Opinion

Felix Salmon

Political appointees and the revolving door

By Felix Salmon
January 7, 2011

Justin Fox has a smart piece on the revolving door today. “There doesn’t have to be a problem with a revolving door between government jobs and non-government jobs,” he writes, and indeed the movement back and forth between the public and the private sector “has for most of the nation’s history been more strength than weakness.” The problem, he says, is specific to Wall Street, which pays so much better than any other area of the economy.

With that kind of pay differential, Wall Street inevitably begins to emit a giant sucking sound as it hoovers up smart, self-interested people. This is apparent at top business schools, in physics Ph.D programs — and in Washington, where smart out-of-office (or just burned-out) government officials who want to secure their family’s financial future before either retiring or heading back into public service now flock to Wall Street jobs. Larry Summers did. Rahm Emanuel did too. John Snow did. Bill Daley did. Phil Gramm did. Harold Ford Jr. did. Peter Orszag is doing it. Heck, I’d probably do it if I were in their shoes. Gene Sperling, to be fair, didn’t go so far as to become a banker. But on the whole, if you believe that people respond to economic incentives, you have to believe that Wall Street’s artificially high pay scales have come to have a big impact on decisionmaking in Washington — and that this is an unhealthy development for our democracy and our economy. So making a stink over Sperling’s Goldman paychecks is, under the circumstances, a perfectly appropriate thing to do.

It is is also, of course, a mostly ineffectual thing to do. He’s got the job. But now that he’s got it, maybe he should try to figure out what to do about the chasm between Wall Street pay and compensation in the rest of the economy.

But there’s the rub. Government is perfectly capable, were it so inclined, of shrinking the financial sector and making it much less profitable. Banks could become highly-regulated utilities, bonus culture could be eradicated, hedge funds would no longer be exempt from SEC rules about transparency and investor protection, private-equity honchos would have to pay income tax on their income, leverage would be discouraged in the tax code by eradicating the tax-deductibility of interest, and so on and so forth. The economy might lose a bit of possible debt-fueled upside, but it would be much less fragile and much less prone to banking crises.

If that happened, then the huge gap between what people earn on Wall Street and what they earn everywhere else would disappear: we’d be back in the 1970s, essentially, when the best and brightest went into all manner of different industries.

But it’s not going to happen, because the public servants who could enact such a change currently have the ability to earn millions of dollars per year when they leave DC. Government work pays well, but not that well. The real value of a government position, especially in the economic team, is in the marginal net present value of all those juicy future earnings that you’ll be offered upon your departure from the administration. And so any reforms aimed at shrinking the financial sector would do massive damage to the economic health of the reformers themselves. And those reformers are wonks, remember: precisely the kind of people who consider probability-weighted future earnings to be genuinely valuable things.

In that sense, the revolving door is arguably less distasteful when it swings the other way, from Wall Street to Washington. People like Hank Paulson or Bill Daley have already made their Wall Street millions, and so the marginal net present value, to them, of taking a government job is probably negative. The problem in these cases is that after so many years on Wall Street these people have internalized the worldview of the financial sector, where banks create value and bonuses are great and what’s good for Goldman Sachs is good for America. They’re not going to gut the very system which was so good to them. (Although in rare cases they’ll tinker at the margin, as Gary Gensler is doing at the CFTC.)

One solution here, I think, is to radically reduce the number of political appointees in the economic team. It’s impossible to have a successful career at Treasury or the NEC, because all the top jobs are political: when the president changes, especially when there’s a change of party, all the old appointees get kicked out. As such, every senior appointee is always going to have, in the back of their head, the question of what they might do next. It’s not a question we really want them to have, since right now Wall Street is always going to be on everybody’s shortlist.

Comments
6 comments so far | RSS Comments RSS

We should all be thanking every respective deity that Hank Paulson was Treasury Secretary when this all hit as opposed to say Gordon Brown.

Posted by Danny_Black | Report as abusive
 

It appears from what I read that the finance sector used to be 7% and apparently now it is consideraly larger
?14%? But if the theory is that investment bankers allocate capital efficiently and effectively – well, it appears that theory has been shot to hell. Was giving loans to people for overpriced houses a good thing?
Is there any evidence that investment bankers are allocating capitcal any better than before?

Posted by fresnodan | Report as abusive
 

Danny_Black This old URL works so much better then anything I might say.

http://trueslant.com/matttaibbi/2009/06/ 08/mean-street-it’s-time-to-enshrine-h ank-paulson-as-national-hero-deal-journ

Posted by hsvkitty | Report as abusive
 

Investment bankers enable (and feed off) the flow of capital. The efficiency depends on the owners of the capital.

hsvkitty, read up on the court decision out of Massachusetts today. A bunch of foreclosures are thrown into question on procedural grounds.

The banks are starting to pay for their sloppiness, and I doubt we have seen the last of it yet.

Posted by TFF | Report as abusive
 

So you either need to spend time on Wall Street to afford political office, but by the time you arrive think Wall Street is so ace you won’t do anything to touch it or are in political office and counting the days til you get the Wall street gravy so have no reason to touch it either?

Not quite catch 22, but it does suggest there are deeply incentivised structures in-place that are going to continue distorting US economic and social policy making for the long-term.

As for Hank Paulson vs Gordon Brown re: the Danny Black post, yeah right. Gordo wiped Hank’s ass after the Lehman Bros policy catastrophe.

Posted by zinkus | Report as abusive
 

The reverse revolving door has not worked out well for middle class constituents of the 5th Congressional District. Our Conressman, Jim Himes, was formerly with Goldman Sachs. After making his piles of cash, he went to work for an affordable housing non-profit. This made him look very attractive to Democratic regulars like myself. After getting elected, however, he joined the corporate friendly New Democrats coalition and became a tool for corporate interests. You can’t get a constituent meeting with him now, guess you have to be a hedge fund manager or a lobbyist to get his attention.

Posted by SARABELLE10 | Report as abusive
 

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