--James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own--

Rest in peace, Great American Consumer. We will not see your like again.

"Cash-for-clunkers" aside, consumers seem bent on actually paying back debt rather than racking it up, a change that if sustained, as it is likely to be, will dampen economic growth not for months but for years, and not just in the U.S.

Outstanding U.S. consumer borrowing fell by a jaw-dropping $21.6 billion in July, according to data released this week by the Federal Reserve, five times more than analysts expected and the second largest monthly drop since the end of World War II.

June's borrowing was revised to negative $15.5 billion from what had been an impressive minus $10.3 billion.

Over the past year, the stock of consumer loans outstanding has dropped by 4.2 percent, or nearly $110 billion, leaving the total now lower than it was before the crisis began in 2007.

Over the long term, this is exactly what needs to happen. With household wealth badly hit by the housing and stock market crashes balance sheets are stretched. And with a huge baby boomer cohort hurtling towards retirement age also, spending and borrowing were bound to be curtailed.

The question really becomes how entrenched the trend towards the new frugality becomes.

"Memories of debt are very powerful. The generation that grew up in the 1920s and 1930s, was wary of getting into debt as it - and its parents - had experienced two periods of deflation," Lombard Street Research economist Gabriel Stein wrote in a note to clients.

"We are now in another period of debt repayment and deflation. The thought that US households will forget 2007-2009 and begin to borrow and spend as they did in the early 2000s, is fanciful at best."

For years the mantra on Wall Street was "don't bet against the American consumer," a creature so fabulously resilient as to be almost super human.

Wars and recessions did little to brook consumption and the debt that grew alongside. Even the September 11 attacks saw healthy month on month growth in borrowing in the aftermath.

Whole industries, some now vanished, were predicated on Americans continuing to borrow and spend. It's an overstatement, but only a slight one, to say that the global economy was predicated on U.S. consumption, which in turn was predicated on consumers borrowing.

THE NEW FRUGALITY

It is doubtless true that lenders of all stripes are making credit harder to get. But there is a good bit of evidence that individuals are changing their preferences. Much of the cash from stimulus handouts earlier this year was used to pay down debt rather than goosing consumption.

A Gallup poll asking Americans how much they had spent in the past day, not including major purchases or normal household bills hit $63 when most recently measured, down from above $100 a year ago.

Now on the face of it, that reduction must be overstated. If consumption had fallen by that magnitude, we'd be in a depression rather than debating the strength of a recovery.

But of course the Gallup poll is a self reported one, and I would be willing to bet that people are now exaggerating how frugal they are, where once they would have exaggerated how much they were spending. That in itself is an important marker of a social trend. Once you wanted the nice people at Gallup to think you were a big shot leaking money, now you probably want them to see you as a saver.

Gallup also looked at the data by generational group, and found that it was not just those in or approaching retirement who were cutting back on self-reported spending. So-called Generation Xers and Millennials, who followed the boomers into the workforce, are also cutting back in similar scale.

But the issue isn't the rate of savings but the stock of savings as compared to liabilities. While it is reasonably possible to cut back on spending and so increase your savings rate that is far different from suddenly becoming financially robust.

The other thing to bear in mind is that there is a huge difference between stocks and flows. A person can quite quickly raise her savings rate - as we have seen - but that does not mean that her debts are quickly paid off.

If U.S. consumers cut debt as quickly as Japanese corporations did in the 1990s, it will still take them until 2018 to get their debt down to 100 percent of GDP from recent peaks of 130 percent, according to a study from the San Francisco Federal Reserve.

If the trend in consumer borrowing continues, it will not be long before the conversation will turn back to stimulus, quantitative easing, and a relapse for the U.S. economy.

--At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund.--

- Marie Diron is senior economist at Oxford Economics. The opinions expressed are her own -

A swine flu pandemic would affect the economy via various channels involving supply and demand.

On the supply side, infection and death imply that employees would be unable to go to work. This is what most people think about when they think about swine flu’s economic costs.

But the demand channels are likely much more powerful. Fear of infection would keep people away from airports, train stations, restaurants, cinemas and shopping centres. This would imply cuts in travel and tourism and consumer spending.

In addition, uncertainty about the impact and duration of the pandemic would dampen investment, while financial markets would probably experience renewed tensions with spreads between policy and market interest rates rising again and share prices negatively affected.

To get a quantitative estimate of the impact, we need to make a few assumptions. First, based on the experience of previous pandemics and developments so far, we can assume that 30 percent of the world and UK populations would be infected and be unable to go to work for two weeks. We also assume a death rate of 0.4 percent.

Second, we look at the experience of the SARS outbreak in Asia in 2003 to calibrate the likely cuts in discretionary consumption and international travel. This episode showed significant reductions, of around 20 percent and 60 percent respectively. In the current environment of rising unemployment and needs of balance sheet repairs, households could cut discretionary consumption even more sharply.

Under these assumptions, the GDP loss during the six months of the pandemic would amount to around five percent in the UK. This means that GDP growth in 2010 would be at least as bad as in 2009.

However, and although once the pandemic is over the economic bounce back would likely be less sharp than post-SARS, chances are that, by 2011, GDP growth could be above our baseline forecast and the economic loss would be gradually recouped within around three to four years. CPI inflation would likely turn negative for a few months but would rise as pent-up demand is realised.

There is a risk that swine flu tips the UK and the world economy into deflation as the pandemic would hit at a time when businesses and banks are still reeling from the economic crisis.

Rather than catching up on postponed spending, households may raise savings for a longer time, while companies that are already fragile after the recession may succumb to this new shock.

We estimate that under such a scenario the UK and world economies would fall into deflation. UK CPI inflation would fall to around minus one percent throughout 2010-12 and UK GDP growth next year could be as low as minus seven-and-a-half percent. With the government budget deficit already at sky-high levels and the Bank of England’s interest rates pretty much at zero, there is little that public authorities could do to try to buffer the impact.

-- James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own --

Sure, seeing your economy shrink at a 15 percent annual clip is depressing, quite literally, but if you believe in even a tepid global economic recovery in the second half, then Japan is actually attractive.

There is no way to sugar coat the first quarter Japanese gross domestic product figures released on Wednesday: they are breathtakingly bad viewed from virtually any angle.

The economy shrank by a record four percent in the quarter, or an annualized fall of 15.2 percent, leaving the economy no bigger in real terms than it was in 2003. Net exports fell sharply, by themselves pushing GDP 1.4 percent lower and, perhaps even worse, capital spending shrank by more than ten percent and private consumption fell by 1.1 percent.

What's more, stocks of inventory remain high when compared to sales, so there is plenty left to sell without placing new orders.

But just as global trade, and with it Japan's economy, had an extended and sudden plunge in the wake of last year's panic, there are signs already of an improvement.

Industrial production in March in Japan actually rose from the month before, up 1.6 percent, a rise echoed softly in the Reuters Tankan survey of confidence among manufacturers which showed less gloom than the month before.

A recovery will require a substantial recovery in exports, industrial output and household spending, according to Julian Jessop, chief international economist at Capital Economics in London.

"The strong rebound in the survey evidence confirms that this is realistic," Jessop wrote in a note to clients. "The extent of the previous declines in exports and investment also leaves plenty of room for a decent bounce."

That decent bounce could result in a nice return on Japanese shares, which have rallied in sympathy with global stocks.

Significantly, Tokyo shares actually rallied after the GDP news even despite a rise in the yen which crimped the competitiveness of exporters. And measured on a price-to-book value basis, Japanese shares, especially smaller cap issues, are among the world's cheapest, implying decent potential for gains if the economy as a whole surprises.

Japanese shares as a whole are trading on a one year prospective price-earnings ratio of about 30.

LEVERAGED TO CHINA AND U.S.

Japan's economy is very highly leveraged to global trade, making this perhaps the key call in any bet on a recovery there. Japan's position is better than it might seem because those things which it does still successfully export are of high quality and technical specification and less vulnerable to cheaper substitutes from China or elsewhere.

A Barclays Capital composite leading indictor for Japanese exports, which tends to be three to five months ahead, has recently turned positive after a sustained and precipitous drop.

The index includes U.S. stock prices, commodity prices, new orders in the U.S. in both transport machinery and information technology, Chinese auto production and the relationship between U.S. inventories and sales.

Efforts by China to jump start auto sales seem to have worked particularly well, recording an 18.5 percent gain in April from the year before. Similarly, there is a reasonably good chance we are in the midst of a U.S. recovery of some sort, though the risks are it is short lived or chronically feeble.

As this happens look for a rebound in exports and production in Japan and even, at some point, in actual investment. This leaves us with the 20-year running sore that is Japanese domestic consumption.

The fear, and it is not a small one, is that employment and income suffer after a downturn of depression size and that already falling consumption retracts further. The gap between Japan's output and its capacity is eight or nine percent now, making the risk of deflation, and with it the possibility of a negative spiral in spending, quite high.

Balancing that is the fact that Japan's healthy savings rate gives its consumers an option less available to their U.S. peers when income falls, they can make up some of the shortfall by simply saving less.

Further, Japan is feeling the impact of a substantial fiscal stimulus, with at least some of the tax cuts finding their way into shopkeepers' hands. Japan also has front loaded infrastructure spending.

As with all such spending, the impact of this is transient and, with the possibility of an election soon, there is no guarantee that further extra budgets will be forthcoming.

It won't be glamorous, in part because the engine of growth will be elsewhere, but between now and the end of the year a rebound could be surprising and, depression-era style economic statistics notwithstanding, surprisingly profitable.

-- At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund --

– David Kuo is a director at the financial Web site The Motley Fool. The views expressed are his own. –

What are consumers supposed to make of the latest inflation numbers? Do we have inflation, deflation or a bit of stagflation?

Truth is, it depends on who you are and what you do with your money. The Retail Prices Index or RPI tells us that prices today are exactly the same as they were a year ago. The Office for National Statistics reported that RPI was unchanged at 0%.

But be very careful when bandying around the term “prices”. The RPI includes elements of housing costs. So it is better to talk about the cost of living rather than prices. Prices have risen compared to a year ago, but the total cost of living as measured by RPI has fallen because of the disproportionately large drop in mortgage costs as a result of lower interest rates.

The proof, if proof was needed, that prices have risen from a year ago, can be seen from the Consumer Prices Index (CPI). Instead of 0%, as measured by the RPI, prices as measured by the CPI are 3.2% higher. The CPI does not include housing costs, so it is a better measure for people on fixed-rate mortgage deals, and also for people in rented accommodation.

The upshot is that if you have taken on mortgage debt and chosen to spend rather than save, then you are worse off as a result.

However, it’s worth bearing in mind that both the RPI and CPI are broad measures of inflation. Consequently, the extremely large basket that is used to gauge inflation may not necessarily reflect the true changes in the cost of living that you may experience. Put another way, if we don’t buy exactly the same things that the ONS puts into its basket then we will experience a different rate of inflation.

To measure our personal inflation rates we need to compare our household budgets today with what we spent a year ago. Interestingly, a twice-yearly study by The Motley Fool has shown that personal inflation is consistently higher than the Government’s measure of inflation.

This should set alarm bells ringing for many of us.  If inflation refuses to die in a so-called deflationary economy, then the outlook for the cost of living could worsen when the Government finishes pouring money through quantitative easing or the printing of raw money.

The jury is still out as to whether quantitative easing will work. It is almost anyone’s guess. But history tells us that boosting the supply of money can be inflationary. This is because when there is too much money sloshing around an economy, chasing a limited supply of goods,  prices will inevitably rise.

Investors therefore have two clear choices. They can sit on their hand and hope that their nest eggs will not shrink to the size of quails’ eggs through inflation or they can heed the lessons of history and invest in assets that have demonstrated an ability to combat inflation.

Only two asset classes have successfully beaten inflation in the long term. These have been property and shares. Most homeowners already have a large exposure to property. So, it may be prudent to increase their exposure to shares to rebalance their way their wealth is distributed.

Interestingly, the yield on UK shares is currently around 5%. That is almost ten times more than interest earned in a traditional savings account. Of course your capital is exposed to both ups and downs.

Even better yields may be available from individual shares. But it is vital to choose carefully. After all, dividend payouts are at the discretion of the company’s directors. That said, companies are often reluctant to cut dividends unless they absolutely have to. And a careful selection of companies whose dividend payouts are strong could be just the panacea for embattled investors.

– Read David Kuo’s blog here or listen to the Motley Fool podcast.

-- James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own --

With the U.S., Japan and Britain -- nearly 40 percent of the global economy -- facing the threat of deflation, it's going to be just too easy for one, two or all three of them to get the policy response horribly wrong.

The global economy is so connected, and our experience with similar situations so limited that the scope for error is huge.

Think of it as having three pilots flying a jet plane, one each operating a wing and the third managing the tail.

Oh yeah, and they all work for different airlines.

Though there will be much talk of international coordination in the next year, and though the central banks and governments of the world will likely be rowing in the same direction, their ability to gauge the effects of monetary policy and government spending on their own economies will be pretty limited, and even more so on the whole.

Failure when fighting a global recession, a global balance sheet adjustment, a global banking recapitalization, debt deflation and very possibly actual deflation can take many forms.

"It's very hard to calibrate and it's awfully easy to overshoot or undershoot, both of which would be disastrous," said Lena Komileva, London-based strategist at Tullett Prebon.

Under clubbing the response to falling prices means you could slip into a self-reinforcing deflation, making your debts, be they consumer, housing or government, heavier and setting up a cycle where businesses and consumers defer consumption and investment.

Over-reacting risks fomenting a new bout of inflation and potentially causing a new bubble. (Who knows what that would be -- dirt, water, baseball cards?)

And remember too, when deflation was last an issue on this scale globally during the 1930s, the global economy was nowhere as near as integrated.

As for now, the signs are clear: deflation is a growing threat in much of the world's economy, though still to be sure not the central forecast.

U.S. producer prices dropped by 2.8 percent in October, the largest decline on record. Core intermediate goods and core crude goods prices, which show inflation at earlier stages in the production cycle, fell by a big 1.7 and a staggering 17 percent, respectively.

Consumer prices, which are usually sticky on the way down, fell at a record rate in October, down one percent and even falling by 0.1 percent in the month when plunging food and energy prices are excluded. That will kill corporate profits and shows a business community racing with consumers to see who can capitulate fastest.

HERE, THERE AND EVERYWHERE

Inflation is falling rapidly in Britain too, with overall consumer price inflation down 0.2 percent in October, the first monthly fall since the annual January sales and the first in October since 2001, just after 9/11.

Japan meanwhile has slipped back into recession, domestic demand is weakening, wages are falling and deflation may develop some time next year, a scenario Barclays Capital rates as a 40 percent chance.

Even China, where inflation has tumbled to 4.0 percent in October from a 12-year peak of 8.7 percent in February, has moved its focus to averting deflation.

Be in no doubt, central banks have the tools to fight deflation; while interest rates can only be cut so much, officials can step up the quantitative easing now happening, they can commit to hold rates at zero for an extended period of time, they can drive down their own currency by purchasing foreign bonds or finally, simply print money and drop it from the famous helicopters.

The issue is not the tools, but the speed of the printing presses or size of the bond purchases needed to get the right result, especially when it is interacting with what will be huge tax cuts and deficit spending.

A mix of monetary and fiscal policy will work, but it's got to be the right mix and it has to be reasonably well coordinated internationally.

None of this is without risk. Remember the last deflation scare in the U.S. in the early part of this decade, which in retrospect caused the monetary bubble which was nursemaid to the housing bubble.

Print money or borrow excessively and you could lose the confidence of the currency market and experience a run, which certainly will help to fight deflation but is no-one's idea of good policy.

In theory the amount the state will need to borrow will be in part offset by the amount individuals save, or more to the point pay down in debt and decline to invest privately. That theory will be put to the test by the number of governments who are going to be selling a very large number of bonds, which will after all have to be paid back.

Next year is looking as if it will be as unconventional as it is scary.

-- At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an owner indirectly as an investor in a fund --

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