Comments on: Otiose shareholder of the day, B&N edition http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/09/30/otiose-shareholder-of-the-day-bn-edition/ A slice of lime in the soda Sun, 26 Oct 2014 19:05:02 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=4.2.5 By: Derrida http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/09/30/otiose-shareholder-of-the-day-bn-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-18948 Fri, 01 Oct 2010 14:35:59 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=5574#comment-18948 In all probability, these votes represented ETF shares, and State Street’s voting was determined by some very complex interests. I’ve voted a lot of these, and they can be done over the phone or via Internet, weeks in advance. If State Street was representing multiple voting blocks, they could have processed them as the decisions came in. However, considering that they were voted consistently across all the shares, it does not appear that they were polling the holders to determine the vote.

If they were ETF shares, State Street likely would not vote something egregiously anti-shareholder, but it also doesn’t want to get in between two powerful interests that may try and make their lives difficult. My best guess for the strange split, late vote was that State Street was trying to vote whoever was winning, was unable to get a proxy tally until the start of the meeting (as it is highly material, inside info), got a close tally, and then rushed to put in a split ticket, too late to count. They might have been sued if they did not attempt to vote at all, but this gave them some cover.

The growth of ETFs = the death of shareholder democracy.

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By: bklawyer http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/09/30/otiose-shareholder-of-the-day-bn-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-18926 Thu, 30 Sep 2010 17:03:00 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=5574#comment-18926 The problems with the voting system for equities are explained very well in Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 Georgetown Law Journal 1227 (2008).

Available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?a bstract_id=1007065

Abstract:

Never has voting been more important in corporate law. With greater activism among shareholders and the shift from plurality to majority voting for directors, the number of close votes is rising. But is the basic technology of corporate voting adequate to the task? In this Article, we first examine the incredibly complicated system of US corporate voting, a complexity that is driven by the underlying custodial ownership structure, by dispersed ownership and large trading volumes, and by the rise in short-selling and derivatives. We identify three ways in which things predictably go wrong: pathologies of complexity; pathologies of ownership; and pathologies of misalignment of interests. We then discuss the current legal treatment of these pathologies and consider a variety of directions for reform, ranging from incremental modifications to fundamental redesign. We show that, absent a fundamental reconstruction of the ownership structure, the existing system will continue to be noisy, imprecise and disturbingly opaque. The problems with the existing system pose fundamental challenges for both proponents of direct shareholder democracy, who advocate more extensive voting rights for shareholders, and for proponents of indirect shareholder democracy, who advocate deference to a board of directors the legitimacy of which ultimately also rests on shareholder elections.

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By: AABender1 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/09/30/otiose-shareholder-of-the-day-bn-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-18915 Thu, 30 Sep 2010 12:42:57 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=5574#comment-18915 Gennitydo brings up an important issue here.

Felix notes that “State Street contrived to vote its shares late.” It probably was no contrivance. It was endemic to the outdated shareholder/bondholder registration system. And this outmoded system has shaped how stock Custodians (and bond Trustees) define their obligations of timeliness, among other things.

But more to the point, there is a terrible inefficiency in our “modern” US shareholder/bondholder vote collection and delivery mechanism. Custodians not only have non-U.S. institutions to deal with, but also may go through one or more U.S. sub-custodian chains (with medallion stamps or other verification mechanisms), operations departments of financial or other institutions, and numerous additional links in the delivery chain before getting a response from the qualified decision-maker which, many times, may be more than one person or a committee. I would bet State Street hasn’t a clue who the ultimate real decision maker is. Nor are they required to. So it’s not their problem.

And what is true for stock custodians is also true for bond indenture Trustees: think about trying to process a vote on a subprime CDO or on a pooled bank trust preferred. Doesn’t happen very often. The voting requirements are too cumbersome. And you wonder why mortgage securitizations have left bondholders and servicers paralyzed to act in their best interest to clear the market? The financial engineering got way ahead of the physical/legal plumbing used for voting.

So we should worry about and try to correct the egregiously outmoded manner in which votes relating to corporate governance are processed. And it is not trivial. Forget about hanging chads and rigged voting machines. This system is ripe for all sorts of vote tampering. In the BN case, it probably gave the incumbents a significant edge.

Voting one’s economic interests in important governance and resource allocation decisions is a critical assumption of well-functioning capitalism.

And an outmoded voting system means that gaming the voting process outweighs managing the substance of governance in too many cases.

Is that really how we want corporate managers, shareholders and bondholders spending their time and resources–figuratively stuffing ballot boxes?

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By: Gennitydo http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/09/30/otiose-shareholder-of-the-day-bn-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-18910 Thu, 30 Sep 2010 07:43:57 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=5574#comment-18910 Felix, I am reasonably certain State Street is acting as custodian for a number of different beneficial owners. Afterall, that is their principal business. They voted several ways on behalf of different underlying investors. They were late because it takes a long time to send the information down the custody chain and then send the voting instructions back up the custody chain especially if the holdings are cross-border which is quite likely as State Street acts as custodian for many non-US institutions.

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By: absinthe http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/09/30/otiose-shareholder-of-the-day-bn-edition/comment-page-1/#comment-18907 Thu, 30 Sep 2010 05:50:36 +0000 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=5574#comment-18907 You’re missing a piece. It’s not enough to say that the vote was close and that they had a big share. You should also argue that they actually have some preference between the outcomes.

Ego fights like this only matter if you have an opinion about the relative competence of the combatants. Is it obvious State Street should have had a preference here?

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