a chicken (client) and chicken never dies. How lucky is GS, winning either way by shedding undisclosed risks onto customers. Now is the time for retribution.</p>
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		<title>By: longandshort</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/comment-page-1/#comment-13595</link>
		<dc:creator>longandshort</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 17 Apr 2010 06:16:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=3431#comment-13595</guid>
		<description>robertwaldman,

Your arson/insurance scenario is flawed. Neither Paulson nor GS caused the defaults on the loans backing the securities issued by Abacus.

Your analogy would work if GS or Paulson somehow forced those homeowners into not making payments or lied about the composition of the collateral making up the CDO.  All Paulson had was an idea that these sub prime mortgages would go under (based on public information)

The investors in those CDO tranches had full access to the collateral information  and knew explictly (it is stated in the Abacus pitch book) that GS and its affiliates were purchasing CDS protection on those tranches.

Instead, unlike Paulson, investors buying the tranches relied on S&amp;P and ACA.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>robertwaldman,</p>
<p>Your arson/insurance scenario is flawed. Neither Paulson nor GS caused the defaults on the loans backing the securities issued by Abacus.</p>
<p>Your analogy would work if GS or Paulson somehow forced those homeowners into not making payments or lied about the composition of the collateral making up the CDO.  All Paulson had was an idea that these sub prime mortgages would go under (based on public information)</p>
<p>The investors in those CDO tranches had full access to the collateral information  and knew explictly (it is stated in the Abacus pitch book) that GS and its affiliates were purchasing CDS protection on those tranches.</p>
<p>Instead, unlike Paulson, investors buying the tranches relied on S&amp;P and ACA.</p>
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		<title>By: samp3</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/comment-page-1/#comment-13593</link>
		<dc:creator>samp3</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 17 Apr 2010 05:28:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=3431#comment-13593</guid>
		<description>Agree with many of you on here (alea, doubleliability, nsp1, mistaken). Many things didn&#039;t seem to add up when I read the SEC complaint:

1) “On January 27, 2007, ACA met with a Paulson representative in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, and they discussed the proposed transaction and reference portfolio.” (Goldman wasn&#039;t even at the meeting)

2) “Had ACA been aware that Paulson was taking a short position against the CDO, ACA would have been reluctant to allow Paulson to occupy an influential role in the selection of the reference portfolio.&quot; (hindsight is 20/20)

3) “In sum, GS&amp;Co arranged a trasaction at Paulson’s request in which Paulson heavily influenced the selection of the portfolio to suit its economic interests.&quot; (isn&#039;t this why most clients come to Goldman?)

4) “Although the marketing materials for ABACUS 2007-AC1 made no mention of Paulson or its role in the transaction, internal GS&amp;Co communications clearly identified Paulson, its economic interests, and its role in the transaction.” (Goldman generally doesn&#039;t disclose the activities of one client to another client on the opposite side of a trade)

5) “According to an internal GS&amp;Co memorandum ot the Goldman Sachs Mortgage Capital Committee (“MCC”) dated March 12, 2007. . .&quot; (committees generally aren&#039;t approving deals if they think that they&#039;re going to end up defrauding clients)

5) “This synthetic CDO. . .was structured and marketed by GS&amp;Co in early 2007 when the United States housing market and related securities were beginning to show signs of distress.  Synthetic CDOs like ABACUS 2007-AC1 contributed to the recent financial crisis by magnifying losses associated with the downturn in the United States housing market.”  (irrelevant, particularly since nobody knew this at the time)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Agree with many of you on here (alea, doubleliability, nsp1, mistaken). Many things didn&#8217;t seem to add up when I read the SEC complaint:</p>
<p>1) “On January 27, 2007, ACA met with a Paulson representative in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, and they discussed the proposed transaction and reference portfolio.” (Goldman wasn&#8217;t even at the meeting)</p>
<p>2) “Had ACA been aware that Paulson was taking a short position against the CDO, ACA would have been reluctant to allow Paulson to occupy an influential role in the selection of the reference portfolio.&#8221; (hindsight is 20/20)</p>
<p>3) “In sum, GS&amp;Co arranged a trasaction at Paulson’s request in which Paulson heavily influenced the selection of the portfolio to suit its economic interests.&#8221; (isn&#8217;t this why most clients come to Goldman?)</p>
<p>4) “Although the marketing materials for ABACUS 2007-AC1 made no mention of Paulson or its role in the transaction, internal GS&amp;Co communications clearly identified Paulson, its economic interests, and its role in the transaction.” (Goldman generally doesn&#8217;t disclose the activities of one client to another client on the opposite side of a trade)</p>
<p>5) “According to an internal GS&amp;Co memorandum ot the Goldman Sachs Mortgage Capital Committee (“MCC”) dated March 12, 2007. . .&#8221; (committees generally aren&#8217;t approving deals if they think that they&#8217;re going to end up defrauding clients)</p>
<p>5) “This synthetic CDO. . .was structured and marketed by GS&amp;Co in early 2007 when the United States housing market and related securities were beginning to show signs of distress.  Synthetic CDOs like ABACUS 2007-AC1 contributed to the recent financial crisis by magnifying losses associated with the downturn in the United States housing market.”  (irrelevant, particularly since nobody knew this at the time)</p>
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		<title>By: robertwaldmann</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/comment-page-1/#comment-13590</link>
		<dc:creator>robertwaldmann</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 17 Apr 2010 04:52:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=3431#comment-13590</guid>
		<description>This reminds me of a debate we once had via AOL IM. Note that the scam wouldn&#039;t work if cash settlement CDS contracts were not enforceable so that only physical settlement CDS contracts are ever signed.  IIRC we agreed that this would be a good reform.  Why hasn&#039;t any legislature even considered it ?

I&#039;d consider the scam to be the financial analog of arson.  To understand what went wrong and what can be done to prevent it, go straight North from Wall Street. The reason arson is not as profitable as it used to be in New York City is that the city is effectively preventing people from over insuring buildings so that they profit if the buildings burn (many of those buildings burned).  

Once upon a time, long long ago, CDSs were physical settlement CDSs -- if one had the instrument in default and the CDS the CDS writer made you whole.  If you had just the CDS, you had a piece of paper (OK a bytes on a hard disk -- it wasn&#039;t that long long ago).  

Then people who bet that a firm would go bankrupt by buying naked CDSs discovered that the firms bonds were sellign for 100 cents on the dollar, because so many people owned naked CDSs.  For some reason this was considered to be a problem and so now you can buy a CDS to insure against a loss on an instrument which you don&#039;t own.

Oddly, some such instruments were designed to default.  Who could have guessed ?  If only physical settlement CDSs were allowed, this scam wouldn&#039;t have worked.  

So what is the useful social role of cash settlement CDSs ?  Why is the rule for all other insurance contracts not applied to CDSs ?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This reminds me of a debate we once had via AOL IM. Note that the scam wouldn&#8217;t work if cash settlement CDS contracts were not enforceable so that only physical settlement CDS contracts are ever signed.  IIRC we agreed that this would be a good reform.  Why hasn&#8217;t any legislature even considered it ?</p>
<p>I&#8217;d consider the scam to be the financial analog of arson.  To understand what went wrong and what can be done to prevent it, go straight North from Wall Street. The reason arson is not as profitable as it used to be in New York City is that the city is effectively preventing people from over insuring buildings so that they profit if the buildings burn (many of those buildings burned).  </p>
<p>Once upon a time, long long ago, CDSs were physical settlement CDSs &#8212; if one had the instrument in default and the CDS the CDS writer made you whole.  If you had just the CDS, you had a piece of paper (OK a bytes on a hard disk &#8212; it wasn&#8217;t that long long ago).  </p>
<p>Then people who bet that a firm would go bankrupt by buying naked CDSs discovered that the firms bonds were sellign for 100 cents on the dollar, because so many people owned naked CDSs.  For some reason this was considered to be a problem and so now you can buy a CDS to insure against a loss on an instrument which you don&#8217;t own.</p>
<p>Oddly, some such instruments were designed to default.  Who could have guessed ?  If only physical settlement CDSs were allowed, this scam wouldn&#8217;t have worked.  </p>
<p>So what is the useful social role of cash settlement CDSs ?  Why is the rule for all other insurance contracts not applied to CDSs ?</p>
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		<title>By: JamesPerly</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/comment-page-1/#comment-13578</link>
		<dc:creator>JamesPerly</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 17 Apr 2010 01:17:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=3431#comment-13578</guid>
		<description>This is good discussion but I really wanted to add something:
I think that the real story here is reputation - never mind the kind of follow up lawsuits we will see (including foreigners and anyone else who got screwed in these kinds of deals). Even if Goldman wins, if no-one does deals with them any more (or only at a hefty risk premium) they may go into a death spiral.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is good discussion but I really wanted to add something:<br />
I think that the real story here is reputation &#8211; never mind the kind of follow up lawsuits we will see (including foreigners and anyone else who got screwed in these kinds of deals). Even if Goldman wins, if no-one does deals with them any more (or only at a hefty risk premium) they may go into a death spiral.</p>
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		<title>By: nsp1</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/comment-page-1/#comment-13575</link>
		<dc:creator>nsp1</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 16 Apr 2010 23:46:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=3431#comment-13575</guid>
		<description>In a CDO, the seller goes short and the buyer goes long.  In fact this is pretty much true not just of a CDO but any security. I think both ACA and IKB might have picked up on this.  ACA and IKB may also have been noticed the assets going into the structure given the risks they were taking.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In a CDO, the seller goes short and the buyer goes long.  In fact this is pretty much true not just of a CDO but any security. I think both ACA and IKB might have picked up on this.  ACA and IKB may also have been noticed the assets going into the structure given the risks they were taking.</p>
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