Three snapshots for Monday
The yield on 10-year U.S. Treasuries, fell to their lowest levels since early October today, breaking decisively below 1.80 percent. That compares to the dividend yield on the S&P 500 of 2.28%.
The European Central Bank kept its government bond-buy programme in hibernation for the ninth week in a row last week. The ECB may come under pressure to act as yields on Spanish 10-year government bonds rose further above 6% today.
Output at factories in the euro zone unexpectedly fell in March, the latest in a series of disappointing numbers signalling that the bloc’s recession may not be as mild as policymakers hope. On an annual basis, factory output dived 2.2 percent in March, the fourth consecutive monthly slide, Eurostat said, and only Germany, Slovenia and Slovakia were able to post growth in the month.
Big Fish, Small Pond?
It’s the scenario that Bank of England economist Andrew Haldane last year termed the Big Fish Small Pond problem — the prospect of rising global investor allocations swamping the relatively small emerging markets asset class.
But as of now, the picture is better described as a Small Fish in a Big Pond, Morgan Stanley says in a recent study, because emerging markets still receive a tiny share of asset allocations from the giant investment funds in the developed world.
These currently stand at under 10% of diversified portfolios from G4 countries even though emerging markets make up almost a fifth of the market capitalisation of world equity and debt capital markets. In the case of Japan, just 4% of cross-border investments are in emerging markets, MS estimates.
But change is on its way. MS surveys show most classes of global institutional investors intend to boost allocations to emerging markets, including the more conservative investor groups – Japan’s $1.3 trillion government pension insurance fund, for instance, plans to start buying emerging equities later this year. MS analysts calculate allocations to emerging markets could rise 3.5% over the next five years.
That may not sound like much until one realises the true scale of the global pool of investable institutional assets and compares them with current market cap values in developing countries . These assets currently exceed $212 trillion, meaning a 3.5 % allocation increase will bring over $2 trillion into emerging markets. That’s over half the capitalisation of EM equity market, more than 80% of bond markets and a third of the combined market cap of both sectors.
Take a look at some more numbers:
– Based on current market values, a 1% increase in allocation to EM by pension and insurance funds represents a $524 billion flow to EM assets.
Three snapshots for Thursday
The European Central Bank kept interest rates on hold on Thursday. President Mario Draghi urged euro zone governments to agree a growth strategy to go hand in hand with fiscal discipline, but as thousands of Spaniards protested in the streets he gave no sign the bank would do more to address people’s fears about the economy
The divergence between Euro zone countries is starting to impact analyst estimates for earnings. As this chart shows earnings forecasts for Spain and Portugal are seeing more downgrades than Germany or France.
The inflation rate in Turkey rose to 11.1% in April, putting pressure on the central bank to raise interest rates:
The “least worst” option?
Western governments saddled with mountainous debts will “repress” creditors and savers via banking regulation, capital controls, central bank bond buying and currency depreciation that effectively puts sovereign borrowers at the top of the credit queue while simultaneously wiping out real returns for their bond holders. So says HSBC chief economist Stephen King in his latest report this week called “From Depression to repression”.
Building on the work of U.S. economist Carmen Reinhardt and others, King’s focus on the history of heavily indebted governments applying “financial repression” to creditors arrives at several interesting conclusions. First, even though western governments appeared successful in using these tactics to reduce massive World War Two debts alongside brisk economic growth during the 1950s and 1960s, King argues that the debt was cut mainly by the impressive economic growth and tax revenues during that “Golden Age” – and this was mostly down to the once-in-a-century period of relative peace that involved unprecedented integration and cooperation among western governments also engaged in a Cold War with the Soviet Union. Compared to this boost, the financial repression was a “sideshow”, he reckons. To show t
Instead, King says governments will adopt this repression tactic anyway just to stave off draconian austerity now and prevent a destabilising surge in economy-wide borrowing rates. This will effectively reduce the amount of credit to the rest of the private sector, or at least elevating its cost, while reducing the pressure on governments to cut the debt levels quickly. The net result, then will likely be “persistently lower growth”, whatever your conclusion about the desirability of state or the market allocation of resources.
And, in the absence of an obvious alternative, repression may also be the “least worst” option, King argues.
Renihart is exactly right. But there is a darker theory yet: that Fed policy is just part of a government-wide strategy of practicing “financial repression” to escape from the consequences of the debt explosion. The leading expert on financial repression is Carmen Reinhart of the Peterson Institute. She defines it as a situation in which “governments implement policies to channel to themselves funds that in a deregulated market environment would go elsewhere.”
Low or negative real interest rates are among the oldest examples. Call this monetary repression. Reinhart points out that it was practiced on a large scale by governments after World War II. She asserts that it accomplished by stealth the effective cancelation of government debt without resort to orthodox spending and tax policies for which governments knew then and now that they cannot get the electorate’s consent.
A similar debt predicament today implies that monetary and other forms of repression are again on the cards, especially in the United States. Wainwright has attempted to measure it, but estimates of real interest rates and monetary repression are fuzzy and contentious, especially because the government as¬serts control over the method by which inflation is measured.
Nevertheless, the company’s research, estimates that the Fed’s interest-rate policy in 2007-11 has cut the real interest rate from a normal 2 or 3 percent to an aver¬age of minus 7 or 8 percent. That’s a diversion of about ten percentage points a year to the Treasury and other borrowers—just about enough to fund the current budget deficit. Genius…
Luis de Agustin
Three snapshots for Monday
Spanish 10-year bond yields hit 6%, around the levels seen in Ireland/Portugal and Italy/Spain at the start and resumption of ECB bond purchases.
U.S. retail sales rose more than expected in March as Americans shrugged off high gasoline prices.
Currency speculators boosted their bets against the euro in the latest week. Figures from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission released on Friday showed a jump in euro net shorts of 101,364 contracts this week from 79,480 previously.
Yuan risks uniting bulls and bears?
Is the outlook for China’s yuan uniting the biggest global markets bulls and bears? Well, kind of.
As China posts its biggest trade deficit (yes, that’s a deficit) of the new millennium and its monetary authorities flag greater “flexibility” of the yuan exchange rate (the PBOC engineered the US$/yuan’s second biggest daily drop on record on Monday), the chances of an internationally-controversial weakening of yuan in a U.S. election year have risen. A weaker yuan would clearly up the ante in the global currency war, coming as it does amid Japan’s successful weakening of its yen this year and as Brazil on Monday felt emboldened enough in its battle to counter G7 devaluations by extending a tax curbing foreign inflows. And, arguably, it could bring the whole conflagration around full circle, where currency weakening in the BRICs and other emerging economies blunts one of the desired effects of money-printing and super-lax monetary policy in the G7 — merely encouraging even more printing and so on.
Societe Generale’s long-time global markets bear Albert Edwards argued as much last week: “We have long stated that if the Chinese economy looks to be hard landing, as we believe it will, the authorities there will actively consider renminbi devaluation, despite the political consequences of such action.”
But, unusually, BRIC-inventor and long-time global economy bull Jim O’Neill, in an FT op-ed this weekend, is not that far away from this yuan call either — even if he’s keener to stress the likelihood of a more volatile yuan rather than the risk of a weaker one per se and, unlike Edwards’ typically gloomy wider take, reckons it’s a benign development related to China’s healthy rebalancing of its economy away from export dependency to more domestic consumption
…currency reform does not equal currency appreciation. The renminbi is going to become more volatile like other currencies. It will go up as well as down against the dollar, partly because China’s current account surpluses are coming to an end, but also because it is opening up its capital account.
So if not a meeting of minds on the bigger picture, then at least something approaching harmony on the risks to anyone betting on an endlessly rising yuan – especially those in Washington.
Fresh skirmishes in global currency war
Amid all the furious G7 money printing of recent years, Brazil was the first to sound the air raid siren in the “international currency war” back in 2010 and it continues to cry foul over the past week. With its finance ministry issuing fresh warnings last night over hot-money flows being dropped by western economies on its unsuspecting exporters via currency speculation, Brazil’s central bank then set off its own defensive anti aircraft battery with a surprisingly deep interest rate cut late Wednesday. Having tried everything from taxes on hot foreign inflows to currency market intervention, they are braced for a long war and there’s little sign of the flood of cheap money from the United States, Europe and Japan ending anytime soon. So, if you can’t beat them, do you simply join them?
The prospect of a deepening of this currency conflict — essentially beggar-thy-neighbour devaluation policies designed to keep countries’ share of ebbing world growth intact — was a hot topic this week for Societe Generale’s long-standing global markets bear Albert Edwards. Edwards, who represent’s SG’s “Alternative View”, reckons the biggest development in the currency battle this year has been the sharp retreat of Japan’s yen and this could well drag China into the fray if global growth continues to wither later this year. He highlighted the Japan/China standoff with the following graphic of yen and yuan nominal trade-weighted exchange rates.
Edwards goes on to say that this could, in turn, create another explosive FX standoff between China and the United States if Beijing were to consider devaluation — the opposite of what the protectionist U.S. lobby has been screaming for for years.
“We have long stated that if the Chinese economy looks to be hard landing, as we believe it will, the authorities there will actively consider renminbi devaluation, despite the political consequences of such action.”
“Clearly, the US will not respond well if China chooses to devalue. But China might argue that as its reserves are now declining there is clear downward pressure on its currency and that, after all, the US has asked it to allow market forces to have more of an influence!”
Central banks and the next bubble (3)
Expectations are running high ahead of next week’s LTRO 2.0 (expected take-up is somewhat smaller than the first time and the previous estimate though, with Reuters poll predicting banks to grab c492 bln euros).
The ECB’s three-year loan operation, along with the BOJ’s unexpected easing, BoE’s QE and commitment from the Fed to keep rates on hold until at least end-2014 may constitute competitive monetary easing, Goldman Sachs argues.
As the moves to ease have been rolled out, we increasingly encounter the argument that such ‘competitive’ (non-coordinated) monetary expansions by developed market central banks are at best ineffective and at worst a zero-sum game at the global level—and perhaps a precursor of something worse, such as a slide towards protectionism.
Goldman’s calculation shows developed market benchmark yields have fallen by an average of around 30 basis points since the Fed started its $400 bln “Operation Twist” stimulus programme in August.
The current phase of easing, the U.S. bank says, is similar to the QE2 from Aug-Nov 2010, which resulted in a sharp spike in oil and commodity prices, a fall in the dollar and the famous “currency war” of competitive devaluation.
Goldman says while easing is still net positive for global growth, the ones who may struggle are, again, emerging economies.
Agreed – the emerging markets monetary policy rate index also illustrates this: http://www.centralbanknews.info/2012/02/ emerging-markets-monetary-policy-rate.ht ml
Central banks and the next bubble (2)
In the previous bubble blog earlier in the week I wrote that G4 central bank balance sheets are expanding to a whopping 26% of GDP.
In what Nomura’s Bob Janjuah called “Monetary Anarchy”, some analysts worry that central bank liquidity expansion is a timebomb which if/when it explodes would have very negative consequences.
Swiss private bank Lombard Odier, weighing in on the debate, warns that not only has the quality of central bank balance sheets deteriorated, there has been no visible impact on the real economy.
Stephanie Kretz, member of the investment strategy team for private banking at Lombard Odier, points out that a sharp fall in the money multiplier, defined as the ratio of broad money (M3) to the monetary base, means the impact on the real economy has been almost non-existent.
What about the real economy? Ballooning and riskier central bank balance sheets will not generate sustainable growth or reduce unemployment and debt levels, but could well induce at a later stage unintended consequences that include bouts of hyper-inflation, loss of trust in fiat money and loss of central banks’ credibility as to their capacity to maintain strong currencies and stable prices.
The huge increase in the monetary base has not flowed into the real economy, and is sitting in the excess reserves of still reluctant-to-lend banks whilst the world is deleveraging, thus capping the demand for credit.
What happens when a recovery eventually kicks in, interest rates go up, the velocity of circulation of money comes back and real economy is flooded with paper currency that does not correspond to real human production? Monetary base expansion will need to be reversed in large, non-incremental steps if it is to be non-inflationary. This is uncharted territory for central banks and poses significant longer-term policy risks.
Central banks and the next bubble
Central bank balance sheets are expanding at what some say is an alarming pace. Can this cause the next bubble to form and burst?
JP Morgan estimates G4 (U.S., Japan, euro zone and Britain) balance sheets are now around 24% of GDP combined, with around 11% of GDP comprising bonds held for monetary purposes.
“The recent pace of balance sheet expansion is the fastest since the immediate aftermath of Lehman, largely down to the ECB. The increased BOJ purchases, more QE in the UK, and 200 bln euros upwards of increased ECB lending from this month’s LTRO together point to a further $600bln+ rise in G4 central bank balance sheets this year, to around 26% of GDP.”
Outside G4, Switzerland is a country which saw a massive expansion in its central bank balance sheet. And because of its huge holdings, its balance sheet has been very volatile.
The Swiss National Bank suffered a loss of 21 bln francs last year — its biggest ever — due to currency interventions to weaker the Swiss currency. It expects to swing back to a profit of 13 bln francs this year.
Its acting chairman Thomas Jordan himself admitted: “Our profits have been and will be very volatile … because our balance sheet is four to five times as big as it was five years ago.”
