Quiet CDS creep highlights China risk
As credit default swaps (CDS) for many euro zone sovereigns have zoomed to ever new record highs this year, Chinese CDS too have been quietly creeping higher. Five-year CDS are around 135 bps today, meaning it costs $135,000 a year to insure exposure to $10 million of Chinese risk over a five-year period. According to this graphic from data provider Markit, they are up almost 45 basis points in the past six weeks. In fact they are double the levels seen a year ago.
That looks modest given some of the numbers in Europe. But worries over China, while not in
the same league as for the euro zone, are clearly growing, as many fear that the real scale of indebtedness and bad loans in the economy could be higher than anyone knows. Above all, investors have been fretting about a possible hard landing for the economy, with the government unable to control a growth slowdown.
The CDS rises have coincided with worsening economic data – state-owned companies’ profits have fallen 8.6 percent in the January-April period from year-ago levels while industrial production weakened sharply in April. Fixed asset investment – a key driver of the economy – has hit its lowest level in nearly a decade.
CDS fell slightly today after Premier Wen Jiabao called for more efforts to support growth. His comments also provided a mild boost to China’s stock markets. Gavan Nolan, Markit’s director for credit research, says Wen’s comments suggest growth is taking precedence over inflation in policymakers’ minds:
Battered India rupee lacks a warchest
The Indian rupee’s plunge this week to record lows will have surprised no one. After all, the currency has been inching towards this for weeks, propelled by the government’s paralysis on vital reforms and tax wrangles with big foreign investors. These are leading to a drying up of FDI and accelerating the exodus from stock markets. Industrial production and exports have been falling. High oil prices have added a nasty twist to that cocktail. If the euro zone noise gets louder, a balance of payments crisis may loom. The rupee could fall further to 56 per dollar, most analysts predict.
True, the rupee is not the only emerging currency that is taking a hit. But the Reserve Bank of India looks especially powerless to stem the decline. (See here for an article by my colleagues in Mumbai) . One reason the RBI’s hands are effectively tied is that India is one of the few emerging economies that has failed to build up its hard currency reserves since the 2008 crisis and so is unable to spend in the currency’s defence. Usable FX reserves stand now around $260 bilion, down from $300 billion just before the 2008 crisis. See the following graphic from UBS which shows that relative to GDP, India’s reserve loss has been the greatest in emerging markets.
But there is worse. The relative decline in reserves since 2008 coincides with a ballooning in India’s external debt, both private and public. Comprising mostly of corporate borrowing and trade credit, the debt stands at $350 billion, up from $225 billion four years back.
No wonder investors have upped their bearish bets on the rupee: a Reuters poll of Asian fund managers shows these at a six-month high and significantly higher than any other Asian currency. For now, the trade looks worryingly like a one-way street.
South African bond rush
It’s been a great year so far for South African bonds. But can it get better?
Ever since Citi announced on April 16 that South African government bonds would join its World Government Bond Index (WGBI), almost 20 billion rand (over $2.5 billion ) in foreign cash has flooded to the local debt markets in Johannesburg, bringing year-to-date inflows to over 37 billion rand. Last year’s total was 48 billion. Michael Grobler, bond analyst at Johannesburg-based brokerage Afrifocus Securities predicts total 2012 inflows at over 60 billion rand, surpassing the previous 56 billion rand record set in 2o1o:
The assumption..is based on the fact that South Africa will have a much larger and diversified investor base following inclusion in the WGBI expanding beyond the EM debt asset class
Currently South African bonds are restricted to emerging local bond indices. The most-widely used, JPMorgan’s GBI-EM, has less than $200 billion benchmarked to it and South Africa’s weighting is 10 percent. But the WGBI is a different matter altogether — around $2 trillion is estimated to track this index which currently includes just 22 countries, only three of them emerging markets. An expected 0.44 percent weighting for South Africa implies inflows of $5-$9 billion, analysts estimate.
Some of that cash has already come. How much more could roll in this year? Optimists point to Mexico – foreign ownership of the local debt market there rose to 31 percent from 24 percent over 2010, the year the country joined the WGBI, with $11 billion flowing in. But the picture in South Africa is in fact not that rosy. Inflows will undoubtedly pick up, benefiting both bonds and the rand but many reckon positioning in South African bonds is already pretty crowded – about a third of the market is in foreign hands already, analysts at Morgan Stanley reckon. Worse, the country faces a possible credit ratings downgrade this year (all three rating agencies have cut its ratings outlook to negative in recent months).
Kieran Curtis, a fund manager at Aviva Investors upped his holdings of South African local bonds after the WGBI news but is reluctant to go overweight, betting the market will benefit less than Mexico did two years ago. He cites two reasons — first South Africa’s budget deficit has been creeping higher and it follows that debt issuance will too. Second, the external backdrop is less supportive today than two years ago when the Fed was in full money-printing mode:
I wouldnt say I detect a very strong commitment in South Africa to restoring the budget to balance and those debt numbers can rise quickly when you have a 5-6 percent deficit. Also Mexico’s inclusion came at a time when U.S. Treasury yields were falling fairly quickly but now, with Treasury yields rising we may not get the same support for South Africa.
Big Fish, Small Pond?
It’s the scenario that Bank of England economist Andrew Haldane last year termed the Big Fish Small Pond problem — the prospect of rising global investor allocations swamping the relatively small emerging markets asset class.
But as of now, the picture is better described as a Small Fish in a Big Pond, Morgan Stanley says in a recent study, because emerging markets still receive a tiny share of asset allocations from the giant investment funds in the developed world.
These currently stand at under 10% of diversified portfolios from G4 countries even though emerging markets make up almost a fifth of the market capitalisation of world equity and debt capital markets. In the case of Japan, just 4% of cross-border investments are in emerging markets, MS estimates.
But change is on its way. MS surveys show most classes of global institutional investors intend to boost allocations to emerging markets, including the more conservative investor groups – Japan’s $1.3 trillion government pension insurance fund, for instance, plans to start buying emerging equities later this year. MS analysts calculate allocations to emerging markets could rise 3.5% over the next five years.
That may not sound like much until one realises the true scale of the global pool of investable institutional assets and compares them with current market cap values in developing countries . These assets currently exceed $212 trillion, meaning a 3.5 % allocation increase will bring over $2 trillion into emerging markets. That’s over half the capitalisation of EM equity market, more than 80% of bond markets and a third of the combined market cap of both sectors.
Take a look at some more numbers:
– Based on current market values, a 1% increase in allocation to EM by pension and insurance funds represents a $524 billion flow to EM assets.
Ukraine’s $58 billion problem
Ukrainian officials were at pains to reassure investors last week that no debt default was in the offing. But people familiar with the numbers will find it hard to believe them.
The government must find over $5.3 billion this year to repay maturing external debt, including $3 billion to the IMF and $2 billion to Russian state bank VTB. Bad enough but there is worse: Ukrainian companies and banks too have hefty debt maturities this year. Total external financing needs– corporate and sovereign – amount to $58 billion, analysts at Capital Economics calculate. That’s a third of Ukraine’s GDP and makes a default of some kind very likely. The following graphic is from Capital Economics.
In normal circumstances Ukraine — and Ukrainian companies — could have gone to market and borrowed the money. Quite a few developing countries such as Lithuania recently tapped markets, others including Jamaica plan to do so. Ukraine’s problem is its refusal to toe the IMF line. Agreeing to the IMF’s main demand to lift crippling gas subsidies would unlock a $15 billion loan programme, giving access to the loan cash as well as to global bond markets. But removing subsidies would be political suicide ahead of elections in October. And with the sovereign frozen out of bond markets, Ukrainian companies too will find it hard to raise cash.
So what options does Ukraine have? It could yet sell bonds on global markets. Or it could, as the finance minister sugggested last week, borrow at home in hard currency. But its tiny, illiquid local debt markets are unlikely to attract too many foreign investors. And yields will be ruinous. Ukraine’s 2015 dollar bond is trading with a yield of 9 percent and Ukrainian sovereign dollar debt carries a hefty 870 basis-point premium to U.S. Treasuries, among the highest in emerging markets. Analysts at Capital Economics write:
Issuing debt at interest rates of 8-10% is unsustainable for a country that even on the IMF’s optimistic projections is likely to record average nominal GDP growth (in US$) of only 4.5% a year over the next three years.
The government could also dip into the central bank’s $30 billion reserves. But this would be a temporary fix. Also, reserves are already down $7 billion since last August and spending more of this could leave the hryvnia seriously exposed in coming months.
Three snapshots for Tuesday
Italy and Spain are back in focus as bond yields and spreads start rising again.
The latest Sentix euro zone investor sentiment index also seemed to confirm the feeling that crisis worries are back falling to -14.7 in April.
U.S. small business confidence dropped in March for the first time in six months:
A Hungarian default?
More on Hungary. It’s not hard to find a Hungary bear but few are more bearish than William Jackson at Capital Economics.
Jackson argues in a note today that Hungary will ultimately opt to default on its debt mountain as it has effectively exhausted all other mechanisms. Its economy has little prospect of strong growth and most of its debt is in foreign currencies so cannot be inflated away. Austerity is the other way out but Hungary’s population has been reeling from spending cuts since 2007, he says, and is unlikely to put up with more.
How did other highly indebted countries cope? (lets leave out Greece for now). Jackson takes the example of Indonesia and Thailand. Both countries opted for strict austerity after the 1997 Asian crisis and resolved the debt problem by running large current account surpluses. This worked because the Asian crisis was followed by a period of buoyant world growth, allowing these countries to boost exports. But Hungary’s key export markets are in the euro zone and are unlikely to recover anytime soon.
The other example is Argentina. It too recovered strongly from its 2001 crisis but its way out was default. Capital Economics writes:
There are arguments for why, in Hungary’s case, default might appear to be an attractive option. The economy runs both a current account surplus and a primary surplus (i.e. government spending is lower than receipts before interest payments are taken into account). This means that if the Hungarian government were to default and were to be barred from borrowing from abroad, it would still not be forced into drastic fiscal austerity or a painful current account adjustment via reduced domestic demand.
Moreover, the note says:
Sujata Rao, let me explain why this isn’t going to happen, a default that is. It would tarnish the PMs otherwise flawless reputation and image.
He rather resort to unorthodox financial strategies that slowly makes the people that can, move out of the country, and the rest will suffer the consequences of these strategies.
Hungary’s plan to get some cash in the bank
Hungary says it might borrow money from global bond markets before it lands a long-awaited aid deal with the International Monetary Fund. That pretty much seems to suggest Budapest has given up hope of getting the IMF cash any time soon. Given the fund has already said it won’t visit Hungary in April, that view would seem correct.
There is some logic to the plan.
Hungary desperately needs the cash — it must find over 4 billion euros just to repay external debt this year.
It is also an attractive time to sell debt. Appetite for emerging market debt remains strong. Emerging bond yield premiums over U.S. Treasuries have contracted sharply this year and stand near seven-month lows. Moreover, U.S. Treasury yields may rise, potentially making debt issuance more costly in coming months.
For Hungary’s government , the idea of a successful bond sale is particularly attractive as this will at a stroke improve its bargaining position with the IMF. That’s bad news, says Tim Ash, RBS head of emerging European research:
The problem is that getting cash in the bank may actually reduce the likelihood of the government actually finally cutting a deal with the IMF, so arguably increases market risk over the slightly longer term.
He concedes however:
Bullish Barclays says to buy Portuguese debt
Some bets are not for the faint-hearted. Risky punts are even less so following a sovereign debt crisis, one that has riddled European debt markets for two years. Barclays Capital, however, recommends a particularly unusual bet, one that your parents might baulk at.
It will be of little surprise that Barcap is bullish on the year, advising towards assets that will perform well in an environment of US-led global growth, easy monetary policy and tight oil supplies following reduced tail-risks in Europe curbed by cheap money from the European Central Bank.
Now that the rush of the addictive LTRO money is over and the dust is settling on central banks’ balance sheets, Barcap is brave enough to recommend an unlikely candidate and one of the recent targets of financial markets — Portugal.
Laurent Fransolet, Managing Director of Research at Barclays Capital told reporters at a Global Outlook briefing today:
“One of the top trades that we recommend in the global outlook is to be long on Portugal, which is a little bit of a roll of the dice. It is a fairly high risk, high return strategy. The sustainability of the debt, the fiscal consolidation, the long-term economic performance – these are still questions that remain on people’s minds for the foreseeable future.”
But the investment bank said it took the EU and the IMF at their word on implications following the Greek Private Sector Involvement (PSI) bailout deal.
“After the Greek PSI, we do believe the statement that Greece is unique and that anything will be done for Portugal for as long as needed if Portugal does deliver its side of the bargain — which has been the message by the European officials and by the IMF. In the very near term you probably have some opportunity for Portugal to outperform from what are fairly cheap levels.”
Russia’s new Eurobond: what’s the fair price?
Russia’s upcoming dollar bond, the first in two years, should fly off the shelves. It’s good timing — elections are past, the world economy seems to be recovering and crucially for Russia, oil prices are over $125 a barrel. And the rise in core yields has massively tightened emerging markets’ yield premium to U.S. Treasuries, offering an attractive window to raise cash. Russia’s spread premium over Treasuries hit the narrowest levels in 7 months recently and despite some widening this week it is still some 75 basis points below end-2011 levels.
Initial indications from the ongoing roadshow are for a two-tranche bond with 10- and 20-year maturities, possibly raising a total of $3.5 billion.
But market bullishness notwithstanding, investors say Moscow should resist temptation to price the bond too high, a mistake it made during its last foray into global capital markets in April 2010. Fund managers have unpleasant memories of that deal, recalling that Russia unexpectedly tightened the yield offered by 25-28 bps, making the bond an expensive one for investors who had already placed bids. The bond price fell sharply once trading kicked off and yields across the Russian curve rose around 25-30 basis points. Jeremy Brewin, a fund manager at Aviva said:
Russia has a slightly disappointing reputation.. We all ended up paying a tighter spread than we expected. Everyone is concerned they will get pulled in too tight again.
James Croft, head of emerging debt trading at Mitsubishi-UFJ agrees:
The demand for Russian risk is such that getting this bond away should be no problem. The only impediment that could make the transaction harder is investors’ wariness, based on the negative experience of the last deal back in 2010.
Dear Ms. Rao,
A recent claim successfully put forth by the Russian Government before two French courts (see below) could have drastic financial implications for the Russian State’s budget, stemming from the existence of billions of unpaid russian sovereign debt.
We believe credit rating agencies and emerging debt managers should follow developments in this matter very closely.
The current investment grade ratings enjoyed by the Russian Federation are based on a negligent analysis of inaccurate financial data.
The public accounts of the Russian Federation’s financial position make no mention of (and therefore actively dissimulate) the existence of due debt issued or guaranteed by the Russian State prior to 1917.
It has been put forth to the French Senate (Sénat, Commission des Affaires Etrangères de la Défense et des Forces Armées, rapport no. 150 – 1997 – 1998, projet de loi relatif au règlement définitif des créances réciproques entre la France et la Russie, annexe au procès verbal de la séance du 3 décembre 1997) that the 1997 value of this debt was in excess of 40 billion US$.
If the leading credit rating agencies adjusted the Russian Federation’s public accounts, as they should, to include an additional liability of US$ 40 billion this would no doubt lead to a change in their opinion on that State’s capacity to repay debt, and so to the ratings they issue.
While credit rating agencies and the Russian Federation have both argued wrongly in the past, and still do, that debt issued or guaranteed by the Imperial Russian State is not a full faith and credit obligation of the Russian Federation, they may not be able to do so in the future because recent claims sucessfully put forth recently by the Russian Federation have drastically changed the situation.
By successfully claiming ownership, before two French courts (Tribunal de Grande Instance de Nice in 2009 and Cour d’Appel d’Aix en Provence in 2011), of the Orthodox Cathedral in Nice on the grounds that the building had been paid for out of the Imperial Russian State budget and that the Russian Federation was the successor governement to the Imperial Russian State, the Russian Federation has in fact asked the court to acknowledge what defaulted sovereign bondholders have been saying all along: that the Russian Federation is the successor government to the Imperial Russian State and as such is both entitled to claim its assets and bound to pay off Imperial Russia’s debt.
For more on the matter of negligent sovereign debt rating analysis, please visit our website at:
We thank you for your attention.
The Credit Rating Agency Observatory – CRAO
