The Great Debate UK

from MacroScope:

Can Greek public opinion be turned?

So we’ve got the fresh Greek elections we expected and markets, despite the inevitability that we would get here, have reacted with some alarm. European stocks have shed  around 1 percent, and the harbour of German Bunds is pushing their futures price up in early trade. The Greeks will try to form a caretaker government today to see them through to elections expected on June 17.

The key question is whether the mainstream parties can mount a convincing campaign second time around, playing on the glaring contradiction in SYRIZA’s position (no to bailout, yes to the euro) and essentially turning the vote into a referendum on euro membership, which the overwhelming majority of Greeks still support. Don’t count on that. SYRIZA remains ahead in the polls. To be able to pull it off, PASOK and New Democracy will need some help from Europe. There have already been hints from Brussels that if a pro-bailout government is formed, Athens could be given some leeway on its debt-cutting terms. But equally other voices are saying there is no more room for manoeuvre.

France's Francois Hollande used his presidential debut to frame help for Greece within his push for a European growth strategy last night, saying he hoped that could also foster a return to prosperity there. He and Germany's Angela Merkel are due in the United States for a G8 summit at the end of the week where doubtless they will come under heavy pressure to make sure Greece doesn’t bomb out of the euro zone or, if it does, that the effect is contained. Easier said than done. Given a Greek euro exit would probably require rapid concerted reaction from the EU, IMF (to shore up Spain?) and the world’s big central banks (remember the global monetary policy response after the collapse of Lehmans?), planning for that could well be bubbling below the surface at the G8.

IMF chief Christine Lagarde said last night that it was important to be technically prepared for the possibility of Greece leaving the euro zone while Finland’s prime minister said Greek euro exit would not cause the financial mayhem seen in 2008.

As we’ve said before, Greece has some leverage. The IMF, ECB and euro zone governments are holding a lot of Greek debt so have an incentive to keep the  show on the road or face heavy losses if there is a hard default. Of Greece’s 250 billion-plus euros of debt, nearly 200 billion is now held by those public bodies, most of it by the ECB, which could need recapitalizing after that sort of hit, something that would fall back on euro zone governments. It is also hard to see how Europe could avoid propping Greece up even if it did leave the currency club. The calculation for euro zone leaders is whether pouring good money after bad is more or less palatable than taking a big loss on their Greek debt holdings.

On the growth strategy, there are hints that Spain will get more time to hit its 3 percent of GDP budget target, so why not something similar for Greece? PASOK leader Venizelos, the man who negotiated the bailout and who was humiliated in the election 10 days ago, has pressed for three years rather than two to make the cuts required by Greece’s programme. If he got stronger signals from euro zone partners that something like that could happen – and persuaded the electorate that this is the only way to avoid euro exit  -- it’s possible that he and New Democracy leader Samaras could do better second time around. The problem for the markets is that while you can take a reasonable stab at how politicians might act, it’s much harder to read a battered electorate. So they are in for a rocky month.

What is undeniably true is that the piecemeal European growth measures announced so far to revive moribund economies don’t amount to a hill of beans.

from Lawrence Summers:

It’s time for the IMF to step up in Europe

By Lawrence Summers The opinions expressed are his own.

European leaders will meet today for yet another “historic” summit at which the fate of Europe is said to hang in the balance. Yet it is clear that this will not be the last convened to deal with the financial crisis.

If public previews from France and Germany are a guide, there will be commitments to assuring fiscal discipline in Europe and establishing common crisis resolution mechanisms. There will also be much celebration of commitments made by Italy, and a strong political reaffirmation of the permanence of the monetary union. All of this is necessary and desirable, but the world economy will remain on edge.

Given that Europe is the largest single component of the global economy, the rest of the world has a stake in helping to avoid major financial accidents. It also has a stake in aiding continued growth in Europe and ensuring that the European financial system supports investment around the world – particularly as cross-border European bank lending dwarfs that of banks from any other region.

Now is also a historic juncture for the International Monetary Fund. The focus of the policy response to the crisis must now shift from Brussels and Frankfurt to the IMF’s boardroom.

From the problems of the UK and Italy in the 1970s, through the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the Mexican, Asian and Russian financial crises of the 1990s, the IMF has operated by twinning the provision of liquidity with strong requirements that those involved do what is necessary to restore their financial positions to sustainability. There is ample room for debate about the precise policy choices the fund has made in the past. But, the IMF has consistently stood for the proposition that the laws of economics do not and will not give way to political considerations. At key points the IMF has offered prescriptions, not just for countries in need of borrowed funds, but also for those whose success is systemically important for the global economy.

Christine Lagarde, the head of the IMF, highlighted the seriousness of problems in Europe to members of the international financial community assembled in Jackson Hole in August. She pointed to capital shortfalls in the European banking system and the need for adjustment to be carried on in ways that were consistent with continuing growth. Now, the IMF needs to speak and act on several fronts.

from The Great Debate:

The abyss and our last chance

By Carlo De Benedetti The opinions expressed are his own.

In a magnificent book published a few years ago Cormac McCarthy imagines a man and a child, father and son, pushing a shopping cart containing what little they have left, along a back road somewhere in America. Ten years earlier the world was destroyed by a nameless catastrophe that turned it into a dark, cold place without life.

There is no history and there is no future. But there is an objective: to head south toward the sea. Mythical places, only vaguely perceived, where there might be salvation. The father is getting older and is ever more weary. But he has the child with him. And he has his objective. He wants to take him southward to the sea. Toward a future that may still be possible.

Today, is the western economy, in particular the Italian economy, that world destroyed by an Apocalypse? Are we pushing that cart, containing the few things we have left, toward a mythical sea of which we know nothing, or even what it is like or where it is?

Re-reading the book I was tempted to think this. To think that those pages, written in 2006, were in some way a prophesy of what we are living through today. Never before has an entire productive system, our own, been so fundamentally questioned.

I have been convinced for some time now that the huge financial crisis of the last few years is the litmus test of a deeper crisis to do with the universal economic order that has lasted through the centuries, with a shift of the balance of world wealth toward new countries.

Capitalism and democracy under threat from euro zone crisis

By Laurence Copeland. The author is a professor of finance at Cardiff University Business School. The opinions expressed are his own.

It takes quite a lot to make me feel sorry for politicians, especially the European variety, but I must say that Nicholas Sarkozy and particularly Angela Merkel have a right to be livid at the news that the Greek government now proposes to hold a referendum on whether they will agree to be given another gigantic dollop of aid. Having only reached agreement (of a very vague kind) at last week’s summit in the early hours of the morning, you can imagine how the French and German leaders must have felt when they discovered that their marathon negotiating sessions may all have been in vain. It seems the Greeks are now too wary of foreigners bearing gifts to accept their largesse without weeks or months of prior deliberation and debate.

The acceptance of the referendum proposal is apparently not a foregone conclusion, which is just as well, since it is plainly insane.

First, consider the wording of the referendum question. Opinion polls appear to show that Greeks remain keen on staying in the EU (and maybe even in the euro zone), so as things stand at the moment the outcome could be a majority in favour of rejecting the deal, but staying in the EU.  But is this option still open to Greece? If not, the Greek government could end up with a mandate to follow a road that is already clearly blocked.

To pre-empt this scenario would require some sort of clear statement from Brussels about whether they would be willing to allow Greece to stay in the euro zone and/or EU if it rejected the latest round of austerity measures.

Even supposing the details of the referendum are sorted out, what then? How long is all this supposed to take? The vote could hardly go ahead before mid-January at the earliest. What on earth does Mr Papandreou think will be happening in the markets in the meantime?  Does he think they will simply sit on their hands and wait patiently for Greek democracy to grind through the gears?

In reality, the momentum of this crisis is so inexorable that you can be quite sure that the deal currently on offer will have become totally irrelevant by the time any referendum is held, if the offer hasn’t anyway been withdrawn by the time you read this.

from The Great Debate:

Does the euro have a future?

By George Soros The opinions expressed are his own.

The euro crisis is a direct consequence of the crash of 2008. When Lehman Brothers failed, the entire financial system started to collapse and had to be put on artificial life support. This took the form of substituting the sovereign credit of governments for the bank and other credit that had collapsed. At a memorable meeting of European finance ministers in November 2008, they guaranteed that no other financial institutions that are important to the workings of the financial system would be allowed to fail, and their example was followed by the United States.

Angela Merkel then declared that the guarantee should be exercised by each European state individually, not by the European Union or the eurozone acting as a whole. This sowed the seeds of the euro crisis because it revealed and activated a hidden weakness in the construction of the euro: the lack of a common treasury. The crisis itself erupted more than a year later, in 2010.

There is some similarity between the euro crisis and the subprime crisis that caused the crash of 2008. In each case a supposedly riskless asset—collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), based largely on mortgages, in 2008, and European government bonds now—lost some or all of their value.

Unfortunately the euro crisis is more intractable. In 2008 the U.S. financial authorities that were needed to respond to the crisis were in place; at present in the eurozone one of these authorities, the common treasury, has yet to be brought into existence. This requires a political process involving a number of sovereign states. That is what has made the problem so severe. The political will to create a common European treasury was absent in the first place; and since the time when the euro was created the political cohesion of the European Union has greatly deteriorated. As a result there is no clearly visible solution to the euro crisis. In its absence the authorities have been trying to buy time.

In an ordinary financial crisis this tactic works: with the passage of time the panic subsides and confidence returns. But in this case time has been working against the authorities. Since the political will is missing, the problems continue to grow larger while the politics are also becoming more poisonous.

It takes a crisis to make the politically impossible possible. Under the pressure of a financial crisis the authorities take whatever steps are necessary to hold the system together, but they only do the minimum and that is soon perceived by the financial markets as inadequate. That is how one crisis leads to another. So Europe is condemned to a seemingly unending series of crises. Measures that would have worked if they had they been adopted earlier turn out to be inadequate by the time they become politically possible. This is the key to understanding the euro crisis.

Greece deal is a compromise and, once again, the banks have won

By Laurence Copeland. The opinions expressed are his own.

Whenever I see photos of Chancellor Merkel these days, I’m reminded of the lugubrious features of the creature in the Restaurant at the End of the World, as it recommended to guests which part of its own anatomy they should eat. The details of the “Deal to Save the Euro” are still mysterious and have been given a misleading spin in the official releases, but one or two points seem clear.

First, the package is a compromise – a little bit of default (as required by a reality check) plus assistance to Greece which looks very generous but is still not enough to give it a realistic chance of paying its remaining debts. So the can has been kicked further down the same road yet again.

The second point is one I am as fed up of writing as you probably are of reading: once more, the Banks Have Won. On the one hand, the French President wanted some kind of blanket balance-sheet tax, supposedly to contribute to the cost of the bailout. This was a daft idea for all sorts of reasons, not least the fact that it would have penalised the banks which behaved responsibly along with the irresponsible, the sort of outcome we have seen only too often in the last three years.

Germany, or at least Angela Merkel, wanted a solution which involved some contribution from the private sector creditors (mostly the banks, of course), which she has in the end got. Now the first thing to be said is that the words “private sector” ought to be in inverted commas, because we have seen time and again since 2007 how, one way or another, bank losses end up being borne by the taxpayers, so that any serious hit on the banks would have been deflected on to the public sector anyway.

And then, of course, the British banking sector is half state-owned in any case – all of which begs the question: why all the fuss? Why were negotiations held up for weeks over the issue of how much the private sector should contribute?

In the end, how much are the so-called private sector lenders going to contribute to the rescue?

from Global News Journal:

What’s really behind Merkel’s nuclear U-turn?

(German Chancellor Angela Merkel promises a more rapid shift to renewable energy sources during a speech in the Bundestag lower house of parliament on March 17)

The consensus view in Germany is that Angela Merkel's abrupt reversal on nuclear energy after Fukushima was a transparent ploy to shore up support in an important state election in Baden-Wuerttemberg. If indeed that was her intention (she denies any political motive) then she miscalculated horribly. Her party was ousted from government in B-W on Sunday after running the prosperous southern region for 58 straight years. But what if Merkel was really thinking longer-term -- ie beyond the state vote to the next federal election in 2013? After the Japan catastrophe she may well have realised that her chances of getting elected to a third term were next-to-nil if she didn't pivot quickly on nuclear. There are two good reasons why that is probably a safe assumption. First is the extent of anti-nuclear sentiment in Germany. A recent poll for Stern magazine showed nearly two in three Germans would like to see the country's 17 nuclear power plants shut down within 5 years.  The nuclear issue was the decisive factor in the B-W election. And you can bet it will play an important role in the next national vote -- even if it is 2-1/2 years away. The second reason why the reversal looks like a good strategic decision from a political point of view is the dire state of Merkel's junior partner in government -- the Free Democrats. It was the strength of the FDP which vaulted her to a second term in September 2009. But now it looks like their weakness could be her undoing in 2013.  Merkel probably needs the FDP to score at least 10 percent in the next vote to give her a chance of renewing her "black-yellow" coalition. Right now the FDP is hovering at a meagre 5 percent and it is difficult to see how they double that anytime soon. The nuclear shift widens Merkel's options in one fell swoop. Suddenly the issue that made a coalition between Merkel's Christian Democrats and the Greens unthinkable at the federal level has vanished. Her party set a precedent by hooking up with the Greens in the city-state of Hamburg in 2008. Now she has more than two years to lay the foundations for a similar partnership in Berlin. By then voters may see Merkel's nuclear U-turn in a different light. And only then will it be truly clear if it was a huge political mistake, as the Baden-Wuerttemberg vote suggests, or a prescient strategic coup.

German elections bring forward a possible stalemate situation for EMU

-Jane Foley is research director at Forex.com. The opinions expressed are her own.-

Next month’s UK general election is not the only one of significance in Europe. There is the possibility that the German regional elections in North Rhine-Westphalia on May 9 could result in the end of the CDU/FDP government’s majority in the upper house of parliament.

While this would not alter Angela Merkel’s status as Chancellor, lessened support would make it more difficult for her to implement planned tax cuts and health services reforms. Fear that she may lose support in NRW is currently delaying the transfer of a German loan to Greece. In turn this means the markets are bracing themselves for a possible default in Greece; an event which could change the present composition of the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union.

German popular opinion is firmly set against the notion of providing loans to Greece; although Germany as the largest EU economy is obliged to lend around 8.4 billion euros to Greece very soon to help the latter avoid default. While the election in NRW will not be fought on the subject of Greece it does give an added edge to concerns about lack of fiscal manoeuvrability in the region.

NRW has had to issue a record 27 billion euros this year. Over the past 10 years or so the amount of debt per capita has soared. This increase in debt and the possibility that the level of local services will have to be cut to meet fiscal consolidation targets does not sit happily with the notion that German taxpayers may have to make funds available to Greece.

Andreas Pinkwart, the Deputy Leader of the government’s junior coalition partner the FDP has described the prospect of a German loan to Greece as a “slap in the face of German employees”. It is unlikely that sentiment within the cash strapped economies of Spain, Ireland and Portugal has warmed to the topic of a bailout for Greece either.

Germany’s unwillingness to put its hands in its pockets to prevent a Greece default opens EMU to yet further criticism that it is a deeply flawed system. It has been clear for some time that the Stability Pact provides inadequate fiscal controls but if German pockets prove to have limited depth, then the ability of EMU to muddle its way through this crisis is significantly lessened.

from Commentaries:

Germans vote for change; will they get it?

Germans have voted for change. A centre-right government with a clear parliamentary majority will replace the ungainly grand coalition of conservatives and Social Democrats that ran Europe's biggest economy for the last four years.

This should mean an end to "steady as she goes" lowest common denominator policies, and at least some reform of the country's tax and welfare system. The liberal Free Democrats, who recorded their best ever result with around 14.7 percent, will try to pull the new government towards tax cuts, health care reform, a reduction in welfare spending and a loosening of job protection in small business.

Conservative Chancellor Angela Merkel, a cautious centrist, made clear in her first post-election comments that she she would not allow a radical lurch to the right. She promised to be the "chancellor of all Germans" -- old and young, entrepreneurs and workers -- and said the conseravtives would be sufficiently dominant in the new coalition to prevail "in questions that affect social balance".

The new government faces tough economic challenges in what is bound to be a more polarised political atmosphere, with the Social Democrats in opposition. The economy is expected to contract by at least 5 percent this year, and export-led growth is likely to return only slowly. Unemployment is set to explode in the coming months as short-time work schemes run out. The budget deficit is set to top 6 percent of gross domestic product next year, more than twice the EU limit. So 2010 will be an extremely difficult year. But there are some problems that are even more urgent.

The first big choice involves Germany's ailing banks. Outgoing Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck admitted last week that the public-owned regional Landesbanks "continue to pose an enormous systemic risk to our market". The outgoing parliament passed a virtually useless "bad bank" law meant to encourage stricken financial institutions to put their toxic assets into state-guaranteed special purpose vehicles. The banks have so far spurned the system because it leaves the risk of losses with them rather than with the taxpayer.

Merkel and her new partners need to amend the law so that the state takes more of the risk, otherwise Germany faces a future of "zombie" banks that are too burdened with liabilities to lend to the real economy. That won't be popular, with the left bound to claim that taxpayers are being forced to bail out wealthy bankers.

Fixing the banks is more urgent than cutting taxes or curbing public spending to revive the economy. That also means merging the Landesbanks, shrinking their activities and privatising as much as possible. The Germans must also be ready to allow healthy foreign banks to buy up sickly German ones. That is the logic of the European single market, to which a centre-right government is likely to be more committed.

German elections too close to call

- Erik Kirschbaum is a Reuters correspondent in Berlin. -

Has this been dullest German election campaign in decades or the most exciting?  Has the battle for power in Berlin between Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier that concludes with Sunday’s election been a memorable showdown or a forgettably boring contest?

Many journalists, pundits and voters have complained it’s all been a merciless bore compared to the high-octane battles of the past with little action and precious few highlights.

But I would argue that in many ways it has been one of the most interesting campaigns in decades. Why? Because the outcome is so uncertain and there are more different government possibilities that could result from it than at any time in Germany’s post-war history.

Instead of the usual centre-right or centre-left choice that German voters had for the last 60 years, there are options galore this time — at least in theory.

There could be a centre-right government, another grand coalition or several three-way coalitions that could include the Free Democrats, the Greens and from a purely  mathematical point of view even the Left party that have never been tried before at the federal level.

On top of that, the opinion polls have once again tracked a dramatic narrowing in the lead that Merkel’s preferred centre-right coalition (Conservative  Christian Democrats  and Free Democrats) have over the three other parties — Social Democrats, Greens and Left party .