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from Pakistan: Now or Never?:
On India-Pakistan thaw and the changing Afghan dynamics
There is a time and a place for everything and back in the days of the Obama election campaign the idea that progress on the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan could help turn around the flagging military campaign in Afghanistan looked plausible. The argument, much touted by Washington think-tankers, was that Pakistan would not turn against Afghan Taliban militants on its western border as long as it believed it might need to use them to counter India's growing influence in Afghanistan, and as long as it felt the need to keep the bulk of its army on its eastern border with India.
Even in the middle of last year, when Pakistan and India made an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to revive peace talks which had been frozen since the attack on Mumbai at the end of 2008, the possibility of a "grand bargain" from Kashmir to Kabul still carried some resonance.
But time has moved on, so it is a little bit strange to see these arguments resurfacing now after India proposed to resume talks with Pakistan. (See Newsweek's "Kashmir is the key to peace in Afghanistan" or the op-ed by David Ignatius in the Washington Post)
As I wrote in this analysis, a thaw in relations between India and Pakistan would be too little, too late to achieve results in time for Washington's 2011 deadline for drawing down troops in Afghanistan. Real progress on Kashmir would require them to get back to a roadmap for peace sketched out between India and Pakistan in 2007 under former president Pervez Musharraf. But Pakistan, whose vulnerability to attacks by Islamist militants has been demonstrated in a spate of gun and bomb attacks over the past year, probably no longer has the political space to offer the kind of concessions Musharraf made to get there without risking a backlash at home. And while the roadmap provided a framework for further negotiations on Kashmir, a lot of ground had yet to be covered to translate that into a real agreement; even if indeed it would ever have worked.
from Pakistan: Now or Never?:
In Afghanistan: fighting over the terms of a settlement
At last week's London conference, two of the great truisms of warfare punched their way to the surface. The first is that wars are fought as much on the home front as on the battlefield. With public support for the war in Afghanistan ebbing away, the United States and its allies in NATO have shifted from seeking outright victory to looking for an exit strategy that will allow them to start bringing home their troops next year. Rather as the British did after their two failed invasions of Afghanistan in the 19th century, they are sending in reinforcements in a display of military might which they hope will secure better terms in an eventual settlement.
The other truism is that if you can't win outright victory on the battlefield, then you have to negotiate with your enemies. President Hamid Karzai set the ball rolling by announcing he would hold a peace council to which, according to an Afghan government spokesman, the Taliban leadership would be invited. Karzai has made such suggestions before, and it is by no means clear the Taliban leadership will send representatives. What was different this time, however, was the context. Karzai's suggestion no longer met with the same resistance from war-weary governments, who stressed that it was up to the Afghans themselves to lead the process of reconciliation. He also coupled his call for a peace council with an appeal to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to bring peace to Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia is a trusted interlocutor between the Afghan government and the Taliban leadership; Pakistan is the only country which still has some measure of leverage over them. Thus Karzai's call for a loya jirga, though not dramatic in itself, became emblematic of a broader shift towards seeking a political settlement to end the war.
What happens now is so complicated and so delicate, that no one can predict the outcome. Just as western governments have little clear idea about who might buy into a political settlement and on what terms, nor do the insurgents themselves. Contacts with various insurgent groups are expected to follow many different tracks, so that everyone -- on all sides -- is going to be watching what everyone else does to try to maximise their advantage.
The warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, whose men play a powerful role in the insurgency in eastern Afghanistan, has shown some signs of flexibility, according to the Wall Street Journal. In a video leaked to the WSJ, he said that "we have no agreement with the Taliban - not for fighting the war, and not for the peace."
@Umair,
Umair, you do not understand western European mentality. You keep thumping your chest about Pak Army sacrifices, well to the western mindset, that this is just a part of the progress to achieving the goal. You have no reason speaking out here about sacrifices until militancy is gone from the region, then feel free to gloat about sacrifices and such. In the mean time, feel free to turn in Talibans, keep your eyes and ears open to those bearded guys who call themselves muslims, they rove the streets of Pindi and Islamabad, you never which one, and when may try to harm your countrymen. This is the creation of your army forefathers. Please be more productive and invite all forms destruction backwardness, like the Afghan Taliban, TET, JUD and all Kashmiri militants.
The world will not rest until ALL of Pakistan is rid of anti-civilization and anti-human elements, that includes all strategic depth toys your army guys you have as unofficial limbs of the army, trying night and day to wreak havoc on Afghans and Indians.
from Pakistan: Now or Never?:
On Taliban/AQ ties and the Afghanistan exit strategy
Vahid Brown at the CTC Sentinel has a new article (pdf document) out arguing that the relationship between Taliban leader Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden before 9/11 was considerably more fractious than it was made out to be. The main source of argument was between the Taliban's Afghan nationalist agenda and bin Laden's view of global jihad, and in particular his determination to attack the United States, he says.
Based on an account by an insider, he challenges the assumption that bin Laden personally swore an oath of allegiance to Mullah Omar. The account by Egyptian jihadist Mustafa Hamid, better known as Abul-Walid al-Masri, was first published in jihadist forums in 2007 but gained little attention outside specialist websites.
Given the groundswell of talk this week about the possibility of an eventual peace deal with the Taliban it is worth reading closely in the light of the debate about whether they can be prised away from al Qaeda (bin Laden's son says in this interview with Reuters that there is little love lost between the Taliban and OBL).
Brown notes that Abul-Walid is a Taliban loyalist and his claims should be treated with caution. However the apparent endorsement of his views by the Taliban would suggest that whether or not his account of a Taliban/al Qaeda rift is accurate, they cast light on how the Taliban chooses to project itself today.
@@ Can India withstand a nuclear strike even though it would retain a second strike status”
-Umair
Umair: This is the precise reason the world knows Pakistan for—-the “irresponsible nuclear power” whose citizens take out nuclear sword so often and whose scientists mingled with terrorists and whose agencies proliferated the nuclear weapons like no body’s business. Why I do not see Indians threatening Pakistan with nuclear weapon?
Perhaps you do not know the answer to your own question: “Are you aware of the destructive nature of nuclear weapons?” It’s about time you find the answer to it. A dirty bomb is good enough and you are discussing these nukes.
from Pakistan: Now or Never?:
U.S. policy confusion on Pakistan and India
What is the U.S. policy towards Pakistan and India, and in particular over how to deal with their rivalry over Afghanistan which complicates U.S. efforts to bring stability there? I've been trying to find an answer for weeks now amid a raft of contradictory signals and statements coming from different U.S. officials.
First we had the leaked report by General Stanley McChrystal in September suggesting the issue should be handled with caution given Pakistani sensitivities about a big rise in India's presence in Afghanistan following the fall of the Pakistani-backed Taliban in 2001.
“Indian political and economic influence is increasing in Afghanistan, including significant development efforts and financial investment,” it said. “In addition the current Afghan government is perceived by Islamabad to be pro-Indian. While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani counter-measures in Afghanistan or India.”
Then we had a series of reports, most recently here, suggesting Washington might welcome a bigger role for India in Afghanistan - precisely the kind of development that would exacerbate tensions with Pakistan given the current sour mood between New Delhi and Islamabad.
The biggest problem with any supposed attempts for a dialog between India and Pakistan by anyone (India, Pakistan, Kashmiri leaders, US) is that Pakistani military / ISI is not held accountable. It is Pakistani military / ISI that is in (most) control in Pakistan, and it gains tremendously from keeping animosity with India alive. I hope all parties involved get this (which they likely do), and more importantly, start acting upon it. Shying away from engaging in talks or curtailing the power of the Pakistani military / ISI will not get anyone anywhere on Indo-Pak peace, no matter what the intentions are.
from Pakistan: Now or Never?:
Pakistan: ditching “strategic depth”
Kamran Shafi has a column up at Dawn mocking Pakistan's old strategy of seeking "strategic depth" - the idea that in the event of war with India its military would be able to operate from Afghanistan to offset its disadvantage as a small country compared to its much bigger neighbour:
"Let us presume that the Indians are foolish enough to get distracted from educating their people, some of whom go to some of the best centres of learning in the world. Let us assume that they are idiotic enough to opt for war instead of industrialising themselves and meeting their economic growth targets which are among the highest in the world. Let us imagine that they are cretinous enough to go to war with a nuclear-armed Pakistan and effectively put an immediate and complete end to their multi-million dollar tourism industry. Let us suppose that they lose all sense, all reason, and actually attack Pakistan and cut our country into half.
"Will our army pack its bags and escape into Afghanistan? How will it disengage itself from the fighting? What route will it use, through which mountain passes? Will the Peshawar Corps gun its tanks and troop carriers and trucks and towed artillery and head into the Khyber Pass, and on to Jalalabad? Will the Karachi and Quetta Corps do likewise through the Bolan and Khojak passes? And what happens to the Lahore and Sialkot and Multan and Gujranwala and Bahawalpur and other garrisons? What about the air force? Far more than anything else, what about the by now 180 million people of the country? What ‘strategic depth’ do our Rommels and Guderians talk about, please? What poppycock is this?
"More importantly, how can Afghanistan be our ‘strategic depth’ when most Afghans hate our guts, not only the northerners, but even those who call themselves Pakhtuns?"
Nuclear weapons were used once in history and no country can ever use them again. Possession of these weapons does not give a country any extra edge over others globally. All it accomplishes is in-house support for the leadership of that particular country.
Pakistan cannot be talking about exercising the nuclear option at the drop of a hat. Even if Pakistan were ever so foolish to use such a weapon, it would become an instant pariah on the international scene. No country least of all Pakistan which is so dependent on international aid can survive the fallout, UN sanctions of 1998 is a case in point. Pakistani media and its leadership need to be more responsible and less jingoistic.
The use of militant Islam as a means of low intensity aggression against any nation is not acceptable in the post 9/11 world. Pakistan therefore needs to see the writing on the wall, and dismantle these institutions which it has supported so far, to further its influence in the South Asian region. State support for religious militancy is fraught with pit-falls, as interests of a nation state are much broader than the strict and narrow ideology of a religious group or sect. It does not take much provocation for these groups to turn on the benefactor itself, Pakistan is experiencing it today!
Pakistan has to build trust in its neighborhood. It cannot continue being a local bully, teetering on the edge, using threats and nuclear coercion as the new instrument of foreign policy.
from Pakistan: Now or Never?:
Kashmir gunbattle underscores India-Pakistan tensions
A nearly 24-hour gunbattle this week between militants and Indian security forces in the centre of Srinagar, the summer capital of Jammu and Kashmir, is a powerful reminder of the tensions in the region at the heart of enmity between India and Pakistan. Two people were killed along with the two militants - one of whom was described by police as a Pakistani - in the biggest attack in Srinagar in two years. Hundreds of people, who had become accustomed to relative calm after years of separatist violence, had to be rescued from nearby buildings.
The attack itself might or might not turn out to be an isolated incident. But what is troubling is that it took place within the context of a deterioration in relations between India and Pakistan.
After plummeting following the attack on Mumbai in November 2008, relations improved enough between India and Pakistan for their leaders to hold two rounds of talks on the sidelines of international meetings last year. As recently as July, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh promised to keep the lines of communication open with Pakistan. Since then the atmosphere has soured considerably, in part because of information which followed the arrest in Chicago of American David Headley which suggested the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba militant group blamed for Mumbai might be planning new attacks in India.
Not only are the two countries not talking, but they appear to be on a collision course over both Afghanistan and Kashmir.
@ Rajeev:
“Don;t you think that the flip side of the argument on the topic and Gen Kapoor’s intention is to present India with an aggressive Armed force so that even non-nuclear conflicts do not arise. This makes sense to me.”
I don’t think these comments were directed specifically “at” Pakistan at all. They seem to be more based on concerns that in the event of a future conflict, China and Pakistan would work together.
The big question is how to break a vicious circle in which India adopts a military position in response to China, and Pakistan – because it is focused on India – assumes that position is directed at it.
Dawn has an op-ed here asking how India, Pakistan and China (and the U.S.) can break out of this pattern:
from Pakistan: Now or Never?:
Failed airline attack raises fresh questions about battle against al Qaeda
In the absence of a coherent narrative about the failed Christmas Day attack on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, the debate about how best to tackle al Qaeda and its Islamist allies has once again been thrown wide open.
Does it support those who want more military pressure to deprive al Qaeda of its sanctuary on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, or suggest a more diffuse threat from sympathisers across Europe, the Middle East and Africa? Should the United States open new fronts in emerging al Qaeda bases such as Yemen and Somalia, or focus instead on the fact that the attempted airline attack did not succeed, suggesting al Qaeda's ability to conduct mass-casualty assaults on U.S. territory has already been severely degraded in the years since 9/11?
The evidence so far about the attempt by 23-year-old Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to set off an explosive device on the flight from Amsterdam to Detroit can pretty much be stacked up in favour of whatever argument you want to make.
Abdulmutallab was from a wealthy family in Nigeria, where al Qaeda and its Islamist allies have been trying to make inroads, by and large unsuccessfully so far. Residents in his family home town said they believed he was radicalised during his studies abroad, which included education at a British boarding school in Togo, followed by a course in engineering at the prestigious University College London. He would not be the first educated young man to be inspired by Islamist radicalism in London -- among those who came before him was Omar Sheikh, convicted for the kidnapping of Wall Street Journal correspondent Daniel Pearl in Pakistan.
from Pakistan: Now or Never?:
Pakistan: Through the eye of a needle
For the first time in many months, the future of Pakistan is being determined not in the fight against Islamist militants, but within its institutions -- its judiciary, its political parties, its government and its military. Last week's decision by the Supreme Court to strike down a 2007 amnesty given to politicians and bureaucrats has provided Pakistan with a rare opportunity to remodel itself as a civilian democracy based on the rule of law. But the way forward is so fraught with difficulties that assessments of its chances of success are at best sober, at worst ominous.
The court decision to strike down the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) affects some 8,000 politicians and bureaucrats on a list of those who had been covered by the amnesty, including the defence and interior ministers. President Asif Ali Zardari had also been covered by the amnesty, but remains protected by presidential immunity. Such was the upheaval created by the ruling that foreign exchange markets were briefly shaken last week by unfounded rumours of a military coup. The real impact is likely to be more slow-burning.
THE POWER OF THE MILITARY
The disarray in government ranks will weaken its ability to take on the country's powerful military, which continues to call the shots in Pakistan's security and foreign policy.
from Pakistan: Now or Never?:
Comparing Pakistan’s Islamists to India’s Maoists
One of the more controversial arguments doing the rounds is the question of whether you can compare Pakistan's Islamist militants to Maoist insurgents in India. Both claim to champion the cause of social justice and have been able to exploit local grievances against poor governance to win support, and both use violence against the state to try to achieve their aims.
The differences are obvious: the Islamist militants come from the religious right; the Maoists from the far-left. In Pakistan, the militants have become powerful enough to strike at the heart of the country's major cities. In India, the Maoists remain largely confined to the country's interiors, although their influence is spreading through large parts of its rural hinterland.
In Pakistan, the military initially nurtured Islamist militants to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan - with U.S. and Saudi support - and later to fight India in Kashmir. In India, the Maoist movement has grown organically from its origins as a local 1967 uprising by communists over a land dispute in the village of Naxalbari in West Bengal, from where its followers derive their name as Naxalites.
In Pakistan, the question of whether support for Islamist militants is underpinned by local grievances over social injustice is highly contentious. Many in Pakistan dismiss the Pakistani Taliban as right-wing ideologues, fired up by an alien religious philosophy imported from the Middle East by al Qaeda, and joined by a motley crew of criminals and thugs bent on the pursuit of pursuit of power and money.
@ Dara,
“I read Sen’s “The Argumentative Indian” and freely admit that very often had to read portions repeatedly to even understand the gist.”
I’m glad you said that. I picked up a copy of “The Argumentative Indian” recently and am finding it very hard to get through. Do read his book “Identity and Violence” if you haven’t already done so as it is much clearer.
One thing that did come across in “The Argumentative Indian” is Sen’s view that India suffers from western misconceptions of India. He does not say this, but I’ve been wondering whether the foreign investment view of India as BRIC economy belongs in that category? (I am going way off topic here, but it has been interesting to see that nobody who has commented on this post has recommended foreign investment as the solution to poverty in Chhattisgarh and other places.)
@ Rajeev,
You are right. I should read Khushwant Singh’s “A History of the Sikhs”. (I agree that Kashmir is not terribly relevant here, but it just happens to be the area I’ve read about since I’ve been studying 19th century Kashmir history for an entirely separate project.)
“I have personal experience. During my visit to Venice, standing at a bridge was an elderly couple who overheard us talk in Hindi/Punjabi and they were Punjabis from Lahore, settled in Vancouver. We talked for 20minutes and felt as if we know each other for a long time and departed with invitation next time we visit Canada BC. But my issue is discussing hate, the problem for which we need solution.”
Much as it is risky to generalise, I’ve always had a sense that Punjabis are a bit like people from Glasgow and the west of Scotland (which is where I am from). The sectarian divisions there between Catholics and Protestants used to be extremely powerful, in part, but only in part, because of the Northern Ireland issue. That has changed only in the last few decades. But certainly when I was growing up Catholics and Protestants did not mix, went to different schools, supported different football teams (Rangers is protestant, Celtic is catholic) etc etc.
Obviously in the case of Indian and Pakistani Punjabis you have a division between two different countries, along with all the pain caused by partition that many people still carry. But it’s definitely a subject worth looking at a bit more closely.
from Pakistan: Now or Never?:
Can China help stabilise Pakistan?
When President Barack Obama suggested in Beijing last month that China and the United States could cooperate on bringing stability to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and indeed to "all of South Asia", much of the attention was diverted to India, where the media saw it as inviting unwarranted Chinese interference in the region.
But what about asking a different question? Can China help stabilise the region?
As I wrote in this analysis, China -- Islamabad's most loyal partner -- is an obvious country for the United States to turn to for help in working out how to deal with Pakistan.
It already has substantial economic stakes in the region, including in the Aynak copper mine in Afghanistan and Gwadar port in Pakistan. Its economy would be the first to gain from any peace settlement which opened up trade routes and improved its access to oil, gas and mineral resources in Central Asia and beyond. It also shares some of Washington's concerns about Islamist militancy, particularly if this were to spread unrest in its Muslim Xinjiang region.
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Alamsha Khan: “True Indo-Pak peace is possible only when RSS-BJP-BD-Deoband-JUD-LeT-Kashmiri seperatists hold a peace meeting.”
This is not fair. You forgot to mention the Shiv Sena. You also forgot the Indian Mujahideen, and SIMI. Please improve your general knowledge by reading reliable newspapers like Pak Tribune in order to post accurate information.
India has started a new peace process with Pakistan. As a friendly gesture, we’d like to give you Bal Thackeray, Uddhav Thakkarey and other Thakkareys as gift. You can offer them to the LeT for target practice. Please let us know when we can ship them. They’d feel at home in a country like Pakistan where people are very spirited in expressing their hatred for others. We also have some leaders like Mayawati, Advani, Narendra Modi, Mulayam Yadav, Lallu Yadav and many others that Pakistan can take and offer Nisha-e-Pakistan awards. Did I forget anyone else? Before you make your offer, thanks, but we do not want your Zardaris and Sharifs. We have plenty already at home. Since Pakistan specializes in scrap picking and recycling, it would help us if you could take our garbage. Thanks in advance.