America’s long search for Mr. Right
Whatâs wrong with central casting? Itâs a virtual truism: The United States always seems to pick the wrong guy to star as George Washington in some faraway civil war. We sell him weapons for self-defense against his despicable foes — and then, sometimes before the end of the first battle, we find we are committed to a bad actor who bears an uncanny resemblance to Genghis Khan.
President Barack Obama just approved the sale of 24 Apache helicopters to the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki — despite well-founded concerns that Maliki may use them against people we do like as well as those we donât.
Helicopters arenât the only munitions on Malikiâs shopping list. Washington has negotiated the sale of 480 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, along with reconnaissance drones and F-16 fighter jets.
To hear Maliki tell it, he needs these weapons to stop terrorists from destroying his democratically-elected government. To hear his opponents, the divisive Maliki creates his own problems by hounding legitimate rivals, favoring Shiâites over Sunnis and fueling sectarian grudges. To hear Obama, Maliki is Americaâs only option: Support him, or see Iraq spiral into civil war.
All three scenarios are correct. They almost always are.
Desperate leaders of unstable countries are problematic partners. Theyâre controversial with their own people. Backing them typically involves deep moral compromises. And, boy, weâve picked some doozies in the past: from Vietnamâs Ngo Dinh Diem, to Taiwanâs Chiang Kai-shek (and the notorious Madame Chiang Kai-shek), to Haitiâs Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to Iranâs Reza Shah Pahlavi, to Afghanistanâs Hamid Karzai.
Yet the problem is not about picking well. Itâs about picking at all. The United States needs to get out of that business.
Holding a nation-state together is hard work. When economies or political systems fail, itâs best if local people know their own choices are to blame — not someone elseâs — and that itâs on their shoulders to find a solution. No matter how long that takes.
Otherwise, moral hazard is the result. A local leader with the sponsorship of a world power has less reason to compromise with domestic rivals, and possesses a perfect scapegoat when things donât work out.
This may sound callous and irresponsible. Isnât it Americaâs duty to stop the shedding of innocent blood when we can? Shouldnât the United States make every effort to staunch conflict in places like Iraq and Syria? Isnât stability in Washingtonâs interest?
Not necessarily. History is instructive here. Not every civil war can be prevented. In our own, President Abraham Lincoln rejected mediation by Britain, which was unable to stop killing that eventually took 700,000 lives. Or consider what happened the one time a foreign power tried to jimmy Americaâs electoral process. It backfired spectacularly. The sitting government became more reactionary and the opposition more extremist. Relations with the meddling foreign power worsened.
In 1796, revolutionary France became convinced that the weakling American republic had been captured by vested interests poised to sell out democracy and reinstate monarchy. The French heard this from disgruntled Americans who called their political rivals âAnglomenâ and âmonocrats.â
French diplomats did their best to subvert President George Washingtonâs foreign policy. When that didnât work, they decided that Americans ought to elect âgoodâ Thomas Jefferson, deeply tied to France, over âbadâ John Adams.
Certain that Americans would welcome intervention by a revolutionary big brother, the French did all they could to influence the vote. They even threatened war if Americans followed the path of perdition and chose Adams.
Adams, thin-skinned to start with, was not amused. When he defeated Jefferson in a close election, he built new warships, raised an army and passed the most tyrannical anti-foreign, anti-free speech laws in American history: the Alien and Sedition Acts.
Jefferson claimed that the federal government had forged a ârod of ironâ over the states, which ought not to submit. He and James Madison secretly wrote the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, proposing that states annul federal law. The new nation confronted the possibility of dissolution. Well-meaning French intervention in the name of global republicanism shook the American republic.
So, throughout the 19th century, the United States adhered to George Washingtonâs long-standing âGreat Ruleâ to have âas little political connection as possibleâ with foreign countries. This policy continued under presidents of both parties.
In 1947, however, President Harry S. Truman proposed a drastic modification. Non-entanglement was no longer safe, he believed. The United States must âsupport free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.â
At the time, Nazi Germany was newly defeated, and the Soviet Union had all of Eastern Europe under its thumb. The stakes during the Cold War seemed incredibly high. West European countries might be overwhelmed, as they had been in 1940. Their former colonies might ally with Russia against the âracist, capitalist West.â And so, for seven decades, Washington played the Cold War game of shoring up deficient governments vulnerable to collapse.
The policy mostly succeeded. But the collateral damage lives on in anti-Americanism. Resentments linger that the United States picked the wrong side in numerous domestic conflicts. Even in Greece, where the Truman Doctrine began, some leftist critics still demonize the U.S. for appointing âstooges,â enslaving the nation, and ânot allowing Greece to become a Soviet satellite in the 1940s,â according to Evanthis Hatzivassiliou of the University of Athens.
The Cold War is now long over. Middle East terrorists may bedevil Western governments, but are not poised to take them over. The global community is more firmly united on the sanctity of international borders than in all preceding history. The United States took the lead in building a stable world order — which has materialized.
Now is the time to consider the best course for the next 70 years.
The cardinal principle of the system of nation-states since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia is that sovereign countries must not intervene in one anotherâs internal affairs. This principle is often observed in the breach, but it is the oldest, most stable dictum of international relations. Itâs based on the idea that minding oneâs own business is usually safer, and sometimes more virtuous, than being oneâs brotherâs keeper.
Obamaâs decision to arm the Iraqi government against its multifarious opponents continues the Truman Doctrine, which violates the Westphalian principle.
The Truman Doctrineâs inherent liabilities now outweigh its once undeniable benefits. The chance of Washington — or any outside government — sorting out the Byzantine Middle East is zero to none. Outsiders cannot pick the ârightâ leader in complex internal disputes.
Many now insist that Malikiâs enemies are our enemies. Americaâs hubristic policy ensures that they will become so. Iraqis can best save Iraq.
PHOTO (TOP): Secretary of State John Kerry (R) meets with Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Baghdad March 24, 2013. REUTERS/Jason Reed
PHOTO (INSERT 1): First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt (L) and Madame Chiang Kai-Shek on the White House lawn, February 24, 1943. Courtesy of LIBRARY OF CONGRESS/Office of War Information.
PHOTO (INSERT 2): President John Adams in painting by Asher B. Durand. Courtesy of U.S. Navy
PHOTO (INSERT 3): Mohammad RezÄ ShÄh PahlavÄ« in 1973. WIKIPEDIA/Commons