Opinion

Felix Salmon

Counterparties: Privatizing AIG

Ben Walsh
Sep 10, 2012 20:55 UTC

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On August 23, the NY Fed successfully unloaded the last of its toxic AIG mortgage-backed securities. Now, the US Treasury is selling $18 billion of its AIG shares to the public, with an additional $2.7 billion available to cover investor demand. (Citi, Deutsche Bank, Goldman and JPMorgan are carrying Uncle Sam’s water as joint global coordinators.)

The sale will bring the government’s stake down from 53% to as low as 15%, as Damian Paletta, Erik Holm and Serena Ng write in the WSJ:

A near-exit by the government from one of the most controversial bailouts is both a significant accomplishment for the Obama administration and a sign of how far the markets have come in four years, thanks in part to the rescue of financial companies and the Fed’s efforts to support the economy by reducing interest rates.

But the sale could also renew complaints that Treasury still hasn’t outlined a concrete strategy for exiting other large financial-crisis investments… The government remains in the red on its investments in Fannie and Freddie, which have received $188 billion in taxpayer support. The US continues to hold sizable stakes in General Motors and Ally that it spent $68 billion on and may not fully recover.

As Jesse Eisinger noted last month, Treasury has been offloading shares in small banks by selling them back to the banks themselves, often at a discount. That trending is continuing, albeit in a different structure, with Treasury also announcing today it will sell shares in four small banks.

Dealbook’s Michael de la Merced notes that the “offering will take place during the heat of the electoral campaign, as the president seeks to defend the use of taxpayer money to save financial institutions like AIG”. Markets and AIG’s increasing financial stability also make the case for the Treasury’s timing. The S&P 500 is at its highest point since 2008, and even though AIG shares predictably slid on the news, they’re still up almost 45% this year. The company’s second quarter earnings were nearly double consensus as profit increased 27%; on top of that, it has managed to squirrel away $5 billion in cash to buy a portion of the government’s offering.

At $33 a share, the government will claim a profit from its overall break-even price of $28.73. The government will also be a significant step closer to putting the whole AIG episode, which in total amounted to some $182 billion in bailout funds, behind it. AIG can get back to more routine matters, like worrying about its soon-to-be regulator. – Ben Walsh

On to today’s links:

Must Read
Why health care matters and our current debt does not – St Louis Fed

Compelling
Paul Graham on why startup investing is like “Black swan farming” – Paul Graham

Regulations
Rogoff: Financial reforms have “mostly served as a patch to preserve the status quo” – Guardian
Because what we really need is slower, more deliberative financial reform – NYT

Popular Myths
“Everything people think they know about the stimulus is wrong” – WaPo

Remuneration
JPMorgan, Citi searching for the most politically palatable way to overpay their execs – WSJ

EU Mess
Angela Merkel is now suddenly willing to rescue Greece at all costs – Der Spiegel
The “cold douche begins” for Draghi’s bond plan – The Telegraph

New Normal
The “new oil well”: collecting the $1 trillion in outstanding student loan debt – NYT

Financial Arcana
“Spoilsport bank regulators ruin another derivative that was too beautiful to live” – Matt Levine

Politicking
Who would be left out of Romney’s pre-existing conditions plan? 89 million people – WaPo

Charts
The genealogy of New York City pizza – Braiker

UGH
Small businesses created “essentially zero” jobs in August – WaPo

Apple
The iPhone 5 could add half a point to 4th quarter GDP, JPMorgan says – JP Morgan

Alpha
Tim Geithner posted a respectable triathlon time this Sunday – WaPo

Poway: It’s not too late to unwind

Felix Salmon
Sep 7, 2012 21:22 UTC

Remember the Poway school district? They did a horrible bond deal, borrowing $105 million now and promising to repay a total of $981 million by the time 2051 rolls around. The deal was broken up into lots of tranches, none of which start paying back any money at all before 2033. The most egregious tranche of all was the longest one: a bond with an original principal amount of $13,986,037.80, which matures in 2051, when bondholders will receive a total of $321,740,000. That’s more than $22 of interest for every dollar borrowed today.

One of the most distasteful parts of the deal — whose prospectus can be found here — comes in a short and bold-faced single-sentence clause right at the front:

No Optional Redemption

The Series B Bonds are not subject to optional redemption prior to their fixed maturity dates.

In other words, Poway has no call option on these things, and now that they’re issued, it has no choice but to pay up the whole $321,740,000 in 2051.

But that doesn’t mean it’s too late to fix this mess. Matt Levine has an absolutely wonderful post up about SunTrust’s stake in Coca-Cola — a true marvel of clear, funny, approachable prose explaining highly-recondite concepts. In this case, SunTrust, a bank based in Atlanta, has agreed to sell off a stake in Coca-Cola which it has held since 1919. Even though, at least as far as US regulators are concerned, it already sold off that stake, back in 2008.

But the way that deal was structured, SunTrust got some but not all of the proceeds in 2008, and was still massively exposed to Coca-Cola shares: so long as the shares were worth more than $33 each (they’re now at $38), SunTrust was due another $14 per share between 2014 and 2015. And this deal, too, could not be undone. Here’s the language, from Levine’s footnote:

SunTrust generally may not prepay the Notes. The interest rate of the Notes will be reset upon or after the settlement of the Agreements, either through a remarketing process or based upon dealer quotations. In the event of an unsuccessful remarketing of the Notes, SunTrust would be required to collateralize the Notes and the maturity of the Notes may accelerate to the one year anniversary of the settlement of the Agreements. However, SunTrust presently believes that it is substantially certain that the Notes will be successfully remarked.

But in light of new regulations, SunTrust decided it that it did want to prepay the notes after all. And — guess what — it has found absolutely no difficulty in doing so.

And if SunTrust can prepay obscure and highly-illiquid equity-derivative instruments, you can be quite sure that Poway, if it put its mind to it, would be able to prepay some of those horrible 2051 bonds. One obvious way of doing so would be to just go out into the market and buy them: they’re trading pretty much at par, and my guess is that if they offered to pay say 105 cents on the dollar, they’d be able to buy back many if not most of the outstanding debt. Which is a hell of a better deal than paying back 2,300 cents on the dollar, which is what they’re currently contracted to do.

Since the details of this bond deal were made public, the San Diego population has reacted as you might expect — with no little outrage. They want the deal unwound. And although there’s nothing in the letter of the contract which makes that possible, a decent banker should be able to get them out of this dreadful obligation at relatively little expense. Especially compared to the cost of staying in it.

COMMENT

I agree with the basic idea here, which I take to be that this is lazy public financing. Zero coupon debt combined with a political desire to avoid current period taxation is a dangerous combination. However, I think that you are being somewhat misleading when you compare the zero coupon bond yields in the Poway structure to the spot treasury.

A 30 year treasury principal strip has a yield of about 3%, not 2.61% at the moment. Moreover, it sells for about $40.

Posted by Marked2Market | Report as abusive

Counterparties: Obama’s unemployment aphasia

Sep 7, 2012 20:56 UTC

Welcome to the Counterparties email. The sign-up page is here, it’s just a matter of checking a box if you’re already registered on the Reuters website. Send suggestions, story tips and complaints to Counterparties.Reuters@gmail.com

If you listened to President Obama’s speech on the final night of the Democratic National Convention, which clocked in at about 4,600 words, there were a number of words you didn’t hear. Chief among those omissions, Zeke Miller notes, is the most important issue for at least 12.5 million Americans: unemployment.

In a speech that the pundit class largely saw as safe — even a bit boringMatt Yglesias found no mentions of aggregate demand, fiscal stimulus, monetary policy or housing finance. (Obama’s signature homeowner aid program, even in its latest spiffed-up form, was also not mentioned.)

Josh Barro finds Obama’s speech “lame and unconvincing”, with “shockingly little content in defense of his economic policies over the last four years, focusing almost exclusively on results in the manufacturing and energy sectors”. Ramesh Ponnuru says the speech was “a celebration of job growth” that the country as a whole “rightly finds grossly inadequate” .

Before the speech, however, the Obama campaign did release a set of economic targets, which Ron Fournier says wasn’t a “blueprint as much as it was a collection of lofty goals and promises”. Among those goals:

  • Create 1 million new manufacturing jobs by the end of 2016
  • Double exports by the end of 2014
  • Cut net oil imports in half by 2020
  • Support 600,000 natural gas jobs by the end of the decade
  • Cut the growth of college tuition in half over the next 10 years
  • Recruit 100,000 math and science teachers over the next 10 years
  • Job training for 2 million workers at community colleges
  • Reduce the deficit by more than $4 trillion over the next decade

Those manufacturing claims seem rosy, considering we’ve seen three straight months of ISM index contraction and August saw 15,000 manufacturing jobs disappear, Joe Deaux writes. John Cassidy writes that most of the goals were “familiar or modest, or both”.

Those goals, it’s worth remembering, will do nothing to help America deal with the U word in the short term. Klein notes one more thing that wasn’t mentioned in the speech: the president’s failed American Jobs Act. Which was his most promising solution to the jobs crisis. — Ryan McCarthy

On to today’s links:

Facebook
God bless Mark Cuban for being honest about who’s to blame for Facebook’s IPO – Jonathan Weil

Indicators
“The high-end nanny (and manny) economy is thriving” — the latest Fran Drescher Index has been released – Businessweek

EU Mess
Former Greek pharma salesman: “It was a good job. Now I clean Swedish sh–” – Bloomberg
Italy would really prefer not to request an EU bailout – NYT

New Normal
America’s hidden austerity program: public-sector layoffs – NYT
A concise guide to what the monthly jobs report misses – The Daily Beast

Charts
From unemployed…to dropping out of the labor force altogether – Felix

Apple
Apple wants to take on Pandora by negotiating directly with music labels – WSJ
Meet Apple’s favorite blogger, who pulls in an estimated $500,000 per year – Businessweek

Cephalopods
Federal appeals court rules class action against Goldman can move forward – Bloomberg

Sourcing
Philip Roth’s awesome open letter on his credibility as a source on the works of Philip Roth – New Yorker

Welcome to Adulthood
Wall Street intern gets it completely backwards: You won’t be able to stop thinking about money – Ben Walsh

Depressing
Companies now “crowdsource” their own employees’ morale – NYT

Alpha
DE Shaw is doing just fine, thank you very much – NY Post

JPMorgan
JPMorgan has a new whale trainer – DealBook

China
China approves 60 infrastructure projects worth more than $150 billion - Reuters

Growth Industries
The American beer market is booming as silly Prohibition-era laws are repealed – Economist

Wonks
Krugman: “Obama can fairly claim to have helped the country get through a very bad patch” – NYT

COMMENT

Curmudgeon
We hire more gov’t workers in both good and bad times to keep up with population growth. I haven’t compared the rates of the two to see if/how out of line they are, but the fact that a sector of our economy is continuosly growing should be seen as a good thing.

Posted by KevyD | Report as abusive

Chart of the day, employment-status edition

Felix Salmon
Sep 7, 2012 14:59 UTC

status.jpg

There are two ways in which the national employment situation influences the election. The first is, simply, the effect of unemployment and underemployment on America’s animal spirits. People who are unemployed, or who are so discouraged that they’re not even looking for work any more, don’t tend to be very happy with their lot, and as a result are more likely to vote against the current president. It may or may not be fair, but the president does get blamed for current economic conditions, and arguments about first derivatives (“it’s bad, but it’s getting better”) or counterfactuals (“it’s bad, but it’s better than it would have been under the other guys”) tend to be pretty unpersuasive to voters.

On this level, today’s employment report is pretty gruesome. According to the establishment survey, employers added just 96,000 jobs this month — less than the amount needed just to keep up with population growth. According to the household survey, the size of the civilian labor force shrank by 368,000 people last month. And the number of people not in the labor force grew by an absolutely massive 581,000.

Right now, the proportion of Americans with a job is lower than it has been in over 30 years. America’s getting older, and you’d expect the number to be falling — but it shouldn’t be falling nearly as fast as this. We’re well below trend, when it comes to the employment-to-population ratio, and that’s really bad for the economy as a whole: it means we have fewer productive workers, and as a result the country is creating much less wealth than it could be creating if more people had jobs. At the margin, of course, anything that depresses the amount of wealth in the country is bad for the incumbent president.

So anybody trying to use the jobs report to handicap the result of the election should probably see a tick down, this morning, in the chances of Obama’s re-election. My feeling is, however, that the size of the tick is likely to be very small. These things depend much more on levels than on deltas, and in any case the current electorate is more polarized than ever, with political convictions which are hard to shake.

Which brings me to the second way that employment affects electoral outcomes. The employment numbers are reported, on the first Friday of every month, and political parties try to use the numbers to their best advantage. On this front, there’s really only one number that matters, and that’s the headline unemployment rate. Financial types care more about the payrolls number, because it’s more accurate and less fuzzy. The unemployment rate, by contrast, is harder to calculate, and is based on the idea that you’re only unemployed if you’re looking for work. But the fact is that from a rhetorical perspective, the unemployment rate is the thing which counts. And so in terms of the optics of today’s report, it’s good for Obama, just because the unemployment rate fell — to 8.1% this month from 8.3% last month and 9.1% a year ago.

That’s still well above the 7% at which the psephologists will tell you that it’s very hard for an incumbent to get reelected. And it still starts with an 8 — although there’s now a small chance that on the day we actually vote, the unemployment rate might start with a 7. But the Republicans can’t say that the unemployment rate is rising, and the Democrats can say that it is falling. Will that change votes? Again, not very many. But insofar as arguments have an effect on elections, this report — bad though it is — has failed to give the Republicans the kind of rhetorical ammunition they might have hoped for.

Underlying both of these dynamics is the way in which the story of discouraged workers — people falling out of the labor force entirely — has become increasingly important, to the point at which it makes the headline unemployment rate much less useful as an economic indicator. Once upon a time, if you didn’t have a job, you fell into one of two categories: either you didn’t want to work, or else you were looking for work. Nowadays, however, there’s a huge third category of discouraged workers who would love a job but don’t even see the point of looking any more.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics has an interesting-if-obscure data series called “labor force status flows”. Most of the people interviewed in the survey measuring the unemployment rate, it turns out, were also interviewed the previous month. So it’s possible to look at the number of people, on a month-to-month basis, who were unemployed last month and who were no longer in the labor force this month. Historically, that number has been somewhere between 1.5 million and 2 million per month, on a seasonally-adjusted basis. But when the recession hit, it spiked to more than 2.5 million, and even more than 3 million at the peak. And it’s still extremely high.

It’s natural for lots of unemployed people to move out of the labor force each month: the Boomers are retiring, after all. But a glance at this chart is all it takes to see that we’re well outside normal territory, and that we’re still seeing millions of people leave the labor force not because they want to but because they feel that there’s simply no point in looking for work any more. I don’t know when or whether this line will come back down to its historical levels. But so long as it’s as elevated as this, the Federal Reserve has its work cut out. Because it means that even if the unemployment rate comes down substantially, we still won’t have really reached full employment — not unless the size of the labor force increases substantially at the same time.

COMMENT

Who eill the unempoled vote for ?
A promise of jobs ?
A promise of handouts ?
Working is work maybe a handout is easier

Posted by whyknot | Report as abusive

Who is speaking for the poor?

Felix Salmon
Sep 6, 2012 22:31 UTC

After shocking you this morning with the news that people like to go out at weekends, I hope you’re sitting down for this one: people who aren’t good at numbers tend to be bad at looking after their money.

My professional life is largely spent in a world of highly-numerate and highly-intelligent people, many of whom blow up spectacularly in the financial markets. And looking at hedge funds in particular, it’s very easy to find genius-level investors who have lost astonishing amounts of money: there’s clearly more to getting and holding on to vast sums than simply being off-the-charts smart. But the fact is that if you zoom out from the tiny group at the top, there’s a very strong correlation between numeracy, or intelligence, or financial literacy, on the one hand, and having a solid financial footing, on the other.

Bear with me here, for a minute, because it’s worth reviewing the literature. Financially literate people are more likely to plan for retirement. And if you plan for retirement, you have more wealth: a 2006 paper showed the median person who was planning for retirement as being worth between $307,750 and $410,000, while the median person who isn’t planning for retirement was worth just $122,000.

IQ also helps. Check out this chart, for instance, from a very long and detailed paper about the likelihood that a person of given intelligence will be invested in the stock market.

iq.tiff

The distribution is clear: the smarter you are (as measured by IQ), the more likely you are to be invested in the stock market. And this distribution is independent of wealth: it applies to the rich as much as it does to the poor. Or, as the paper puts it, “IQ’s role in the participation decisions of the affluent is about the same as it is for the less affluent. The definition of affluence—net worth or income—does not affect this finding.”

Most impressively, check out this paper from 2007. It asked just three “simple mathematical questions” of couples to judge the numeracy of each one. If neither got any questions right, the total wealth of the couple, on average, was $202,000. If they both got one question right, it was $505,000. If they both got two questions right, it was $853,000. And if they both got all three questions right, their average wealth on average was a whopping $1.7 million. (If they got different scores from each other, the wealth ended up somewhere in between.)

And similarly, at the other end of the spectrum, there’s huge amounts of research showing that if you’re particularly financially illiterate, or you’re not good at numbers, then you’re much more likely to be ripped off by predatory lenders or other scams, be they legal or otherwise.

There are various conclusions to be drawn here, one of which is that if we do a better job of financial education, then Americans as a whole will be better off. That’s true. But at the same time, financial illiteracy, and general innumeracy, and low IQs, are all perfectly common things which are never going to go away. It’s idiotic to try to blame people for having a low IQ: that’s not something people can control. And so it stands to reason that any fair society should look after people who are at such a natural disadvantage in life.

Which brings me to Nina Easton’s horrible new cover story for Fortune. Online, the headline is “Stop beating up the Rich”: even the capitalization grovels to the overclass. The magazine coverline is even worse: “In this political season,” it says, “the rich are an easy punching bag”.

But over the course of the story’s 2,700 words, Easton never really manages to give any examples of “people beating up the Rich”: she’s incredibly vague about the behavior she wants to stop. There’s a graphic, under the cute headline “Public Enemy No. 1%”, listing historical examples of Americans “taking shots at the wealthy”: it features things like the debut of Mr Burns in The Simpsons, and Enron’s Jeff Skilling getting pied.

By Easton’s own lights, that kind of thing is fair enough: there’s always a handful of evil rich people worthy of opprobrium. Her argument, quite explicitly, is that we shouldn’t tar all the rich with the same brush — but it’s precisely that kind of broad-based tarring which Easton has clearly failed to find. Yes, there are lots of impassioned pleas against rising inequality, but complaining about inequality is not at all the same thing as beating up on the rich.

So when Easton says that “it’s wrong to lump the 1% into a monolithic group of greedy, tax-avoiding, selfish capitalists”; when she complains of “diatribes against the 1%”; when she says those people are being vilified — what she’s actually doing is carefully constructing a straw man. She simply assumes that every time anybody stands up for the 99%, or complains that they’re not fully partaking in the fruits of America’s economic growth, that they’re vilifying the 1% who do partake in those fruits at the same time.

She’s also capable of writing highly mendacious stuff like this:

Obama’s tax proposal labels as “wealthy” households making more than $250,000 a year — a comfortable income in Indianapolis (where the median home price is $102,000) but barely enough to afford a studio apartment in Manhattan, where tax rates easily hit 50%.

This completely ignores how marginal tax rates work: to a first approximation, there are roughly zero people in Manhattan who pay 50% of their total income in taxes. It’s possible that marginal income ends up being taxed at that rate — but if you’re earning $250,000 a year, you’re not paying anything near $10,000 a month in taxes.

Even if you were having to suffer through life in New York on a post-tax income of a mere $125,000, you could still, quite easily, rent pretty much any studio apartment you wanted, with money to spare for nice meals and international holidays and the like. In Manhattan, the average studio apartment rents for $2,261 per month in non-doorman buildings, and $2,677 per month in doorman buildings. That’s just over $32,000 a year, or 12.8% of a $250,000 salary. I’d say that falls into the “easily afford” bucket, rather than the “barely afford” one.

The point here is that an income of $250,000 does, in fact, make you rich — and that if you increase marginal tax rates on people making more than that, then you’re only raising taxes on the income they make over and above a pretty hefty amount.

But Easton is too busy throwing out red herrings to notice: for instance, she says that “over the past four decades the global economy has left many behind, but it has also lifted tens of millions out of poverty”. Actually, the number of people lifted out of poverty, globally, over the past four decades is much bigger than that — but the number of Americans lifted out of poverty has been shamefully low for basically all this century.

“Raising taxes definitely won’t cure inequality,” says Easton, weirdly — if that’s the case, then the 1% really shouldn’t worry about higher taxes at all, since they’ll still be sitting happy, relatively super-rich, above everybody else.

In any case, the deep underlying problem with Easton’s article is the way in which she essentially says that the way to fix what ails us is for everybody to become intelligent and numerate and so on.

“Even if Occupy Wall Street’s wish came true and all the gains of the top 1% since 1979 were confiscated and redistributed to the 99%,” writes Easton, “household incomes would go up by less than half of what they would if everyone had a college degree.” She continues:

There’s a limit to what policymakers can do about the ravages on a middle-aged man’s job prospects after three decades’ worth of technological advances and global competition. But we can talk about education: College degrees, while not a panacea, not only carry huge salary premiums but also offer a measure of job protection.

This is true, but it also misses the crucial fact that not everybody can extract good value from college. There’s a reason that not everybody goes to college, and if you look at the predatory for-profit colleges pushing people into courses which they’re not remotely suitable for, it’s easy to see that the outcomes for people who do go to college are in large part a function of the fact that there’s a lot of self-selecting going on. The people who go to college are the literate and numerate and intelligent ones, and many of them would do well for themselves even if they had no college degree at all. Meanwhile, many of the people who don’t go to college would find it little more than a waste of time and money.

It seems to me that the current election campaign comes down in large part to a simple question: “who do you care about”? Do you care about the 1%, on the grounds that they are “job creators”? Or do you care about the bottom 40% — the people who have been left behind by US economic policy and who desperately need help and support? The Republicans clearly are the party of the 1%, and the Democrats are trying to paint themselves as the party of the middle class — of the 59%, you might say. But no one is standing up for the bottom 40%, the invisible poor, partly because they have a distressing tendency not to vote.

Easton concludes by saying that “mobility, in the form of equal opportunity rather than equal outcomes, is rooted in the very idea of America”. That’s true — and it’s also true that America has less equality of opportunity today than at any point in living memory. Once Easton has managed to provide the poor the same level of education afforded to the rich, then she can start talking about the open road to riches. But at that point, you might have a genuinely mobile society, where the people at the top know what it’s like to be at the bottom, and know that they might end up back down there themselves at some point. And in those societies, you tend to find much stronger safety nets, much more concern for people at the bottom, and many fewer tears shed for the plight of the 1%.

COMMENT

Seconding, Curmudgeon’s comment, the idea that nothing is done for the bottom 40% is over the top partisanship. To give two examples – Medicaid spending (federal plus state) is $400 billion per year and growing and food stamp spending is $76 billon and growing. There are, of course, other programs also focused on the bottom 40% of the population. Felix clearly thinks that more should be spent, but the idea that nothing is being done is preposterous

Posted by realist50 | Report as abusive

Counterparties: Draghi makes his move

Ben Walsh
Sep 6, 2012 22:03 UTC

Welcome to the Counterparties email. The sign-up page is here, it’s just a matter of checking a box if you’re already registered on the Reuters website. Send suggestions, story tips and complaints to Counterparties.Reuters@gmail.com

Mario Draghi has made his leaked proposal official: the European Central Bank will buy unlimited amounts of troubled euro zone debt on the open markets in an effort to push down sovereign borrowing costs. The NYT’s Jack Ewing and Steven Erlanger write that the plan puts the ECB’s “unlimited financial clout behind an effort to protect Spain and Italy from financial collapse” and “effectively spreads responsibility for repaying national debts to the euro zone countries”.

The plan, called “Outright Monetary Transactions” (OMT), will purchase bonds maturing in the next three years, after countries have made a request to the euro zone’s bailout fund and fully agreed to its conditions. If countries renege on their promises in areas like banking reform or fiscal policy overhauls, the ECB will terminate the bond purchases. Importantly, the ECB will not have seniority over private bondholders.

Draghi was coy in his press conference when asked who dissented, but Germany’s central bank later confirmed its dissenting vote and denounced the plan as “tantamount to financing governments by printing banknotes”. The reaction from the German press, as surveyed by Joe Weisenthal, ranges from nonplussed (“Alas, if that goes wrong”) to apoplectic  (“Black day for democracy”, “death of Bundesbank”). Half the German populace doesn’t trust Draghi, according to a recent poll.

IMF chief Christine Lagarde was chuffed, saying in a statement that the ECB’s plan will “support countries’ efforts to secure finance at a reasonable cost while they undertake sustained macroeconomic adjustment”. In non-monetary policyspeak, that means giving countries with steep borrowing costs, stagnant economies, large debts and fiscal deficits the time and money to sort themselves out. Markets, as Matt Levine points out in a simple graph, seem to agree with Lagarde.

The onus now is on Spain, as Reuters’ Paul Taylor notes, to “swallow its pride and apply for help to bring down crippling borrowing costs”. And the same applies to Italy. Both countries’ 3-year bonds are now yielding above 3%, while their German equivalent yields under 1%. Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has not indicated that he will immediately seek the aid Draghi is offering.

As the Economist‘s Free Exchange blog points out, OMT will work if it lower borrowing costs long enough for Italy and Spain to regain their footing.  If it doesn’t, then the risk, and losses, will have been shifted to the ECB’s balance sheet. — Ben Walsh

On to today’s links:

Gloomy
UN says we’re heading toward the third major global food-price spike in five years - NYT

Growth Markets
Myanmar has no credit cards and installed its first ATM last year — and MasterCard wants in - WSJ

Economy
Oil and water: Drought pits fracking against farming - NYT
Three charts on why America’s debt problem is better (and worse) than you think - Ryan McCarthy

New Normal
Why the minimum wage doesn’t explain stagnant wages - NYT

Politicking
An argument that you never really get who you vote for - HBR
What Bill Clinton wrote versus what he said at the DNC - The Atlantic Wire

Terrible
Regulation is forcing JPMorgan to evaluate the financial strength of its counterparties - John Carney 

Wonks
“As soon as you say the word ‘baseline,’ you might as well just pack up your bags and go home.” - Mother Jones

Literary
Infinite Atlas plots the locations in DFW’s novel on Google maps - Infinite Atlas

Risk Management
Your couch is literally killing you right now… or maybe not - The Billfold

Oxpeckers
A great Q&A with Katherine Boo on the conflicts of reporting on poverty - Guernica Mag

 

COMMENT

“If countries renege on their promises in areas like banking reform or fiscal policy overhauls, the ECB will terminate the bond purchases.” (Text)

** calls bullshit on this ^ ^ **

Once the ECB embraces this ‘tar baby’ there’s no putting it down. The hand has been called – now is the moment for Germany and a few others to get the hell out of the EZ and form their own common currency.

Posted by MrRFox | Report as abusive

Chart of the day, party neighborhood edition

Felix Salmon
Sep 6, 2012 13:45 UTC

Uber_weekend_model.jpg

This chart comes from Uber data geek (that is, a data geek who works for Uber) Bradley Voytek. You might recognize it from a blog post of Voytek’s from back in June, headlined “Building the Perfect Uber Party City”.

Uberdata_PCAdemandcurve.jpgWhat Voytek managed to do, back then, was create two “stereotyped patterns” of Uber car usage, based on something called principal component analysis. The first pattern he called “Weekend Component”, and it’s the chart you see above. The second pattern he calls “Weekday component”, and it looks very different indeed. (You can see the two overlaid on top of each other at right.)

Just by looking at these two curves — the red and the blue — Voytek can account for 93% of the way in which demand for Uber cars fluctuates over time. Some cities and neighborhoods are more Weekday; other cities and neighborhoods are more Weekend. (Most, it turns out, are more Weekend than Weekday, at least when it comes to demand for Ubers.) But just about everywhere comes very close to being a mix of the two, rather than something altogether different.

And there are some neighborhoods which correlate very strongly with the weekend curve in particular: Voytek calls these the “party neighborhoods”. In his post, he picked out the most “weekendish” neighborhoods in each of Uber’s cities: North Beach in San Francisco, Soho in New York, and so on. But I was interested in the league table. So, via Voytek, here’s the top 50:

City Neighborhood Weekend Index
Chicago Near North Side 89.51
San Francisco North Beach 88.75
Boston South Boston 87.59
Boston Back Bay-Beacon Hill 86.37
NYC Soho 86.03
DC Dupont Circle 85.80
San Francisco South Of Market 85.67
San Francisco Potrero Hill 85.67
Chicago Near West Side 85.62
DC Au-Tenleytown 85.44
DC Downtown 85.08
DC Georgetown 84.90
NYC Greenwich Village 84.81
NYC Tribeca 84.71
DC South West 84.63
NYC Financial District 84.53
DC Foggy Bottom 84.48
Los Angeles Santa Monica 84.38
DC Capitol Hill 84.30
NYC Clinton 84.27
NYC Chelsea 83.59
Boston East Cambridge 83.29
NYC Gramercy 82.85
Los Angeles Sawtelle 82.84
San Francisco Glen Park 82.62
Los Angeles Beverly Hills 82.58
Boston Central 82.25
Boston South End 82.09
San Francisco Chinatown 81.98
Seattle First Hill 81.51
San Francisco Financial District 81.29
Seattle Pioneer Square 81.27
NYC Midtown 81.12
DC Logan Circle 81.06
San Francisco Mission 80.96
Los Angeles Westwood 80.89
NYC Murray Hill 80.88
DC Brentwood 80.83
San Francisco Russian Hill 80.62
San Francisco Inner Sunset 80.48
DC Woodley Park 80.38
NYC Little Italy 80.34
Seattle Downtown 80.32
Chicago Lincoln Park 80.24
Seattle Capitol Hill 80.12
Los Angeles West Los Angeles 80.03
Los Angeles Mid City West 80.02
NYC Williamsburg 80.01
Los Angeles Mid Wilshire 79.73
Boston Fenway-Kenmore 79.62

The Weekend Index, here, is the degree to which Uber usage in the neighborhood in question resembles the red line in Voytek’s chart. Obviously, it’s not all nights and weekends, but it’s skewed that way. Sunday nights are very slow, and then each successive night picks up a bit, and goes on a little bit later, until you get big peaks on Friday and Saturday nights. And across the board, nighttime usage is much heavier than daytime usage.

Voytek also sent me a list of the least “weekendish” neighborhoods that Uber covers. They’re pretty dull, as you might expect. What you might not expect is that the top six are all on the west coast. At the top of the list is Outer Richmond, in San Francisco, followed by Roosevelt and Madrona in Seattle, Visitacion Valley in San Francisco, Greenwood in Seattle, and Leschi in Seattle. Nowhere in New York or Boston or DC even makes the top ten.

The big league table, however, of the most weekendish neighborhoods, is fascinating — just because those tend to be particularly (to use a word that Thomas Frank hates) vibrant. These are the neighborhoods that other cities aspire to; they’re the areas that cause people to want to move to a city, and make them willing to pay high rents to live there.

And if you ever wondered what were the best and worst nights to go out, this Uber chart should answer your question very simply: the later you get in the week, the more crowded any given place is likely to become. That’s pretty intuitive, but it’s always good to see intuitions backed up with empirical data — and it’s easy to see why restaurants that close one or two days a week always choose Sundays or Mondays.

COMMENT

I can only speak for San Francisco, but the inclusion of some of those neighborhoods (for instance, Potrero Hill) speaks only to the lack of availability of cabs.

Posted by absinthe | Report as abusive

Counterparties: Europe’s shrinking money funds

Ben Walsh
Sep 5, 2012 22:40 UTC

Welcome to the Counterparties email. The sign-up page is here, it’s just a matter of checking a box if you’re already registered on the Reuters website. Send suggestions, story tips and complaints to Counterparties.Reuters@gmail.com

The sovereign debt crisis has put European money market funds in an intolerable position. Many European MMFs promise not to “break the buck” — or let the net asset values of their holdings fall below 1 euro per share. At the same time, these funds are following their US counterparts by avoiding an ever-growing pool of risky (and high-yielding) continental assets.

Unfortunately for funds obliged to invest inside the euro zone, short-term assets are increasingly moving toward negative yields. This, of course, is bad news for fund managers and investors alike. Fund managers, the FT’s Ajay Makan writes, are now becoming a lot less willing to swallow their losses:

Four of the biggest money market fund managers have told the Financial Times that along with the rest of the industry they are looking at ways of passing on negative returns to investors.

But with interest rates on short-term French and German government debt in negative territory as investors scurry for safety, most money market funds now offer no yield to new investors. The European Central Bank last month said it could start charging banks to hold their cash overnight, which means bank deposit rates may also turn negative.

European MMFs are looking for clever ways to break the euro without actually letting NAV drop: “options include reducing the number of shares investors hold in the fund to reflect negative income … asset managers could also levy fees outside the fund structure to reflect negative yields without reducing the net asset value”.

That might sound clever enough to keep mass hysteria at a minimum, but it changes nothing of the economics for fund investors. And the stakes are high. (Remember the Reserve Primary Fund from 2008?)

To people like Mary Schapiro, Daniel Tarullo and John Gapper, the long-delayed reform in MMFs is a matter of systemic risk. The problems faced by euro MMFs show that there are risks, even without Lehman-style defaults. Last week, Gapper wrote that MMFs have become an illusory oasis of safety for corporations and have left the financial system resting on “quicksand”:

the old-fashioned bank run, with depositors lining up outside banks to withdraw cash, has been updated to corporate treasurers wiring money from money market funds at any hint of trouble … the structure of the funds makes them especially prone to a run.

Ben Walsh

On to today’s links:

New Normal

Bill Gross: “The age of credit expansion which led to double-digit portfolio returns is over” – PIMCO

Facebook

Mark Zuckerberg will not be selling any Facebook stock anytime soon – WSJ

Liebor

The CFTC was warned of “enormous” Libor fixing 15 years ago – American Banker

NC’s treasurer on Libor: “We think this could be as big as the mortgage crisis settlement” – NYT

Hope/Change/Etc.

How African Americans have fallen behind under Obama – Bloomberg

Revolving Door

“Dear SEC Friends” and other cozy emails between the regulator and Wall Street – Bloomberg

The top industries for revolving-door connections with regulators – Opensecrets.org

EU Mess

The ECB is reportedly planning unlimited sterilized bond buying – Bloomberg

The ECB is setting itself up as a shadow government for various European nations – Matt Yglesias

Financial Arcana

What Matt Taibbi got wrong about private equity in his latest opus – Fortune

The implications of the NY AG’s private equity tax inquiry – NYT

Strangely Existential

15,000 reporters stare into the staggering, newsless abyss of political conventions – Huffington Post

Are you better off without dumb campaign questions? – Ezra Klein

TBTF

Big banks’ $29 billion cookie jar for litigation expenses – WSJ

Politicking

Deval Patrick’s misleading claims about Romney’s record in Massachusetts – WaPo

Alpha

Hedge funds are having yet another crappy year – Covestor

China

China just has too much damn capital – Also Sprach Analyst

And, of course, there are many more links at Counterparties.

When hedge funds advertise

Felix Salmon
Sep 5, 2012 21:51 UTC

Jesse Eisinger, today, joins Matt Levine in worrying about the effects of allowing hedge funds to advertise. The all-but-certain consequence is that while the handful of excellent hedge funds will remain highly secretive, a bunch of much less savory characters will start hitting the airwaves with gusto. As Jesse says, “Jacoby & Meyers advertises on television; Sullivan & Cromwell does not.”

You get no prizes for guessing who counts as the Jacoby & Meyers of the hedge-fund world:

“I am hellbent on creating a global brand and the only way to do that is through advertising,” said Anthony Scaramucci of fund of hedge funds SkyBridge Capital, which manages $3 billion in assets and hosts a star-studded industry conference in Las Vegas.

Earlier this year, Mr. Scaramucci had lunch with a midsize New York ad firm he says he could hire if the ban is lifted, adding he was waiting to learn what rules the SEC would issue and for his lawyers to approve any plans he might hatch.

The big problem here is that we seem to be going from one extreme to the other: while the restrictions on what hedge funds can say in public have historically been too strict, they’re now going to be far too loose. As Levine notes, hedge funds will be able to basically say anything they like about their funds, while omitting anything they want to omit at the same time.

It’s very hard to see how any good can come of this. Picking a hedge fund (or, in Scaramucci’s case, a fund-of-funds) is hard — much harder, actually, than picking a mutual fund, and that’s difficult enough. It’s almost impossible that advertising from individual funds will be helpful rather than unhelpful in this respect.

That said, the SEC is dragging its feet here — the new rules were meant to be in place in June — and it’s really not the main culprit: Congress has mandated that these changes be made, and the SEC can’t just ignore one of the few bills to pass with genuine bipartisan support.

It could, however, put in place a series of hoops that any hedge fund would have to jump through before being allowed to advertise. It could require that all ads be run by the SEC first, for instance, and it might also restrict the kind of places that hedge funds can advertise. It could even, if it wanted, force all advertisements to be in print form, with lengthy disclosures a bit like the ones you see in pharmaceutical ads.

But the SEC didn’t do any of that: it’s basically washing its hands of the whole issue, and saying that if Congress wants hedge-fund ads, then Congress is going to get hedge-fund ads. It’s quite a passive-aggressive stance, actually.

As Eisinger says, “the best-case scenario from the agency’s move is a bunch of Paulsons”, with investors buying in at the top and selling at the bottom, “while the worst-case is a bunch of Madoffs.”

That said, I can see one upside. Once the new rule is passed, a lot of hedge fund managers are going to be much happier starting their own blogs and Twitter accounts. They’ve been muffled until now: while reporters have always been able to call them up and have off-the-record phone calls, hedgies have found it much more difficult to get their compliance officers to sign off on public communication. If that kind of thing is now allowed without constraint, we could see an influx of very smart people into the Twittersphere. A blogger can hope, anyway.

COMMENT

If Scaramucci says that he’s “hellbent on creating a global brand and the only way to do that is through advertising”, that doesn’t speak very well of his confidence in his own abilities to create positive return for investors, does it? If he generates large positive returns for investors, the world should beat a path to his doorstep, and he shouldn’t have to lean so hard on advertising.

I think, therefore, that investors in SkyBridge Capital should probably rethink their confidence in Anthony Scaramucci.

Posted by Strych09 | Report as abusive

Barack Obama and the limitations of probabilistic decision making

Felix Salmon
Sep 5, 2012 16:22 UTC

Michael Lewis has a big profile of Barack Obama in the latest Vanity Fair, and Obama tells Lewis something very interesting:

“Nothing comes to my desk that is perfectly solvable,” Obama tells Lewis. “Otherwise, someone else would have solved it. So you wind up dealing with probabilities. Any given decision you make you’ll wind up with a 30 to 40 percent chance that it isn’t going to work. You have to own that and feel comfortable with the way you made the decision. You can’t be paralyzed by the fact that it might not work out.”

This is very much in line with the m.o. of Larry Summers, and of Bob Rubin before him. Here’s how Steve Rattner explains it, in his book about the auto bailouts:

Larry pressed us to attach probabilities to our recommendations and countered with odds of his own. Like Bob Rubin, with whom the concept is most closely associated, Larry is an enthusiast for “probabilistic decision making,” a method for weighing uncertainties.

This all sounds very scientific — but the problem is, it isn’t. Certainly, if you’re making a decision like whether or not to surge in Afghanistan, you cannot know for sure what the consequences of that decision are going to be. But trying to express things in probabilistic terms is not much of an improvement.

For one thing, there’s no evidence to believe that people are better at subjectively assigning probabilities to outcomes than they are at simply predicting what’s going to happen. People in general — and experts like Summers in particular — tend to suffer from overconfidence bias, and tend to massively overestimate the probability of things they think are going to happen. And if you get too deep into the weeds of probabilistic decision making, you end up multiplying probabilities, and thereby massively compounding your estimation errors.

On top of that, probabilistic decision making tends to live in a binary world: what is the chance of success, and what is the chance of failure? But that kind of analysis can conceal much more than it reveals, and nearly always results in people doing things which have a very high probability of success, no matter how devastating failure would be. This is what I call the Rubin Trade, and is very popular among merger arbs, which is the business Rubin started in. Let’s say that company X has agreed to buy company Y for $100 per share, but if the merger falls through, then Y’s stock will fall to $50. Would you buy stock in Y for $95? People who do that — especially if they leverage themselves in doing so — will normally make a lot of money, and cash large bonuses. But once in a while the trade will blow up. In many ways, the entire financial crisis was the result of a huge global bet that very safe securities were very safe.

If you’re doing probabilistic analysis, then, you really need to be looking at probability distributions, rather than simply drawing a line between success and failure and trying to work out the ratio of the areas on the left and right sides of that line. Specifically, you need to be looking at tail risk, and asking yourself just how bad things could get if they do go wrong. And the flipside of that is that sometimes it’s a good idea to bet on things which are unlikely to happen, just because the payoff should those things happen is so big. That’s basically what a large part of options trading is all about: trying to buy things which are cheap and which will probably expire at zero, but which if they don’t can pay off enormously.

Summers understands all this. He’s one of the more forceful proponents saying that it can be a good idea to deliberately go too far on the side of doing too much, because the risks of doing too little are so great. But it’s hard to build that kind of analysis into probabilistic decision making — unless you’re the person framing the questions. And that’s the real problem with this kind of framework: you can pretty much always get any answer you want, just by being careful about the questions you’re asking, and how you use the answers you get. Let’s go back to Rattner:

At one point, [Summers] confessed that as we gave our answers, he was discounting our probabilities based on what he thought we would say. For example, knowing that Ron was in favor of saving Chrysler, Larry lowered the probability Ron assigned to the success of the alliance with Fiat. The opposite for Harry. Plainly, Larry was loving this debate…

Larry called for a show of hands. His question was precise: “If you assume that the probability is 50 percent or greater that Chrysler would survive for five years, would you save it?”

Diana was unhappy with the phrasing, because she thought Larry was stacking the deck — forcing those who believed Chrysler’s chances were actually slim to assume a higher probability. She had suspected that he wanted to save Chrysler and now was sure of it. While she recognized that under Larry’s formulation she should be voting to save Chrysler, she voted against it anyway, as a kind of protest. Austan felt sandbagged too.

It’s pretty obvious, here, that the reason Larry was loving the debate was precisely because he was controlling it. If you get to unilaterally change other people’s probabilities, and you get to frame all the questions, you can basically give yourself dictator-like powers while ostensibly running a democratic, technocratic, and probabilistic process.

And this is why I worry about the way that Obama has internalized this way of thinking: when he thinks he’s making a choice, in fact he’s always going to end up choosing the option that his advisers have managed to present as having the highest probability of success. And after making those decisions, he won’t lose sleep about their possible downsides or unintended consequences.

For instance, consider the decision to concentrate on healthcare rather than climate change as the Obama administration’s first big legislative push. In the wake of that decision, the chances of getting any kind of climate-change legislation passed became effectively zero — and the negative consequences for the well-being of the planet as a whole could easily end up dwarfing the upside from everything else the Obama team does put together.

Meanwhile, no one really worried, when the healthcare legislation was being negotiated, that the whole thing could end up being struck down by the Supreme Court. It wasn’t, in the end — but it turned out to be very close. When calculating healthcare probabilities, did anybody in the White House properly account for SCOTUS risk? Almost certainly not. And as a result the whole calculation was missing a crucial element.

For Obama, if a decision doesn’t work out, he’s OK with that, since he reckons there’s a statistical certainty that a good third of his decisions will fail to work out. And he takes solace in the idea that so long as the process of arriving at the decision was a good one, by which he means that it was properly technocratic and probabilistic, then he did the best that he could have done.

But that kind of decision-making framework leaves very little room for ideals — for actually putting into practice the kind of vision you have for America. By making decisions on a case-by-case basis, you can end up missing out on building something bigger and much more coherent. In 2008, America voted for a man who was truly excellent at staring into the distance, a man looking at the big picture, and at a centuries-long legacy. Instead, hampered by the financial crisis and by a dysfunctional Congress, they got a man who spends his days weighing success probabilities: a tactician, rather than a strategist.

I’m sure that when Obama accepts his party’s nomination for president in Charlotte on Thursday, there will be lots of moving and rousing rhetoric. But realistically, we cannot hope that a second-term Obama will have much if any ability to make his high-flying dreams a reality. Especially not if he continues to make decisions based on which actions have a 65% probability of success.

COMMENT

KenG…I agree with you on the commenting system…no clue whether my initial response will get posted 5 times or not at all, but my point was that Obama was in no way handcuffed when he started, he was filibuster-free for his first two years. How do you explain your comment that they put limitations on him?

Posted by Dietzamerk | Report as abusive

America’s minuscule high-end wine market

Felix Salmon
Sep 4, 2012 22:53 UTC

Dan Levy at Bloomberg has a big story today under the headline “America Drinking Top-End Wine Fuels Napa Deals”. It’s mostly about land and winery transactions, but this jumped out at me:

High-end California wine accounts for more than two-thirds of U.S. bottle sales above $20, according to data compiled by Nielsen Holdings NV… Purchases of California premium wine totaled $410 million in the 12 months through July 21, up 14 percent year-over-year, store-scan data from New York-based Nielsen show.

To which my reaction was simple: “That’s it?”

$410 million a year might be some kind of wonderful record high, but it’s still a minuscule figure on an absolute basis: it works out at about $3.50 per US household per year. I don’t know what the average bottle of wine costing more than $20 actually costs — let’s say it’s $25. Then the average US household buys one such bottle of wine every 7 years. Once you account for my wino friends, the median US household buys wine costing more than $20 a bottle exactly never.

Let’s look at this another way. Grey Goose imports about 3.5 million nine-liter cases of vodka into the US every year. Those cases are sold by suppliers for about $200 a pop; the suppliers sell to wholesalers, and the wholesalers sell to retailers and to clubs, bars, and restaurants. But a good rule of thumb is that the retail price is three times the supplier revenues: that’s $600 a case, or $50 a bottle. Which is about right for Grey Goose.

Now 3.5 million cases of vodka, at $600 per case, works out at $2.1 billion of vodka sold annually — and that’s just Grey Goose. Overall, the US vodka market had supplier revenues of $4.8 billion in 2010, according to the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States, which means that we as a country get through about $14.5 billion of vodka per year. If you take only the “high end premium” and “super premium” end of that, you’re still talking $7.4 billion per year.

Meanwhile, the entire national wine market, for wine costing more than $20 per bottle, is $410 million for Californian wines and about $600 million in total.

According to the NYT’s Eric Asimov, $20 is the “sweet spot” for wine — and although he concedes that $20 “is not cheap”, he also says that you won’t find a decent California cabernet for that price. Yet the fact is that most of the over-$20 wine we drink does come from California, and frankly a huge amount of it isn’t very good. (Go on a wine-tasting tour of Napa one day: the vineyards there will all pour you $25 wine all day at a quality worthy of wine costing maybe $5 or $7.)

All of which is to say that if you drink wine costing more than $20 a bottle remotely regularly — every couple of months, say — then you’re an extreme outlier in this country. And if it’s French, or Italian, or even from Washington — if it comes from anywhere at all other than California — then you’re truly a member of the abstruse-and-recondite set.

Because the entire high-end wine market in this country — the amount of money you get if you add up every bottle of wine sold in America for more than $20 over the course of a whole year — is less than one third of the size of the market in Grey Goose vodka alone. Which doesn’t taste of anything at all.

So the next time you walk into a wine store and feel intimidated by the number of bottles costing $40 or $70 or more, don’t be. If you’re merely spending a Jackson on a bottle of wine, you’re part of a tiny elite minority. Everybody else, if they’re not drinking beer, is drinking vodka — a drink designed to be as bland and tasteless as possible.

COMMENT

First of all, those of us who really understand this portion of the wine market knows that $20+ price category is disappearing from scan data…almost all of this is going DtC…over the 52 week period thatWine & Vines and ShipComplaint reported mid 2012 DtC sales were at $1.4 Billion…yes…that is with “b” amounting to 8.6% of all domestic wine sales.

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Counterparties: Mario Draghi’s shopping list

Sep 4, 2012 21:49 UTC

Welcome to the Counterparties email. The sign-up page is here, it’s just a matter of checking a box if you’re already registered on the Reuters website. Send suggestions, story tips and complaints to Counterparties.Reuters@gmail.com

After Ben Bernanke took the stage in Jackson Hole last week to rather defensively suggest the Fed will act soon, Thursday is Mario Draghi’s turn.

Before we get into the details of what the ECB could announce, a quick update on the European debt crisis: It’s still there. Yields for Spanish and Portuguese debt are at or above the 7% danger zone, and Italy is publicly complaining that their debt costs have little basis in reality. Jens Weidmann, Germany’s top central banker, meanwhile, is reportedly both isolated and threatening to quit over his opposition to the ECB buying debt of struggling EU countries.

In a closed-door meeting in Brussels yesterday, Mario Draghi told the European Parliament that he’d be comfortable buying EU members’ bonds with maturities of three years or so. This, Draghi reportedly said, wouldn’t violate EU treaties. (Bill Gross tweeted that this bond-buying program would be something like writing “2-3 year checks”).

Of course, ECB bond-buying has been the summer’s worst-kept secret. As the WSJ’s Matt Phillips noted, Draghi said this on July 25: “To the extent that the size of these sovereign premia (in Spain and Italy) hamper the functioning of the monetary policy transmission channel, they come within our mandate”.

Draghi’s hints mean that three years into the European debt crisis, the ECB may finally return to limited, direct financing of struggling governments. Analysts, however, are all over the map as to what the ECB may actually announce after its meeting on Thursday, and whether it will involve yield caps.

One safe bet: more political entanglement. Even though Draghi insists the ECB is not political, his actions are still very much wrapped into discussions on what he recently called ”the sharing of powers and of accountability”. Or, as Nomura put it: “Just imagine if the Fed had to play tough with California or worse Texas for example, to effectively impart monetary policy”.

The Economist‘s Charlemagne blog has a great description of Draghi’s predicament: He simply can’t fix Europe without the help of the continent’s leaders:

The euro’s crisis is fundamentally political, not monetary or financial. The ECB cannot fix the euro; it can only buy time. In many ways Mr Weidmann is right to say that, if there is to be mutualisation of risk it should not be done through the back door of the ECB, but rather through the front door (eg, with Eurobonds) and with the agreement of national parliaments. Some in the ECB think that the crisis will have to worsen before politicians take such radical action. Either because he cannot, or because he does not want to, Mr Draghi will not be the lone ranger.

– Ryan McCarthy

With that nod to incremental political change, on to today’s links:

Sinodependency
The frightening implications of a slowdown in China – Economist

Popular Myths
Lazear: There is no structural unemployment – WSJ

The Fed
How the Fed has seriously misunderstood the effects of QE – David Glasner

EU Mess
“The unravelling of the eurozone’s financial integration” – FT Alphaville
The professional class is now beginning to follow the elite out of Spain – NYT

Facebook
Facebook is down 52% since its IPO, and Andrew Ross Sorkin blames one man – DealBook
Felix: There’s only really one Facebook shareholder who matters – Reuters

TBTF
Big banks are increasingly reliant on the cheapest funding available: your deposits – Bloomberg

Economy
$1 billion in debt forgiveness to aid a flagging economy…in Egypt – NYT

The Oracle
What it’s like to play in Warren Buffett’s private poker game – Forbes

Oxpeckers
A wonk is born: the rise of Ezra Klein - CJR
Wired’s investigation of Jonah Lehrer’s work finds “plagiarism, dodgy quotes, and factual inaccuracies” – Slate
Wired officially severs ties with Jonah Lehrer – Wired
What it’s like to fact-check at the New Yorker – Oxford American

Primary Sources
U.S. manufacturing index falls to lowest level in more than three years – ISM

Big Numbers
It costs the U.S. $2 billion to $3 billion per year to power those little red exit signs in office buildings – Boing Boing

Startups
Fred Wilson: Why the collapse of venture capital is good – Technology Review

New Normal
The slow demise of the public corporation – NYT

Hard Landings
Asia’s manufacturing slump gets even slumpier – WSJ

The problem with buybacks, Dell edition

Felix Salmon
Sep 4, 2012 17:58 UTC

Fifteen years ago today, on September 4, 1997, Dell stock closed at $86.69 per share; on a split-adjusted basis, that works out to $10.84 per share today. The stock peaked at almost 5 times that level, in March 2000, but it’s not looking quite so hot any more: it’s now back down to $10.52 per share.

Over the course of the intervening 15 years, Dell has been solidly profitable, and in fact reached record earnings per share of $1.87 in 2011. It has never had an unprofitable year, and the company’s total earnings since 1997 (if you exclude 1997′s earnings but include the $1.68 in 2012) total $15.40 per share.

How is it possible that Dell has earned more than $15 per share since 1997, has never lost any money, has never paid a dividend, and is now worth less than $11? The answer, of course, is buybacks:

Based on their annual 10K filings, from Fiscal Year 2005 to 2012, Dell has purchased approximately 989 million of its own shares at a cost of over $24bn… Going back further to 1997 (through February 3, 2012), Dell has reportedly spent approximately $39 billion in share repurchases under a $45 billion repurchase program.

$39 billion is more than double Dell’s current market capitalization of $18 billion, and it’s over a thousand times more than the $30 million that Dell actually raised from the market in its 1988 IPO.

Dell, then, is an extreme example of a phenomenon that is actually typical of the market as a whole, which has seen net equity issuance of negative $287 billion in just the past ten years — and that’s not even counting dividends. Shareholders like to think of the stock market as a place where they fund companies with equity, take risks, and then reap returns. But in reality shareholders take out much more than they put in.

Every company says it wants buy-and-hold shareholders, who will stick with the firm for the long term. But a buy-and-hold shareholder in Dell is looking particularly idiotic right now. If you bought 15 years ago at $10.84, you should expect to have at least $15.40 in value at this point: after all: that’s how much the company has made since then. Instead, you have less than you started with. And all the extra money went to fickle shareholders who sold their stock back to the company.

In principle, I quite like buybacks over dividends: they’re a way of returning cash to shareholders, without sticking those shareholders with possibly-unwanted income. In theory, shareholders who want income will sell some percentage of their shares back to the company and get income that way, while shareholders who don’t want income will see the value of their shares rise, thanks to the fact that there’s extra demand in the market and the fact that the free float is shrinking.

In practice, however, as we can see with Dell, it doesn’t always work that way. The company ends up overpaying for its shares when the stock is high, thereby essentially taking money which belongs to all shareholders, and distributing it only to those who are exiting. As a result, the most loyal and faithful shareholders can end up with less than they started with, even when the company has been solidly profitable all along.

If things were sensible, a company could simply declare a dividend, and then the investors who didn’t want the income could just reinvest that dividend back into the stock. In the UK, we have things called scrip dividends which serve that purpose*: you basically get your dividend paid in stock rather than cash. If you want to sell that stock and take the dividend you can, but if you don’t, you don’t have to.

If Dell had gone for a scrip dividend rather than buybacks, then at least our hypothetical 1997 buy-and-hold investor would have more stock now than she had originally, and the past 15 years’ profits wouldn’t have disappeared into the pockets of the lucky few who sold high on the secondary market. Those people would still have made money on the movement of the stock; they just wouldn’t have taken profits from other shareholders.

As for Dell’s statement, justifying its lack of a dividend, saying that “our earnings are best utilized by investing in internal growth opportunities, such as new products, new customer segments and new geographic markets” — well, it doesn’t pass the laugh test. Dell has spent all of the money from its earnings — and then some — on stock buybacks, rather than on new products or new markets. And stock buybacks are never an “internal growth opportunity”.

(h/t Elfenbein)

*Update: Many commenters, along with jdpink, have pointed out that scrip dividends are basically just fractional stock splits, and don’t return any cash to shareholders. From a behavioral-econ perspective, shareholders might be more willing to sell their scrip to get a dividend check than they are to sell some percentage of the shares that they hold in a non-dividend paying stock. But unless the scrip dividend is optional, it doesn’t get cash off a company’s balance sheet. And if it is optional, then the new shares count as income for tax purposes.

COMMENT

Michael is restless and it’s easier to game doubling the price to the new private equits without the public baggage.

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Why Amazon’s competition is good for Netflix

Felix Salmon
Sep 4, 2012 15:53 UTC

Last year, with Netflix’s stock price plunging, I predicted that Netflix would find itself forced to move from exclusive contracts to non-exclusive contracts for the material it’s streaming. And today, that’s exactly what’s happened: a huge slug of Netflix’s movies are now going to be available on Amazon as well.

This is, trivially, great for consumers. When multiple platforms are all streaming the same movies, those platforms are forced to compete on price, on ease of use, on reliability, and on all the other things we couch potatoes care about.

But the immediate reaction of Netflix’s stock price was sharply negative, with the shares falling by 10%. Since then, however, they’ve recovered a bit, and I think that’s exactly right: if video content becomes not only non-rival but also non-exclusive, that’s almost certainly good for Netflix.

Think about it this way: up until now, when Netflix has signed exclusive deals for TV shows and movies, the enormous sums involved can be broken down into two parts: one part for the right to show the material, and another part for exclusivity. If Netflix gives up on exclusivity, that means that it’s paying less for the material, and that all the money it’s spending appears on the screens of subscribers, rather than showing up also in the absence of that material on the screens of non-subscribers. If Netflix is convinced that its value proposition for subscribers is a good one — and I think that it is — then it shouldn’t need to pay untold millions of dollars to keep non-subscribers from watching certain shows.

What’s more, the big underlying problem with the Netflix business model is that it never had much of an opportunity to make profits: if it was buying up exclusive rights, then the studios would always just jack up the price of those rights to Netflix’s pain point, and and Netflix would be forced to pay. Netflix, under the old model, needed the studios much more than the studios needed Netflix.

But under a non-exclusive model, all that changes. Video content becomes a commodity, with the studios happily renting it out to anybody who wants to stream it — Netflix, Amazon, whomever — probably at a standard price-per-stream with a certain guaranteed minimum. That puts the various competitors on a level playing field, and forces them to compete on customer service, user interfaces, reliability of evening-time bandwidth, and so on and so forth. And that’s where Netflix shines, as David Pogue recently concluded:

The bottom line: Netflix beats Prime on movie selection, site clarity and playback features. It has much more to watch, too; Netflix won’t say how many movies it has, but informed estimates put its catalog as twice the size of Amazon’s.

Ever since it started streaming movies, Netflix has found it very hard to turn that superiority into profits. Ironically, now that Amazon is beginning to buy up the same movies that Netflix has, such profits might well be easier to come by.

Update: Matt Yglesias replies.

In a commodity video world, the companies that win will be the companies that can embed streaming video in a larger business proposition. Apple, for example, could offer a streaming video subscription plan at cost as a loss-leader for selling iPads. That’s not Amazon’s current business model with the Kindle Fire or Google’s with the Nexus 7 but it could be. Even under its current model, Amazon wants to sell Prime subscriptions to help entrench its position as the Wal-Mart of the Internet—Netflix needs to actually make a profit, but selling commodities in a competitive market isn’t profitable.

COMMENT

Right now the streaming market is really all about the rights to back catalogues of old TV seasons that subscribers may have missed when they first aired. It’s a misconception to suggest it has anything to do with “movies”. Right now if you want to stream a movie, you pay $4 or $5 to Apple or Amazon according to exactly the kind of “commodity” business model Felix describes. But that is not Netflix’s game at all — they are selling me all-I-can-eat streaming at a low monthly rate. Sure it’s mostly TV shows I’m watching, but they have some very fine shows to choose from and there’s no way I would be watching most of them under the “commodity” model where I pay $2 or $3 for each episode I want to watch. That’s a vastly inferior deal for the consumer.

As for Amazon trying to directly compete with Netflix with their Prime offerings, they can acquire all the licensing they want, but their product is still fatally flawed for the same reason: the UI sucks for finding free stuff to watch. It is transparent that they are using their free streaming options simply as a lure to advertise their non-free streaming options. If they make their interface more comparable to Netflix then maybe their acquisitions will actually matter from a consumer choice perspective. Until then, not so much.

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The Facebook investors’ lament

Felix Salmon
Sep 4, 2012 06:40 UTC

Andrew Ross Sorkin has a rather odd column about Facebook CFO David Ebersman today, blaming him for the miserable trajectory of Facebook’s stock since its gruesome IPO. It’s hard for me to disagree, since I said exactly the same thing back on May 23 putting Ebersman at the very top of the list of Facebook incompetents.

But my post in May was narrowly focused on the Facebook IPO; Sorkin aspires to something bigger. “When Facebook’s I.P.O. first started to appear troubled back in May, I purposely avoided weighing in,” he writes. “Frankly, I thought it was too soon to judge. But we have passed the pivotal three-month mark.”

It’s not actually true that Sorkin avoided weighing in; in fact, at the time, he was calling the Facebook IPO the “ultimate” case of the 1% versus the 99%. Kyle Drennen helpfully transcribed Sorkin’s appearance on the NBC Nightly News:

This idea that the playing field is not level — that certain people, certain investors, are getting access to information, and the other guys, Main Street, isn’t getting the same information. And who’s holding the bag? It’s the greater fool theory. In an IPO, somebody’s buying and somebody’s selling. But in this case, the public is the one that’s the buyer. And in that case, maybe they were the fool in this case.

If the public was the buyer in the Facebook IPO, then the seller — the rich guy with all the information — was David Ebersman, the villain of Sorkin’s current column. So Sorkin hasn’t exactly been scrupulously agnostic on this issue for the past three months.

And here’s the reason why Sorkin thinks that the point three months after the IPO is so important:

Statistically, the three-month mark is a much better predictor of a company’s future share price than any of the closing prices in the first week or two. According to Richard Peterson of Capital IQ, 67 percent of technology companies whose shares lagged their I.P.O. price after 90 days were still laggards after a year. Until Facebook’s stock rebounds, Mr. Ebersman will be feeling the pressure.

In other words, short-term movements in the share price don’t matter. What matters is medium-term movements in the share price!

But while Ebersman can be blamed for messing up the mechanics of the IPO, I do not think it’s fair to blame him for where Facebook’s stock might be trading 3 months or 1 year after the IPO. The stock price is not under his control; Ebersman should be judged on things which are under his control, which generally surround issues like how much money Facebook has, and what it’s doing with that hoard.

As for the idea that Ebersman “will be feeling the pressure” until Facebook’s stock gets back near its IPO price, well, I think that’s probably wishful thinking on the part of IPO investors more than anything else. Certainly Ebersman doesn’t seem to be taking a particularly groveling stance towards his public investors: Sorkin notes that when he met with some of them in New York recently, he sent out the invites so late — for a summer Friday, no less — that many of the more senior invitees couldn’t make it. I’m sure Ebersman wasn’t too bothered.

After all, there’s only one shareholder who matters, when it comes to Facebook, and that’s Mark Zuckerberg. The rest of them can huff and puff to the financial press, but they have no real influence on Facebook or its management — and no real ability to put pressure on Ebersman, either.

The other shareholders who matter are Facebook’s employees, without whom the whole company is nothing. They want to see the share price rise, of course, but Sorkin oversimplifies what’s good for them, and for the company:

Facebook’s falling stock price is not just a problem for investors; it is quickly creating real questions inside the company about its ability to retain and attract talented engineers, the lifeblood of any technology company.

Employees who joined the company starting in 2010, for example, are now holding onto restricted shares that were granted at a higher price — $24.10 — than the current trading price. (It should be noted that these are restricted stock units, not underwater stock options, so they do still have real value, but not nearly what the employees had expected.)

Let’s say you’re an employee who gets $50,000 of RSUs every year. Then in 2010 you got just over 2,000 RSUs, which are now worth about $37,500. Sorkin’s point is that you had hoped that they would be worth more than that by now — maybe you thought that Facebook would be a $100 billion company, and your RSUs would be worth $75,000.

But here’s the thing: if Facebook were worth $100 billion right now, then you would get only 1,300 RSUs this year. Whereas if Facebook is worth only $40 billion, then you’ll get 2,750 RSUs — more than twice as many. You’re increasing your stake in Facebook much faster than you would if it was worth more.

Zoom back and look at what’s happening across Facebook’s workforce as a whole: Ebersman is doling out a lot more shares to employees than he might have expected. That dilutes external shareholders and makes them even less relevant, but it’s not necessarily bad for employees.

Having a low share price can actually help in terms of attracting and retaining talent: it gives existing employees a reason to stay on rather than cash out, and it gives new employees much more upside. After all, anybody coming on board today and getting RSUs at $18 each knows that only a few months ago, there were market participants willing to pay more than $40 per share. And that nothing much has really changed since then as far as Facebook’s fundamentals are concerned.

Sorkin doesn’t get caught up in the detailed mechanics of the IPO: after all, he claims to be interested in the medium term, not the short term. But he never explains what he means when he says that “this wasn’t a traditional IPO and should never have been priced that way” — is he saying that the Facebook IPO was priced in some kind of traditional manner? Because, if he is, he’s wrong.

And more generally, it’s worth noting that Sorkin uses the word “investors”, in this column, no fewer than 13 times: it’s clear where his sympathies lie. But Ebersman’s job is to run Facebook’s finances much more than it is to worry about the mark-to-market P&L of the fickle buy side. He didn’t much care about investors before the IPO, and he doesn’t seem to care much about them after it, either. If they react by selling Facebook’s stock, that’s their right. But Zuckerberg — the guy who really matters — has made it very clear he’s concentrating on the long term. And so long as Zuckerberg has confidence that Ebersman is a good steward for Facebook’s finances, Ebersman is going to be safe in his job. No matter what investors think.

COMMENT

Sadly collapsed as a company as promising as Facebook, but fell into the snares and Wall Street greed destroyed a dream … Facebook as a company does not pay its advertising is not effective as its rival Google and that’s the problem dot com http://mulatahosting.com/

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