The craven SEC, part 196
Edward Wyatt makes a very good point today — why is the SEC doing big favors for big banks, every time it slaps a fine on them?
If a bank settles a fraud case, it automatically loses certain privileges, like the ability to issue debt securities opportunistically, without going through laborious SEC filings, and the ability to shelter forward-looking statements against lawsuits from investors.
It’s worth noting here that no company has any kind of right to these privileges. If a company tells lies to investors, those investors should be able to sue it. And if a company wants to issue securities to the public, it’s the SEC’s job to examine the proposed offering first.
But somehow, along the way, a handful of very big companies — especially banks — managed to persuade the SEC that they were trustworthy corporate citizens, and that they didn’t need to be bound by those rules.
That’s a little bit suspicious just for starters. But it gets much worse. The SEC, quite naturally, put in place a policy which said that if any of those companies ended up being fined by the SEC for violation of securities laws, then it would lose its special privileges.
And then the SEC proceeded to ignore that policy.
An analysis by The New York Times of S.E.C. investigations over the last decade found nearly 350 instances where the agency has given big Wall Street institutions and other financial companies a pass on those or other sanctions. Those instances also include waivers permitting firms to underwrite certain stock and bond sales and manage mutual fund portfolios.
JPMorganChase, for example, has settled six fraud cases in the last 13 years, including one with a $228 million settlement last summer, but it has obtained at least 22 waivers, in part by arguing that it has “a strong record of compliance with securities laws.” Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, which merged in 2009, have settled 15 fraud cases and received at least 39 waivers.
Wherefore these waivers? Former SEC chairman David Ruder says that were it not for their privileges, these poor banks might have difficulty staying in business. Which, it seems to me, is a very good reason to remove those privileges. Too-big-to-fail banks should be rock-solid, with fortress balance sheets, able to withstand big and unexpected shocks. If their ability to operate as a going concern would be threatened by forcing them to comply with standard SEC regulations, then there’s something very wrong with them indeed, and they don’t deserve special waivers at all. Instead, they require extra-close scrutiny.
But in fact losing the privileges is not the end of the world for a bank. Look at Citigroup, which lost its privileges for three years in October 2010, and is certainly in poorer financial shape than, say, JP Morgan. It’s still chugging along quite happily, making a net profit of well over a billion dollars per quarter.
The SEC does seem to be far too cozy with America’s biggest banks, going soft on them when they commit fraud just because it fears for their livelihood if it gets tough. That’s wrong. America can live without big banks; what’s truly dangerous is a world where too-big-to-fail banks have de facto impunity and can do what they like. Right now, the fines banks pay to the SEC are like protection money: they pay a few million bucks here and there every so often, and in return get to continue doing whatever they like. It’s time the SEC put a stop to this. But I’m not holding my breath.