- Laurence Copeland is a professor of finance at Cardiff University Business School and a co-author of “Verdict on the Crash” published by the Institute of Economic Affairs. The opinions expressed are his own. -

Before the credit crunch, we had what I called a Prozac market. Investors on both sides of the Atlantic seemed to be in denial, as irrational as the people who end up in the bankruptcy court because for years they have kept on smiling while the bills piled up unopened.

Last Fall, reality caught up in the shape of the worst banking crisis in history, and we have now had to mortgage our earnings for decades to come in order to bail out the banks. Not surprisingly, by mid-March this year, the Dow had fallen by well over 50 percent from its peak level at the start of October 2007, and the FTSE by nearly as much. In the last three months, however, the FTSE has risen by 20 percent and the Dow by nearly 30 percent. What has happened to justify the recovery?

The best that can be said is that there have been signs that the economic situation is deteriorating more slowly than in the second half of last year.

For example, the fall in house prices may be slowing. But in both UK and the U.S., they remain a long way above their long run levels by most yardsticks. Moreover, in the early 1990s, after the last British house price bubble popped, it took almost a decade for prices to recover, against a background of far higher inflation and a much more robust economy than today – and of course without an accompanying banking collapse.

Insofar as the construction industry is concerned, any increase in demand from the residential sector is likely to be overshadowed by continuing weakness in commercial real estate and, in the UK particularly, brutal cuts in public sector capital expenditure.

For the foreseeable future, the UK and U.S. governments, households and much of the corporate sector will be forced by record levels of debt to rein in their spending. Long term bond yields are already above 4 percent. Insuring against the risk of default costs 39 basis points for U.S. government debt, 80 points for UK gilts, and 300 or 400 points for a number of major multinationals, which clearly indicates that some financial markets have few illusions about the future.

Pricing equities usually involves a comparison of historic dividend yields with long term interest rates. Unfortunately, in crisis conditions, past levels of earnings (and hence of dividends) are no guide to the future. As government and consumers begin to repay their debts, they will both have to cut spending, or at least prevent it growing at anything like the rate seen in the last few years.

Ideally, the slack would be taken up by export demand. But with world trade in the doldrums, it is hard to imagine the UK and U.S. can export their way out of recession.

I can only visualise two possible exits from this impasse. Either the future involves years of Japan-style deflation, high unemployment and stagnant output. More likely, Anglo-Saxon electorates will opt for monetary expansion, inflation and devaluation, implying a de facto default – which is exactly the outcome being priced by the CDS insurance premia mentioned earlier.

Neither scenario is attractive for equity markets. Add to all this the danger of another round in the banking crisis (possibly involving the European banks), thinly-veiled threats from China to dump their dollars, long term problems which have not gone away, like global warming, pensions and health care……if the market was on Prozac last time, it must be on Ecstasy now.

So what should investors do? My own choice would be a mix of two components:

1. Corporate debt and/or equity of low-leverage companies in “safe” industries: pharmaceuticals and healthcare, food processors, utilities, etc.

2. Conventional and index-linked gilts in pounds, dollars and euros.

Of course, if you think governments are going to default on their debts, rather than inflate them away over the next decade or two, you need to buy gold……and a gun might be useful too.

- Laurence Copeland is a professor of finance at Cardiff University Business School. The opinions expressed are his own. -

Is the crisis over yet?

In the last 3 months, the Dow and the FTSE have each risen by about 25 percent, the Standard & Poor’s 500 by a third. House prices appear to be stabilising in the UK. Stress-tested and backed by seemingly unlimited government funding, the banks are lending again (if only to each other), so that 1-month libor is down to only 0.3 percent.

In the Far East, the Chinese economy may be growing again, and even Japan may have pulled out of its nosedive. The oil price has recovered from its lows.

Is there any reason to doubt that the worst is past?

No reason whatever, except the following (in ascending order of gravity):

1. As unemployment increases, defaults on credit card debt are certain to rise, reducing the banks’ ability and willingness to lend to consumers.

2. Even if the residential property market has stabilised, commercial property prices appear to be in free fall, leading to further contraction in the construction sector, more bad debts and knock-on effects on employment and investment in the broader economy.

3. The consensus view is that bank stress tests, in the U.S. at least, were based on optimistic assumptions about the depth and duration of the real estate slump.

4. In order to spare U.S. and UK taxpayers, the bailout burden has been piled on to the bond markets, which have so far proved willing to finance the massive increase in the national debt of the two countries at a cost of only 3.75 percent on 10-year Government debt in UK and 3.5 percent in U.S., which is remarkable considering that both countries appear to be heading for a debt-to-GDP ratio of 100 percent or more.

However, in addition to the recent threat by S&P to downgrade UK gilts, the spread on credit default swaps is an even clearer warning: it costs 86 b.p. to insure against a British government default, and 44 b.p. for the U.S. (compared to only about 40 b.p. for France, Germany or Japan). Outright default by Britain or the U.S. is, in my view, highly improbable.

By far the most likely outcome in the medium term is inflation, or default by stealth. This is how Britain paid the bill for World War Two and the U.S. for Vietnam. So far, however, the bond markets appear to trust the politicians to come up with a plan to pay off these debts. But they will not wait forever.

At some point, they could well take fright and try to dump UK or U.S. government debt, forcing yields up to cripplingly high levels, with disastrous consequences for the real economy.

5. Who are these bondholders anyway? A significant proportion are institutions or governments of countries which, unlike Britain and the U.S., save rather than consume, and hence have balance of payments surpluses, notably the Gulf States, Japan and, most important, China. How long will their patience last? They are locked into their massive accumulation of dollar assets, unable to exit without realising enormous capital losses. But if they decide to stop throwing good money after bad, the outcome could be a dramatic rise in interest rates and a calamitous fall in the value of the Dollar, a final convulsion in this long devastating crisis.

None of these disasters is inevitable. But if you think the worst is over, ask yourself: why is the price of gold - traditionally seen as a safe haven in times of economic turmoil - rising again?