Global Investing

Battered India rupee lacks a warchest

Photo

The Indian rupee’s plunge this week to record lows will have surprised no one. After all, the currency has been inching towards this for weeks, propelled by the government’s paralysis on vital reforms and tax wrangles with big foreign investors. These are leading to a drying up of FDI and accelerating the exodus from stock markets. Industrial production and exports have been falling.  High oil prices have added a nasty twist to that cocktail. If the euro zone noise gets louder, a balance of payments crisis may loom. The rupee could fall further to 56 per dollar, most analysts predict.

True, the rupee is not the only emerging currency that is taking a hit. But the Reserve Bank of India looks especially powerless to stem the decline. (See here for an article by my colleagues in Mumbai) .  One reason  the RBI’s hands are  effectively tied is that  India is one of the few emerging economies that has failed to build up its hard currency reserves since the 2008 crisis and so is unable to spend in the currency’s defence. Usable FX reserves stand now around $260 bilion, down from $300 billion just before the 2008 crisis.  See the following graphic from UBS which shows that relative to GDP, India’s reserve loss has been the greatest in emerging markets.

But there is worse. The relative decline in reserves since 2008 coincides with a ballooning in India’s external debt, both private and public. Comprising mostly of corporate borrowing and trade credit, the debt stands at $350  billion, up from $225 billion four years back.

No wonder investors have upped their bearish bets on the rupee: a Reuters poll of Asian fund managers shows these at a six-month high and significantly higher than any other Asian currency. For now, the trade  looks worryingly like a one-way street.

Hard times for EM in QE-less world of higher US yields

Photo

Now that the Fed appears to have dashed any lingering hopes for an imminent QE3, what’s next for emerging markets? Most observers put this year’s stellar performance of emerging bonds, currencies and equities largely down to the various money-printing or cheap money operations in the developed world. That’s kept core government bond yields bumping along near record lows and benefited higher-yielding emerging assets.

Many would add that in any case a solid economic recovery in the United States should be fairly good news for the rest of the world too. Not so, says HSBC. It argues that a better U.S. outlook is not necessarily good news for emerging markets simply because the side effect of economic improvement is a stronger dollar and higher Treasury yields and that’s an environement in which EM assets tend to underperform.

For an example, it looks back to the days between November 2010 and Feb 2011 when signs of improvement in the U.S. economy steepened the U.S. yield curve,  pushing the spread between 2-year/10-year Treasuries almost 100 bps wider.  Flows to emerging markets dipped sharply, the following graph shows:

Money did continue to flow into emerging local bonds and equities in this period, albeit at a slower pace. But from local bonds the return was negative, HSBC notes. That could be an indication of what’s to come:

The carry trade is not dead yet but the change in tone by the Fed suggests it may have passed its best days.

Headwinds for emerging markets may in fact be greater now than 18 months ago.  U.S. growth expectations haven’t budged much HSBC says:  the bank expects U.S. growth under 2 percent this year and in 2013. On the other hand emerging market output gaps are much tighter than they were 18 months back and oil prices are higher. That makes the outlook for emerging local currency bonds more challenging,  especially as a  stronger dollar will give EM currencies less room to rise.

Should ongoing improvements in U.S. data result in further hawkish moves from the Fed and if such changes see U.S. yields rise further, we would expect this to be positive for the dollar vs EM . The combination of a potentially more inflationary backbone and a more challenging backdrop for EM FX might become a headwind for local rates.

Three snapshots for Friday

Photo

One Apple chart that has been going down for 10 years is its forward P/E ratio:

Rising gasoline prices push up American’s inflation expectations for the next year:

Currency moves this year:

 

Currency hedging — should we bother?

Photo

Currency hedging — should we bother?

Maybe not as much as you think, if we are talking purely from a equity return point of view — according to the new research that analysed 112 years of the financial assets history released by Credit Suisse and London Business School this week.

Exchange rates are volatile and can significantly impact portfolios — but one can never predict if currency moves erode or enhance returns. Moreover, hedging costs (think about FX overlay managers, transaction costs, etcetc).

For example, the average annualised return for investors in 19 countries between 1972 (post-Bretton Woods) to 2011 is 5.5%, hedged or unhedged. For a U.S. investor, the figures were 6.1% unhedged or 4.7% hedged (this may be largely because only two currencies — Swiss franc and Dutch guilder/euro — were stronger than the U.S. dollar since 1900).

“The impact of hedging on returns (as opposed to risk) is a zero sum game. The profit a German investor makes on Swiss assets if the franc appreciates is offset by the loss the Swiss investor incurs on German assets… Averaged over all reference currencies and countries, the mean return advantage to hedging both equities and bonds was zero, both over 1900-2011 and 1972-2011.

LBS’ Elroy Dimson and Paul Marsh, who presented the report at a briefing this week, were keen to emphasise hedging has its use. Mainly, it does reduce volatility, hence risk.

However, the study showed that the benefits of hedging on volatility did shrink; On average, hedging reduced equity volatility by 15% over 1900-2011, but by only 7% over 1972-2011. For bonds, the figures were 36% and 30%.

Currency rally drives sizzling returns on emerging local debt

Photo

Emerging market bonds denominated in local currencies enjoyed a record January last month with JP Morgan’s GBI-EM Global index returning around 8 percent in dollar terms. Year-to-date, returns are over 9.5 percent.

 

 

This is mainly down to spectacular gains on emerging currencies such as the Mexican peso and Turkish lira which have surged 7-10 percent against the dollar and euro this year.  Analysts say the currency component of this year’s returns has been around 7 percent, meaning any portfolio hedged for currency risk would have garnered returns of just 2.5 percent.

The gains come as good news to investors licking their wounds after the index ended 2011 in negative territory. A mid-year rout on emerging markets pushed up local bond yields, often by hundreds of basis points and sent many currencies to multi-year lows.

Now,  promises of more cheap cash from Western central banks has changed the mood, driving currency rallies. Adding to the optimism is the hope of more interest rate cuts in emerging markets, where inflation has peaked and growth is slowing.

Calculating euro breakup shocks

Photo

Euro breakup risks, although subsiding, are still high on investor minds.

Almost one in two fund managers surveyed by Bank of America Merrill Lynch last month said they expect a euro zone country to leave the monetary union.

Technology services company SunGard, which has modelled different euro breakup scenarios, says the departure of Greece and Portugal will lead to a 15 percent rise in the euro against the dollar, a 20 percent fall in euro zone yields, a 15 percent fall in euro zone equities and a 20 percent increase in credit spreads.

Below are other findings:

  • If all PIIGS left the euro, the single currency would rise 25% and regional equities would fall 20%. U.S. stocks would drop 15 percent. European banking stocks would fall by 25% and ITRAXX Financials credit spreads would increase by 100%, which would imply losses of up to 20% in high-grade corporate debt. VIX would be over 50.
  • A total collapse scenario would see European equities down 40%, U.S. and global equities down 30%, euro yields down 75% and ITRAXX Europe and ITRAXX Financials credit spreads up 150% and 200%respectively.
  • Oil would fall across the scenarios, ranging from 5% from a Greece departure through to a 50% decline from a complete breakup.
  • Sterling would strengthen against the Euro by between 5-25% across the scenarios.

The results seek to model the impact of each scenario over three months, looking eight weeks before and six weeks after the shock to form a balanced picture.

from MacroScope:

When the euro shorts take off

Photo

Currency speculators boosted bets against the euro to a record high in the latest week of data (to end December 27) and built up the biggest long dollar position since mid-2010, according to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Here -- courtesy of Reuters' graphics whiz Scott Barber, is what happens to the euro when shorts build up:

Good reasons for rupee’s fall but also for recovery

Photo

It’s been a pretty miserable 2011 for India and Tuesday’s collapse of the rupee to record lows beyond 52 per dollar will probably make things worse. Foreigners, facing a fast-falling currency, have pulled out $500 million from the stock market in just the last five trading sessions.   That means net inflows this year are less than $300 million, raising concerns that India will have trouble financing its current account gap.  The weaker currency also bodes ill for the country’s stubbornly high inflation.

Why is the rupee suffering so much? First of all, it is a casualty of the general exodus from emerging markets. As a deficit economy, India is bound to suffer more than say Brazil, Korea or Malaysia.  And 18 months of interest rate rises have taken a toll on growth.

UBS analysts  proffer another explanation. They point out a steady deterioration in India’s net reserve coverage since the 2008 crisis. The reserve buffer — foreign-exchange reserves plus the annual current account balance, minus short-term external debt — stands at 9 percent of GDP, down from 14 percent in 2008.  Within emerging markets, only Egypt, Venezuela and Belarus saw bigger declines in net reserve coverage than India.

“What it really means for the present, in our view, is that the rupee is now joining the ranks of higher beta “risk” currencies,” UBS said.

Still not everyone is overly perturbed. Some expect the rupee to rebound as the global picture improves. One reason is that the rupee is generally seen as undervalued in nominal terms, as well as on purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, more so than most emerging currencies. The latter is the rate at which one currency would convert to another to buy the same amount of goods and services in each country. On that basis the Indian rupee would equate to 20 to the dollar, data from the World Bank/IMF shows.  Given the strong underlying story, investors are more likely to buy back the rupee than say the South African rand when risk appetite improves.

Furthermore, Indian equity valuations are looking more reasonable than before, despite the slowing economy. Stocks trade now around 12 times forward earnings, compared to 17 times a year ago. That should lure some overseas cash once the dust starts to settle.

“This may not be bottom of the market but for us, investing at these levels of currency and equity valuations is an attractive proposition,” says Phil Poole, head of global and macro strategy at HSBC Global Asset Management.

from Jeremy Gaunt:

Why is the euro still strong?

Photo

One of the more bizarre aspects of the euro zone crisis is that the currency in question -- the euro -- has actually not had that bad a year, certainly against the dollar. Even with Greece on the brink and Italy sending ripples of fear across financial markets, the single currency is still up  1.4 percent against the greenback for the year to date.

There are lots of reasons for this. The dollar is subject to its country's own debt crisis, negligible interest rates and various forms of quantitative easing money printing -- all of which weaken FX demand. There is also some evidence that euro investors are bring their money home, as the super-low yields on 10-year German bonds attest.

Finally -- and this is a bit of a stretch -- some investors reckon that if a hard core euro emerges from the current debacle, it could be a buy. Thanos Papasavvas, head of currency management at Investec Asset Management, says:

Let's assume there is some sort of breakup ... if the euro is the currency of a potentially core set of economies, then it would be an incredibly strong currency

Of course, there is the question of whether $1.36 or thereabouts represents a strong euro against the dollar.  Lots of people, for example, tend to judge it by the $1.17 rate at which the euro was introduced.  But the following graph suggests that if you give the euro a longer historical life, it is not all that much above its average value. Still higher than some might have expected give the crisis that is threatening it entire survival.

 

from Jeremy Gaunt:

When things stagnate

Photo

Goldman Sachs researchers have been hitting the history books again, trying to divine what happens to currencies when economies stagnate. Answer:  Not as much as you might think

Looking at exchange rates for years before and during "stagnation", Goldman found that year-to-year FX volatility in such periods is lower than in normal periods. But a lot of it depends on the type of stagnation.

First, an average stagnation -- a period of sub-par economic growth lasting for at least six years:

On average, the run-up to stagnations (and the early years into an episode) tends to be characterised by moderate FX appreciation. Later on, FX remains flat for a while and gradually assumes a depreciation trend during the last years of stagnation. The average initial appreciation hovers below 5%, while the ultimate depreciation tends to be smaller than 10%.

Next, a "Great Stagnation" -- a period lasting for 10 years or more:

The initial appreciation can reach more than 20% (computed from the years prior to the stagnation) and the posterior depreciation can surpass 10 % .

What does this mean? Well is it not particularly good news for the United States.