Opinion

Felix Salmon

How lucky are Greece’s bondholders?

By Felix Salmon
March 8, 2012

“Greece’s private creditors are the lucky ones,” says Nouriel Roubini — which I think is putting it a bit strongly. Nouriel — who at one point was one of the world’s foremost econobloggers — is falling back on bad habits here: he says that “a myth is developing” about the official sector getting off scot free in Greece, and goes on to tell us how “the argument runs”. But he doesn’t link to any such argument — and I’d dearly love to know who he has in mind, and what exactly they’re saying.

Nouriel then gives a good overview of the degree to which the official sector really is bailing out Greece. This is important to remember: just because bondholders are taking a haircut, doesn’t mean this isn’t a bailout. It is. Greece is running a massive budget deficit, even before interest payments on its debt. It can’t borrow the money to cover that deficit in the markets, either foreign or domestic. Which means that the only thing standing between Greece and bankruptcy is the Troika, throwing billions of dollars at the Greek government to avert insolvency. As Nouriel says, this should give the Troika seniority, on the grounds that they’re providing the equivalent of “debtor-in-possession” financing.

Nouriel’s attempts to paint the private sector’s 75% haircut as a good deal which is “too little”, however, are less convincing. He’s right that once Greece’s new bonds are issued under English law, the Greek government can’t unilaterally convert them to drachmas — or to worthless scrip, for that matter. But as Nouriel well knows, that’s a fact of life for countries of dubious creditworthiness: the markets are always suspicious when they try to issue under their own laws. If Greece wants to give anything of real value to its bondholders, then it has to offer bonds issued under English law, because no one will believe its promises to pay, otherwise.

Put it this way: someone in the Greek government genuinely intends that the country is actually going to make all of its payments on the new bonds. Insofar as the Greek government is believed with regard to that promise, the new bonds are going to have real market value. But in order for bondholders to be able to realize that value, the bonds have to be issued under English law. If Greece came out with exactly the same offer but kept the new bonds under Greek law, then the haircut would be substantially larger than 75%, because the new bonds would trade at a significantly lower price when issued. So the governing-law aspect to all this is already incorporated in the haircut, and by choosing English law, Greece is simply maximizing the value of its bonds without increasing its total indebtedness by a penny.

And this argument of Nouriel’s makes very little sense to me:

Greece’s private creditors should stop complaining and accept the deal offered to them. They will take some losses, but they are limited and, on a mark-to-market basis, the debt exchange offers them a potential capital gain. Indeed, the fact that the new bonds are expected to be worth more than the old suggests that this PSI exercise has further transferred losses to Greece’s official creditors.

The job of the market — which it normally does quite well — is to anticipate how big a Greek haircut is going to be, and then arbitrage Greece’s bonds appropriately, pricing them at a level such that bondholders tendering into the exchange wouldn’t be better off simply selling their bonds instead. (If they would be better off selling their bonds instead, then the buyer of those bonds is pretty stupid, and is going to end up making a loss.) So by definition, an exchange offer always offers “a potential capital gain” to bondholders, just because the market price before the exchange has to be a little bit lower than the expected value of the new securities after the exchange.

What’s more, Greece has to offer something, or else there won’t be an exchange at all, and instead there would just be a chaotic default which would be extremely damaging to all concerned. Already, the majority of the value in the package being offered bondholders is not coming from the new Greek bonds, but rather from European EFSF securities. The value of the new Greek bonds is only about 10 cents on the dollar — a 90% NPV haircut. It doesn’t get much bigger than that.

There are very good reasons why Greece would love to remain a member in good standing of the international community — not least that it wants to remain a member in good standing of the European Union, with Greek banks retaining most if not all of their current deposit base. As such, it has to take its bonded obligations reasonably seriously. The last thing it wants is protracted litigation with bondholders a la Argentina, where bondholders have recently been winning small but important victories in the US courts. Argentina is going to have to spend the foreseeable future being extremely careful with its sovereign holdings, for fear that they will otherwise be attached by its creditors. Greece doesn’t want to be an international pariah like that.

So while I’m shedding no tears for Greece’s bondholders, who took a risk which didn’t pan out, neither am I going to go as far as Nouriel and say that they’re getting a good deal. They’re not. They’re getting 25 cents on the dollar. Just imagine what would happen if Greece tried to make that kind of offer to other holders of sovereign obligations, like its pensioners.

Comments
4 comments so far | RSS Comments RSS

But Felix, the pensioners are getting the same deal.

“Majority of pension funds favour bond swap but six rule decide against”

http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-2012 0308-706624.html

Posted by a.soffronow | Report as abusive
 

“But Felix, the pensioners are getting the same deal.

“Majority of pension funds favour bond swap but six rule decide against””

I believe that by pensioners Felix means the retired Greek public servants who are getting pensions as opposed to Managers of Pension Funds.

But I have been wrong before.

Posted by Tom_Murphy | Report as abusive
 

Do you really think bonds issued under British law have more protection than Greek law? Maybe slightly, but the fact remains that no British court can foreclose on Greece. If Greece declares default, what good does the British connection really do? If the Greek law bondholders eventually get Drachma, the British law bondholders might not get even that if they annoy the Greek government with suits in British courts.

Posted by JayCM | Report as abusive
 

I read the piece in the FT and agree that it was largely missing the point. Greece is effectively using bondholders and the EU to finance its restructuring at a low cost. He is right that there is a transfer of debt to the public sector but this is only after current bondholders have essentially taken up most of the losses, so aside from the Greek government, which is saving billions of euros in debt costs, it is hardly to see any other winners. But the country is now rated D, which will rule out any provate sector financing (bonds or loans or funding swaps) at least for the next couple of years. The only thing that matters is if the CDS will be triggred, otherwise everyone and their brother will start dumbing their sovereign exposure.

Posted by Tseko | Report as abusive
 

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