Why Argentina will default in 2013

By Felix Salmon
February 28, 2013

Some countries default on their performing debt because they no longer have the ability to pay it. Other countries default on their performing debt because they no longer have the willingness to pay it. Argentina has been in both situations: something of a serial defaulter, it defaulted on or restructured its obligations in 1828, 1890, 1982, 1989, 2001, and 2005.

And it’s going to default once again in 2013.

This time, however, is a little bit different. Argentina has both the willingness and the ability to pay its performing debt. It’s adamant, however, that it’s not going to pay $1.4 billion to Elliott Associates, a hedge fund which has been prosecuting a highly-aggressive litigation strategy against the country, based on the fact that it holds defaulted debt and refused to exchange that debt for performing bonds. Depending on where you sit, Argentina’s refusal to pay off Elliott is either noble or foolish. But after two and a half hours of highly contentious oral testimony in federal appeals court today, it’s pretty clear that the US courts aren’t going to allow Argentina to stay current on its performing debt — not unless the country also writes a ten-figure check to Elliott. Which means that we’re headed straight for default, with almost no realistic chance of avoiding it.

You didn’t really need me to tell you that: one look at Argentina’s 12-month credit default swap (current spread: 5,266bp) will tell you everything you need to know. But this is a pretty big deal all the same — not least because the Second Circuit seems certain to hand down a judgment which is pretty bad law.

That’s nothing new: in its first decision, the Second Circuit happily ignored lots of settled law about sovereign immunity, among other things, and was downright wrong about pari passu. This time around, the law preventing the Second Circuit from upholding the lower court’s orders is much weaker, and mainly comprises something called Rule 65(d)(2)(C), which is even more obscure than pari passu. Essentially, the Second Circuit has proved itself more than capable of taking a steamroller to formidable legal obstacles; this one should present no real problems at all, by comparison.

The questioning was led, aggressively, by Judge Reena Raggi, who barely let a sentence get finished and who made it clear from the very beginning that she is if anything even more fed up with Argentina’s antics than the district court judge, Thomas Griesa, whose verdict was being appealed. The fact that Argentina’s vice president and economy minister were sitting right in front of her didn’t faze her for one second: this was her courtroom, she was in charge, and it took her no time at all to accuse Argentina of being “contumacious”. (Which is fair enough, even Argentina’s counsel didn’t really disagree on that front.) In Raggi’s eyes, clearly, there’s nothing worse than a contumacious defendant: it doesn’t matter how many footnotes you have or how much precedent you cite, if you’re thumbing your nose at her she’ll find against you.

What’s more, Raggi really doesn’t like being blackmailed. Both Argentina and David Boies, acting on behalf of the bondholders who are currently being paid by Argentina, made the point multiple times that if Griesa’s order was upheld, the certain result would be another Argentine default, a whole new set of cases on Griesa’s docket, and, essentially, a loss for everybody, including Elliott Associates, which still wouldn’t actually get paid. Raggi was unimpressed: “Is that really this court’s concern?” she asked Boies, saying that it was not her job to wonder about “whatever the market might do” as a result of her ruling.

Boies, in truth, was unimpressive: he never seemed entirely on top of his brief, and there was one excruciating episode where he had to go scurrying off to ask Bank of New York’s lawyer to find out the answer to a question which everybody else in the courtroom knew the answer to. Argentina’s tactic today was to spend less time arguing its own case, and to outsource the job of fighting Elliott to Bank of New York and to David Boies, in the hope that they would be more sympathetic and less contumacious. But Raggi made mincemeat both of BoNY’s lawyer — telling him in as many words at one point that he was giving very bad advice to his client — and of Boies, who was clearly out of his depth. Remarked one lawyer, observing the proceedings: “If you’re going to bring in a hired gun, at least make sure it’s fully loaded.”

Argentina’s own lawyer, Jonathan Blackman, started off rockily yet actually finished quite strongly, warning of the practical consequences of what everybody in the courtroom could quite clearly see coming at that point. “You’re making it worse!” he said. “Do no harm!” It was an argument with no legal weight, and it won’t change the final result. But he did give Argentina the use of a “don’t say we didn’t warn you” card at any time the US or anybody else criticizes it for defaulting yet again.

But the clear winner was Ted Olson, representing Elliott, who stayed calm and masterful throughout. In contrast to Boies, he knew exactly what he was talking about, was sure of the merits of his own case, and didn’t feel the need to appeal to Learned Hand precedent every few minutes. In front of more impartial judges, he might have had a harder time of it. But oral arguments aren’t the time or the place for jurisprudential nit-picking: that’s what detailed briefs are for. Rather, Olson’s job was to reassure the three appeals-court judges that they should feel perfectly comfortable upholding their colleague’s decision and standing up for legal rights enshrined in New York-law documentation. And he did that extremely well.

Or maybe the real winner was pretty much everybody in the courtroom, since the one thing that seems certain is that the amount of litigation and dealmaking surrounding Argentine sovereign debt — which has already been enormous — is going to become positively stratospheric. It’s hard to look too far into the future, here, but one likely scenario is that the appeals court will uphold Griesa’s decision at some point in April or May, forcing a big default in June. At that point, Argentina will probably launch an exchange offer under Argentine law, under which anybody holding currently-performing bonds would be able to swap them into bonds with substantially identical terms, just payable in Buenos Aires rather than New York. Given that Argentine-law bonds have been trading at tighter spreads then US-law bonds for some months now, one can assume that nearly all bondholders would jump at the opportunity to keep on getting their coupons.

Argentina might even take the opportunity to give its holdouts a third bite at the cherry, offering them some kind of option to take a haircut and get performing Argentine-law bonds in exchange for their defaulted debt. But many holdouts would still remain, and will surely continue to pester New York courts for the foreseeable future.

All of which helps explain why Argentina’s credit default swaps are trading so much wider than Argentina’s bonds. The bonds will probably default, but bondholders are unlikely to suffer huge losses if they just have a bit of patience for a couple of months — eventually, Argentina will surely give them the opportunity to swap their debt into a slightly different instrument, one which is less susceptible to New York jurists. That said, the credit default swaps will be triggered, and Argentina will probably drop out of key emerging-market indices like JP Morgan’s EMBI.

This is emphatically not what Argentina hoped for when it entered into its exchange offers in 2005 and 2010. Back then, the idea was that it could cure its default, mop up its holdouts somehow, or at least render them irrelevant, and ultimately make it back into the good graces of the international capital markets. Instead, Argentina remains a capital-markets pariah, it can’t really do business anywhere in the world without worrying that Elliott or someone like it is going to attach its property, and pretty soon it will probably have to give up on issuing any foreign debt at all, retreating instead to its own small South American world.

Argentina is a unique and special case on many levels: the failure of its 2005 and 2010 debt restructurings does not mean that debt restructurings in general don’t work, or that we need to resuscitate the idea of a sovereign bankruptcy regime. Still, the precedent being set here is not a happy one — not for international bondholders, probably not even for Elliott Associates, which is still a long way from getting paid, and definitely not for Argentina. This is looking very much like one of those court cases which absolutely everybody ends up losing.

Update: There is one way that Argentina can prevent a default in 2013: by prepaying all its 2013 coupons now, before the ruling comes down. Don’t rule it out: in this case, anything is possible.

32 comments

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After living here in retirement for nearly eight years, I have come to have a new appreciation for the idea of pyrrhic victories. Thin-skinned, ever ready to enter combat whether prepared or not, willfully ignorant of international standards of behavior, and always willing to lose rather than admit its wrong: Welcome to Argentina.

Posted by PeterBsAs | Report as abusive

@F.Salmon: Do you really think it is the right thing to judge those who try to enforce a contract as they see it as using a ” highly-agressive litigation strategy”?
You were wrong in your construction of the equal treatment clause of the FAA of Argentina. It looks like being a sore looser if now the judge of the district court as well as the three judges of the Second Circuit are considered to be impartial and biased because they do not agree with your interpretation.
Since Argentina agreed to be judged by NY law and NY court it should live with the result.
If the transcript confirms the following quote as reported by Bloomberg of Judge Raggi, responding to the suggestion that Argentina would default if the ruling of the District Court is upheld: “So the answer is you will not obey any order but the one you propose” it would strongly illuminate Argentina’s contempt of the law.
But the answer by the attorney of Argentina is inter-esting: “We would not voluntarily obey such an order.”
Such a contradictio in adjecto could indicate another strategy, namely to show a weapon against the demand by
holders of Exchanged Bonds to be paid ratable and equal to the Holdouts, which is their contract with Argentina if Argentina offers voluntarily better terms to Holdouts. The contact is silent in respect what happens in case Argentina is forced to pay what is due to the Holdouts.
Regards

Rainer Manthey

Posted by Manthey | Report as abusive

What happened to my comment?

Posted by Manthey | Report as abusive

All the Perry Mason BS aside, outside the US all the paper Elliot is holding now is nearly worthless?

Posted by Woltmann | Report as abusive

Hedge funds. They go crazy if they can’t make the law.

Pass the popcorn.

Posted by Eericsonjr | Report as abusive

“This is looking very much like one of those court cases which absolutely everybody ends up losing.”

This is exactly right and proper and is exactly what should happen when a bunch of institutions lend an extremely uncreditworthy borrower billions of dollars and that borrower is unable to repay.

Argentina took out a bunch of loans, and was unable to pay them. They underwent a lot of complicated financial maneuvering to try and game the system and make that as painless as possible for themselves. Some smart people did some complicated maneuverings of their own and tried to game the system to make a bunch of money.

That both parties have had a bad outcome from this huge waste of time and energy seems appropriate.

Posted by QCIC | Report as abusive

“Argentina has both the willingness and the ability to pay its performing debt. It’s adamant, however, that it’s not going to pay $1.4 billion to Elliott Associates, a hedge fund which has been prosecuting a highly-aggressive litigation strategy against the country, based on the fact that it holds defaulted debt and refused to exchange that debt for performing bonds.”

I don’t know how you can say that Argentina has the willingness to pay its debt when the reason for not paying is that it doesn’t want to take the chance on paying people it previously defaulted on. If Argentina doesn’t want speculators to buy up its debt, then it should make the debt non-transferable. Ha-ha. Can you imagine a country trying to finance itself on non-transferable debt?

Argentina cheated its creditors. They’re not embarrassed about it. To the contrary, they consider it their right.

Posted by Bob9999 | Report as abusive

The assumption that Argentina will now default on its obligations to exchange bondholders warrants closer scrutiny. Argentina might, in fact, pay the $1.4 billion owed to Elliott and all the money owed to exchanged bondholders.

Jonathan Blackman stated repeatedly that Argentina would never “voluntarily” pay holdouts. If Argentina now argued it had no choice but to pay holdouts, however, it could protect itself from claims by exchange bondholders that they were misled when they entered the exchange offers.

Argentina also has strong legal arguments (on FSIA and contract merger doctrine grounds) for why other holdouts who have already received court judgments on their defaulted bonds cannot collect using the “enhanced judgment enforcement mechanism” of an injunction. Payment might not, therefore, open Argentina to valid claims by all other holdouts. That seems like a better legal battle to wage than the mess that would entail after a default.

So unlike past episodes of contumacious conduct, this time may indeed be different.

Posted by gjm11 | Report as abusive

The bonds were issued from Brady Plan in 1992 and have an explicit clause of renunciation of the Argentine government to oppose the defense of sovereign immunity. The bonds are guaranteed by the United States. If Argentina stop paying, the United States will pay the remainder in 2023.
The restructured bonds have the same clause as the Brady bonds. In addition, Argentina explicitly waived its sovereign immunity by Decree 419/04.

Posted by miguelkatz | Report as abusive

The assumption that Argentina will now default on its obligations to exchange bondholders warrants closer scrutiny. Argentina might, in fact, pay the $1.4 billion owed to Elliott and all the money owed to exchanged bondholders.

Jonathan Blackman stated repeatedly that Argentina would never “voluntarily” pay holdouts. If Argentina now argued it had no choice but to pay holdouts, however, it could protect itself from claims by exchange bondholders that they were misled when they entered the exchange offers.

Argentina also has strong legal arguments (on FSIA and contract merger doctrine grounds) for why other holdouts who have already received court judgments on their defaulted bonds cannot collect using the “enhanced judgment enforcement mechanism” of an injunction. Payment might not, therefore, open Argentina to valid claims by all other holdouts. That seems like a better legal battle to wage than the mess that would entail after a default.

So unlike past episodes of contumacious conduct, this time may indeed be different.

Posted by gjm11 | Report as abusive

Great article! Some thoughts:

Whether or not you have been cheering for Argentina, for NML, or for no one in these proceedings, the most interesting impact may be the injunctive remedy which is arguably more powerful that any judgment would be. It seems that using a contempt trap/choice (depending on your viewpoint) for BoNY and a default trap/choice for Argentina the court seems likely to affirm the most powerful enforcement mechanism in the realm of sovereign debt since the era of “gunboat diplomacy.” Blocking access both to the world payment system and world capital markets is as close one can get to blocking access to trade and customs duties.

The question now remains whether this mechanism would be applicable to all other sovereigns or whether the 2nd Circuit’s stance is derived from Argentina’s specific history. As a court in equity, it is incumbent on the court to look at the totality of the circumstances. Argentina’s role as a “repeat defaulter” and “contumacious” challenger of holdout and creditor rights may be the limiting factor in the further use of such an enforcement mechanism. Still, if the injunction is affirmed it will be interesting to see if similar injunctions are sought either inside or outside the sovereign debt context. One imagines that others will certainly try

RPESSC

Posted by paripassuwatch | Report as abusive

You suggest this time is a little bit different, but is it really?

Reinhart and Rogoff recount this same story over 8 centuries: the sovereign issues debt, the sovereign defaults, the sovereign restructures, and there are holdouts, and those holdouts want to be paid.
Attitudes towards sovereign default and repayment go through phases. Yet, historically, holdouts have almost always been paid, for example, countries often end up settling their debts with their holdout creditors and so far this has not impaired sovereign debt restructuring. Besides, there have always been enforcement mechanisms: while we are no longer using gun boat diplomacy (see Michael Tomz, Enforcement by Gunboat), the norm is to hold countries accountable—exactly what the injunction purports to do. This is just another step in the evolution of enforcement mechanisms.

Moreover, the Second Circuit is not ignoring lots of settled law about sovereign immunity because sovereign immunity has changed dramatically over the last century moving from absolute immunity, to restrictive immunity, to the creation of the FSIA replete with specific exemptions. Besides, as Judge Raggi pointed out: Argentina waived its claim to sovereign immunity, submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court and wrote a pari passu clause into its sovereign debt contracts. Normally, in these circumstances, the court wouldn’t have to worry about enforcing its injunction…but Argentina is being a bit “contumacious.” This is just one more step in the evolution of sovereign debt—a mechanism for modern day situations.

Posted by ADEatDukeLaw | Report as abusive

Interesting article. I agree that it’s likely that Argentina will default; but it’s critical to remember that it doesn’t have to. Argentina would only have to pay a relatively small amount to the holdouts: in this case, $1.4b. In the worst case scenario, other FAA bondholders (some of whom have money judgments in hand) would use the Second Circuit’s case as precedent to collect on an additional ~$9b in defaulted instruments.

But the prospect of sovereign default does not warrant histrionics. In “This Time is Different” Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff point out that sovereign default is an historically common occurrence and, each time, we believe the situation is unique. While I expect a lively debate on whether the potential discovery of a credible enforcement mechanism does in fact distinguish this default from historical ones, history suggests that a belief in the singularity of the current situation is misplaced.

Moreover, although the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the pari passu language within the Argentine bonds may have created a more effective enforcement mechanism than in the past, does that make our situation unique? Creditors have always been able to turn to gunboat diplomacy or diplomatic responses. Does the court’s interpretation of pari passu distinguish this default from all historical defaults—or is it merely a natural step in the evolution of our response to sovereign default? Isn’t it just another war, albeit with different weapons? Why should we think that this time really is different?

Posted by eb14 | Report as abusive

“Given that Argentine-law bonds have been trading at tighter spreads then US-law bonds for some months now, one can assume that nearly all bondholders would jump at the opportunity to keep on getting their coupons.”

That is undoubtedly true, but their efforts to do so would be a direct violation of the decision that is likely to emerge from the 2nd Circuit. Absent an exchange to which every single bondholder agrees, any solution that provides for payment of some bondholders but not of others would be a violation of the pari passu clause. Any participation in such a violation would constitute active concert or participation with a party violating the NML v. Argentina and would therefore implicate Rule 65(d)(2)(C). The justices in the hearing demonstrated their commitment to a strict reading of 65(d)(2)(C) throughout their questioning of Bank of New York’s counsel, and that strict reading would doubtless be extended to bondholders seeking to bypass the panel’s by now practically guaranteed interpretation of the pari passu clause.

Posted by DanielKoehler | Report as abusive

It’s funny how when a sovereign or an individual goes through bankruptcy — the legal process in which, theoretically, we all agree that an entity cannot reasonably be expected to pay its debts, and thus we will ALL, creditors included, be better off letting it pay something less and clear its slate — certain people are inclined to rail about how creditors are being cheated. But when a corporation declares bankruptcy, and uses court proceedings to screw over those to whom it owes liabilities (such as its current and past workers), that is merely the capitalist system finding efficiencies.

Posted by Auros | Report as abusive

Unrelatedly: Can Argentina still appeal to the Supreme Court, and is anyone taking odds on whether Roberts and Kennedy might be inclined to uphold sovereign immunity? I would think the administration would file an amicus on Argentina’s side…

Posted by Auros | Report as abusive

Great article! Some thoughts:

Whether or not you have been cheering for Argentina, for NML, or for no one in these proceedings, the most interesting impact may be the injunctive remedy which is arguably more powerful that any judgment would be. It seems that using a contempt trap/choice (depending on your viewpoint) for BoNY and a default trap/choice for Argentina the court seems likely to affirm the most powerful enforcement mechanism in the realm of sovereign debt since the era of “gunboat diplomacy.” Blocking access both to the world payment system and world capital markets is as close one can get to blocking access to trade and customs duties.

The question now remains whether this mechanism would be applicable to all other sovereigns or whether the 2nd Circuit’s stance is derived from Argentina’s specific history. As a court in equity, it is incumbent on the court to look at the totality of the circumstances. Argentina’s role as a “repeat defaulter” and “contumacious” challenger of holdout and creditor rights may be the limiting factor in the further use of such an enforcement mechanism. Still, if the injunction is affirmed it will be interesting to see if similar injunctions are sought either inside or outside the sovereign debt context. One imagines that others will certainly try

RPESSC

Posted by paripassuwatch | Report as abusive

@Auros – the whole point of this action is that Argentina never went through a bankruptcy. Unlike with corporations, individuals, or local U.S. governments, there’s no mechanism for a sovereign to go bankrupt. Bankruptcy law has nothing to do with this case.

There is no question that Argentina’s old, defaulted bonds held by Elliott are a legal obligation of Argentina under New York and U.S. law. The question before the court is what means can be used to collect this obligation.

Posted by realist50 | Report as abusive

@ADE @paripassu Isn’t the point of gunboat diplomacy — Tomz’s article in particular — that it doesn’t work, or least didn’t happen the way we think it did. So, in that way, the injunction is nothing new; it’s just some semblance of government acting on behalf of its bondholders but not actually *doing* anything (I can’t imagine an Argentinian ship being detained in an American port a la the Libertad).

Posted by Ned_Stark | Report as abusive

@ADE

Agreed that looked at from 30,000 feet in many ways this is not necessarily different but rather a part of a rather long cycle of sovereign defaults with different periods when creditor rights became relatively weaker. Interestingly if we believe Tomz argument that the gun-boat hypothesis does not hold then this is perhaps the most powerful remedy ever in the sovereign context. Still looking at it like Reinhart and Roghoff might one imagines that the market including Sovereigns, Institutional holders and the many intermediaries that could be affected might begin to correct thus limiting the larger effect. Still those battles will be interesting to see. It does appear that other sovereigns are reacting e.g. Belize, Paraguay. One imagines that they will continue to do so. Still it seems that we can at least expect a period of difference until the historical arc again reverts to this norm of default, search for remedy, creation of new remedy, reaction to remedy.

Posted by paripassuwatch | Report as abusive

@ned Actually it is quite easy to imagine assets being either seized in the US or based on US court rulings. According to the following the libertad was the 29th impound case.

However, the impounding of assets has proven to be a remarkably inefficient remedy. The injunction however creates a default trap with far greater consequences than the nuisance of impounding la libertador tango 1 (the presidential plane). Attachment of assets thus far has proven to be for far smaller amounts than the hoped for payout of 1.3 billion at present making this in many ways different. Still your point is taken about gunboat diplomacy happening as people think it did. Indeed it can be hard to prove intervention on behalf on bondholders when it may have been intervention for a raft of reasons (geopolitcal concerns included). So we will it seems have to wait to see if this remedy is any different or any more effective.

Posted by paripassuwatch | Report as abusive

Like most of the posters here, I disagree with Mr. Salmon. He labels the 2nd DCA as “biased” simply because the court is likely to uphold well established NY law. His view indicates that he has little or no understanding of the laws that govern debtor/creditor rights, and that he would like courts to act in what he views as the majority bondholders’ “interest”, regardless of the fact that doing so would clearly violate the established legal rights of the minority bondholders.

He writes, seemingly with regret, that:

“..Argentina remains a capital-markets pariah, it can’t really do business anywhere in the world without worrying that Elliott or someone like it is going to attach its property, and pretty soon it will probably have to give up on issuing any foreign debt at all, retreating instead to its own small South American world.”

So what? They are DEADBEATS, for God’s sake! Argentina is an irresponsible debtor nations that caused huge numbers of innocent pensioners in Italy and across Europe to lose their life savings just a few years ago. The Argentine government DESERVES to be completely cut off from international capital markets. There is nothing more moral or just than doing exactly that. Allowing them access to markets, and, thereby, the ability to employ western banks, who are experts at squeezing money out of innocent little old ladies, is the wrongful act, not cutting them off!

But, as mentioned by so many other people here, Argentina is simply the tip of the iceberg. Its mistake was to borrow in the currency of another nation, the USA, when it cannot legally print dollars. The USA is also an irresponsible debtor nation, and will also default on its debt, but it will do so in a stealthy manner, by devaluing the US dollar to a tiny fraction of its present value. BUY GOLD!!

Posted by ttolstoy | Report as abusive

I’ve tried to get my head around this a few times before with little success but I’m too interested to just give up:

Can anyone explain how Argentina can issue bonds under New York law denominated in a foreign currency (USD$) and then try to assert their full sovereignty rights?

To me when you issue bonds outside of your own legal system and your own currency those bonds stop being truly sovereign and become something else. Thanks to anyone who can help!

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