Research Radar: Greek gloom
Greek gloom dominates the start of the week as new elections there look inevitable and talk of Greek euro exit, or a Grexit” as common market parlance now has it, mounts. All risk assets and securities hinged on global growth have been hit, with China’s weekend reserve ratio easing doing little to offset gloomy data from world’s second biggest economy at the end of last week. World stocks are down heavily and emerging markets are underperforming; the euro has fallen to near 4-month lows below $1.29; safe haven core government debt is bid as euro peripheral debt yields in Italy and Spain push higher; and global growth bellwethers such as crude oil and the Australian dollar are down – the latter below parity against the US dollar for the first time in 5 months.
Financial research reports on Monday and over the weekend were just as gloomy, but plenty of interesting takes:
Bank of New York Mellon’s Simon Derrick’s view of the Greek political impasse concluded “there is at least an evens chance that the latter part of this summer will see what had officially been seen up until last November as an impossibility: a nation leaving the EUR.”
RBS’s Sanjay Mathur reckons that if there is another hung parliament after new Greek elections, implying no significant voter return to the pro-bailout parties, then euro risk soars. “This means, on another hung parliament, that Greek government IOUs could trade as proxy currency as early as July.” If that does not galvanize sufficient parties into accepting Trioka bailout demands at that point, he said that then exit looms. “Opening up the Pandora’s box of exit means deposit risk across the periphery. The future of the euro would then be dictated by the subsequent policy response.”
Barclays Sree Kochugovindan talks of a three phase possible deterioration of the euro crisis — one, where solvency concerns and asset market fright are contained to Europe and mostly the fixed income markets of the periphery countries concerned; two, solvency concerns hit the core such as France and Belgium with asset market contagion widening before a series of major policy responses; and three, no major policy response or ECB SMP/LTRO, which leads to Greek default and even exit and global market shock akin to September 2008. “Given the immense cost of a crisis triggered by a Greek exit, we are not expecting the current situation to deteriorate into Phase 2. However, the risks are elevated and with the prospect of second round Greek elections in a few weeks, market jitters are likely to continue.”
Deutsche Bank’s global markets note also focuses on rising risks from Greece and also on the May 31 Irish referendum on the EU fiscal pact. Apart from outlining obvious risks to the Greek financing from a political vacuum, one conclusion Deutsche comes to is that a new EU growth pact may happen sooner than many had figured. “The new situation in Athens forces EU leaders to find common ground faster than we thought.” Another conclusion was that Ireland may consider postponing its referendum, given the risk that a “no” vote may disastrously cut off its access to new EU funds and also given a possible delay in German parliamentary votes on the fiscal deal to June. “Ireland might do well to think about postponing the 31 May referendum.” It called Spain’s sweeping banking reform plan “making progress” but a 15 bln euro government recapitalisaation of the banks “too timid”.
HSBC’s Karen Ward and Simon Wells warn about the long-term impact of continuous quantitative easing by central banks, saying the political relationship between central banks and governments rather than inflationary consequences may be the biggest concern. “The heyday of independent central banking could be drawing to a close.”
Research Radar: Beyond Hollande and Holland…
Markets have been dominated this week so far by the fallout from Sunday’s French presidential election, where Socialist Francois Hollande now looks set to beat incumbent conservative Nicolas Sarkozy in the May 6 runoff , and the collapse of the ruling Dutch coalition on Monday. Public anxiety about budgetary austerity in Europe was further reinforced by news on Monday of a deepening of the euro zone private sector contraction in April. That said, euro equity, bond and currency prices have stabilised relatively quickly even if implied volatility has increased as investors brace for another month or so of political heat in the single currency bloc. The French runoff is now on the same day as the Greek elections and May 31 sees Ireland going to the polls to vote on the EU’s new fiscal compact. Wall St’s volatility gauge, the ViX, is back up toward 20% — better reflecting longer term averages — and relatively risky assets such as emerging market equities remain on the back foot. The euro political heat and slightly slower Q2 world growth pulse will likely keep markets subdued and jittery until mid year at least. At that point, another cyclical upswing in world manufacturing together with the passing of the EBA’s euro bank recapitalisation deadline as well as the introduction of the new European Stability Mechanism may well encourage investors to return at better levels.
Following are some interesting tips from Tuesday’s bank and investment fund research notes:
- JPM economists reckon finding the reason behind the backup in US weekly initial jobless claims over the past couple of weeks is key to assessing whether a sub-par March payrolls report is repeated in April. It says it’s possible the claims jump move is a seasonal factor as unadjusted claims are closely tracking 2007′s pattern and Easter holidays fell on the same dates in both years. If 2007 was repeated, there would be a sizeable late April drop in claims and JPM looks for some of that on Thursday with a 14,000 forecast drop. (Reuters poll consensus is for a 11,000 drop)
- Following the surprise news last week that dovish Bank of England policy maker Adam Posen is no longer voting for more UK money printing, Barclays FX team said it’s turning more positive on the UK economy and also says sticky inflation may mean the Bank of England’s current monetary stance may be too accommodative. As a result, it lowered its euro/sterling 3-month forecast to 0.79 from 0.84. However, it cautioned about being short euro/sterling until after Wednesday’s Q1 UK GDP report, which it said could come in weaker than expected due to temporary factors. (Reuters poll consensus is for a 0.1% rise Q/Q)
- As everyone watches the FOMC outcome on Wednesday, Bank of New York Mellon‘s Simon Derrick highlights widespread expectations of further Bank of Japan easing and asset purchases on Friday. He reckons the economic arguments for more easing in Japan may be sound but it’s worth considering whether BoJ governor Masaaki Shirakawa may want to start facing down heavy political pressure for endless BoJ easing.
- Rabobank‘s emerging markets team flag their concern about Poland’s zloty, which has been one of the best performing currencies of the year so far. They say the zloty is a high “Eurozone beta” play, seen in the correlation of the eur/pln rate with composite euro periphery sovereign CDS spreads, and as a result will suffer if euro tensions rise further over the next month or two.
Hair of the dog? Citi says more LTROs in store
Just as global markets nurse a hangover from their Q1 binge on cheap ECB lending — a circa 1 trillion euro flood of 1%, 3-year loans to euro zone banks in December and February (anodynely dubbed a Long-Term Refinancing Operation) — there’s every chance they may get, or at least need, a proverbial hair of the dog.
At least that’s what Citi chief economist Willem Buiter and team think despite regular insistence from ECB top brass that the recent two-legged LTRO was likely a one off.
Even though Citi late Wednesday nudged up its world growth forecast for a third month running, in keeping with Tuesday’s IMF’s upgrade , it remains significantly more bearish on headline numbers and sees PPP-weighted global growth this year and next at 3.1% and 3.5% compared with the Fund’s call of 3.5% and 4.1%.
But its euro zone calls are gloomiest of all. First off, it sees two consecutive years of economic contraction of the bloc as a whole — a 1.0% shrinkage this year followed by 0.2% drop in 2013. Against this dire backdrop, it expects Spain to be forced to seek Troika (EU, IMF and ECB) support later this year that will be focussed on recapitalizing and restructuring its ailing banks and it also expects both Portugal and Ireland to need second bailouts from the same source.
And with that sort of pressure from deleveraging, austerity, sovereign debt stress and recession , the ECB will have to bring out yet another punchbowl, it reckons.
We expect that renewed EMU strains will prompt the ECB to launch at least one more multi-year LTRO and continue to pencil in one or two more rate cuts by end-2013.
Yet, just like the euphoric effects of both the binge and “morning after” drink, the problem with LTRO is that it risks causing more problems than it solves by tying the banks of weak peripheral euro states ever closer to their ailing sovereigns.
Three snapshots for Monday
Spanish 10-year bond yields hit 6%, around the levels seen in Ireland/Portugal and Italy/Spain at the start and resumption of ECB bond purchases.
U.S. retail sales rose more than expected in March as Americans shrugged off high gasoline prices.
Currency speculators boosted their bets against the euro in the latest week. Figures from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission released on Friday showed a jump in euro net shorts of 101,364 contracts this week from 79,480 previously.
Is Ireland back on track?
In a week in which euro zone debt fears returned in earnest for the first time in 2012, a positive investment tip about one of the three bailed out peripheral euro economies was eye-catching in its timing. RBS on Thursday issued a recommendation to its clients to buy the bonds of one of Ireland’s main commercial banks Bank of Ireland.
Now, financial markets have for some time priced Irish government debt more positively that either Greece or Portugal, in large part due to the country’s superior private sector growth prospects and the government’s seeming acceptance of and adherence to the austerity targets demanded in return for European bailout funds. That said, there is little end in sight to problem of banks bad debts and mounting mortgage arrears and few signs of recovery in a housing market where prices are down some 50 percent from pre-crisis peaks. Moreover, Ireland has scheduled a referendum on the new euro fiscal pact for May 31 and, if it’s rejected, the country could lose access to future euro emergency funds.
But, in a note entitled “The Celtic Tiger is coming back on track”, RBS credit strategists Alberto Gallo and Phoenix Kalen took a positive tilt on developments and recommended investors snap up the 8.45% yield available on the senior unsecured bonds of ailing, government-backed Bank of Ireland — the country’s “main viable bank”. The bonds mature in 2013 and had an original coupon of 4.625%.
The broad RBS argument is that Irish banks are tackling their problems, deleveraging more than banks elsewhere on the euro periphery, using less ECB liquidity and doing fewer sovereign carry trades. But the main reason for the trade is that they do not expect government support for the banks to be removed before the maturity of these bonds next year and therefore feel the 8.45% yield now available is a pretty good compensation for interim risks of deposit flight and those emanating from exposure to the still-dire local housing market. What’s more, this yield is a premium to the 10-year Irish government bond yield of some 6.9 percent even though the banks continue to be effectively gauranteed by the sovereign. The reason for the premium is the risk the government backs away from that pledge, something very much at the centre of the debate about rescheduling promissory note payments to the shell of failed real estate lending behemoth Anglo Irish Bank.
These risk premia reflect fears that the Irish government could reverse its support for bank debt, in our view. The IMF and EU are showing more flexibility for Ireland and have agreed last week to the exchange of the next promissory note payment for government debt. That said, we think concerns on senior bank debt haircuts are overdone, and particularly so for Bank of Ireland. First, haircuts are not necessary, as Ireland is currently on track with its fiscal targets. Second, a voluntary bank haircut would have negative systemic consequences for funding, potentially shutting both banks and the sovereign out of primary markets. Compared to the little amount of outstanding senior debt, this is unlikely to happen. Third, our economists expect the Irish referendum will centre on the fiscal compact, not on EMU membership.
Yet , confidence in a steady Irish recovery is far from universal. Irish economist and commentator David McWilliams, for one, sketches a far gloomier picture in his latest take on the state of the Irish banks on Thursday.
Other overseas economists are similary wary of the Irish turnaround. On Wednesday, Germany’s Commerzbank said the country was struggling to control its budget deficit just as much as the other euro periphery countries and while tax revenues were ahead of schedule, social security spending was also higher to more than offset that.
I like the commentary Reuters provides. I was reading a similar article on monetarilyspeaking.com and they mad similar suggestions regarding Irelands economic situation. None the less both sites give a unique perspective
Japanization of euro zone bonds?
Fear of many years of stagnation in the major western economies has everyone fretting about a repeat of the “lost decades” that Japan suffered after its banking and real estate bubble burst in the early 1990s. Indeed HSBC economists were recently keen to point out that U.S. per capita growth over the noughties was already actually weaker than either of Japan’s lost decades.
But in a detailed presentation on the impact of two years of soveriegn debt crisis on euro zone government bond holdings, Barclays economist Laurent Fransolet asks whether that market too is turning into the Japanese government bond market — where years of slow growth, zero interest rates, current account surpluses and captive local buyers have depressed borrowing rates for years and turned JGBs into an increasingly domestic market dominated by local banks, pension funds and insurers. Non-residents hold less than 10 percent of JGBs, compared to more than 50 percent for the EGB as a whole, and Japanese banks hold up to 35 percent of their own government bond market.
But is the euro government market heading in that direction after successive crises have seen foreign investors flee many of the peripheral markets of Greece, Portugal, Ireland and even Italy and Spain? Fransolet argues that the seniority of substantial European Central Bank holdings built up in the interim (now about 15 percent of each of the five peripheral markets) may be one reason why these foreign investors will be wary of returning. Meantime, euro zone banks, who have traditionally held a high 20-25 percentage point share of euro government markets, withdrew sharply late last year amid balance sheet repair pressures but have rebuilt holdings again sharply in early 2012 after the ECB’s liquidity injections — particularly in Italy and Spain.
In answer to the longer-term question of whether euro bonds will turn into a more insular market dominated less by interest rate signals than liquidity, regulatory and balance sheet issues, Fransolet is equivocal. On one level they are still very different — state-sector holdings of euro debt are still far from Japan’s, the euro market has clearly fragmented and net new issuance of euro debt is also still way below Japan.
However, the trend is clearly toward a more domestically driven market in the periphery of euro bloc in particular and local banks are becoming bigger players. And, crucially, although foreign investors may not return en masse soon, their impact on those markets via futures and CDS markets and index weightings may still be high.
Retreat of Tail-Risk Trinity
Until this week at least, one of the big puzzles of the year for many investors was squaring a 10-15% surge in equity indices with little or no movement in rock-bottom U.S., German and UK government bond yields. To the extent that both markets reflect expectations for future economic activity, then one of them looks wrong. The pessimists, emboldened by the superior predictive powers of the bond market over recent decades, claim the persistence of super low U.S. Treasury, German bund and British gilt yields reveals a deep and pervasive pessimism about global growth for many years to come. Those preferring the sunny side up reckon super-low yields are merely a function of central bank bond buying and money printing — and if those policies are indeed successful in reflating economies, then equity bulls will be proved correct in time. A market rethink on the chances for another bout of U.S. Federal Reserve bond-buying after upbeat Fed statements and buoyant U.S. economic numbers over the past week also nods to the latter argument.
But as we approach the final fortnight of the first quarter, more seems to be going on. Much of the whoosh of Q1 so far has merely been a reversal of the renewed systemic fears that emerged in the second half of last year. In fact, gains in world equity indices of circa 13% are an exact reversal of the net losses suffered between last June and the end of 2011. And if those gains are justified, then much of the extreme “tail risks” that scared the horses back then must have been put to rest too, no? Well, the two mains tail risks — a euro zone breakup or collapse and a lapse of the U.S. economy into another recesssion or depression — do look to have been been put to bed for now at least. The ECB’s mega 3-year cash floods in December and February and the “orderly” Greek debt default and restructuring last week have certainly eased the euro strain. The remarkable stabilisation of U.S. labour markets, factory activity, household credit and even retail sales has also silenced the double-dippers there for now too.
The net result seems to have been this week’s synchronised retreat in three of the main “catastrophe hedges” — gold, AAA-government bonds and equity volatility indices — and this move could well mark a critical juncture. Gold is down 8% since its 2012 peak on Leap Day, 10-year U.S., UK and German government bond yields are up 25/30 basis points since Monday alone, and equity volatility gauges such as Wall St’s ViX have dropped to levels not seen since before the whole credit crisis exploded in the summer of 2007. If extreme systemic fears are genuinely abating and the prevalence of even marginal positioning like this in investment portfolios is being unwound, then there may well be some seismic flows ahead that could add another leg to the equity rally. The U.S. bias in all this is obvious with the rise of the dollar exchange rate index to its highest since January. That has its own investment ramifications — not least in emerging markets. But the questions for many will remain. Is the coast really clear? Are elections over the coming weeks in France and Greece and an Irish referendum on the euro fiscal pact just sideshows? Is the global economy sufficiently repaired to bet on renewed growth from here and will corporate earnings follow suit? Has bank and household deleveraging across the western world halted? Are the oil price surge and geopolitical risks in the Middle East no longer a concern? And if you’ve made 10-15% already this year, are you going to go double or quits? The chances are there will not be 10-15% equity gains in every quarter this year.
German inflation to rescue euro economy?
With the ECB’s second cheap money flood in three months coursing through European banks and financial markets and the possibility at least of a further interest rate cut in offing, the relief in Europe’s austerity-wracked periphery is palpable. But what of the impact on the relatively buoyant “core” in Germany, the bloc’s largest economy and super-competitive export engine? Darren Williams at money managers Alliance Bernstein reckons German inflation is being cooked up by this super-easy ECB money, coming as it does against a backdrop of relatively brisk German credit growth and house price inflation there of some 5.5% last year which is “positively explosive by German standards”.
This whole healing-by-inflation idea is just utter nonsense. Some counterproductive facts should be obvious to everybody, but are conveniently ignored by the pundits:
-In a common currency zone, it’s very difficult to limit inflation to one nation. If there’s a surplus of liquidity, it will rise the tide everywhere, with only minor differences.
- You can’t simply ignore the preferrences of the voters. German people will protest inflation much more vehemently than folks in the South, who are more accustomed to that. And German politicians probably are more efficient than those in the South in fighting inflation. So, the nations in the South will be hit harder, which is totally the contrary of what shall be achieved!
- Wage increases always lag behind inflation! So, the short term effect will be that the purchasing power of the majority of the population is REDUCED. It doesn’t matter that the nominal GDP will rise when actually less products are sold (at higher prices) and thus the real output decreases, with negative consequences for employment. Inflation doesn’t increase domestic demand, that’s just an optical illusion.
- Maybe that decrease of the purchasing power of the incomes can be compensated by the people spending more of their savings instead, which will constantly lose value. But a reduction of the saving rate, especially among the lower and medium incomes, isn’t socially desirable at all! Even more money concentrated in the hands of the 1%, while the 99ers have no reserves at all for hard times? Idiocy.
Not a single one of those pro-inflation hawks ever presents a thorough, cohersive picture of the consequences. They know dang well why – because it would show that their great idea has many negative consequences! That cure could easily be worse than the desease. There simply is no magic recipe, improvement can only come through tough work on reforming the nations. Ignore all the snake oil dealers!
Calculating euro breakup shocks
Euro breakup risks, although subsiding, are still high on investor minds.
Almost one in two fund managers surveyed by Bank of America Merrill Lynch last month said they expect a euro zone country to leave the monetary union.
Technology services company SunGard, which has modelled different euro breakup scenarios, says the departure of Greece and Portugal will lead to a 15 percent rise in the euro against the dollar, a 20 percent fall in euro zone yields, a 15 percent fall in euro zone equities and a 20 percent increase in credit spreads.
Below are other findings:
- If all PIIGS left the euro, the single currency would rise 25% and regional equities would fall 20%. U.S. stocks would drop 15 percent. European banking stocks would fall by 25% and ITRAXX Financials credit spreads would increase by 100%, which would imply losses of up to 20% in high-grade corporate debt. VIX would be over 50.
- A total collapse scenario would see European equities down 40%, U.S. and global equities down 30%, euro yields down 75% and ITRAXX Europe and ITRAXX Financials credit spreads up 150% and 200%respectively.
- Oil would fall across the scenarios, ranging from 5% from a Greece departure through to a 50% decline from a complete breakup.
- Sterling would strengthen against the Euro by between 5-25% across the scenarios.
The results seek to model the impact of each scenario over three months, looking eight weeks before and six weeks after the shock to form a balanced picture.
Sparring with Central Banks
Just one look at the whoosh higher in global markets in January and you’d be forgiven smug faith in the hoary old market adage of “Don’t fight the Fed” — or to update the phrase less pithily for the modern, globalised marketplace: “Don’t fight the world’s central banks”. (or “Don’t Battle the Banks”, maybe?)
In tandem with this month’s Federal Reserve forecast of near-zero U.S. official interest rates for the next two years, the European Central Bank provided its banking sector nearly half a trillion euros of cheap 3-year loans in late December (and may do almost as much again on Feb 29). Add to that ongoing bouts of money printing by the Bank of England, Swiss National Bank, Bank of Japan and more than 40 expected acts of monetary easing by central banks around the world in the first half of this year and that’s a lot of additional central bank support behind the market rebound. So is betting against this firepower a mug’s game? Well, some investors caution against the chance that the Banks are firing duds.
According to giant bond fund manager Pimco, the post-credit crisis process of household, corporate and sovereign deleveraging is so intense and loaded with risk that central banks may just be keeping up with events and even then are doing so at very different speeds. What’s more the solution to the problem is not a monetary one anyway and all they can do is ease the pain.
Low interest rates and liquidity schemes can’t solve what ails the developed world. Societies must accept that in order to alter their current perilous course they must undergo great change, moving away from entitlements to which they have become accustomed. The alternative is weak economic growth, a loss of competitiveness and negative external balances — a loss of face and place in the global hierarchy.
As if to reinforce the underlying point that the developed world faces a protracted reform period that tests political, economic and social priorities, credit rating firm Standard & Poors’ — not the most popular company in corridors of power over the past year — warned on Tuesday that it may downgrade the debt of “a number of highly-rated” Group of 20 countries from 2015 if their governments fail to enact reforms to curb rising healthcare spending and other costs related to ageing populations.
For Pimco, the political and social resistance to this sort of change is already showing itself to be significant both in Europe and the United States. People clearly don’t want to see pensions and benefits cut but politicians have already grown government and sovereign indebtedness close to their maximum. Accommodative central banks that helped them get there only ended up fueling credit, consumption and housing bubbles and distorting the balance of the economy away from production and into an increasingly bloated financial sector. That, clearly, ended in tears as finance itself needed bailing out and compounded the sovereign debt burden.
So if harder, longer-term choices and reforms are now needed, central banks ability to continually reflate the world economy by monetary means alone is at best uncertain, Pimco argues. The risk of major upheavals along the way in Europe, for example, has the potential for major market volatility and economic seizures.
