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	<title>Comments on: Europe&#8217;s half-baked deal</title>
	<atom:link href="http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/27/europes-half-baked-deal/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/27/europes-half-baked-deal/</link>
	<description>A slice of lime in the soda</description>
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		<title>By: dWj</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/27/europes-half-baked-deal/comment-page-1/#comment-32474</link>
		<dc:creator>dWj</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 28 Oct 2011 03:01:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=10758#comment-32474</guid>
		<description>They should borrow the $750 billion from French banks.  This would reduce the transfers involved, not to mention the ultimate counterparty risk.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>They should borrow the $750 billion from French banks.  This would reduce the transfers involved, not to mention the ultimate counterparty risk.</p>
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		<title>By: Auros</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/27/europes-half-baked-deal/comment-page-1/#comment-32452</link>
		<dc:creator>Auros</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2011 21:19:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=10758#comment-32452</guid>
		<description>The idea of the Fed being broke is kinda laughable.  As long as they&#039;re willing to tolerate somewhat higher inflation (which arguably would be a good thing -- www.interfluidity.com/v2/2347.html ), the Fed can have as many dollars as it damn well pleases.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The idea of the Fed being broke is kinda laughable.  As long as they&#8217;re willing to tolerate somewhat higher inflation (which arguably would be a good thing &#8212; <a href='http://www.interfluidity.com/v2/2347.html'>http://www.interfluidity.com/v2/2347.htm l</a> ), the Fed can have as many dollars as it damn well pleases.</p>
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		<title>By: johnhhaskell</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/27/europes-half-baked-deal/comment-page-1/#comment-32450</link>
		<dc:creator>johnhhaskell</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2011 19:52:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=10758#comment-32450</guid>
		<description>Fbreughel1: Felix&#039;s comments about how difficult the ECB found it to buy Spanish and Italian debt are 100% correct.  Also, the Fed is not broke.  It actually has plenty of dollars.  Try to pay attention.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Fbreughel1: Felix&#8217;s comments about how difficult the ECB found it to buy Spanish and Italian debt are 100% correct.  Also, the Fed is not broke.  It actually has plenty of dollars.  Try to pay attention.</p>
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		<title>By: alea</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/27/europes-half-baked-deal/comment-page-1/#comment-32442</link>
		<dc:creator>alea</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2011 17:38:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=10758#comment-32442</guid>
		<description>@KidDynamite:
Yes, AIG had a massive NET exposure, non-collateralized (until the downgrade) and was THE only market for certain types of CDS. 
The EU situation has nothing to do with that, the NET is very small (vs total bonds outstanding), collateralized and (relatively) liquid.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@KidDynamite:<br />
Yes, AIG had a massive NET exposure, non-collateralized (until the downgrade) and was THE only market for certain types of CDS.<br />
The EU situation has nothing to do with that, the NET is very small (vs total bonds outstanding), collateralized and (relatively) liquid.</p>
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		<title>By: KidDynamite</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/27/europes-half-baked-deal/comment-page-1/#comment-32439</link>
		<dc:creator>KidDynamite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2011 17:27:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=10758#comment-32439</guid>
		<description>@Alea - thanks for the other reply. I think that one problem us non-CDS experts have here is that we think of AIG 2008 - and the problems arising there - but this Euro situation is very much NOT like that, right? In other words, with AIG, the NET exposures were massive - the banks all bought protection, and AIG sold it to them...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@Alea &#8211; thanks for the other reply. I think that one problem us non-CDS experts have here is that we think of AIG 2008 &#8211; and the problems arising there &#8211; but this Euro situation is very much NOT like that, right? In other words, with AIG, the NET exposures were massive &#8211; the banks all bought protection, and AIG sold it to them&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: KidDynamite</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/27/europes-half-baked-deal/comment-page-1/#comment-32438</link>
		<dc:creator>KidDynamite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2011 17:25:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=10758#comment-32438</guid>
		<description>@Alea - let me ask you a simpler question:  if the NET CDS exposure is under $4B, then that implies that the current market setup was NOT a lot of parties who bought and hedged (with CDS) Greek debt, right?  

and the next step is to conclude (which I think is your point), that this voluntary exchange not triggering a CDS credit event is not a big deal and is being blown out of proportion in a big way.

am I on the right track now?

thanks in advance...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@Alea &#8211; let me ask you a simpler question:  if the NET CDS exposure is under $4B, then that implies that the current market setup was NOT a lot of parties who bought and hedged (with CDS) Greek debt, right?  </p>
<p>and the next step is to conclude (which I think is your point), that this voluntary exchange not triggering a CDS credit event is not a big deal and is being blown out of proportion in a big way.</p>
<p>am I on the right track now?</p>
<p>thanks in advance&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: alea</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/27/europes-half-baked-deal/comment-page-1/#comment-32437</link>
		<dc:creator>alea</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2011 17:22:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=10758#comment-32437</guid>
		<description>Gross positions irrelevant. Read this:
&quot;Net notional positions generally represent the maximum possible net funds transfers between net sellers of protection and net buyers of protection that could be required upon the occurrence of a credit event relating to particular reference entities.&quot;  http://www.dtcc.com/downloads/products/derivserv/tiw_data_explanation.pdf</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Gross positions irrelevant. Read this:<br />
&#8220;Net notional positions generally represent the maximum possible net funds transfers between net sellers of protection and net buyers of protection that could be required upon the occurrence of a credit event relating to particular reference entities.&#8221;  <a href='http://www.dtcc.com/downloads/products/derivserv/tiw_data_explanation.pdf'>http://www.dtcc.com/downloads/products/d erivserv/tiw_data_explanation.pdf</a></p>
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		<title>By: KidDynamite</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/27/europes-half-baked-deal/comment-page-1/#comment-32436</link>
		<dc:creator>KidDynamite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2011 17:15:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=10758#comment-32436</guid>
		<description>@Alea - I saw that $3.7B number... but the gross number is $75B. Something is hurting my brain thinking about how we can&#039;t just ignore that here when thinking about incentives of the parties involved. ???

and yes, I did read this:

http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2011/10/27/713826/how-gross-and-net-cds-notionals-really-work/</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@Alea &#8211; I saw that $3.7B number&#8230; but the gross number is $75B. Something is hurting my brain thinking about how we can&#8217;t just ignore that here when thinking about incentives of the parties involved. ???</p>
<p>and yes, I did read this:</p>
<p><a href='http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2011/10/27/713826/how-gross-and-net-cds-notionals-really-work/'>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2011/10/ 27/713826/how-gross-and-net-cds-notional s-really-work/</a></p>
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		<title>By: alea</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/27/europes-half-baked-deal/comment-page-1/#comment-32432</link>
		<dc:creator>alea</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2011 17:00:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=10758#comment-32432</guid>
		<description>@KidDynamite:
The CDS position is not significant, the net notional is only $3.7 bln  and even if 100% of that is covered by bonds (unlikely) and they don&#039;t participate in the restructuring it doesn&#039;t matter (we are talking €205 bln float for the restructuring). But as far as the CDS is concerned, Greece has not defaulted yet, and no restructuring has occurred yet, it will take months before the restructuring is effective and since it&#039;s not mandatory, it won&#039;t be a credit event.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@KidDynamite:<br />
The CDS position is not significant, the net notional is only $3.7 bln  and even if 100% of that is covered by bonds (unlikely) and they don&#8217;t participate in the restructuring it doesn&#8217;t matter (we are talking €205 bln float for the restructuring). But as far as the CDS is concerned, Greece has not defaulted yet, and no restructuring has occurred yet, it will take months before the restructuring is effective and since it&#8217;s not mandatory, it won&#8217;t be a credit event.</p>
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		<title>By: FBreughel1</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/27/europes-half-baked-deal/comment-page-1/#comment-32431</link>
		<dc:creator>FBreughel1</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2011 16:55:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=10758#comment-32431</guid>
		<description>&quot;One place the money’s not coming from is the ECB, which found it hard enough just to keep on buying bonds from Spain and Italy&quot;

Euuh, Felix, you do know this the ECB represents the largest economy on earth, do you ? This is not the Fed (which is quite broke).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;One place the money’s not coming from is the ECB, which found it hard enough just to keep on buying bonds from Spain and Italy&#8221;</p>
<p>Euuh, Felix, you do know this the ECB represents the largest economy on earth, do you ? This is not the Fed (which is quite broke).</p>
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		<title>By: KidDynamite</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/27/europes-half-baked-deal/comment-page-1/#comment-32430</link>
		<dc:creator>KidDynamite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2011 16:45:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=10758#comment-32430</guid>
		<description>@Alea - so does it then stand to reason that anyone with a CDS position would not accept the restructuring offer?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@Alea &#8211; so does it then stand to reason that anyone with a CDS position would not accept the restructuring offer?</p>
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		<title>By: alea</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/27/europes-half-baked-deal/comment-page-1/#comment-32429</link>
		<dc:creator>alea</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2011 16:40:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=10758#comment-32429</guid>
		<description>@KidDynamite:
yes</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@KidDynamite:<br />
yes</p>
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		<title>By: KidDynamite</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/27/europes-half-baked-deal/comment-page-1/#comment-32424</link>
		<dc:creator>KidDynamite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2011 16:00:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=10758#comment-32424</guid>
		<description>@alea - what happens to you if you decline to restructure?

what if you&#039;re long greek bonds, and long CDS protection against it?  If I&#039;m understanding this correctly (a long shot), then you can keep your position, you do NOT collect on the CDS because it&#039;s not a credit event, but you CAN collect in the future when Greece actually defaults on the old debt that you didn&#039;t restructure?

???</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@alea &#8211; what happens to you if you decline to restructure?</p>
<p>what if you&#8217;re long greek bonds, and long CDS protection against it?  If I&#8217;m understanding this correctly (a long shot), then you can keep your position, you do NOT collect on the CDS because it&#8217;s not a credit event, but you CAN collect in the future when Greece actually defaults on the old debt that you didn&#8217;t restructure?</p>
<p>???</p>
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		<title>By: alea</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/27/europes-half-baked-deal/comment-page-1/#comment-32422</link>
		<dc:creator>alea</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2011 15:02:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=10758#comment-32422</guid>
		<description>&quot; But on the other hand, this does make a farce of the idea that credit default swaps constitute default protection, at least in the sovereign arena.&quot;
No, it doesn&#039;t, the CDS doesn&#039;t pay if the restructuring is not mandatory. RTFC.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8221; But on the other hand, this does make a farce of the idea that credit default swaps constitute default protection, at least in the sovereign arena.&#8221;<br />
No, it doesn&#8217;t, the CDS doesn&#8217;t pay if the restructuring is not mandatory. RTFC.</p>
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		<title>By: hariknaidu</title>
		<link>http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/27/europes-half-baked-deal/comment-page-1/#comment-32421</link>
		<dc:creator>hariknaidu</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2011 14:42:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/?p=10758#comment-32421</guid>
		<description>Your logic is politically naive and irresponsible - principally because I respect your views and analysis generally.

The bottom line, here, is that Dallarra was imposed upon by Ecofin Junker to accept it or forefit IIF banks bonds when Greece defaults!

Try to accept this as a faita compli!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Your logic is politically naive and irresponsible &#8211; principally because I respect your views and analysis generally.</p>
<p>The bottom line, here, is that Dallarra was imposed upon by Ecofin Junker to accept it or forefit IIF banks bonds when Greece defaults!</p>
<p>Try to accept this as a faita compli!</p>
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