(James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own)

Stocks and other risky assets are rallying around the world this week because the Group of 20 nations said on the weekend they would keep the economic stimulus flowing, a state of events which illustrates where we are and what a very strange place it is.

The G20, the only group of big hitters that matters because it is the only group which includes the Chinese, met in Scotland over the weekend and, as is the way of these things, did very little with immediate consequences for anybody.

In the communique they issued, the Group of 20 finance ministers, after congratulating themselves on the recovery, more or less admitted that the measures we once thought of as heroic are in the process of becoming commonplace.

"However, the recovery is uneven and remains dependent on policy support, and high unemployment is a major concern," the statement said. "To restore the global economy and financial system to health, we agreed to maintain support for the recovery until it is assured."

Let me put that in human terms for you:

"We've spent untold trillions saving the economy, but, er, we've really only saved the financial system and that only to the extent that we keep on saving it. Jobs, well, not so much. We therefore pledge to continue doing this thing that may or may not be working until we are sure that it is."

Global stock markets then went off on a stonking rally on Monday, which major media attributed to the pledge of continued stimulus. I suppose we shouldn't dismiss the possibility that the financial media was, as we often do, mistaking coincidence for causation, but professionals were citing it too.

So, what are they promising to do? Will they be able to do it? And why do the risk markets like it so much?

There are at least two aspects to the stimulus - continued easy money from central banks and actual government spending.

The easy money part - low interest rates and unconventional measures - clearly will continue. It will be politically very difficult to raise interest rates while unemployment is still so high, and given the wan nature of the recovery, unemployment will take a long time to fall.

The actual government spending part is a lot harder to bank on, as it were. One reading of the Japanese experience in the 1990s is that their stimulative measures worked but they lost heart and withdrew them for mostly political reasons, thereby bringing on a relapse from which they never really properly recovered.

The politics of another stimulative spending binge will not be easy, especially in the U.S. and especially given populist backlash. That's not to say more stimulus won't be needed, it very likely will, but you can't count on it arriving. Deleveraging takes a long time and we very likely would have been better off just writing the debt down in the first place.

MARKETS LOVE CERTAINTY

Investors have decided, and I think they are probably right, that so long as the authorities are hell bent on reflation it is foolish to get in the way.

As analyst David Merkel has pointed out, the statement of the Federal Reserve meeting, released last week, characterized financial markets as "roughly unchanged" since they last met in September, revealing that they pay far more attention to equity markets than debt markets.

Because of course equity markets were going more or less sideways in October but many of the riskier parts of the debt markets were rallying strongly. Wasn't this whole crisis, and its expensive fix, supposed to be about "unfreezing credit markets"? Not anymore, apparently.

That is because the Fed realize that they have got to keep equity markets up, indeed have got to force them to rise. It is the only way to float the equity above the debt, make the banks and the holders of debt whole, and allow the financial system to weather the crisis.

There were other options - default, temporary nationalization - but that is not the route we went down. So, within this context the rally makes great sense.

Notice how equity markets have been on a huge tear since last week, going up on news that implied that the Fed would remain on hold for a long time, going up on unemployment rising through 10 percent in the U.S. and, funnily enough, going up on faith that the G20 would stick with stimulus measures.

This brings us to the crazy part. While it may be individually rational for everyone to hitch a ride on the policy train and follow asset prices higher, I would argue that the project is collective folly.

The risks are inflation and a rapidly falling U.S. dollar which leave banks and debtors solvent in nominal terms but not better off. Those risks are best observed now through the dollar, which is falling, and gold, which is at record highs.

(At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund.)

(James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own)

So it can be done after all.

Britain is poised to take tough steps to break up the large banks it rescued, setting it in stark contrast to the United States, which seems set on a policy of shoring up the unfair advantages it grants its too-big-to-fail banks while regulating around the edges.

It is quite a change for Britain, which has a sorry history of self-serving self-regulation in financial services combined with limp and outgunned official control.

Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling on Sunday told the BBC that Lloyds, RBS and Northern Rock would be partly broken up and assets sold to new entrants into the banking market. Large existing competitors such as HSBC are expected to be blocked from making bids for the assets.

Britain took over Northern Rock after a run on the bank and its rescue of Lloyds and RBS left it with stakes of 43 and 70 percent, respectively.

It is worth noting that if anything Britain is more dependent on its financial services sector than the United States.

Could it be that Britain has determined that a level playing field, strong competition and a lower risk of a crisis might actually make it more competitive internationally? I certainly think so.

It will without doubt improve the situation for the small businesses and individuals that can't access international capital markets and depend on the banks for access to credit and other financial services.

Before we get all excited and expect the United States to follow suit with Citibank and Bank of America, it is important to recall that Britain's Labour government is more or less on its death bed and faces an election in 2010 which the bookies and almost everyone else think it is highly unlikely to win.

There is also the matter of the European Union, which has a say over subsidies such as the ones Britain has showered on the banks. RBS said on Monday that it may be forced by the EU to sell more assets than it had planned. Lloyds is also seen likely to raise additional new capital to allow it to stay outside of an asset insurance scheme Britain is running for the banks and which would involve the government taking yet more equity in the participants.

OH WHAT A CONTRAST

The fact remains that Britain and the EU are saying that more competition is needed and taking steps to ensure that the banks which ended up needing state care are broken up. This must have an impact on how other big banks are ultimately treated, even if they did not receive the same level of direct state aid.

The equity buffer that is being required is also remarkable; the banks should end up with core tier one equity of about 10 percent, four times what they were expected to hold before the crisis.

Contrast all of this with the hopefully named Financial Stability Improvement Act of 2009, now wending its way through Congress. As Harvard Business School professor David Moss points out, as currently drafted this bill won't even allow the systemically important banks it is designed to control be named, a real Monty Python-esque touch.

Think about it: we won't even be allowed to know the identities of the firms we are potentially on the hook for. Moss points out that this neatly side-steps the idea of taxing too-whatever-to-fail status as a means of encouraging the behemoths to sell up and avoid the costs. The costs remain with the taxpayer, or potentially with a group of big firms after the fact.

The argument the U.S. administration is making, more or less, is that our complex global economy somehow demands that we have complex huge banks. If we don't allow huge banks to persist, we'll choke off growth. If we think we can go back to mom and pop banking, we are simply kidding ourselves. And anyway, if the U.S. doesn't allow it, foreign banks will just scoop up the cream. With Britain and the European Union taking strong steps, that argument is losing traction. And as for complexity, well I'd have to say that the record of complexity in banking is mixed, to be kind, as far as the deal it gives to taxpayers and consumers of banking services. It would be one thing to argue for huge economies of scale for plain vanilla banking processes like clearing, but it is hard to see why that needs to be combined with derivatives and trading.

It would be nice to think the winds are blowing west across the Atlantic, but this is not usually the case.

(Editing by James Dalgleish)

(At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund.)

(James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own)

The simplest way to end the imbalances in the world's economy is also sadly perhaps the most likely: for the Chinese to stop buying U.S. debt.

This is not going to happen anytime soon, for one thing deleveraging in the U.S. will for a time make U.S. Treasuries look good value, but a buyer's strike is a heck of a lot more likely than the orchestrated rebalancing the U.S. will push at this week's G-20 meeting of leading nations.

The U.S. plans to advance a plan at the Pittsburgh summit to fundamentally change the balance of the global economy, which over the past 15 years or so has been characterized by over-borrowing and consumption in the West provided and financed by savers and workers in Asia.

That state of play kept going, as is the way of these things, until it stopped, or rather until one of its wheels fell off. It wasn't that Asians stopped saving or buying U.S. debt but that speculators, usually in Europe, stopped buying securities, often minted in London, which were being created to front run the flow of capital from Asia to the west.

That popped the asset price bubble and the flow of finance to consumers in the U.S. who, with much gnashing of teeth, began to save again and consume more guardedly.

But the debt bubble hasn't really popped, it has only shifted shape. Before we had private debts which only could be repaid if assets, mostly real estate, continued to go up in value. Now, a new wave of public borrowing is cushioning the downturn. Asians buy some of the debt and some of the money raised buys goods from Asia.

Theoretically, China and other investors in U.S.  Treasuries buy them because they believe that the U.S. will ultimately tax more, spend less and make good. In reality, it is more vendor financing and a good money after bad attempt to protect earlier investments.

The U.S. points out, in a letter to its G20 partners, that if the savings rises in the deficit countries persist and there is no rise in consumption in the savings-bloc, global economic growth will be poor. The idea, it seems, is for IMF-led international coordination to, on the one hand, jawbone the borrowers so they remain credible while at the same time somehow inducing the savers to allow their currencies to appreciate and induce their citizens to spend.

WILL SOVEREIGNS BE THE NEW SUBPRIME?

A new study of global imbalances by economists at the Bank of England points out that Asian savers will only carry on buying western debt so long as they believe it to be high quality.

"In the short run, increased supply of government bonds resulting from the expansionary fiscal policies pursued in deficit countries has provided an ongoing source of asset supply to meet the investment demand from surplus countries," according to the Bank of England.

"However, to the extent that savers in surplus countries may become more reluctant over time to invest funds in deficit-country government bonds this would tend to raise the cost of borrowing in deficit countries. This shift in the relative cost of borrowing could be an important part of the process by which a rebalancing of demand from deficit to surplus countries is achieved over the medium term."

In other words, if Asian savers lose faith in Treasuries or gilts, they will stop buying, causing interest rates to spike. This would cause demand to be rebalanced, all right, but mostly by suppressing it in the U.S. and other highly indebted countries like Britain.

This kind of loss of faith in markets can be very sudden. You could draw a parallel to the way in which investors in securitized debt lost faith in the value of a AAA rating, except this time the loss of faith will be in sovereign borrowers and we really will not be able to blame the ratings agencies as enablers.

China and other exporters of course have good reason to want to avoid this. They are stuck with trillions of dollars in Treasuries and they certainly don't want to kill the U.S. goose while it is still more profitable to sell it goose food.

There may also come a time when the world's savers calculate that they can earn more by investing at home.

Essentially much of what a controlled rebalancing would do - weaken the dollar and build opportunity for domestic-oriented investment in Asia - creates incentives for a rapid reallocation out of Treasuries.

Ultimately the rebalanceing must happen. The U.S. for very good reasons wants this to happen little by little, but it does not have to happen that way. Past attempts at a controlled rebalancing have failed and it is hard to see what will make this one different.

(At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund.)

--James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own--

If and when China makes its currency convertible and opens its financial system the stage will be set for a bubble that should make the dotcom and housing booms look tame.

China has recently signaled its key aspirations: for a greater international role for the renminbi and for Shanghai to become a great financial capital. Neither is imminent, but both imply, if not require, a series of steps that, taken in combination with China's legitimately great potential for growth, could lead to a bubble of magnificent and dangerous proportions.

Magnificent in that, like the dotcom bubble or the railroad boom in the U.S. in the 19th century, a bubble in domestic China is directionally right and will build useful things which will change the world. A bubble, after all, needs a good story and China has one of the best ever.

Dangerous because, like the housing bubble, it will inevitably go too far and could take down banks and banking systems globally.

Perhaps rather than dotcom or housing, the most useful template for China is closer to home; namely the Japanese bubble which preceded its ongoing malaise, according to Dylan Grice, a strategist at Societe Generale in London.

"In the medium term we face the mother of all asset bubbles in China. The fundamental story is a good one; there are just lots and lots of people to sell to," Grice said.

"If you drop a ton of liquidity on people it is possible that they will do rational things with it, but more likely they will do something pretty stupid."

The parallels are strong. Both China and Japan successfully industrialized and opted for high-savings, low-consumption economies which concentrated on exports, exporting capital and keeping their currencies artificially weak. The result in both cases was a huge stockpile of U.S. Treasuries.

Both, too, scared their western clients and competitors witless. Remember U.S. autoworkers ritually burning Japanese cars? This of course was mingled with admiration and a sense that the global balance of power was changing, giving bubble thinking a strong push.

Japan slowly and over a long period liberalized its capital account; allowing the yen to float freely and deregulating financial markets.

Grice points out that during some of the 1980s the world fell in love with the yen, figuring that Japan's new ascendancy meant that it would rise and rise. As a result Japan Inc. could in effect borrow in dollars, swap it into yen and get paid for the privilege. Much of the money found its way into the stock market, sending stocks to stratospheric levels and reinforcing the bubble illusion.

The Nikkei index of stocks went to the moon and Tokyo residents ended up needing 100-year mortgages to afford tiny apartments.

GOOD AND BAD BUBBLES

Of course, that is not where it ended with Japan, which had its bust and which is still struggling with deflation, though that is in part a function of a shrinking workforce.

Japan liberalized its financial system and currency arrangements under strong pressure from the United States.

China almost certainly has more relative real power today and there is every sign that it will open up on its own terms and to its own schedule.

But open it probably will.

Chinese officials have expressed a desire for the renminbi to play a great role in world trade, naming 2020 as a date by which it can play the role of a reserve currency.

That is almost certainly going to require deregulation of financial markets, something also needed if Shanghai is to become a global financial capital.

China now buys Treasuries not because it thinks they are good value, but because those purchases maintain a competitive currency, not to mention protecting existing holdings. As that ends, much of the money will seek out high returns, and as the renminbi strengthens international capital will doubtless pile on and pile in.

That kind of liquidity and deregulation, in combination with strong national pride and a legitimately fantastic story, is a step-by-step recipe for a bubble. So it proved in Japan, so it likely will be in China.

A look at recent experience in China only underlines this. Speculation is rife and billions in government mandated loans have leaked into stock market bets.

China's government undoubtedly understands all of this and is surely determined to maintain control. They may not find it that easy. Getting rich, as we've seen in the United States, is a heady business and it is easy to start to believe your own press.

As the momentum builds and the money rolls in it will be easy to see it as a great country meeting its prosperous destiny.

Given the size of the opportunity and the strength of the story, China's bubble will be huge. Investors would do well to avoid being in the immediate vicinity when it bursts.

--At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund.--

(James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own)

Investors met the news that Japan's economy has emerged from a bone-breaking recession calmly and rationally: they sold shares quickly and in large amounts and made bets that consumer prices are going to be falling for years to come.

That's because Japan's recovery, coming as it does after a global bubble in the production of what I call, for lack of a more technical term, "stuff," is really not sustainable.

The fact that the consumer portion of the recovery is only a reflection of income transfers from government to individuals isn't very encouraging either.

More importantly, given that hopes for Japan were low anyway, the vulnerability of its recovery point to some important challenges the nascent rebounds in the U.S. and Europe now face.

Japan grew at a 3.7 percent seasonally adjusted annual rate in the second quarter, in data reported on Monday, quite a contrast with the almost 12 percent annual rate of contraction in the three months before.

The recovery was heavily dependent on consumer spending, goosed by government subsidies for buying hybrid cars and green appliances, as well as a heavy public works spending.

Public spending in a downturn is a good thing, but it needs to set the stage for private investment and consumption later, and in Japan this does not seem to be happening.

"Japan's return to growth in the second quarter is a prime example of a 'feel bad' recovery," Lombard Street Research's Michael Taylor told clients.

"Recovery may prove to be rather short-lived, as so far there are precious few signs that Japan is capable of sustained, domestically-driven GDP growth. The continued accumulation of inventories in Q2, albeit at a more modest pace than in recent quarters, also casts doubt on growth prospects through the second half of the year."

The underlying figures were ugly. Private capital investment fell 4.4 percent compared to the first quarter, and real investment in housing fell by nearly a tenth. Cash earnings for Japanese workers has fallen 7.1 percent in the year to June.

The recovery in Japan is like a long lost and reputedly rich uncle who, now that he has come home, proves to be a poor bedraggled thing who rather than bringing hope and gifts only really wants to cadge a meal and a place to sleep.

WHY THIS TIME IS JUST NOT NORMAL

In a typical economic recovery, inventories, having been run down are rebuilt. This should prompt companies to make capital investments to gear up new production. People get hired, they spend money and so do others who are less fearful for their jobs. Companies become more profitable and the cycle reinforces itself.

But in Japan, and perhaps elsewhere, this recovery isn't really working that way. Capital expenditure isn't coming back. Company profits are being hit. Whatever profitability improvements we see globally are largely down to cost cutting.

This squeeze hurts already nervous workers who in their turn aren't spending much money. Unless, of course, they need to in order to get their share of a government handout.

Even with inventories being restocked, the amount of spare capacity in the global economy is very substantial. Company managers too will have been taught a lesson about leveraging up to expand: not only is demand not always there sometimes the banks want their money back unexpectedly and usually at the most inconvenient time.

Consumers, and not just in Japan, aren't very confident in the future of property and decide that what once looked like a prime investment now looks like avoidable consumption.

Policy makers in Japan and elsewhere understand these dynamics and they have made heroic efforts to break the cycle. Up to a point, they have succeeded.

It's not so much that the policies - huge increases in liquidity and massive stimulus - aren't appropriate but that our expectations for what they can do has been too high. We are no doubt better off than we would have been, but we have shifted the burden of re-making the economy and paying down the debt out in time. It will be a longer, slower process and will disappoint many investors who think we are back to the good old days.

One advantage Japan does have is its position in Asia, where it may be able to benefit if Chinese domestic demand takes off. But overall Japan is linked to global trade, which while it has bottomed, has made its recovery due to government spending which some day soon will have to be replaced.

As for Japan domestically, the fiscal stimulus will peter out in the first quarter of next year. What will arrive to take its place I cannot tell you, but if nothing does it will prove to have been a brief, miserable recovery.

(At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund. )

-- James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own --

Rising pay in the finance sector in the wake of the global financial crisis is no surprise and is driven partly by the government's bailout itself and the underwriting of banks that are too big to fail.

News that some financial firms benefitting from government largesse actually increased the share of revenue they pay their employees sparked a lot of outrage but more heat than light.

The good news is this new bulge in pay may not be sustainable.

The bad news is it will probably only be stopped by further regulation, regulation which may never come.

To understand what is going on you need to understand the economic concept of "rents", essentially the extra money a given individual or industry is able to extract from its clients above what it would be able to if there was perfect competition.

A monopoly will charge a very high price for goods or services because, well, they can. Needless to say economic rents are not a good thing, unless of course you are in receipt of them.

Workers in financial services have been huge beneficiaries of economic rents in recent years. They sell products which are complex and poorly understood by clients. They have been very lightly regulated, and it has been hard in many areas for start ups to compete with large firms and drive down prices.

A study by economists Thomas Philippon of New York University and Ariell Reshef of the University of Virginia found that about 30-50 percent of the extra pay bankers get as compared to similar professionals is attributable to rents. <http://people.virginia.edu/~ar7kf/papers/pr_rev15_submitted.pdf>

In other words, banking is able to overcharge its customers and bankers are able to capture a huge portion of that for themselves. Why? Because they don't face enough competition, their products are too complex for clients to be able to understand and bargain effectively, and crucially because regulation allows for this state of affairs.

Rising complexity, in my view, has probably been fuelled at least in part because it drives margins and tilts power away from bank clients and shareholders and to employees.

"The more complicated the product the easier it is for people to hide the risks," Reshef said in an interview.

The study shows that excess pay in banking is very closely linked to lax regulation, as opposed to higher productivity or early adoption of technology.

Relative compensation in finance in the early part of the last century peaked not in 1929 before the crash but several years later just before the more stringent regulations kicked in. Relative compensation began to climb again in the 1980s as deregulation happened and rose like a rocket since 1990.

WHAT JUST HAPPENED??

The economic crisis, far from undermining circumstances that allow for rents and excess pay, has in some ways cemented them.

One area of complexity, asset backed finance, has been eviscerated but many others still sail on relatively unaffected.

Most importantly, the doctrine of too big to fail has confirmed and reinforced the superior market position of those banks and investment banks which still survive.

The U.S. has essentially made it known that the current players will not be allowed to fail. These banks had an advantage already based on their size, that advantage is now greater and carries an implied government guarantee.

Ladies and gentleman, this is your banking recapitalization program: an unfair playing field. I might be able to swallow that as the economy needs a banking system. But, if you believe Reshef and Philippon's data, a goodly part of the essentially unearned money that should be going to recapitalize the banks is ending up instead overpaying the bankers.

It is true that part of the reason banks are paying their best people so much is that a tectonic shift in banking will place a higher premia on the most talented. Fair enough, but only if we see a shrinking pool of compensation money being tilted towards a smaller elite.

The rise and rise of the rents extracted by bankers from the economy will only really be stopped by government intervention, since, given we have a system of bank insurance, it only really can exist with government connivance.

You could make good progress controlling excess compensation and banking rents by placing limits on size, by taxing complexity (which after all hasn't really served us well), and by limiting the use of leverage within the parts of the system that can make a call on the taxpayer.

If you look at the Great Depression, this process will take about four years. We've not made a very encouraging start.

(At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund. )

(James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own)

If you thought the U.S. housing crash could be blunted if only lenders would cut delinquent borrowers a break, it is perhaps time to move on to another vain hope.

That's right, the loan modification movement - pushed by the U.S. administration and others as a means of keeping non-paying borrowers in their houses, keeping those same houses from flooding the market as foreclosures, and even helping beleaguered lenders - is running into a reality-shaped wall.

An exhaustive study of loan modifications by economists at the Boston Federal Reserve, under which delinquent borrowers are given lower rates, more time, or even cuts in the principal amount owed, showed fundamental problems with the way that idea works when put into practice.

Looking at data that covers about 60 percent of U.S. mortgages the authors, Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi, and Paul S. Willen, came up with two important conclusions.

First, securitization, whatever its other shortcomings, is not an important factor in stopping loan servicers from cutting deals with delinquent borrowers.

Second, and even more importantly, lenders don't renegotiate for a simple, unanswerable reason: it is not in their best interest financially.

Virtually every rescue plan in the U.S. since the crisis began in 2007 has been in part a loan modification program, the most recent being the Making Home Affordable plan the Obama administration unveiled in February.

The thinking is that, as a foreclosure can cost the lender between 30 and 50 percent of the value of the loan, deals can be struck with borrowers for a lot less than that leave everyone better off.

Sadly, very few loans are being modified - only about 3.0 percent of delinquent loans - with many blaming securitization, which can make a loan modification toxic for one class of lender but beneficial for another.

Seeing as how securitization was part of the way finance spun of control and the bubble was inflated, this was a satisfying narrative, but a false one according to the Fed study. They found no significant differences in the rate of renegotiation among loans that were in private-label securitizations and those actually owned by the servicer doing the negotiating with the borrowers.

NEITHER A BORROWER NOR A MODIFIER...

The real issue is that, in the vast majority of instances, banks are better off not modifying.

For one thing, about 30 percent of borrowers who become delinquent get back on track before foreclosure. Since its very hard to know which borrowers will become payers again, this implies that 30 percent of the money expended in modifying loans is wasted, at least from the lenders point of view.

Secondly, a huge percentage of borrowers who are given new improved terms go and become delinquent all over again. A whopping 40 to 50 percent of borrowers who get modified loans are 60 days delinquent again six months later.

For them, and for their banks, it is just delaying the inevitable, and expensive to boot, as falling property prices make putting off foreclosing and liquidating costly.

The implication is that unless the government wants to pony up much larger amounts of money to entice lenders to modify loans, we are not going to make much of a dent in the wave of foreclosures washing across the economy. This could be done, and possibly support house prices in the process, but at a very high costs.

The real issue is that there are too many houses for the supply of credit worthy borrowers. The re-default rate shows that, as does the low clearing price when banks sell foreclosed houses.

Housing needs to fall in value, less of it needs to be built, and more people should become renters. That is going to continue to eat away at bank capital and act as a drag on growth.

Beyond that, there is a real question about the long-term consequences of mass loan modification. If the incentives are there more borrowers will become selectively delinquent and fewer who become delinquent will in the end catch up with their payments. Why should they?

That means higher loan rates than would otherwise be the case.

The thinking behind loan modification has interesting parallels in the rest of the economy, where policy makers are following similar strategies for banks and corporate borrowers.

Rather than simply cutting back on leverage, probably via default, there seems to be a consensus for stringing struggling borrowers, and lenders, along, hoping that something turns up.

Ultimately, it seems likely that strategy is about as successful in the rest of the economy as it seems to be in housing.

(At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund.)

-- James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own --

Come good news or bad, the U.S. treasury market is taking a sell now and wait for inflation later strategy.

Since May 21, Treasuries have been battered, sending the yield on 10-year bonds up by nearly 40 basis points to 3.53 percent, an enormous move in bond market terms.

This is where the real action is, not in speculation about whether credit ratings agencies will cut the U.S. AAA rating in a year or two; by the time they get around to saying what everyone already knows is true, the damage will have been done.

The U.S. is in the process of reflating, really re-leveraging its economy, but this time using the public purse and printing machine to replace private demand.

This may be necessary, it may even work, but what it is without doubt is risky. The Federal Reserve's massive direct intervention in credit markets will have to be unwound if and when it works, with unforeseeable consequences, and the government's funding needs are in the meantime intimidating.

Investors in Treasuries rightly fear the risks of inflation and of being left, eventually, holders of what the Fed is selling rather than what it is, at least for now, buying.

Stephen Lewis, of Monument Securities in London believes the surge in prices of things the Fed was buying was by definition short-lived:

"Investors quickly realised that, unless the Fed intended to be a permanent holder of the securities it had bought, or of an equivalent amount of similar securities, the favourable shift in the supply/demand balance would be only temporary," he wrote in a note to clients.

"Sooner or later, it would give way to an unfavourable shift as the Fed unwound its holdings. More than that, even the cessation, or diminution, of the flow of Fed asset purchases might leave the prices of those assets high and dry...The prospect then would be of a sickening plunge in market prices."

The irony on Tuesday was that bonds were hit hard even despite a successful auction of $40 billion of 2-year notes, with performance getting worse the further in the future the bonds are due for repayment. But a further series of tests are upcoming, with another $60 billion being sold this week and more to follow as far as they eye can see.

An optimistic gloss on the bond sell off on Tuesday is that better than forecast consumer confidence data had touched off a rally in stocks. Happy days, fill your boots with equities and sell those bonds. A steepening yield curve is supposed to be a sign of a recovery, right?

TREASURIES WEAKEN, OTHER VARIABLES CHANGE

That analysis is tough to reconcile with recent events. Last week, bad news and a fall in the stock market coincided with bonds tumbling. Britain was put on warning by Standard & Poor's that it could lose its AAA rating, supposedly sparking a read-across of the same implication for the U.S., the jobs numbers looked a bit ropey and, hey presto, bonds and stocks, well really U.S. assets, fell in concert.

Moody's on Wednesday said the U.S.'s AAA rating was stable, but strangely the rally on the back of this was not forthcoming.

But to understand why bond markets aren't pleased with the U.S. fiscal situation, you don't need to read-across from the British model, just read the Congressional Budget Office data.

The CBO predicts nearly $10 trillion of new debt in the decade from 2010, which will leave it at more than 80 percent of GDP. These are just astounding numbers, and while we can't be sure, the real risk is that the bond market is telling us this is unsustainable, unfinancable over the long term.

The data may well be looking up, and I do think a tepid recovery in the second half of this year is on the cards, but surely not a recovery that is worthy of inspiring a 12 percent plus move in government interest rates in 10 days or so, and not while the Fed is busily doing its best to keep rates artificially low by buying debt directly.

The central scenario is probably a volatile bond market, a jittery one which sees inflation behind every tree but in the end keeps faith with the U.S. and with its ability and resolve to manage the economy.

The tail risk is that the bond market loses faith, and in some combination with a falling dollar begins to not reflect events but dictate them.

It is a small risk, but the bond market could be the story of the summer.

-- At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund. --

-- James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own --

California's fiscal train wreck should be watched warily by investors in U.S. Treasuries; as the start of a trend among states seeking bailouts, as a source of pressure on Federal funds and as a harbinger of hard choices at national level.

California voters last week rejected a finance bolstering proposal, setting the stage for billions of dollars worth of  cuts in services, layoffs and a shortened school year.

It also leaves the state with a budget shortfall of more than $21 billion, an exacerbated seasonal revenue shortfall and a fragile reputation in the bond market.

These are just about the last things a state needs when unemployment is high and recession is deep, but California is trapped between its own high cost base, bond investors unwilling to give it the benefit of the doubt and a Federal government that is loath to play Santa Claus. Of the three, the last is most likely to give way, and if the U.S. does widen the bailout it is already giving to states it will have potentially profound consequences.

Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner knocked back, equivocally, a request from California Treasurer Bill Lockyer to use TARP funds to backstop the issuance of bonds by California. Lockyer fears that investors and banks will impose punitive costs on new borrowings, costs that will only worsen its overall position.

Though Geithner was right to say California wouldn't fit under the TARP, saying in essence that this was not the purpose of the vehicle, he was far from final on the whole issue.

Asked to rule out categorically a California bailout, Geithner told Congress:

"We will have to do exceptional things, as we have done already, to fix this mess ... That's not putting on the table or taking off the table any specific thing like that. But I just want you to know that there are things that we've had to do I would never have contemplated doing."

Christopher Thornberg, of Los Angeles-based Beacon Economics, thinks the stakes for California and the U.S. economy will prove too high.

"I don't think the Feds can afford to say no to California just now."

AS THE BAILOUT ROLLS

The economic and social impact of California's spending cuts are unpleasant. Also of concern is the health of the municipal bond market itself, the continued smooth functioning of which is systemically important and could force the government's hand. To be clear, Californian 10-year debt is still yielding a fairly reasonable 4.4 percent, a lot higher than equivalent Treasuries at about 3.3 percent but not ruinous. There are well founded fears about what the price will be going forward.

Treasury and Federal Reserve officials are understandably reluctant; after all, look at the mortgage market which continues to be hooked up to a government sponsored ventilator. Clearly too if Federal assistance were given to help California  sell bonds, other states and localities would quickly get in line for their share.

And while California makes the headlines, the finances of other states are also dire.

Forty-seven of the 50 states face budget deficits in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 totalling a hefty $350 billion, according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.

Much of that will be resolved through higher taxes and spending cuts, but a chunky part could end up being bankrolled in one way or another by the Federal coffers, which should give pause to Treasury investors already absorbing massive issuance.

California is in some ways a special case: it requires two thirds majorities to pass tax increases. But its political inability to get to grips with a set of unpleasant choices is perhaps a warning for the U.S. as a whole.

There is precious little consensus in Congress for more bailout money and even if another tranche of support for states on top of the $140 billion already offered makes economic sense, it may not be forthcoming. It's not hard to see political paralysis in Washington if more money is needed, for whatever reason.

Secretary Geithner has been lucky or smart to the extent that markets have decided that his tools and bankroll are equal to the task as far as banks go. That consensus may or may not hold and may or may not continue to matter.

If states or municipalities mean he must go back to a refractory Congress, confidence could ebb as rapidly and dramatically as we have seen it grow.

-- At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund. --

-- James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own --

Sure, seeing your economy shrink at a 15 percent annual clip is depressing, quite literally, but if you believe in even a tepid global economic recovery in the second half, then Japan is actually attractive.

There is no way to sugar coat the first quarter Japanese gross domestic product figures released on Wednesday: they are breathtakingly bad viewed from virtually any angle.

The economy shrank by a record four percent in the quarter, or an annualized fall of 15.2 percent, leaving the economy no bigger in real terms than it was in 2003. Net exports fell sharply, by themselves pushing GDP 1.4 percent lower and, perhaps even worse, capital spending shrank by more than ten percent and private consumption fell by 1.1 percent.

What's more, stocks of inventory remain high when compared to sales, so there is plenty left to sell without placing new orders.

But just as global trade, and with it Japan's economy, had an extended and sudden plunge in the wake of last year's panic, there are signs already of an improvement.

Industrial production in March in Japan actually rose from the month before, up 1.6 percent, a rise echoed softly in the Reuters Tankan survey of confidence among manufacturers which showed less gloom than the month before.

A recovery will require a substantial recovery in exports, industrial output and household spending, according to Julian Jessop, chief international economist at Capital Economics in London.

"The strong rebound in the survey evidence confirms that this is realistic," Jessop wrote in a note to clients. "The extent of the previous declines in exports and investment also leaves plenty of room for a decent bounce."

That decent bounce could result in a nice return on Japanese shares, which have rallied in sympathy with global stocks.

Significantly, Tokyo shares actually rallied after the GDP news even despite a rise in the yen which crimped the competitiveness of exporters. And measured on a price-to-book value basis, Japanese shares, especially smaller cap issues, are among the world's cheapest, implying decent potential for gains if the economy as a whole surprises.

Japanese shares as a whole are trading on a one year prospective price-earnings ratio of about 30.

LEVERAGED TO CHINA AND U.S.

Japan's economy is very highly leveraged to global trade, making this perhaps the key call in any bet on a recovery there. Japan's position is better than it might seem because those things which it does still successfully export are of high quality and technical specification and less vulnerable to cheaper substitutes from China or elsewhere.

A Barclays Capital composite leading indictor for Japanese exports, which tends to be three to five months ahead, has recently turned positive after a sustained and precipitous drop.

The index includes U.S. stock prices, commodity prices, new orders in the U.S. in both transport machinery and information technology, Chinese auto production and the relationship between U.S. inventories and sales.

Efforts by China to jump start auto sales seem to have worked particularly well, recording an 18.5 percent gain in April from the year before. Similarly, there is a reasonably good chance we are in the midst of a U.S. recovery of some sort, though the risks are it is short lived or chronically feeble.

As this happens look for a rebound in exports and production in Japan and even, at some point, in actual investment. This leaves us with the 20-year running sore that is Japanese domestic consumption.

The fear, and it is not a small one, is that employment and income suffer after a downturn of depression size and that already falling consumption retracts further. The gap between Japan's output and its capacity is eight or nine percent now, making the risk of deflation, and with it the possibility of a negative spiral in spending, quite high.

Balancing that is the fact that Japan's healthy savings rate gives its consumers an option less available to their U.S. peers when income falls, they can make up some of the shortfall by simply saving less.

Further, Japan is feeling the impact of a substantial fiscal stimulus, with at least some of the tax cuts finding their way into shopkeepers' hands. Japan also has front loaded infrastructure spending.

As with all such spending, the impact of this is transient and, with the possibility of an election soon, there is no guarantee that further extra budgets will be forthcoming.

It won't be glamorous, in part because the engine of growth will be elsewhere, but between now and the end of the year a rebound could be surprising and, depression-era style economic statistics notwithstanding, surprisingly profitable.

-- At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund --