Comments on: Why sell-side analysts are wrong http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/06/21/why-sell-side-analysts-are-wrong/ A slice of lime in the soda Sun, 26 Oct 2014 19:05:02 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=4.2.5 By: anon242 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/06/21/why-sell-side-analysts-are-wrong/comment-page-1/#comment-16100 Wed, 23 Jun 2010 05:05:47 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=4347#comment-16100 In any worst-case scenario that wipes out BP shareholders, it may be foolhardy to think that bondholders would be spared. If things got that bad, the niceties of settled law would fare no better than they did in the GM and Chrysler bankruptcies.

There is considerable political risk here: in effect, there is no such thing as senior debt of BP. New equity in a post-bankruptcy BP would be handed to fishermen and other “stakeholders”, not to “greedy speculators” like yourself.

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By: wcw http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/06/21/why-sell-side-analysts-are-wrong/comment-page-1/#comment-16073 Mon, 21 Jun 2010 21:00:51 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=4347#comment-16073 If you think this disaster is not going to wipe out BP bondholders, by all means buy their paper (full disclosure: I have been). But don’t kid yourself in equating the company with Exxon. Ask some people who’ve been around the industry for a few decades how people view the two. They’re.. different.

If you’re going to plunge in on the equity side, by all means, put your money where your analysis leads you. I would consider what the common is really worth under a bad-but-not-unthinkable Gulf scenario, though. In a mostly unrelated piece, Russell Napier wrote last year that “[e]quities are the fine sliver of hope between assets and liabilities.” If liabilities start balloon enough, they can extinguish it.

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By: DanHess http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/06/21/why-sell-side-analysts-are-wrong/comment-page-1/#comment-16072 Mon, 21 Jun 2010 20:45:26 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=4347#comment-16072 Some points:

(1)
Unlike with say Goldman Sachs, BP’s product is 0% reputational. Theirs is an essential commodity and 100% of their inventory will always be sold. The Air Force bought BP oil to fly Obama down so he could yell at BP. How is that for a captive market?

(2)
Managements come and go. There is a mean-reverting aspect to it. Do you think the next management at BP will be better or worse than current management?

(3)
After years of sorting things out in the courts, Exxon’s final tab including all damages in re the Valdez was in the low single digit billions. This is certainly bigger, but not boundless. The relief wells are considered nearly certain to work eventually and in any case all gushers peter out gradually.

(4)
BP so far has rolled over and paid up nicely, for PR reasons and because they are in a strong financial position. But if their backs were against a wall, they have a lot of options. They have chosed to be complaint rather than combative. Things they haven’t done but could include suing their drilling partners for their share, fighting for enforcement of the controlling law that limits their liability and fighting individual claims in court. They could also detach their US subsidary and bring the fight to Britain, where opinions are 180 degrees different what they are here.

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By: Curmudgeon http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/06/21/why-sell-side-analysts-are-wrong/comment-page-1/#comment-16066 Mon, 21 Jun 2010 18:54:23 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=4347#comment-16066 Dan, you’re still thinking what it’s going to cost to clean up. I’m offering the hypothesis that the cost to BP’s market cap may be greater than just the cost of cleaning up the spill. Some of that is known at this time, and some is unknown (such as long-term health problems that may be traced back to the spill, or higher borrowing costs because of lower credit ratings). Some may be intangible (such as brand power, or quality of management) but reflected in a depressed value for a long time.

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By: DanHess http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/06/21/why-sell-side-analysts-are-wrong/comment-page-1/#comment-16065 Mon, 21 Jun 2010 18:38:52 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=4347#comment-16065 @Curmudgeon, so are you saying that $200 billion is a reasonable amount for BP to be spending on this?

BP’s cost in this thing so far has been about $2 billion. That includes “the cost of the spill response, containment, relief well drilling, grants to the Gulf states, claims paid, and federal costs”.
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06 -21/bp-falls-as-cost-of-oil-spill-reache s-2-billion-update1-.html

So you really think BP might be only about 1% of the way through the costs of this? Okey doke…

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By: dWj http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/06/21/why-sell-side-analysts-are-wrong/comment-page-1/#comment-16063 Mon, 21 Jun 2010 17:45:49 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=4347#comment-16063 “Why was Wall Street so very bullish on the stock even as it was being pummeled in the markets?”

Felix once again can’t let go of his beliefs in the EMH.

I like Curmudgeons analysis. I also like Dan’s analysis, though I’d note to Dan that XOM is largely thought to be better at long-term management than BP, and that current events aren’t the entirety of the risk premium you’re looking at. Even at current prices, this is a risky stock, and while I could imagine someone responsibly buying it (for reasons Dan gives), I certainly don’t think anyone should be loading up on it. If you like to keep a small portion of your portfolio in higher-risk plays, BP, the old widows-and-orphans dividend stock, has moved to that chunk of your portfolio. Keep the rent money somewhere else.

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By: Curmudgeon http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/06/21/why-sell-side-analysts-are-wrong/comment-page-1/#comment-16061 Mon, 21 Jun 2010 17:10:38 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=4347#comment-16061 Dan, you’re doing the same sort of analysis that Felix ascribes to the sell-side analysts – it can’t possibly cost $200 billion to clean this up. The problem with that thinking is that the bottom is still unknown, and will be unknown for a long time. What happens if the relief wells fail? What happens if health or environmental risks come from an unexpected direction? What happens if Tony Hayward organizes his next regatta in Mobile? It’s not clean-up costs the market is pricing, but unknowns. I can’t say you’re wrong, but I’m not willing to bet money that you’re right.

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By: ottorock http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/06/21/why-sell-side-analysts-are-wrong/comment-page-1/#comment-16060 Mon, 21 Jun 2010 16:38:29 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=4347#comment-16060 “Sell-side analysts live in mediocristan, and are prone to being blindsided by the unexpected; they almost never, for instance, recommend negative-carry trades. Investors, if they’re any good, know this. No one ever made money by blindly following sell-side advice, and so we should hardly be surprised that people whose position coincided with the sell-side consensus ended up losing a lot.”

Agreed.

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By: DanHess http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/06/21/why-sell-side-analysts-are-wrong/comment-page-1/#comment-16059 Mon, 21 Jun 2010 16:10:53 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=4347#comment-16059 BP is full of problems, but they are priced for doomsday.

BP has nearly the same revenue as ExxonMobil, about the same earnings, and about the same cash flow. Meanwhile, BP has a market cap under $100 billion, while ExxonMobil has a market cap of about $300 billion.

So the market is pricing in a $200 billion or 2/3 handicap to BP. Isn’t that a little bit much?

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