Counterparties: Winner winner prison dinner
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Letâs say your job is buying and selling mortgage-backed securities in a market that is generally illiquid and difficult to price. How much truth do you owe your clients, who canât rely on any sort of public exchange to determine just how much theyâre being screwed? Â To Jesse Litvak, the ex-Jefferies trader whoâs just beenÂ charged with defrauding clients, the answer to that question would seem to be zero.
At least since the days of âLiarâs Pokerâ, the price of an illiquid fixed-income security has always been whatever you can sell it for. Litvakâs job was not so far from that of the Salomon bond traders of old: he would simultaneously buy and sell the same mortgage security, leaving Jefferies, per the complaint, with âminimal or no riskâ.
Matt Levine describes Litvakâs thoughts on what he owed his clients: ââWhy should I tell my customers what I paid for these bonds?,â he asked himself, like any used-car dealer would, and now heâs under arrestâ. To Federal prosecutors, Litvak went too far by doing things like lying about the prices he was paying for securities, not to mention detailing nonexistent transactions with imaginary sellers:
winner winner chicken dinnerâŚhe is gonna sell em to me at 75-28 as I told him to not get cute and just sell the bonds so you can own them at 76âŚ.he said coolâŚ..its 6.23mm origâŚ.aâight?
Of course, there was no seller, and Jeffries had paid a lot less for that particular security than Litvak told clients. This trade generated $150,000 of the roughly $2.7 million that Litvak improperly made for Jefferies. But misrepresenting the price of securities to clients,Â Peter Lattman writes, âmight typically prompt the loss of a job or civil lawsuitsâ; it ârarely, if ever, rises to the level of a federal criminal prosecutionâ. AsÂ Zero Hedge writes, this is time-honored bond-trader behavior:
It wasn’t necessarily an easy job – it required an extensive rolodex, a keen ear for who held what securities in one’s given space, constant schmoozing, and manning the phones constantly. More, importantly, everyone knew how the game is played: everyone knew that the middlemen would usually skim a few basis points on the top or bottom of the bid-ask spread, in exchange for having the first call the next time a juicy security was being shopped around, or whenever one had to offload some debt in a hurry.
So why did the SEC and the Feds target Litvak? Lattman points to the âaggressive prosecutorial stance of the special inspector general for TARP,â Christy Romero. The government, which used TARP to help stabilize the mortgage securities market, was allegedly a victim of Litvakâs actions.
Alternatively, the Epicurean Dealmaker suggests, Litvak simply screwed the wrong people, including making Jefferies an extra $50,000 off George Soros and a measly $10,000 off Blackrock. — Ryan McCarthy
On to todayâs links: