The Great Debate UK
from The Great Debate:
Should economists be “imagineers” of our future?
By Mark Thoma The opinions expressed are his own.
This essay is a response to Roger Martin's "The limits of the scientific method in economics and the world" (part one and part two), recently published on Retuers.com.
Roger Martin is unhappy with the state of economics. One charge is that:
[an economist] predicts a future that is based on the past. And when it is anything but, he returns to the same tools to do it again, believing that in doing so he is being meritoriously scientific. ... Extrapolating the future to be a straight-line projection of the past is neither accurate, nor is it helpful in creating better understanding and newer ideas.
As I will discuss further below, I agree that macroeconomists need to fix their models. But I don't think that predicting the future based upon "a straight-line projection of the past" is the problem. Let me explain why, first in a relatively narrow sense, and then more broadly.
This year's Nobel prize award to Thomas Sargent and the previous award to Robert Lucas were partly in recognition of their development of the tools and techniques that economists need to go beyond simply trying to extrapolate the future from the past, a procedure that can lead forecasters astray.
Prior to Robert Lucas, economists analyzing policy interventions by monetary or fiscal authorities did exactly as charged above, they extrapolated based upon the past and an assumed unchanging future. But the (often false) assumption that the future would be like the past is at the heart of what is known as the Lucas critique.
from MacroScope:
Give me liberty and give me cash!
Come back Mr Fukuyama, all is forgiven.
In his 1992 book "The End of History and the Last Man", American political scientist Francis Fukuyama famously argued that all states were moving inexorably towards liberal democracy. His thesis that democracy is the pinnacle of political evolution has since been challenged by the violent eruption of radical Islam as well as the economic success of authoritarian countries such as China and Russia.
Now a study by Russian investment bank Renaissance Capital into the link between economic wealth and democracy seems to back Fukuyama.
Looking at 150 countries and over 60 years of history, RenCap found that countries are likely to become more democratic as they enjoyed rising levels of income with democracy virtually 'immortal' in countries with a GDP per capita above $10,000.
" Only five democracies above the $6,000 income level have died. Even democracies above the $6,000 level have a 99 percent chance of sustaining their political system each year. The only exceptions were the military coups in Greece in 1967 ($9,800), Argentina in 1976 ($8,180) and Thailand in 2006 ($7,440), and the events in Venezuela in 2009 ($9,115), as well as Iran in 2004 ($8,475)," RenCap global chief economist Charles Robertson writes.
The $6,000 per capita GDP seems to be a crucial level, marking the point where a country is likely to shift to democracy. Tunisia, which early this year triggered the wave of uprisings against autocracy across the Arab world, recently crossed that threshold.
Conversely, democracy is most fragile at the lowest income levels and when incomes are shrinking. The world's populous democracy, India, is a notable exception as its per capita income was under $800 from 1950-1967, and only exceeded $2,000 in 2003.
from MacroScope:
The iPod – the iCon of Chinese capitalism
Walking past Apple's sleek shop along London's Regent Street on Sunday, my wife asked me what I wanted for Father's Day.
"An iPad?" I ventured, half-jokingly.
"Are you sure you want one? Don't you care how they're made?" came her disapproving reply.
She was, of course, referring to the rash of suicides among Chinese workers at Foxconn, the Taiwanese manufacturer of Apple's much desired iPads and iPhones.
The deaths prompted the company to raise salaries and cut working hours but lingering concerns over conditions for its over 1 million workers in China were underscored by a plant explosion last month that killed at least 3 people.
Workers like those who live and work in Foxconn's sprawling Chinese facilities have long been the backbone of the country's vast manufacturing sector which churns out a torrent of consumer goods for export.
But the recent labour unrest that has erupted in parts of China suggests that this low-cost export-fuelled growth model may be wheezing towards its expiry date.
Thank you for your comment.
Apple is working with Foxconn to prevent more worker suicides, including auditing the Chinese plants of its supplier to ensure conditions comply with its standards.
The point of my blog is that the iPod is an interesting prism through which to view China’ economy and gauge its shift in emphasis from manufacturing and exports to domestic consumption.
At first glance, the iPod encapsulates China’s manufacturing prowess. It is able to assemble very sophisticated products at a cost that is low enough to attract global companies. So much so that these Made-in-China iPods and iPad contribute to the trade surplus in China’s favour against the U.S.
But a closer examination of the iPod story also reveals the limitations of the Chinese model. The country remains far behind in innovation and doesn’t own the intellectual property behind many of the products it exports.
A University of California study, for instance, found that the iPod accounted for almost 41,000 jobs worldwide in 2006, of which only 30 jobs were in manufacturing in the US.
But more than two thirds of all the wages paid to workers in the iPod value chain were estimated to have been paid to US workers.
from MacroScope:
Building BRICs in Africa
Some eye-catching numbers from Standard Bank out today on the influence of BRICs countries -- Brazil, Russia, India and China -- on Africa.
First off, the bank says the global recession and its recovery have been nourishing these so-called South-South ties. But it is all now ready to take off. The bank estimates:
-- By 2015, BRIC-Africa trade will have incresed threefold, to $530 billion from $150 billion this year.
-- BRICs share of Africa's total trade will increase from one-fifth today to one-third in the next five years.
-- BRICS foreign direct investment stock in Africa will swell to more than $150 billion from around $60 billion today.
Standard Bank bases these assertions partly on estimates for BRICs growth over the next five years -- eg, domestic output, global output and a doubling of BRICs trade with the world in general. But it also sees Africa growing rapidly -- for example, a per capita real annual growth rate of 5.7 percent between now and 2015, and a doubling of private consumption in Africa's 10 largest economies. And it adds:
Crucially, a host of global-minded corporates is emerging from the BRICs. In 2010 231 (11.5 percent of the total) companies listed in the Forbes Global 2000 originated in the BRICs, up from only 83 companies (4 percent) in 2005. Recent trends are a harbinger of deeper potential.
from MacroScope:
The IMF to turn on the rich
The latest International Monetary Fund meeting ended with emerging market powers getting a pledge from the organisation for stronger and "more even-handed" scrutiny of what is going on in large advanced economies.
As Reuters correspondents Lesley Wroughton and Emily Kaiser report here, the decision is a response to long-running frustrations among emerging economies, which reckon the Fund has not been tough enough on its biggest shareholders, led by the United States.
The move reflects a number of things. First, it shows the growing clout of emerging economies within international institutions. The G-20, for example, is arguably now more influential than the old , richer G7. Secondly, it graphically underlines the current world-turned-upside-down state of the global economy, in which profligate rich economies are struggling to keep above water while supposedly poorer and less-developed ones enjoy solid growth and relatively stable finances. This graph makes the point:
One question that has been raised, meanwhile, is whether the IMF is capable of taking rich countries -- its primary paymasters -- to task. A comment from a craigbhill on the Reuters story encapsulates the issue:
This is like the bankers to the Mafia being politely asked to "give scrutiny" to the Mafia.
A bit harsh. But valid?
from MacroScope:
Who will win this year’s Nobel Prize for Economics?
And the Nobel laureate for economics in 2010 is?
Thomson Reuters expert David Pendlebury might have an idea. At least one of the picks from his annual predictions of winners (economics, chemisty, and so on) has won a Nobel prize over the years. Here is his short-list for economics this year.
* Alberto Alesina of Harvard University in Massachusetts for research on the relationship between politics and macroeconomics, especially politico-economic cycles.
* Nobuhiro Kiyotaki of Princeton University and John Moore of Britain's University of Edinburgh and the London School of Economics for their Kiyotaki-Moore model, which describes how small shocks to an economy may lead to a cycle of lower output. It described Japan's real-estate crisis in the 1990s and could describe some of the causes of the recent U.S. recession.
* Kevin Murphy of the University of Chicago for research in social economics, including wage inequality and labor demand, unemployment, and how medical research pays off.
But what are your views? Who do you think deserves the prize for 2010 on October 11?
from MacroScope:
Investment week: Punch drunk and hard to startle
This week’s rehashing of European banking concerns – related variously to the Basel III impact on German banks, the ongoing morass re Anglo Irish Bank or any other scare story you want to exhume -- provided the latest excuse for a global markets wobble as September kicked off. Yet, with some justified head-scratching over what really was new to the world this week as opposed to last week, price moves showed little conviction. Most losses were quickly recouped and decibel level of the commentariat, still frantically competing to warn you of the next disaster, toned down.
The world’s major sovereigns and banks have big financial problems, no doubt, and Europe more than its fair share. The rescues of the Spring did not provide a silver bullet and genuine repair will likely take a painfully-long time. But we’ve also had a lot of time to adequately discount these risks and the marketplace at large is already positioned extremely cautiously. That's why the idea of sudden, blind panic on these long-running sagas seems just a little OTT – especially against a relatively stable, if bruised, economic backdrop. The bigger issue many investors are grappling with is the growing difficulty in making money in a hyper-cautious, low-growth environment. Ask Stanley Druckenmiller. If he threw in the towel because money-making conditions are just lousy, then you can be sure others see the same. Anecdotally at least, pressurised hedge funds – who faced rising redemptions through the summer – are ultra-cautious about open positions and seem quick to cut and run on even the slightest gain, long or short. (A bit like continually shouting 'bank!' on reaching £100 pounds on The Weakest Link!) Big institutional funds, meantime, are sufficiently uncertain about the market and economic direction that many are already keen to lock down for the remainder of the year and are hugging benchmarks to preserve whatever capital they have without resorting to zero-yielding cash or barely-more-attractive TBonds. U.S. midterms in November only add the caution. In short, it will take a pretty major positive or negative surprise to truly set these markets alight and there is every chance we won’t get a decisive one for some time. We already have historically high vol and caution – but relative steady, unspectacular conditions for all that. The smart money may simply be tempted to buy or sell any hysterical extremes. Is may even be possible that some are tempted to foster a long-absent patience gene?
As to next week? There's welter of new economic data to maybe add some flavour. The biggest potential movers are August China production and investment stats (now, oddly, being released Saturday rather than Monday) and then US retail sales, Philly Fed and German ZEW indices later in the week. On the issue du jour re European banks/sovereigns, an informal EU summit on Thursday provides the main set-piece – but BIS central bankers meeting in Basel this weekend and Spanish and Italian debt auctions next week may add their own spice.
The Japanese yen intervention theme will likely rumble, with the Japanese Democrats leadership poll and BOJ Tankan playing a part. China will also likely find renewed political heat stateside, as the US election campaign adds an edge to a congressional hearing on China’s FX policy on Wednesday as well as the monthly Treasury/TIC flow data. All the above have their own ability to surprise -- but few seem game changers in themselves.
from MacroScope:
What are the risks to growth?
Mike Dicks, chief economist and blogger at Barclays Wealth, has identified what he sees as the three biggest problems facing the global economy, and conveniently found that they are linked with three separate regions.
First, there is the risk that U.S., t consumers won't increase spending. Dicks notes that the increase in U.S. consumption has been "extremely moderate" and far less than after previous recessions. His firm has lowered is U.S. GDP forecast for 2011 to 2.7 percent from a bit over 3 percent.
Next comes the euro zone. While the wealth manager is not looking for any immediate collapse in EMU, Dicks reckons that without the ability to devalue, Greece and other struggling countries won't see any great improvement in competitiveness. Germany, in the meantime, has sped up plans to cut its own deficit. It leaves the Barclays Wealth's euro zone GDP forecast at just 1 percent for next year.
Finally, Asian growth is under threat from tightening policies. Dicks says this is the least problem of the three, but there are indications that powerhouse China needs a period of slower growth to get things under control.
So, there are three problems -- and a not very bright outlook. Are there any others? Or are these three all being overstated?
from Global Investing:
What fund managers think
Bank of America-Merrill Lynch's monthly poll of around 200 fund managers had a few nuggets in the June version, aside from the usual mood-taking.
Gold is too expensive. A net 27 percent of respondent thought it overvalued, up from 13 percent in May. Then again, the respondents to this poll have reckoned gold is too pricey since September 2009.
The fall in the euro should be tailing off. A net 14 percent reckon the single currency is still overvalued, but that is way down from the net 45 percent who thought so in the May poll.
BP is good for pharma. The net percentage of fund managers who remain overweight in energy stocks plunged to 7 percent in June from 37 percent in May as oil has continued to spill into the Gulf of Mexico. The stock beneficiaries have been "dividend friendly" utilities, telecoms and pharmaceuticals.
China's growth is slowing. A net 27 percent of investors reckoned China's economy will weaken from where it is now over the next 12 months. That probably has mixed blessings given that investors both are expecting China to pull the world along the course of recovery and are worried about its economy overheating.
Overall, the poll showed fund managers to be cautious about the world economy but not giving up on riskier assets.
from MacroScope:
Political economy and the euro
The reality of 'political economy' is something that irritates many economists -- the "purists", if you like. The political element is impossible to model; it often flies in the face of textbook economics; and democratic decision-making and backroom horse trading can be notoriously difficult to predict and painfully slow. And political economy is all pervasive in 2010 -- Barack Obama's proposals to rein in the banks is rooted in public outrage; reading China's monetary and currency policies is like Kremlinology; capital curbs being introduced in Brazil and elsewhere aim to prevent market overshoot; and British budgetary policies are becoming the political football ahead of this spring's UK election. The list is long, the outcomes uncertain, the market risk high.
But nowhere is this more apparent than in well-worn arguments over the validity and future of Europe's single currency -- the new milennium's posterchild for political economy.
For many, the euro simply should never have happened -- it thumbed a nose at the belief that all things good come from free financial markets; it removed monetary safety valves for member countries out of sync with their bigger neighbours and put the cart before the horse with monetary union ahead of fiscal policy integration. But the sheer political determination to finish the European's single market project, stop beggar-thy-neighbour currency devaluations and face down erratic currency trading meant the currency was born and has thrived for 11 years.
Now the budgetary and bond market upheaval currently afflicting euro member Greece and stalking Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy has reawakened the whole debate. "Will the euro survive?" seems a legitimate question once again.
Apart from financial analysts, Paul Krugman seems to have made his peace with the euro's existence but he still reckons it was a bad idea. Eric Maskin thinks financial markets are right to question the future of the single currency. And much is being made once again of Milton Friedman -- high priest of 20th century monetarism -- having reportedly said in 1998 that the euro would not survive the zone's first serious economic downturn.
But having an opinion about the euro is not the same as knowing whether it is going to survive. And this is what most annoys those who have money at stake. Plugging in a new set of variables into complex econometric equations is probably not going to get any of these experts closer what happens next. Hanging around the corridors of power in Brussels, Frankfurt, Berlin or Paris is likely to prove more fruitful.
In the 1990s, many financial strategists in London, Manhattan and elsewhere often confused what they thought should happen with what was likely to happen and got the call wrong on one of the most far-reaching monetary events of the century.
I think this economist “gets it”.
Human beings are incredibly inventive and hard to predict in terms of what they will do when threatened. In fact nothing will ever predict every possibility, but trends will emerge over time as hindsight studies what happens even as we proceed forward with every tick of the clock into the unknown.
No one can be faulted for not “seeing” the results of every-rising wage expectations and the globalization of commerce, where countless millions of third-world workers suddenly became available as an alternative to American and European manufacturers. The economics of automation is an increasing factor affecting what unskilled, repetitive labor will be “worth” in the long term.
Just as in the “Industrial Revolution” lives and entire societies are being changed, like it or not. There is always good and bad in change, and when the “good” benefits the affluent and is adverse to those on the bottom of the economic pile there is societal challenge.
But what is “bad” for the American “middle class” has been good for ordinary citizens of Europe, Japan, and the advancing societies of Asia. Everything is relative, depending on who’s ox is being gored ;